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ABSTRACT 
This research is about two modes of built environment production that coexist in the 
contemporary Arab Muslim world. It argues that the contemporary (acquired modern-capitalist) 
mode is based on the concept of power; however, the traditional Islamic (inherited) mode is 
based on the concept of rights as derived from shari `a (Islamic legal system). Substantial 
dissensions exist between the two modes, due to differences in their concepts of power and 
related mechanisms. This research helps to explain many concepts concerning "the structure of 
power" in contemporary societies and "the structures of rights" in traditional Muslim societies, 
and their respective impact on the built environment. 
This thesis argues that most urban studies dealing with Muslim cities stem from Western 
concepts delineated by thinkers such as Weber, Marx, and Durkheim. Such concepts shaped the 
thinking of Orientalists and many Muslim scholars in studying Muslim environments, leading to 
confused conclusions. They have all ignored the exact meaning of power, its sources and its 
utilisation as a resource in manipulating the built environment. For example, one of the basic 
differences between contemporary (acquired) and traditional (inherited) environments is that 
rights (property and individual rights) in contemporary environments are defined by power 
holders (the state) in society, i. e. power creates rights. On the other hand, in the Muslim built 
environment, power is limited by rights, or power is created by rights which is quite static as it 
is well defined by the Islamic legal system. This simple difference, (power of rights or rights of 
power) has created two different structures of power gain: one is static (Muslim built 
environments) and the other is dynamic (contemporary built environments). The static structure 
(or power of rights) has created diverse environmental solutions, as power can only be utilised 
when environmental interventions are activated by inhabitants, while the dynamic structure 
(rights of power), because of its hierarchical nature of domination among parties, has created 
classes of intervening agents with expandable power and thus subjective solutions. Through 
comparisons, using case studies (examples), this research examines and comments on the nature 
of both systems of power to clarify their impact on the built environment. 
Accordingly, this thesis argues, the coexistence of the two modes, loaded with such substantial 
dissensions in one system (contemporary Muslim world), inevitably leads to internal systemic 
contradictions, and thus to a crisis. Therefore, the crisis that contemporary Muslim built 
environments are witnessing today is but one aspect of this broader societal and systemic crisis. 
This thesis investigates the genesis of this crisis in the contemporary built environment by 
focusing on the imperceptible level of the coexistence of those two modes, and mainly the issue 
of power: the main components of the crisis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
GENERAL SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
Contemporary societies in the so-called Third World countries live today in a 
state of contradiction. Advantages of capitalism are seen as paramount; 
however, the blights of contemporary societies are obvious. Environmental 
pollution is evident in diseases. Unemployment has become a significant 
economic indicator. War arising from ethnic origin is spreading over these 
DILEMMAS 
countries. The gap between the rich and the poor is getting larger. Available 
resources have become scarce. Land is available; however, it is not affordable. 
Unutilized yet infrastructured land can be seen everywhere. Housing shortage 
is on the rise, although unoccupied units are available. Homelessness has 
become a common phenomenon. Squatter settlements are spreading with 
unacceptable living conditions. People live in cemetery grounds among the 
dead in some countries (e. g. Egypt). Why are such phenomena so persistent? 
This question has preoccupied many scholars. It is the nature of the human 
intellect to seek progress by constantly challenging the contemporary status 
quo and philosophy of life. Thus, scholars are changing paradigms searching 
for solutions, experiencing one paradigm and then moving to another. The 
search continues. Most of these paradigms emanate from and operate within 
the framework of the underlying dominant system of capitalism. But are these 
contradictions a product of capitalism? Is it capitalism as a mode of society- 
making that should be blamed? 
If history, as claimed (Fukuyama, 1989,1992), has an end, and if capitalism is 
IS THERE accepted as the only conceivable mode of society-making, the human race is 
AN then confined, depriving itself of the chance of progress. We have to search for 
ALTERNATIVE? 
solutions through liberating ourselves from the confinement of the existing 
system, whether it is capitalism or otherwise. We have to learn from other 
modes of society-making, searching for alternatives, or at least to view and 
criticize capitalism through other societies' and cultures' wisdom. 
This study thus attempts to challenge the status-quo of contemporary societies 
ATMs generally, and of Arab Muslim societies, particularly. Since capitalism today is 
accepted as the dominant mode of production, urban studies that question the 
capitalist methods of generating the built environment are quite limited. Most 
studies (e. g. critical studies) accept capitalism unquestioningly, or aim at 
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correcting its path, however trivially, but do not suggest a different systemic 
alternative. A fish can never see a tree on a mountain. We need a fresh vision, 
which is indeed, if not impossible, at least beyond one's life span. However, 
seeking help from other non-capitalist societies, dogmas, or cultures might 
generate a different perspective. This study, through analyzing the production 
process of Muslim built environments, criticizes the modern-capitalist mode of 
society-making, i. e. the prime mode of understanding and generating 
environments in the so-called Third World countries. 
SPECIFIC SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
Looking at most Arab Muslim cities, such as Damascus, Cairo, or Tunis, one 
can distinguish two different patterns or structures of the built environment or, 
put more simply, two different parts of the city: the traditional and the modem 
parts. It is common in urban studies to divide cities in the Arab Muslim region 
THE since the start of colonial period (the nineteenth century) into two groups: the 
MODERN modern and the traditional. Up to today, this dichotomy continues to provide 
VS. 
THE an analytical framework for many studies, especially in the fields of 
TRADITIONAL architecture and urban history. According to Hamadeh in her study of the 
traditional city in North Africa, the notion of the "traditional city" was a 
creation of colonialism. That is, in the "colonies", it was through the 
construction of the centered authority of the so-called "modern city" that the 
indigenous settlement came to be called the "traditional city" (Hamadeh, 1992, 
p. 241). Today this notion is unquestionally accepted and taken for granted. 
To talk of the traditional city is to suggest a distinct structure of the city. This 
can only be defined and understood in relation to the "non-traditional city". 
Unlike the notion of the " old city", which attaches an absolute age value to it, 
that of the traditional city is a relative concept which only gains legitimacy by 
reference to something else, and which can only be assigned to a city from 
without. It was, as Hamadeh argues, "but one ideological construct within a 
broader European image of so-called " Oriental" societies. This image served ... 
to promote ... the 
idea of an exotic, static and disorderly people in contrast to 
advanced and normalized European society" (p. 241-2). In other words, the 
former concept, "old city" (qadim), constitutes the city as a product of time, 
whereas the latter concept, "tradition", constitutes it as a product of ideology. 
Similarly, it can be argued that the concept of "tradition, or turath"', as used in 
most contemporary Arabic discourses, is a contemporary invention. 
"Turath" literary denotes heritage, however, it has been translated in contemporary discourses into 
tradition. Tradition, when used today as an attribute of cities (traditional city, or al-madina at- 
taqlidiyya) denotes that city which was produced according to the traditional customs and conventions 
(taqalid), while tradition as used in the contemporary discourse (turath) denotes an ideology. 
INTRODUCTION 3 
"Tradition" can be defined according to contemporary discourse as all that is handed 
down (i. e. inherited) from past generations to the present and holds an unusual value 
THE for the group or society which belongs to that tradition (Seligman et. al., 1935, p. 62-7; 
CONCEPT 
OF Outhwaite et. al., 1994, p. 676), (i. e. practices, beliefs, as well as the epistemical, 
"TRADITION" ideological, cultural, social, religious heritage and the like). Therefore, tradition 
forms a continuation between past and present, and bridges the gaps between 
generations (al-Jabiri, 1991, p. 23-4). Furthermore, the concept of tradition today, as 
used in most contemporary Arabic discourses, embodies an ideological and 
sentimental content. It can function as an ideology in uniting a certain group, which 
thus constructs an identity centered around it (Seligman et. al., 1935, p. 65). Defined in 
that sense, the word "tradition - or turath" Z has rarely existed in the Arabic literature 
or Islamic jurisprudence in history before the nineteenth century (al-Jabiri, 1991, 
p. 22), i. e. before the colonial period. However, its grammatical roots ('firth, Wirth, 
mirath) have been used to denote material inheritance? In short, the later 
(contemporary) concept of "tradition" is a product of ideology, whereas the prior 
term (old or qadim) is a product of time. 
Based on this distinction, in the Arab Muslim world today the dichotomy of modem 
vs. tradition takes another shape. In the colonial period it was an imposed' 
dichotomy that reflected a distinction which enhanced the image of the colonizer in 
contrast to that of the colonized. Today this dichotomy is a result of the invasion of 
modernity into the Muslim world, which some view as another type of Western 
hegemony, while others view it as progress and advancement. This dichotomy 
implies an optional process, in which it is possible to choose between one of the two 
poles. This latter dichotomy reflects a state of perplexity in the search for a stand to 
be adopted that suits the contemporary Muslim world. ' It poses questions such as: 
should Muslims refer to their tradition or should they accept modern conditions and 
CRISIS their technical advancements and values? Should Muslim societies look to the past or 
forward to the future? This can be considered as a crisis that dominates most 
disciplines in the Muslim world. It is viewed by a prominent Arab thinker (al-Jabiri) 
as a fundamental crisis that touches the Muslim culture at its roots (1991; 1994). It is 
2 According to Ibn Manzur in Lisan al-Arab, "turath" is a derivative of " 'irth" (root: waratha) which 
denotes the inheritance. 
3 For example, the English "traditional city" or French "ville traditionelle" has no equivalent in 
Arabic, and such a concept was usually referred to as the old city - al-madina al-qadima. 
It is described here as an "imposed" dichotomy because one of its poles, the modem, was imposed by 
the colonizers. 
Tradition, in the latter dichotomy, as used in most contemporary Arabic discourses, is confined to the 
Islamic tradition. That is, Islamic traditions constitute those traditions that were established by Islam 
and some of those traditions that were passed to it from other civilizations and cultures and accepted 
by Islam. Therefore, there is no one single Islamic tradition for all Muslim societies, but there are 
Islamic traditions that vary regionally. 
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a crisis of a sense of retardation in the contemporary Arab world civilization, 
in comparison to the civilization of the advanced Western world. 
This crisis is quite clear in the fields of architecture, planning and urban studies, 
starting with the questioning of modernity (e. g. the International Style in 
architecture) and its impacts on the built environment that dissolved the unique 
character of cities. It is reflected in questions that, lately, have been widely 
raised by different scholars: How should Muslim cities be formed in the 
contemporary age? How should Muslim architecture be today? How can 
Muslims achieve an Islamic architecture that could fulfil contemporary needs, 
yet be in the spirit of Islam? How can Muslims today restore their identity? 
How can traditional cultures be maintained or revived within modern 
technology? What type of skills should local professionals have compared to 
Western professionals? 
Since the nineteenth century, stemming from the West's sense of" superiority", 
and as part of its self-mission towards the "Other" less civilized societies, 
waves of modernization processes were carried out in the Arab Muslim world 
(al-Jabiri, 1996, p. 22). However, as modernity is the product of the West, and 
as capitalism is also the product of the West, this led to the notion that to 
modernize or to "capitalize" is to Westernize, i. e. to import Western modes of 
life with all its values. Therefore, these three interrelated conditions 
(capitalism, Westernization and modernity), conceived as parts of a one single 
concept, came to dominate the Arab Muslim world. As a result, changes 
occurred in all aspects of life: social, political, economic, and above all cultural. 
These new changes required new ways of representation, which was/is clearly 
manifested in the built environment. It is a manifestation that embodies a THE 
ACQUIRED struggle between what is "acquired" from the West under the notions of 
AND modernization and progress and what is "inherited" from the past and 
THE 
INHERITED constitutes Muslim tradition. As a result of this acquired/inherited dualism, 
contemporary built environments in the Muslim World became a stage for 
contradictions; contradictions that dissolve any sense of identity. They live a 
crisis of contradictory environmental ideologies. Thus, as this thesis argues, 
Muslims either have to change their faith, or capitalism has to be adjusted if not 
abandoned; otherwise, contradiction will continue, with dire consequences. 
Different ideological attitudes were adopted as a response to this crisis, 
IDEOLOGICAL resulting in many books and articles on the theme of "Tradition or modernity? " 
RESPONSES 
or "Authenticity or contemporaneity? " In answering such questions and aiming 
at disembarrassing the Muslim world from retardation and achieving prosperity 
and progress in all aspects of life, three main attitudes could be distinguished. 
The first is the ancestral attitude which believes in the authority of tradition to 
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guide both present and future. Advocates of this attitude retreat from the 
problematic situation of the present to the past, and ignore that in so doing they 
are accepting the modem concept of traditionalism. This position by its very 
nature does not allow for innovation and change, and therefore can only 
produce traditionalism (al-Hathloul, 1996, p. 10). The second attitude is that of 
the progressionists. They neither accept the past's authority nor its 
authenticity as a source for the present. They regared tradition as a destiny that 
cannot satisfy challenges of the modem era; thus they advocate progress by 
intervention from outside, through modernization. This attitude implies that 
certain cultures are inferior in comparison to others, thus solutions must be 
sought from the superior cultures' experiences (i. e. from the West) (Laroui, 
1976, p. 42). This attitude is criticized as being dependent on and a follower of 
Western ideology and models of progress. Both aforementioned attitudes 
actually seek to retreat from the present, the former by retreating to the past, 
the latter by moving elsewhere in place (al-Hathloul, 1996, p. 11). The third 
attitude is reconciliative. It takes a moderate position that tries to reconcile the 
other two (al-Jabiri, 1989, p. 16); it believes that the modern era has its 
specificity and needs which cannot be met by an unquestioning application of 
traditional solutions. In the same vein, it seeks a non-absolute acceptance of 
modernity but a partial acceptance that does not contradict Islamic traditions. 
In other words, it seeks solutions both from within and without the local 
culture. Its aim is to maintain continuity with tradition so as to re-establish 
Muslim identity. This attitude is criticized as being selective and subjective in 
that it selects what it considers as progressive aspects from both modernity and 
tradition and merges the two to create solutions (al-Jabiri, 1989, p. 16). 
There is today an increasing awareness of this crisis as it applies to Muslim 
PRACTICAL 
built environments. It is a crisis of identity, sustainability, affordability, 
RESPONSES satisfaction, etc. Many studies have addressed this crisis and many efforts were 
IN THE directed to solving it. However, for many architects and urban designers, this 
BUILT 
ENVIRONMENT crisis was reduced and confined merely into a crisis of identity, where 
identity 
is identified in formalistic, stylistic terms. To give an example, adopting a 
reconciliative position, the Aga Khan Award for Architecture (AKAA) was 
established as a response, attempting to solve the crisis that Muslim built 
environments face today, and reducing the hegemony of modern architecture. 
The AKAA in that respect is quite a pioneering attempt in the Muslim world, 
however, as a crucible of many local and international intellectuals and 
scholars, it accommodates the opinions of all its participants. In their first 
seminar, the problem of architecture in the Islamic world was identified by one 
scholar: "The major modern urban environments of the Islamic world are 
suffering from a crisis which is most directly reflected in their ugliness and is 
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in stark contrast with the serenity and beauty of the traditional Islamic city. 
Islamic architecture has been eclipsed by a conglomeration of often hideous 
styles or at best bland ones, in both cases imitated from foreign models with the 
pretense of universality and world-wide applicability" (Nasr, 1978, p. 1). Put 
differently by Oleg Grabart, "the immense building activity of many Muslim 
countries today runs the risk of leading not only to bland neutral architecture, a 
sort of zero architecture, but may especially lead to a further diminution, 
eventually almost to a destruction of cultural identity" (AKAA, 1978, p. 104). 
Thus, such scholars announced the aim as searching for an identity for Islamic 
architecture that meets contemporary challenges within the spirit of Islam. This 
method of solving the crisis is considered here as operating on partial levels of 
the built environment (explained in chapter four). That is, the crisis that the 
Muslim world faces today is a crisis in which some analysts today see a relative 
retardation in Muslim civilization. Identity constitutes only one axis of the 
debate about this crisis. 
The question that arises here is why this preoccupation with the issue of 
identity today? Searching for identity in the Arab Muslim world today mostly 
IDENTITY takes the form of adherence to what Castells refers to as a resistance identity. 
It is a resistance to the external threat of Westernization, capitalism, 
internationalism, and more recently, globalization. In general, resistance 
identity-building constructs the foundations of collective resistance against 
oppression and reinforces its boundaries, usually on the basis of identities that 
were clearly defined by history, geography or the like (Castells, 1997, p. 8-9). In 
the case of the Arab Muslim world, such a resistance identity-building project 
was/is represented by a return to tradition. ' It seems that the issue of identity is 
becoming a central issue in contemporary debates all over the world, especially 
in the fields of culture and sociology. In terms of contemporary Muslim built 
environments, as identity is a concept that has emerged and gained its 
importance as a result of the contradictions and the struggle between the 
acquired and the inherited (crisis), to answer the above question we have to 
situate this issue historically, exploring the roots of this crisis. 
6 Oleg Grabar is a well known scholar in Islamic art. 
This return to tradition in the Arab Muslim world, according to al-Jabiri, took a dual stand: First, a 
return to tradition that took the form of a mechanism of upholdment (predication), i. e. as a prop- 
stand for departure and progress. This stand embodies a departure to the future on the basis of a 
critical awareness of past and present conditions. Second, a protective return to the past as a reaction 
to a present external threats (al-Jabiri, 1991, p. 25). It is a defensive return that functions as refuge and 
creates solidarity, and aims at retrenching and sustaining the presence of the 'Us' (Arab Muslim 
world) against the 'Other' (the West). Thus, searching for an identity inevitably pulls to the ancestral 
attitude. In this context we can add a third stand which occurred in some disciplines (e. g. 
architecture): a return to tradition simply as a fad. 
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Most of those reactions, whether ideological or practical, have conceived the 
causes of the crisis to be merely the coexistence of the acquired and the 
inherited modes, thus contemplated a solution as a matter of a selection 
between the two poles. The crisis that contemporary Muslim countries are 
facing today is not a crisis of voluntary selection. It is a crisis of 
contradictions, caused by the coexistence of the two modes, each operating on 
different societal levels. It is a crisis of systemic destabilization. Thus, 
escaping from one pole to another or resorting to tradition or to concepts of 
identity cannot stand as a solution for this crisis. 
This study thus aims at investigating such a contradiction in contemporary 
ATMs Muslim built environments. It examines both the acquired and the inherited 
modes of built environment production, locating the points of tension between 
the two modes. Such a study might appear as a comparative study between the 
Western modem-capitalist system and the traditional Islamic system. It is in 
fact not. This thesis argues that the modern-capitalist system has its roots in the 
COMPARATIVE 
West from which it emerged thus it fits with the Western culture and society. STUDY 
This system constitutes an exotic system to the Muslim world which inherited 
its system from Islam, thus applying this capitalist system into the 
contemporary Muslim world leads inevitably to a state of contradiction. Thus, 
this thesis is about investigating those two modes as exist in contemporary 
Muslim societies. 
In analysing the processes of the built environment production, certain 
questions arise: who controls what element? who dominates which person? and 
POWER who 
influences or directs outcomes of decision-making processes? Such 
questions are in fact questions of " power". Each society has its distinct 
mechanisms that organise power gain and power exercitation among its 
members. Of course, each system has its characteristics and advantages. The 
conception of power is considered in this thesis as a significant determinant in 
the production of the built environment. It thus receives significant attention. It 
is the main axis of investigation. 
ARGUMENT 
The central argument of this study is that the differences in the conceptions of 
power and rights between traditional and contemporary Muslim societies are 
the main determinant of the contradictory situation in which contemporary 
Muslim built environments live. Power is the capacity to act. It is derived in 
Muslim societies from rights as bestowed by God through sharia (the Islamic 
STATIC legal system). Thus, rights create power (capacity to act). Rights are the 
RIGHTS source of power in the traditional mode. They are obligatory, well known to all 
members of society. Accordingly, rights in Islam are static; they cannot be 
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manipulated. Traditional Muslim societies are thus rights-based societies. On 
the contrary, power in contemporary societies has variable sources. It is not 
pre-determined; it is expandable; thus, it is dynamic. ' This dynamism sets the 
DYNAMIC 
POWER stage for individuals, groups, organisations and the state, as parties shaping the 
built environment, to compete to acquire more power. Power creates rights of 
action. Contemporary societies are thus characterised as lusting for power. Such 
a difference in the conception of power between contemporary and traditional 
modes has endless ramifications on decision-making processes generally, and 
on the production of the built environment, particularly. 
Other sub-arguments, demonstrated throughout this thesis, sustain this main 
argument. That is, the nature of the topic of this study necessitated investigating 
both the traditional and the contemporary modes and their dissensions on an 
intrinsic level, at their roots. Those sub-arguments appear irrelevant in certain 
places; however, they are in fact essential if the issue examined is to be grasped 
comprehensively. 
STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The study first investigates the two modes of environmental production in Arab 
Muslim societies: the traditional (inherited) and the contemporary (acquired) 
(chapter 2). Part one of this study reviews the key literature from the field of 
Islamic urban studies. It is argued in this part (chapters 3,4) that most studies 
of the Muslim built environment have neglected the conceptual differences 
between Muslim and Western built environments. They accepted the modem, 
or Western concept of power and operated within its framework. Thus, such 
studies misinterpreted the Muslim built environment, contributing to its 
misunderstanding and thus to its contemporary crisis. 
The roots of the contemporary mode of production, which are entirely modem- 
capitalist, are delineated in chapter five. The dynamism of contemporary 
societies, the shifting of paradigms to ameliorate the built environment, the rise 
of the modern state as the supreme power, its limits, its rights, are explained. 
POWER From such investigations, the concept of "power" emerges as a determining 
issue. The meanings of power, its limits, its societal implications and its 
environmental consequences are then investigated in both traditional and 
contemporary built environments (chapters 6,8). Comparison of both built 
RIGHTS environments shows the concept of "rights" as a determinant of power in 
traditional environments (chapter 6), and as a tool for power-holders in 
contemporary environments (chapters 9,10). This simple difference: power 
Staticness of rights versus dynamism of power is a relative concept. Rights can be described as static 
when compared to the dynamism of power. This concept will be clarified later in this thesis. 
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creates rights as in contemporary societies, or power is limited by rights as in 
traditional societies, has endless ramifications. Power accumulation, as in the 
contemporary mode, or rights distribution (dimension of power), as in the 
traditional mode, shows the need of an in-depth understanding of the concept of 
"power" in contemporary societies, and of "rights" in Islam (chapters 7,8). 
Both property and individual rights in traditional built environments, with their 
inevitable morphological synthesis, are investigated and compared with the 
contemporary power ladder, bundled with its environmental regulations, role of 
professionals, and physical characteristics. This understanding of the 
conceptions of rights and power prevailing in traditional and contemporary 
built environments, respectively, highlights the relationships between actors 
(such as individuals, institutions, groups, and the state) holding those powers 
and rights. Accordingly, societal power/rights structure in each mode is 
elucidated. Different parties' influences, roles, and scopes of domain in the 
processes of the production of traditional and contemporary built environments 
are identified. In short, points of tension between the two modes are 
highlighted. 
The shift from the traditional to the contemporary Muslim built environment is 
investigated in part four. Chapters 9 and 10 scrutinize the process of changing 
the conception of built environment production due to the emergence of new 
parties (the state, professionals) responsible for such processes of production, a 
matter that led to changes in the roles of private parties in such processes. In 
short, throughout this thesis, the synthesis of traditional and contemporary 
Muslim built environments, within the scope of this study, are illuminated for 
observers to generate their own conclusions. 
METHODOLOGY 
To what extent and how the future of a society can be engineered is quite a 
WHAT controversial 
issue. This study is aware of arguments developed against 
TYPE OF historicists and utopians, and does not intend to engineer the future of the built 
STUDY? environment by deriving principles from past experiences and employing them 
for the future. This study is not a kind of nostalgia; neither a historical study 
that attempts merely to explain past morphologies or synthesis. It is a 
comparative study of two modes: one that prevailed in the past and one 
existing in the present in the Muslim built environment. It tries to learn from 
history, compare the past with the present, and then raises questions to help 
future studies. 
This study is a critical study that challenges the status quo, examining and 
criticizing some of our unquestionably accepted ideologies and presumptions, 
such as capitalism, the existence of the state, the concept of power, 
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professionalism, and the like. Such criticism is intellectually important. That 
is, as Popper contends, it is only through criticism that knowledge can advance. 
ADVANCEMENT "No one can possibly give us more service than by showing us what is wrong 
of 
with what we think or do, and the bigger the fault, the bigger the improvement KNOWLEDGE 
made possible by its revelation" (Popper, cited in Magee, 1982, p. 39). This 
study thus does not follow the classical scientific positivist method of 
induction that starts by collecting data through accumulated observation from 
which a hypothesis is inferred. Scholars following such a classical method are, 
as Popper describes them, not innovating; they are putting accepted theories to 
work. Theory, as Einstein states, "cannot be fabricated out of the results of 
observation, but that it can only be invented" (Einstein, cited in Magee, 1982, 
INVENTIVE p. 33, emphasis added). For the growth of our knowledge, our attempts to solve 
THEORY or explain defined problems must involve propounding theories which must go 
beyond our existing knowledge, a matter that requires a leap of the 
imagination. Most of the great revolutions in science have turned on theories 
of breathtaking audacity (Magee, 1982, p. 26). 
Escaping the limitation of experimental induction, this study starts by 
suggesting a "bold theory"9 (or an argument) for a defined problem: that is, 
the contradictory situation of contemporary Muslim built environments. 
Afterwards, verification of such a theory begins. Building this theory might 
sometimes embody the use of conjecture and intuition arising from sensing a 
problem. Thus, this thesis embodies arguments of two kinds: first, those that 
can be established by evidence either from literature or by examples from real 
life. Second are those arguments that are difficult to generate empirically 
testable hypothesis, thus they remain at the level of logic, abstraction and 
speculation. Such "bold theories", if proved right, advance knowledge. 
However, if falsified, they liberate later studies from their imprisoning 
presumptions and existing knowledge, and thus push the frontier of our 
ignorance back. Such theories lead to conceptual advancement. 
This study builds on predecessors' theories, however, in a critical manner. Its 
starting point is the critical examination of previous accepted studies and 
theories (whether Islamic urban studies, or other environmental studies), so as 
to explore their deficiencies in understanding or solving the crises of 
contemporary Muslim built environments (the problem of investigation). 
Investigating the conception of power in either of the two modes of built 
environment production (traditional and contemporary) necessitated 
investigating the legal system of each mode. Accordingly, court cases 
9 Using Popper's terms. 
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(nawazi! ) and rulings of jurists regarding disputes among acting parties in the 
SOURCES traditional built environment are considered in this study as the prime source 
for comprehending the structures of rights and power enjoyed by different 
parties in the process of the traditional built environment production. As the 
process of the traditional built environment production is not commonly 
known, detailed investigation of the structures of rights is presented. 
On the contrary, the contrast between the traditional and the contemporary 
modes of built environment production, as this study demonstrates, is quite 
evident. Thus, investigation of the contemporary mode of built environment 
production is carried out on a substantial level, without going into well-known 
details, such as of contemporary building regulations. Evidence is sought from 
a wide spectrum of relevant disciplines such as urban politics, philosophy of 
politics, urban sociology, cultural studies, urban planning, architecture, 
philosophy of law, and property law. This study is thus multidisciplinary, 
seeking knowledge from different disciplines. It relates the built environment to 
its mode's broader framework, although within the scope of this study (centred 
on issues of power and rights). This thesis opens doors for questions more than 
providing answers. Such questions remain suspended for others to find answers, 
and thus push the frontier of our knowledge further. 
Chapter Two 
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PROLOGUE 
Two modes of production 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is about two modes of production of the built environment. One pertains to 
modernity and capitalism and the other pertains to Islam. These two modes prevailed in the 
Muslim world, one in the past and one in the present. To grasp the mechanisms of each of 
those two modes, this chapter stands as a prologue to clarify the outline of each mode, thus 
setting the scene for this thesis. 
2.2 THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT 
The built environment is perceived here as the outcome of an accretion of intervening actions 
carried out by different actors (parties': individuals, groups, organizations, state, etc. ), enjoying 
certain powers, through decision-making processes. Therefore, since decision-making 
processes usually imply power enjoyed by the acting parties, investigating those decision- 
making processes would uncover certain significant forces underlying the process of the 
production of the built environment. 
Taking any decision and actualizing it into an overt action requires power to take and 
implement this decision. Non-possession of this capacity (power) is a limitation on actions. For 
example, if an individual does not have the power to make certain modifications to his house 
because it is not his right or the law does not allow these modifications, then taking such a 
decision will have no practical effect. Thus, this research takes the power, enjoyed by different 
parties, whether individuals, groups or the state, and revealed through decision-making 
processes, as the main axis of investigation. It considers the built environment as an arena 
where exercitation of power through decision-making processes can be observed. 
This research argues that each society or culture (e. g. capitalist, socialist, Islamic) has its own 
system of power (power structure, distribution, sources, exercitation, etc. )' which in turn affects 
the processes of the production of its built environment, and, to a certain extent, determines its 
unique character and identity. Thus, to understand the built environment in any society or 
culture, one needs to inquire into its system of power. In this respect, power is used in this 
research as the tool for investigating either of the two modes' built environments: traditional 
Muslim built environments (Islamic mode) and contemporary built environments (modern- 
capitalist mode), considered as reflections of their societal structures. 
In the field of social sciences, "agent" is the common term used as equivalent to "actor" or "party". 
2 Those terms: power sources, power structure, power distribution are explained in chapter eight. 
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In terms of the built environment in general, power is a capacity that enables any party to take a 
decision which is consequently translated into an action that has an impact on the built 
environment (altering it). That is, if one defines elements of the built environment as an object 
or group of objects arranged in a particular order, or a space or group of spaces arranged in a 
certain manner, then it can be said that party "A" has environmental power if it has the right to 
take a decision by which it can change the arrangement of some element(s) in the built 
environment. Accordingly, power can be defined as the capacity of a given party to make a 
difference to a pre-existing state of the built environment. It is, according to Giddens, the "can" 
that mediates between intentions or wants [to which values relate], and the actual realization of 
the outcomes sought after (Giddens, 1993a, p. 118). 
2.3 Two MODES OF PRODUCTION 
Each system (e. g. capitalism, socialism, Islam) has its own distinct mechanisms that operate 
within its broader systemic framework. Systems might share few things, but they differ in many 
others. Each system produces its own built environment as a reflection of its broader systemic 
mechanisms. To understand the modem-capitalist mode, adopted by most contemporary Arab 
Muslim countries, and the Islamic mode, the internal mechanisms of each mode have to be 
scrutinized, mainly their system of power. Decision-making processes of built environment 
production might vary from one country to another (between UK. and the US. ) within the same 
framework of the modem-capitalist system. However, the focus in this study is on the general 
mechanisms that operate in such processes, and which are believed to be more or less similar, 
rather than on the detailed processes (such as planning procedures). Examples of built 
environment decision-making processes, representing each of the two modes and the 
exercitation of power that operates within these processes are given next. Those examples apply 
to the decision-making processes operating in most contemporary Arab countries. 
THE MODERN-CAPITALIST MODE 
FIRST EXAMPLE: Change of property-use 
In a modern-capitalist system, as the case in most Arab Muslim countries today, if party "A" 
decides to change the function of his house into a hostel for example, this party does not have 
the power to implement its decision. He has to seek permission for this change in property-use 
from the higher authorities. ' In some countries, this permission is multilateral; it has to be 
sought from different authorities such as those of tourism, trade, municipality, etc. and many of 
those authorities have different requirements that the applicant has to satisfy to get approval. 
Some systems of planning do not require permission to all actions. In UK, for example, there are a 
few prescribed permitted development actions in residential areas where the householder does not 
have to seek permission from local authorities. Nevertheless, the issue this study is trying to highlight 
is who decides what for whom. If decisions are made for parties, then they are subject to other 
parties' decisions. This is the case in modem systems today. For example, in UK's example above, it 
is the higher authorities who decides which actions need to have permission and which not, so the 
higher authorities are on a higher level than the private parties. 
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In terms of the physical built environment, this permission is given according to certain 
planning rules and building regulations established by a higher authority under the category of 
"development control". For example, the new function of this party's house has to match the 
land-use map of its area, established according to a master plan designed and/or approved by the 
planning authority. Moreover, the new function has to be subject to certain regulations that are 
again derived from that master plan regarding, for example, building setbacks, heights, built-up 
area, number of parking lots required, and the like. ' If the new proposed function matches all 
these regulations, then the permission is granted to this party; otherwise the proposal will be 
rejected. In the latter case, either the applicant, party "A", has to make some changes in his 
property to match the conditions of approval or, if not possible, he has to accept the power of 
the higher authorities and forget about this change in use. If party "A" ignored the higher 
authorities' rejection and implemented his proposal, then his action will be considered by the 
higher authorities as violation of the law, thus party "A" will be liable to legal sanctions. 
SECOND EXAMPLE: Building heights 
Building-height-control constitutes part of the development control process adopted in most 
Arab countries today. It is determined according to the land-use and zone in which the building 
is located. For example, in Amman, Jordan, residential areas are divided into zones A, B, C, D, 
etc. Each zone has its particular regulations that define the plot area, building percentage, 
setbacks, building height, and the like. In zone "A", for example, the maximum height allowed 
is three floors and a roof; however, in zone "A special", only two floors are allowed. If a party 
decides to add a storey to its two storey building that lies in "A special" zone, that is not 
allowed. Streets might be the spatial separation of zones; thus in some cases one can observe 
that on one side of the street buildings are of two floors where on the other side they are of four 
floors. Accordingly, owners on either side of the street have different property rights according 
to higher authorities' prescriptive regulations. In that respect, Cullingworth states that 
zoning's essential role is to protect property values. However, protecting property rights also 
involves reducing those rights. Zoning at a low density protects property values of owners but at 
the same time precludes them from maximizing potential development values (Cullingworth, 
1997, p. 253). In that sense, reducing any party's rights to develop his property is a "taking" 
from his rights without compensation. "Taking" is not limited only to land expropriation; it 
also includes takings of rights. 
Planning law in UK., for example, has checks and balances. Individuals can do what they like in their 
houses, but these rights are constrained by the law. However, major changes (e. g. change of use) 
require scrutiny and planning consent. The local authority planning committee (elected by the people 
in the area concerned), operating within the framework of central authority to protect the 
rights/interests of various parties, would consider the proposal in the light of conflicts between and 
interests of parties involved and decides accordingly. That decision can be challenged, and then goes 
to a public enquiry when all parties involved can negotiate and debate the case. Ultimately a 
judgement is made by the higher authority (planning inspector) (for planning permission procedures 
in UK, see Thomas, 1997, p. 48-50). 
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Analysing the decision-making process in these cases, one can notice that words such as power, 
higher authorities, permission, regulations, and law have occurred several times throughout 
those examples. Formulating those words into a statement, it follows that: higher authorities 
have power to enact laws and regulations according to which they give permission to private 
parties. Party "A" could not actualize his decision that is related to his own property without the 
permission of the higher authorities (external party). Therefore, owners have certain restrictions 
on their actions in their own properties. They are always in direct relationship with the higher 
authorities. They are subject to its power. As higher authorities constitute an external party, 
remote from the site of development, thus owners-authorities relationship can be described as a 
relationship between immediate-remote parties, where the remote party gives itself the 
legitimacy to intervene in the immediate party's properties. In such a process, higher authorities 
claim to be acting on behalf of the public to protect its interests, i. e. it works for the "public 
interest" (as claimed). Building policies and regulations are enacted, as it is claimed, according 
to the presumed "public interest. " 5 In the above examples, the higher authority (the state) was 
acting on behalf of the affected parties in the site (e. g. neighbours), however, its decision was 
taken by reference to its prescriptive regulations without any reference to the specific interests 
of those affected parties. They are considered as part of the public thus their interest is, 
presumably, "the public interest. "6 In short, it can be said that in the decision-making process 
in the modern-capitalist built environment mechanisms of power are dominant. 
Those mechanisms of power can be depicted as top-down mechanisms of empowerment from 
higher level parties (higher authorities) to lower level ones (acting party). ' It is a mechanism 
through which the higher level party dominates the lower level party, i. e. it is a mechanism of 
dominations, where solutions are reached in a prescriptive manner, as this thesis elucidates. 
As explained in chapter five, the state as a representative of the public is the party that defines such a 
public interest. The concept of "the public interest" is discussed in chapters five and seven below. 
6 As to the public interest, it is impossible to satisfy the interests of all people in one action, so some 
will "win" and some will "lose". In the last few years studies of social costs have emerged. For 
example, a study of Phoenix, Arizona, has shown that most businesses have benefited from Phoenix's 
urban growth. However, the evaluation of the net effect of urban growth for ordinary citizens was less 
favourable (Feagin et. al., 1990, p. 3 1). 
The concepts of" levels between parties" and "domination" are explored in chapters six and seven. 
8 Some might argue that in a democracy the state cannot be perceived as representing a mechanism of 
domination, but rather as exercising power and control based on consent. In that sense, the state is 
deemed to be acting in "the public interest", i. e. to mediate between private interests (as explained 
in chapter five). Simplifying the matter for the purpose of grasping the differences between the two 
modes in question (capitalist and Islamic), it is said in this study that this might be true; however, the 
question here is "consent of whom, and whose interests? " Consent in democratic societies refers to 
the majority won in elections, and not to all the population, so there are many individuals who do not 
agree with the state's exercitation of power (enactment of regulations and policies). Moreover, the 
consent of the majority is reached over general policies (agenda) announced during the elections and 
not on detailed issues. Nevertheless, the main point this research is trying to emphasize is not how 
large is the majority or who wins and who loses, but that, even in democratic societies, there are two 
groups: one decides (the state) and the other is decided for (the people), as will be explained. 
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FIRST EXAMPLE: Changes in private property 
In a case, a judge (al-Qarawi9) was asked about a house owner (A) who had a shop on the left 
side of his house (fig. 2.1). The owner (B) on the opposite side of the road wanted to transform a 
room in his house on the right side of his door into three shops, claiming that this action is his 
right, as both A's and B's houses are located in a wide through street, intensively used by the 
public, as it is one of the main streets in the town. However, the owner of the first house (A) 
objected, on the grounds that (as he claimed) what might be allowed in through streets are doors 
only, and not shops. In the case of a new shop, people sitting or working in these shops will 
overlook the inner side of his house and this is considered a severe damage. On the basis of 
these claims, the judge asked building experts to assess the damage caused to the opposite 
house (A) by visiting the site and investigating the case. It was found that the angle of vision of 
the three shops severely exposed the entrance to A's house. Thus, the new shops were closed 
('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 274-5). 
(fig. 2.1) 
In another case that reached judge 'Ibn `Abd ar-Rafi' (d. 734H. ), a person (A) opened a shop in a 
through street that goes from east to west (fig. 2.2). The shop was positioned in front of a dead- 
end street that had a door to B's house. (B) objected to the shop on grounds that the shop caused 
damage to his privacy. The two persons disputed, taking their case to the judge. A building 
expert investigated the case by visiting the site and assessing the damage (as claimed) caused 
by the shop to the house (B). He reported to the judge that those who sit in the shop cannot see 
inside the house, but could only see who is standing within the door. As this was not considered 
a damage to the house (B), the judge ruled for the continuation of the shop ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., 
p. 277). 
9 Al-Qarawi is a jurist (faqih, p1. fugaha) who lived in North Africa in the 7' or 8 ̀h H. C. 
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SECOND EXAMPLE: Change of property-use 
In a case raised to a judge (Ahmad bin al-Makwi), a narrow street had three doors for three 
houses opening into it. Two of the houses were converted into hotels; the third house was only 
three cubits from them. The owner of the third house did not object to the conversion. As those 
two hotels were the only hotels in town, gradually the street became so crowded that the third 
house was no longer fit for a residence, but for other functions. The house owner protested to 
the judge who ruled in the case (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 41-2). 1° 
ANALYSIS 
Although the dates and sites of these actual cases are different, it can be noted that owners acted 
in their properties without permission from the higher authorities. They based their actions 
merely on their rights. In the first example, party (A) acted on the basis of his rights; at the 
same time, party (B) predicated his objection on his right not to be harmed. Both parties were 
aware of their rights. Similarly, in the second example, based on their rights, the owners of the 
two houses changed the function of their properties without permission from any higher 
authorities. That is, in Islam, a party has the right to act freely in its property, without 
permission from external parties (higher authorities), as long as its actions do not affect others 
negatively. This is evident in the right of any Muslim not to be harmed by the actions of others, 
stated in the Prophet's tradition (hadith) "neither darar nor dirar" ", meaning "there should be 
neither harming nor reciprocating harm" or "there is no injury nor return of injury. " 12 
10 The rule in this case was that if the damage caused to the third house was as described, and the 
conversion was done fairly recently, then the damage should be lifted. However, if there had been 
quite a long time since the other two houses were converted into hotels and the third owner had been 
silent, then his right to object lapsed. Thus the two hotels could continue (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, 
p. 41-2). These mechanisms are explored in chapter seven below. 
Darar means what an individual benefits from at the expense of damaging others. Dirar means the 
actions which damage others without benefiting the acting party (Akbar, 1988, p. 256) 
'Z Al-Muwatta' of Imam Malik, (Beirut, 1981) p. 529. The first translation is by Ibrahim and Johnson- 
Davis (1977), An-Nawawi's forty Hadith (an-Nawawi, n. d. /b, p. 106); the second translation is from 
al-Muwatta', translated by A. at-Tarjumana and Y. Johnson (1982), (Imam Malik, n. d., p. 346). 
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Avoiding conflicts, parties, in environmental interactions, communicate together about their 
problems, clarifying their visions, opinions and rights. However, when no agreement could be 
reached, and a dispute arose between the two parties, then they may choose (voluntarily) to 
refer to the judge. Higher authorities cannot intervene without the related parties' request. When 
the case reached the judges, they did not use pre-stated rules to decide. Each case of 
intervention in the built environment has its own circumstances, and while circumstances 
change temporally and geographically, shari `a (the Islamic legal system) does not set up 
prescripts and regulations to deal with all different cases in a sweeping manner (as the case in 
the modern-capitalist mode), but with guidelines which, when applied, produce diverse 
solutions that fit the circumstances of each case. Therefore, each case is dealt with 
independently on its own merits, investigating its conditions, and the validity of disputed 
parties' claims. Ultimately, in the light of the investigations' findings (of building experts), the 
judges reached their rulings. Thereby, as evident from the two cases presented in the first 
example, similar cases might have different rulings, according to the specificity of each case. 
It can thus be argued that relationships that prevailed in the production of built environments in 
the Islamic mode are relationships between immediate affected parties (neighbours in our 
examples). They are, unlike the case in the modem-capitalist built environments, immediate- 
immediate parties relationships, where each party represents itself in defending its rights 
without any external representation or obligatory intervention by remote parties. 
2.4 INFERENCES: THE TWO MODES 
The built environment is an outcome of dynamic processes of production in which power 
through decision-making processes operates as the driving, determinant force, deciding its 
characteristics, as shown in the following chapters. Each societal system has its own system of 
power that operates as an underlying mechanism in the production of its built environment. 
Accordingly, this study argues that mechanisms of power in the modern capitalist mode subject 
the acting individuals to the power of the higher authorities. However, this process in the 
Islamic mode is based on mechanisms of rights, where all individuals refer in their actions to 
their rights. Immediate-remote parties relationships prevail in the modem capitalist mode, 
whereas immediate-immediate parties relationships prevail in the Islamic mode, leading to 
diverse consequences. This hypothesis is examined throughout this study. 
In this context, a few statements have to be asserted. First: mechanisms of rights operating in 
the Islamic mode differ from those of power operating in the modern-capitalist mode, thus their 
subsequent built environments are inevitably different. That is, property rights enjoyed by 
parties in each mode as a result of their respective operating mechanisms are different. Second, 
differences between the operating mechanism in decision-making process in the two modes 
might not appear as important as they are. Their effects, as explained throughout this study, are 
quite substantial. They lead to two different built environments, one produced by professionals 
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and controlled by higher authorities, and the other produced and controlled by its inhabitants, 
reflecting their norms and capabilities. 
This thesis examines the built environments of each of the two modes (modem-capitalist, and 
Islamic) through scrutinizing their respective operating mechanisms. Thus, its main focus is on 
the mechanisms more than on the physical built environments. Investigations of the concept of 
power and that of rights as related to the modem-capitalist and the Islamic (traditional) built 
environments, respectively, are established in part three below. To situate this study among 
other studies in the field, exploration of studies of Muslim built environments, their approaches, 
influences, and methodologies, are presented in the next part. 
Part One 
Part 1 
ROOTS OF ISLAMIC URBAN STUDIES 
ISLAMIC 
URBAN 
STUDIES 
ARGUMENT 
AND 
AIMS 
INTRODUCTION 
"Islamic urban studies" generally refers to those studies of Muslim cities 
(including, sometimes, areas around cities) which (cities) existed in the Islamic 
world in the period from the rise of Islam to the beginning of the 20`h century 
(Haneda and Miura, 1994, p. x). The beginnings of these studies can be 
identified in the 18`h century, but it was not until the early 20`h century that these 
studies crystallized and took a shape. Islamic urban studies before the 20" 
century were mainly archaeological, focusing on a limited number of sites, 
usually containing grand buildings. In addition, there were descriptions of cities 
by European travellers. Most of the early 20th century studies were carried out 
by archaeologists, historians and scholars who were specialized in Oriental 
languages and studies. Later, a few geographers, sociologists and 
anthropologists became involved, but it is only relatively recently that 
architects, art historians and urban planners have joined the field. The majority 
of those scholars were Western (Orientalists) particularly up to the 1970s, after 
which local scholars (Orientals) began to play a significant role in Islamic 
urban studies, bringing a new perspective to the field. 
This research argues that most contemporary Islamic urban studies were 
influenced by their Western counter-studies in terms of themes discussed, 
methodologies adopted, and approaches followed. This part of the research thus 
attempts to throw light on the roots of and influences on Islamic urban studies 
throughout their evolution. This helps to widen this research's epistemological 
basis and to define its boundaries by identifying different problems 
investigated, approaches used and findings of other research, and also gaps in 
knowledge about Islamic cities. This part of the research thus serves as a 
background, aiming at situating the current study among other relevant studies 
in the field. 
Different questions could be raised regarding the origins of these studies: When 
did they start and why at that specific time? Why were Western scholars their 
leaders? Which cities were studied first and why? How were these studies 
done? Answers to such questions supply two sorts of fact: first, those which 
refer to the roots of Islamic urban studies, and second, those regarding 
influences on the field. 
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"Roots" here refers to the foundations from which Islamic urban studies sprung 
ROOTS and developed. " Influences" refers to those factors that affected and coloured the AND 
INFLUENCES manner of Islamic urban studies. The former is concerned with epistemological 
issues such as methodologies, themes and approaches, while the latter deals with 
human values and attitudes. In other words, roots are related to the subject while 
influences are related to the author and his original environment. 
No production of knowledge in the human sciences can be value-neutral and 
INFLUENCES purely objective, either on the part of the researcher (influences) or on the level of 
the subject tackled (roots). The influence of the author's involvement as a human 
subject in his own circumstances cannot be ignored or disclaimed. Thus, as 
Islamic urban studies were developed by Orientalists and later by Muslim local 
scholars, one cannot deny the influence of the main circumstances of the scholar's 
actuality as a Western Orientalist or as an Arab Muslim first, and second, as an 
individual with certain concepts, norms and values. 
External influences, to differentiate them from other influences, are those that 
came from outside the field of Islamic urban studies and affected researchers' 
attitudes and coloured their studies. On the other hand, internal influences are 
those which are generated within the field itself during its evolution, as earlier 
studies and theories affect later studies. 
Accumulating knowledge of Islamic cities is located within the broad realm of 
ROOTS urban studies, which incorporates several fields such as urban sociology, urban 
politics, urban geography, and urban planning. As these fields were developed in 
the West (the base of the Orientalists), the roots of Islamic urban studies are thus 
mainly Western. 
The Western roots of Islamic urban studies as they existed in Western urban 
STRUCTURE studies are investigated in chapter three. In chapter four the effects of those roots 
as well as external and internal influences on Islamic urban studies are examined. 
In the latter chapter, some relevant earlier studies are reviewed critically, 
highlighting their main roots, influences, arguments and gaps in understanding. 
Although criticisms are made of others' work, the undeniable contribution of 
earlier researchers to the field of Islamic urban studies is acknowledged and it is 
recognized that without their achievements it would have been difficult to have 
reached the present level of knowledge in the field. It is only as the field develops 
and widens that successors become able to look back critically at their forerunners 
who worked within a relatively limited context. 
Chapter Three 
Western Roots 
3 
WESTERN ROOTS 
Too much of what classic sociology had to say about 
Western societies was taken for granted as a valid baseline 
from which to work out what was different about the non- 
European world, including the way sociology defined a 
society in general terms and identified societies with 
bounded territorial units. 
(Gledhill, 1994, p. 11) 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is concerned with the roots of Islamic urban studies, epistemologically. As the 
origins of Islamic urban studies were Western, these studies were exposed to and influenced by 
different fields of knowledge developed in the West. Some relevant Western fields constituted 
the roots of Islamic urban studies, such as the field of urban studies. Therefore, the emphasis in 
this chapter is to explore those Western roots as they existed in the West in terms of themes, 
methodologies and approaches, with particular attention to the field of urban sociology as it was 
(as will be shown) the most influential field on Islamic urban studies, especially during their 
beginnings. Such a field can be considered as a crucible, merging studies of urbanism from 
diverse disciplines: urban geography, urban politics, and urban economics. In other words, most 
fields concerned with urban studies overlap in the field of urban sociology. However, other 
fields developed later, such as architecture, urban design, and planning, constituted part of 
Islamic urban studies' later roots. But since most Orientalists were geographers, historians and 
sociologists, they were not exposed to those later fields until more recently, when architects and 
urban planners took their place in the field of Islamic urban studies. 
To scrutinize the roots of Islamic urban studies, it is necessary to study in some depth some 
relevant Western works so as to comprehend the context within which Islamic urban studies 
emerged. Therefore a few key works that influenced the main schools of thought in urban 
studies during the end of the 19`" century and the first half of the 20th century are examined in 
this chapter, including Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, and the Chicago school. The main 
theories in the field were produced during that time; later scholars adopted and followed them 
up to the present time. Those latter studies are not explored here, as they are the effect of the 
same source of studies. ' Moreover, as those latter studies emerged at later times (in the late 
1960s and early 1970s), they are not considered here as part of the Islamic urban studies' 
Western roots. 
Later studies adopted the same approaches developed in earlier studies, establishing what came to be 
known as Neo-approaches, for example, Neo-Marxism (e. g. Castells, Harvey), Neo-Weberianism 
(Rex, Moore, Pahl). 
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Studies of Islamic cities began at the end of the 19`h century, at almost the same time as 
advances in studies of urbanization and cities took place in different disciplines in the West. 
The then leaders of those urban studies were mainly Western scholars. As Orientalists were 
affected by dominant debates and ideas in the field, they adopted some of the prevailing 
theories and themes of research and used them in their studies of Islamic cities. 
Many scholars investigated Western capitalistic societies, particularly in urban areas, and 
treated them as a phenomena to be analyzed and understood according to the discipline 
(sociology and, later, geography) of their different studies. Different approaches were followed 
and different methodologies were developed; however, the main and most influential studies 
were those of the three pioneers in the field of sociology: Marx (1818-1883), Weber (1864- 
1920), and Durkheim (1858-1917). Despite that all including an analysis of cities as an 
important component of their overall theories, none developed a comprehensive theory of cities 
and urbanization. All three (except Weber at certain points) were more concerned with changes 
in society as urban socio-economic processes than with the city as an urban and spatial entity. 
They considered the city as a non-spatial container' in which such urban processes take place. 
Nevertheless, their studies and views greatly influenced later scholars in almost every discipline 
concerned with cities and urbanization; for example we find Marxist urban sociologists, Marxist 
historians or geographers, Weberian urban sociologists, etc. 
Starting with observing social changes and problems in the rapidly expanding industrial 
capitalistic cities, different questions were posed: What were the causes of those changes? Why 
did they occur in Western societies specifically? To answer such questions, scholars turned to 
the roots of these changes in the European Middle Ages when cities began to grow, and 
compared the early modem city of their times, the 19`h century, with the city in the Middle 
Ages. Also, to define the main characteristics of the European medieval cities, which differed 
from cities before and after them, Weber compared them with non-Western pre-industrial cities 
(in the Middle Ages and in Antiquity in the Near and Far East) (Weber, 1973, p. 90). They 
argued that the medieval European city had theoretical significance in itself that neither the 
antique city nor the modern city had (Saunders, 1993, p. 49-50). From their comparative studies, 
the fathers of sociology (Marx, Weber, and Durkheim) deduced that capitalism in its various 
aspects was the main and essential cause for those problems and social changes: Marx focused 
on the modes of production and basic class division, Weber focused on the city's institutions 
and Durkheim on the solidarity of society (Saunders, 1985, p. 79). 
Peter Saunders, in his search for contemporary urban theory of the city, differentiated between two 
types of sociology, according to their concern for spatial issues in the city; non-spatial and aspatial 
sociology. By non-spatial, he meant that there can be no social theory of the city as an entity in 
contemporary industrial capitalistic societies. On the other hand, aspatial sociology is a mode of 
sociological analysis which undertakes no account of space as a potentially inhibiting or facilitating 
factor in the development of various social processes. A non-spatial sociology need not be aspatial 
(Saunders, 1985, p. 79,81). 
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They viewed the significance of the city at a specific period in history during the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism in Western Europe; the city at other periods was not a significant 
economic, political or social unit of analysis. Within their overall theories, they used the city as 
a tool for analyzing the transition in society. They viewed the city at that transitional time as an 
essential condition for the social changes generated within capitalistic societies. In other words, 
the city was not treated as a cause but as an important historical object that acts as a necessary 
condition (Saunders, 1993, p. 14-15). 3 
Marx and Engels, using a "dialectical materialism" methodology4, analyzed the phenomenon 
of urbanism. Both argued that the division between town and country had characterized all 
human societies from antiquity to modern capitalism, and for Marx, it was thus a primordial 
expression of the social division of labour. Using what some refer to today as Marxist 
structuralism, the town-country division was seen by Marx as the manifest form of the 
underlying contradiction between two competing modes of production; the capitalistic mode 
and the feudal mode (Marx and Engels, 1973, p. 139). The essence of the relation between city 
and countryside was different in different periods of human history; therefore the town-country 
antithesis is a phenomenon which has to be analyzed in any given period of human history. For 
Marx, it had to be analyzed in the context of class relations inscribed in the underlying modes of 
production (Saunders, 1993, p. 22). 
Therefore we can say that Marx brought to the fore the idea of an antagonism between town 
and countryside as a significant phenomenon which concealed behind it other essential 
relations and causes. Also he highlighted the theme of class division, widely adopted by later 
scholars in different disciplines. 
Durkheim's focal area of study was society rather than the physical city. Societies for him were 
" systems" made up of interrelated social elements (Cuff et. al., 1990, p. 29). Durkheim 
emphasized consensus as the basis of social order, where general agreement over values and 
norms provides the crucial basis of society (Abercrombie et. al., 1994, p. 83). His concern was 
with relationships between society and the individual within it, also with the moral basis of 
3 According to Saunders, this approach neglected the city as an entity by itself and considered it as a 
non-spatial dependent condition (Saunders, 1985, p. 79,81). Many contemporary neo-Marxist 
scholars such as Castells and Harvey, despite their claims of regarding space as a central element in 
urban analysis, adopted this approach. For Castells, the city is theoretically significant as the physical 
context within which the process of reproduction of labour is situated. He considers spatial units as 
related to social units (spatial units of collective consumption) as the real object of analysis. However, 
Harvey views the city as significant as a spatial configuration which facilitates and expresses the 
process of capital accumulation. He begins with the question of capitalism and seeks to apply this to 
the city (Saunders, 1993, p. 172-4; Herbert & Thomas, 1990, p. 142). 
4 Dialectical Materialism: This term points to two basic principles of Marx's method of analysis. A 
dialectical method holds that no single aspect of reality can be analyzed independently of the totality 
of social relations of which it forms a necessary part. Materialism refers to the principle that reality 
may rarely be directly reflected in consciousness. This means that the world may conceal its essential 
character. Thus science, according to Marx, has to penetrate the forms of appearance in which reality 
cloaks itself in order to discover the essential causal relations which lie behind and give rise to such 
appearances (Saunders, 1993, p. 16-18). 
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society as a source of social cohesion which changes over time, consequent upon the 
development of a complex division of labour in society. He advanced a" functionalist theory of 
religion" in which he suggested that religion functions as a unifying belief system, where its 
essential role is seen as the maintenance of social solidarity (Jary & Jary, 1995, p. 252). 
Durkheim differentiated between two types of social solidarity: mechanical solidarity which 
exists in traditional societies and is based on their moral bonds of "collective conscience", and 
organic solidarity in the industrial urbanized cities (Saunders, 1985, p. 79). Accordingly, 
Durkheim identified two types of society which correspond to his two forms of social solidarity. 
These are segmental societies, which resemble mechanical solidarity; and advanced societies, 
which correspond to organic solidarity. By " segmental society"', Durkheim meant that type of 
society which is made up of small groups linked together in a defined social territory, where 
they have close proximity to each other in social, economic, and political terms. Religion, 
through its beliefs and values, is the unifying factor of these segmental groups. On the other 
hand, advanced society is characterized by its size and diversity of population and a complex 
division of labour (Morrison, 1995, p. 139-40). Durkheim also linked social organization and its 
reflections in territorial and geographical distribution in cities and other areas (village or city, 
district, province, etc. ). He saw social organization in the Middle Ages as grounded in 
interdependence fostered by the division of labour, contiguous with the spatial boundaries of the 
corporate city; that is, territorial boundaries were at the same time social and economic. 
As to his methodology, stemming from a positivist attitude, Durkheim rejected the Marxist 
method of theorizing essences, and argued that essences can be directly ascertained through 
pure observation of appearance. He assumes that reality can be understood by observation, 
asserting that for social phenomena to be the subject of investigation it should be a "thing" and 
not an "idea" (Morrison, 1995, p. 156). Durkheim asserts that observation is the basis of 
knowledge, and consequently he denies any a priori theorization or conceptualization as a 
condition of knowledge (Saunders, 1993, p. 39). 
Another pioneer in the field of sociology, working almost in the same area and using the same 
empirical methodology as Durkheim and contemporary with him, is Toennies (1855-1936). 
Toennies wrote about the differences between what he called Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. 
He defined Gemeinschaft as community, based on traditional rural village life where social 
relations were based on kinship ties and traditional values. Gesellschaft society is one in which 
everything was based on formal and impersonal relationships. 
Weber's work is considered the most relevant in the field of historical urban sociology for this 
study, particularly his theory of cities. While Marx emphasized totality, the need to relate 
everything to everything else, and the identification of the essential causes behind social 
phenomena, Weber argued that only partial and one-sided accounts are possible and he seeks 
Durkheim used the term "segmental society" in a different meaning than used by later scholars, as 
described under the mosaic theory below (p. 34). 
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reality directly from pure phenomenal forms. His approach was a blend of the interpretive6 and 
positivist approaches; he combined explanation and understanding (verstehen) in a unitary 
methodology (Blaikie, 1993, p. 37). He considered understanding (verstehen) to be a method of 
elucidating the motivations for action (Jary & Jary, 1995, p. 336). Although all social events are 
historically unique, Weber pointed out the necessity of generalization in social research in order 
to arrive at casual explanations of those unique events. Weber wanted sociology to be a 
generalizing science in which abstract concepts are used to represent actual historical events 
and concrete courses of action (Blaikie, 1993, p. 178). In his work, this was done through the 
construction of ideal types. Weber insisted that we sometimes use the concept of ideal types 
without realizing it; for example, when we refer to "capitalist societies" we are employing an 
ideal type, for there are many variations between, say, France and the United States which we 
choose to ignore for the purpose of classification, while emphasizing those aspects they have in 
common and appear most relevant to our theoretical purpose (Saunders, 1993, p. 28,31). 
Ideal types are developed from the real world, on the basis of existing empirical knowledge of 
actual phenomena. They involve the logical extension of certain aspects of reality in a "pure" 
type, against which existing phenomena can be measured and compared. "Ideal", as Weber 
argued, signifies "pure" or "abstract" rather than normatively desirable. Ideal types are not 
models to be tested, although Weber himself often, implicitly, used his ideal type as a testable 
model. Since each ideal type covers one aspect of the phenomena, it is possible to construct 
different ideal types of the same phenomena, but they cannot be evaluated against each other. 
Therefore, as Weber says, ideal types are partial and subjective (Weber, 1949, p. 72). 
Using his ideal type method in his study of the city, Weber suggested that cities are defined in 
terms of economic and political organizations. Taking these two dimensions together, Weber 
constructed his ideal type of the city: 
To constitute a full urban community a settlement must display a relative 
predominance of trade-commercial relations with the settlement as a whole 
displaying the following features: 1) a fortification; 2) a market; 3) a court of its 
own and at least partially autonomous law; 4) a related form of association, and 5) at 
least partial autonomy and autocephaly, thus also an administration by authorities, in 
the election of whom the burghers participated (Weber, 1958, p. 80-81). 
This ideal type was based on the medieval European city, which Weber saw of significance in 
the development of Western capitalism. To show why cities in ancient times and those in other 
parts of the world in the Middle Ages failed to create these five conditions, Weber used the 
6 Interpretivism had its origins in the tradition of Hermeneutics. Interpretivism means the subordination 
of explanation and description to interpretation, which cannot be reduced to mere observation 
(Delanty, 1997, p. 40). Interpretivism takes into consideration the meanings and interpretations, the 
motives and intentions of people in their everyday lives. The major task of Interpretive social science 
is to discover why people do what they do by uncovering the largely tacit, mutual knowledge, and 
symbolic meanings, intentions, and rules, which provide the orientations for their actions. While, by 
the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, positivism has been 
widely adopted in England and France, interpretivism was adopted in Germany. Of its advocates are 
Weber (1864-1920), Schutz (1899-1959), and Winch (1926-) (Blaikie, 1993, p. 36-7,176). 
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same ideal type to compare the European city in the Middle Ages, which he called "the 
Occidental city" with other cities precedent to it and/or existing elsewhere, which he called 
"the Oriental city" (Weber, 1958', p. 89). 
Having developed this ideal type, Weber notes that general approximations to it are found only 
in the Occident during the medieval period, particularly in Northern European cities. Also, in 
terms of human association, only in the Western city in the Middle Ages did urban residents 
come together as individuals; while in other places and other times (such as in the Islamic 
cities) they formed associations on the basis of kinship. He argued that Christianity helped 
dissolve clan associations, while other religions, such as Islam, reinforced clan and tribal 
structure (Weber, 1973, p. 96,98). Thus, the people in the Oriental city remained segregated 
tribes, and as Cahnman describes them, were dwellers in the city but did not belong to it 
(Cahnman, 1995, p. 216). Having established these criteria for defining his ideal type of the city, 
Weber eliminates all those cities where authority had rested on a charismatic or traditional 
rather than a rational basis; all where the law was enforced on a personal rather than a 
universalistic basis; all those governed by religious groups (such as the Islamic cities) (Mellor, 
1977, p. 189). Proceeding from there, he considered Asiatic and Oriental cities (of which Islamic 
cities are part) as settlements of an urban economic character only and denies them the title of 
city (Weber, 1958, p. 88). 
Underpinning the importance of human associations in the Western medieval city, Weber 
highlighted the role of the guilds and communes in the development of a rational and 
individualistic economic affairs and of new legal and political forms (Weber, 1958, p. 223,204). 
For Weber, the Orient simply lacks the positive ingredients of Western rationality. The Oriental 
society can be defined thus as a system of absences: absent cities, the missing middle class, 
missing autonomous urban institutions, and the absence of legal rationality (Turner, 1991, p. 22). 
This summary of classical writings of the " fathers of sociology" in the field of urbanization and 
cities is of great importance in this part of our study. On the foundation they laid early in this 
century, many other works were based, influenced by their ideologies and views in general. 
Different approaches to studying the city emerged; two of them are worth mentioning here for 
their effect on studies of Islamic cities. They are, first, "the city as a cultural form", an 
approach begun by Simmel (1858-1919) and later developed by Wirth of the Chicago School; 
second, "the city as an ecological community", the approach of the Chicago School in the 
interwar period (Saunders, 1985, p. 70-71). 
By his essay "Metropolis and mental life" (1902-3), Simmel caused a shift in sociological 
concern which he, and later his successor Wirth, made very clear. Their concern was with the 
mode of life in capitalistic cities. Simmel focused on the city as an aggregation of individuals 
more than on the city as a physical entity. He viewed society as a web of interactions between 
people, and stressed human interactions and conflicts and proposed methods of analyzing them 
Weber's work "The city" was first published in German as a series of lectures in 1905. 
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(Abercrombie, 1994, p. 378-9). He attempted to define large cities in terms of social associations 
based on the individual, where social changes are derived from changes in the forms of such 
associations (Mellor, 1977, p. 18). He defined the city by its size, a method which Weber rejects 
for its insignificance (Mellor, 1977, p. 65-66). 
Thirty years later, in his article "Urbanism as a way of life" (1938), Wirth argued that ways of 
life in cities were anonymous, superficial and segmental, explaining this as the product of the 
size, density and heterogeneity of their settlements (Saunders, 1985, p. 72; Sennett, 1969, p. 149- 
158). His sociological definition of a city is "a relatively large, dense, and permanent settlement 
of socially heterogeneous individuals" (Jones, 1966, p. 8; Sennett, 1969, p. 145-148). 
The approaches discussed so far, although relevant to the purpose of this research, are too 
exclusively sociological, particularly in their disregard of the city as a spatial and physical 
entity. An attempt to marry both themes, the city as a place and the city as a social order, came 
from the Chicago School of human ecology in the 1920s, and were first set out in a book called 
The City by R. Park, E. Burgess and R. McKenzie (1925). The Chicago school of sociology 
was strongly influenced by social Darwinism, which believed in a natural process encapsulated 
in the phrase of "the survival of the fittest" (Greed, 1996, p. 218). Park emphasizes this natural 
process of existence, which he calls competition, as a characteristic of the "ecological 
community" in contrast to "society". Competition, for Park and Burgess, is identified as a 
universal and fundamental form of interaction, whereas the other forms of interaction which 
belong to the social or moral order are: conflict, accommodation and assimilation (Mellor, 
1977, p. 206). This approach, with less concern for urban space and land-use zones, dominated 
much of the urban research between the 1940s and the 1970s; thereafter a new critical approach 
emerged challenging this "traditional social science" approach (Feagin & Parker, 1990, p. 4). 
"Human ecology", in this sense, implies a very close relationship between population and 
environment; and it is constituted as the study of a basic process (competition) and its 
unintended effects (functional adaptation) (Saunders, 1985, p. 70). In other words, as Park and 
McKenzie argued, the separate communities (ecological communities) of the city were the end 
product of the process of invasion by which groups established control over a locality. They 
depicted the city as a natural system, consisting of "natural areas" or sub-areas (slums, 
neighbourhoods, central business district, industrial zones) in dynamic interaction; inhabited by 
ecological communities. Each had a specific function, but all contributed to the maintenance of 
the whole community of the city (Press et. al., 1980, p. 3). These natural areas are seen to foster 
the segregation of the urban population in the city and establish moral distances which makes 
the city "a mosaic of little worlds", which, according to Park, gives the city its diversity, 
novelty and excitement (Sennett, 1969, p. 126). ' 
By focusing on the competition/adaptation process in communities within cities, this approach can be 
criticised as being exclusive to this particular process in cities and neglecting other processes, social, 
political and economic. For example, of the important urban development issues missing from most 
research adopting this approach are capital investment decisions, power and resource inequality, and 
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The interest in the spatial delineation of human associations was supported by methodological 
concerns. It was this concept of adopting natural areas as units of study which dominated the 
work of Park's students. Natural areas are seen as a" frame of reference" within which 
sociologists can operate and undertake studies in large cities. Nevertheless, a conceptual 
reference to the whole city region should be always there, otherwise those studies will run the 
risk of misinterpreting the local situation (Mellor, 1977, p. 215). 
Not only are natural areas, in Park's view, the only basis for urban research, but they also 
"establish a working hypothesis in regard to other areas of the same kind" . To quote: 
It is assumed.. . that people 
living in natural areas of the same general 
type and subject to the same social conditions, will display, on the 
whole, the same characteristics (Park, 1955, p. 197) 
This is precisely the assumption made by all urban sociologists in undertaking local community 
studies (slums, suburbs, etc. ). By assuming this, Park was trying to accumulate a set of 
hypotheses as to the nature of urban existence generally; case studies of individual areas might 
be treated as studies of types and be used for comparative studies. That is, Park simplified his 
task by assuming that all cities were somehow similar, and that the social worlds of the city 
were in regular relationships (Mellor, 1977, p. 215-6). This construction of a theoretical ideal 
type of a community or natural area, based on a specific study, embodied a Weberian 
comparative methodology (see p. 26 above). Studies following such a methodology, based on a 
fallacious presumption of similarity between all cities to achieve generalization, ended up in 
being misleading. (The same comparative methodology and generalization were employed by 
Orientalists in their studies of Islamic cities, demonstrated in the next chapter). 
After this outline of the main classical studies in the field of urban sociology, it is useful to 
summarize the main themes and approaches developed throughout these studies. The focus is on 
those themes that affected later urban studies and in particular Orientalists' studies of Islamic 
cities. The main definitions of the city developed by scholars in different disciplines (historians, 
geographers, urban planners, sociologists, etc. ) are traced first, in an attempt to distinguish the 
city, as perceived by those scholars, from other physical entities. 
3.3 DEFINITIONS OF THE CITY 
Many attempts in different disciplines have been made to define the city; however, no universal 
definition acceptable to everyone has been put forward. For their importance to this study, some 
of the approaches adopted in defining the city are presented next. 
class and class conflict. Moreover, most social scientists adopting this approach have either neglected 
the role of government in city development or have assumed a pluralist perspective (Feagin et. al., 
1990, p. 22). Park, for example, centred his thesis upon the motive (competition for survival) of the 
process and its physical results (natural areas) without analysing the operative mechanisms that 
transformed the motive into physical reality. On the other hand, according to Saunders, as 
competition is a human motive, thus it is not excluded to people in cities; therefore, Park's theory of 
human ecology is not specifically urban; it is not considered as a theory of cities, as he claimed 
(Saunders, 1985, p. 71). 
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Simmel was one of those who defined the city by its size. Others (e. g. Weber) rejected this 
criterion for defining the city and argued that numbers alone mean very little (Mellor, 
1977, p. 65-66). Wirth developed Simmel's definition by bringing another criterion into it, 
that is, population density within a given area. 
(2) Definition by function 
Scholars using this approach tried to define and classify urban functions which should exist 
hence identify the city. Some of them considered the dominant mode of production as the 
defining urban characteristic, as Marx pinpointed early in his writings. In broad terms, they 
perceived the city as the place in which people are not primarily engaged in agriculture 
(Jones, 1966, p. 4-5). 
(3) Institutional definition 
Some studies, mainly carried out by historians, have tended to define the city in terms of 
one exclusive set of factors (Jones, 1966, p. 6). Different institutions: economic, political 
and administrative, or religious were taken as the focal point of those studies. 
Weber was the pioneer in defining the city in terms of economic and political 
organizations. He suggested an ideal type of the city with five main criteria (see p. 26 
above) based on the existence of certain economic and political aspects. 
Later, in his historical study of medieval cities, Pirenne, focusing on the economic factor, 
stated that all the facets of city life in medieval times could be explained in economic 
terms. He argued that it is the market and community of merchants that give the city its 
title. Pirenne distinguished sharply between a town and a city by the type of market that 
exists in each. A city can be considered so only in the case of the presence of a non-local 
market which serves as a foci for the surrounding areas (Pirenne, 1925; Jones, 1966, p. 6). 
On the other hand, Maitland, influenced by Weber, stressed the importance of legal 
institutions in defining the city and in the distinction between city and village (Jones, 
1966, p. 7). Simmel and Wirth based their defmition of the city on its social institutions. 
They focused on the quality of relationships between people in urban life, but they did not 
come to any possible method of measuring this quality (Press, 1980, p. 49). 
3.4 THEMES AND THEORIES 
Some substantive themes and theories can be extracted from the main approaches presented 
above. Later scholars (Orientalists among them) adopted and used those themes and theories as 
bases for their urban studies. These themes were parts of major theories and were used 
sometimes as tools of clarification, understanding or interpreting other more important (in the 
scholar's view) aspects of a major theory. In other words, those themes were just auxiliary tools 
for developing that theory. 
These themes are classified here according to their methodological approaches, with subtitles 
based on their main focus. 
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The idea of dualism means bringing two oppositions together to find the similarities or 
differences between them. In this theory, scholars sometimes presume the existence of 
these two oppositions only. For example, in the case of the industrial / pre-industrial cities 
dichotomy (clarified below), scholars ignored any other city type that might have occurred 
at any other time or place than that covered by their industrial / pre-industrial distinction. 
(1) Contrast theory: rural-urban dichotomy 
Distinction between traditional (rural) and modern (urban) communities. This country- 
town dichotomy was initiated by the fathers of sociology in different manners. Marx 
pinpointed this antagonism, claiming that it arose from the private property system and the 
mode of production, and that it is a feature of a capitalistic regime. Durkheim, Simmel, 
Toennies and Redfield based their distinctions on the patterns of social relationships. 
(2) Industrial/ pre-industrial cities 
This dualism was unintentionally initiated through the first studies in urban sociology. 
They investigated the changes which occurred in industrial capitalistic societies by 
referring to their roots in a pre-industrial era. Afterwards, scholars, such as Sjoberg in his 
"Pre-industrial city" (1960), concentrated on this dichotomy and based their studies on it. 
This dichotomy considered cities as split into two, and only two, types: industrial and pre- 
industrial. The general labels, industrial and pre-industrial, presume an overriding 
similarity between all industrial cities and between all pre-industrial cities regardless of 
their geographical location, their cultural bases and other aspects. The pre-industrial era 
covers all history from antiquity to the industrial revolution everywhere, so if all of this 
enormous era and geographical diversity is to be studied under one single label, then the 
study is falsely circumscribed from the beginning. 
(3) Oriental/ Occidental cities 
Influenced by the modern attitudes of universalism and the superiority of the West, Weber 
stressed this dichotomy in his study of the city in 1905. He made a clear distinction 
between the Occidental city, which he saw as the model of cities as it matched his ideal 
type of the city, and the Oriental city. The Occidental city was the medieval European city, 
while the Oriental city was any non-Western city that existed at the same time or before. 
Weber made his generalization about all non-Western cities and considered them to be 
similar, regardless of their origins, regimes, or evident characteristics. 
(4) Parasitic/ Generative city theory 
This dichotomy distinguishes between the productive (generative) city and the consuming 
city which lives on the production of surrounding areas (parasitic) (e. g. Weber, 1958; 
Jefferson, 1939; Hoselitz, 1955). Cahnman (1995) also highlighted this distinction. 
Influenced by Weber and other Orientalists' studies, he drew examples of the consuming 
cities from the Islamic world, arguing that fortress or a court city like Fez in Morocco, 
religious cities like Mecca and Medina in Arabia, and Kerbela in Iraq, are of this type. 
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Comparative theories revolve around constructing or presuming an ideal type or model (the 
main unit of comparison) with which other phenomena are compared. A major 
methodological issue is whether this suggested model or type and the indicators chosen for 
comparison are genuinely comparable and can legitimately be used outside their specific 
cultural settings. This model or type is constructed by the scholar himself, emphasizing a 
certain issue for the purpose of his study. 
(1) Ideal-type theory 
This theory was established by Weber as a method to study any phenomena through 
comparing it with hypothetically constructed ideal-types. The application of this ideal-type 
method to cities stemmed from the assumption that cities are virtually similar, in principle. 
Therefore, Weber treated cities in general terms, comparing any city, at any time and place, 
with his subjectively constructed, partial ideal-type. 
(2) Territorial similarity 
This theory was suggested by Park of the Chicago School. It looks at the city through its 
functional and territorial zones (natural areas), and it assumes that each individual territory 
(slums, central business district) can constitute an ideal type to be used in studying similar 
territories elsewhere. Again, this comparative theme classifies territories into types, 
presuming similarities within each type, regardless of their location. 
3.4.3 Hermeneutic theories 
Literally, hermeneutics means making the obscure plain but is generally translated as "to 
interpret". Modern hermeneutics is concerned with understanding how a member of one 
culture or historical period grasps the experiences of a member of another culture or 
historical period (Balikie, 1995, p. 28-9). In our study, theories of hermeneutics refer to 
interpretations of cities and societies in order to understand how they operate. These 
interpretations took different directions, according to the focus of the study, but most were 
concerned with understanding the social structure within the city rather than the city itself. 
Hermeneutics is the process of grasping the unknown whole from the fragmented parts and 
using this whole in order to understand the parts. 
The difficulty of hermeneutic analysis lies in how to validate its interpretations. Scholars 
came to understand the whole of social actions and processes through suggested partial 
propositions (which might not exist in the first place) and then interpreting the whole 
setting through those propositions. The interpreter, in investigating territorial settings in 
certain society, for example, tries to recapture the original perspective within which that 
society acted and formulated its own territories. However, there is always a gap between 
interpretation and reality. Interpretations are always subjective, tentative and subject to 
revision. The following are the main perspectives constructed as tools to interpret the 
whole social and, sometimes, spatial settings of cities. 
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(1) Urban conflict theory 
The question of how social order is established and preserved in any society or social group 
has been a central issue in sociology. This urban conflict theory perceives the nature of a 
society as in a constant state of conflict, due to the differences in group interests. Society is 
held together not because of agreement, but because one group actively oppresses the 
others. This was clear in Marxist theory, which centers on a perceived clash between the 
interests of the presumed two basic classes of society, capitalists and workers (proletariat) 
(Greed, 1996, p. 216,229). Conflict would ultimately transform society. Within Marxism, 
various types of conflict, such as industrial or political, are always seen as manifestations 
of, and explained by, a deeper contradiction between capital and labour. 
The development of this theory assumed different forms. Simmel believed that conflicts in 
society had positive functions for social stability. Some other sociologists, mainly 
functionalists, saw conflicts as pathological rather than the normal state of a healthy social 
organism (Abercrombie, 1994, p. 80-81). Ethnic and minority groups conflicts with the 
majority, due to inequalities, are part of this theory. 
(2) Consensus theory 
This approach to social order assumes a degree of social consensus in the form of 
agreement over values and norms. This view was adopted by Durkheim, and has been 
closely associated with " functionalism" that, later, has been most fully developed in the 
writings of Talcott Parsons. 
(3) Natural process theory (Social Darwinism: survival of the fittest) 
Competition and adaptation was the theme suggested by Park in his human ecology theory 
to interpret the urban process of dividing the city into territorial zones. This theme, as 
Sjoberg (1960) argues, can only be applied to Western industrial cities and not necessarily 
to cities of other times or places, especially since it is grounded in a market-centered 
paradigm based on neo-classic economic theory. 
(4) Social stratification theory 
This theory perceives the city as containing a stratified society. It attempts to identify its 
classes or status groups according to presumed bases of inequality. That is, stratification 
has different dimensions, based on criteria of hierarchy, which includes wealth, power, age, 
religion, ethnicity or any other characteristic. Marx based his theory of stratification of the 
industrial-capitalistic society on economic and power bases. This was the stamp of many 
other later urban studies (mainly Marxist studies). 9 
As part of their social stratification studies, scholars of the Chicago School were concerned 
with studying specific classes of small groups, especially gangs (Greed, 1996, p. 218; 
Other scholars, while using this theme, argued that industrial societies' class-type stratification does 
not necessarily apply to other non-European societies like the USA, for example (Abercrombie, 1994, 
p. 413). These differences might be attributed to variations in values, ways of life, and cultural origins. 
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Whyte, 1943). They saw gangs as the product of the urban disorganization of working class 
communities. That is, men in gang groups were bound together by conflict with the wider 
community (Thrasher, 1927); this phenomenon was attributed to class conflict. 
(5) Mosaic theory (or plural society) 
Mosaic means a collection of different separated parts put together in one setting; each part 
does not belong to the whole setting and does not relate to its neighbors except that they all 
share the same setting. In terms of urban studies, it means the segmentation of the urban 
society of any given city, i. e. plural society. Despite the fact that people are living in the 
same city, they do not have any loyalty towards it; they are only dwellers there. 
This theory was originally developed in the light of Weber's investigation of Antiquity and 
non-European medieval societies. Social relationships in these societies were based on 
tribal and kinship ties, reflected in the territorial distribution of their settlements. Each 
territory constituted an independent entity with no relationships or communication with 
other territories. Also, there was no communication between these groups or with the 
higher authority. This tended to prevent the appearance of any communal association. 
Therefore the concept of the "community" was differentiated from that of the "state". 
This, he said, was the cause of the fragmentation and segregation of the city and its urban 
population (Weber, 1973). 
In his investigation of Islamic societies, Weber highlighted the structure of these societies 
which consisted of a wide mix of ethnic, religious and regional groups, bound together by 
tribal ties between the population. He attributed the preservation of this mosaic-type 
society to the Islamic religion itself. He argued that Islam, as indicated through history, 
never overcame the rural ties of Arabic tribal and clan association. Comparing Islam with 
Christianity in this respect, he argued that Christianity, through its emphasis on 
individualism, was the final element destroying the significance of clans in societies that 
became Christian (Weber, 1973, p. 96). Weber's study of Islamic societies was based 
implicitly on a constructed ideal-type which stemmed from the medieval European society 
that he saw as centered on the individual and his participation in the urban processes. He 
looked at non-matching societies as unhealthy societies, and tried to find the causes of this 
unhealthiness by comparing them with his ideal society. Thus, Islamic societies, based on 
clan associations and not on the individual, according to Weber, did not match his ideal 
type, and therefore were depicted by him as having pathological attributes. 
Later, the Chicago School elaborated this theory further, and came to believe that the city, 
through its natural areas, is nothing but "a mosaic of little worlds" (Sennett, 1969, p. 126). 
(6) Institutional theory 
Institutional theory looks at and interprets the city through the operation of its different 
types of institutions. Major complexes of institutions are conventionally identified: 
economic, political, cultural and social institutions. 
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(6.1) Economic and political institution-based theories 
Weber pinpointed to the significance of the city's economic and political institutions 
represented, in his study of medieval cities, by the market as economic institutions, and by 
guilds, corporations and autonomous communes as political institutions. 
(6.2) Social (human) associations 
This approach to the city analyses the patterns of relationships between the elements of its 
society. Departing from modernity's conceptions of individualism and citizenship, Weber 
referred to human associations in the city in terms of their basic bonds, whether based on 
individual or group relationships. He argued that the urban society in any city should be 
built around the individual citizen. There is no room for kinship and clan ties; if these are 
exhibited, the structure will not be called a city. He included this idea in his ideal type, 
which appeared to be a normative image of the urban society. 
Many other studies attempted to map the networks of relationships within a community, 
with the aim of revealing the social structure and patterns of communication. Durkheim 
emphasized the interrelationships within society which he viewed as based on an 
agreement (consensus) grounded on shared values and norms. He emphasized the role of 
religion as an integrative, consolidating system in society that works to generate and 
maintain social solidarity and equilibrium (stability). 
3.4.4 Descriptive theories 
This is an auxiliary theory for other major theories. It helps the scholar to proceed in 
developing his theory by clarifying, classifying and organizing, in a descriptive manner, 
the information gained about certain aspects of a society. 
The city as a pathological milieu 
This approach describes the city by highlighting its social pathological aspects (from the 
scholar's own view) in comparison with other ideal types of (healthy) social order. 
Durkheim used the term "health and morbidity" to refer to the two contrasting conditions 
of a society in terms of its healthiness (Morrison, 1995, p. 158). Examples of the latter can 
be drawn from traditional pre-industrial societies, while the industrial capitalistic societies 
were regarded as having pathological characteristics. 
3.4.5 Analytical hypothetical theories 
This type of theory has two consequential methods. The first is an analytical one, used as a 
prerequisite for the second, the hypothetical. The analysis of the structure of the city or the 
society done in the first stage are used to pave the way for the proposition of an ideal type 
or model for the central subject. 
Location theory 
This was developed by Burgess of the Chicago School (1927). He located different 
functions in the city, dividing it into land-use zones according to the function of each zone 
and to its residents' social class. This theory was based on empirical observation of the 
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growth and evolution of existing cities, such as the city of Chicago. Based on these 
empirical investigations and on the Chicago School's thoughts, Burgess proposed a 
concentric zone model of cities, which was later developed in different ways by other 
urban sociologists and urban planners (Greed, 1996, p. 218-220). This process of theorizing 
the evolution of cities follows an inductive methodology; i. e. forms generalizations based 
on observations of one or a few cases. For example, Burgess based his universal concentric 
zone model on observations of the city of Chicago, regardless of its specificity (the same 
method was adopted in studying Muslim cities, as explained in the next chapter). 
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The above Western urban studies constituted the main roots of Islamic urban studies, as 
developed in the West. Theories generated within these Western studies were adopted and 
reflected in Orientalists' studies of Islamic cities, particularly in terms of methodologies, 
themes and approaches. The effect of those classical theories of urban sociology was stronger at 
the beginning of Islamic urban studies than in later stages, when those theories were developed 
and took different shape. Also in later stages, other scholars from other disciplines, such as 
architecture and urban planning, participated in the field of Islamic urban studies and influenced 
the development of the field. New themes and approaches proved more useful in 
comprehending and illuminating different facets of Islamic cities. The influence of those roots 
on Islamic urban studies is the subject of the next chapter. 
Chapter Four 
Islamic Urban Studies 
4 
ISLAMIC URBAN STUDIES 
Influences 
The modernist intellectual [work about non-Western 
cultures] typically spoke with the confidence of standing at 
the cutting edge of time and being able to speak for others. 
(Huyssen, 1992, p. 69) 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Any field of knowledge is exposed to different external influences from its surrounding 
contexts, and during its evolution, to internal influences generated within the field itself and 
affecting later studies. This chapter is concerned with exploring those influences on Islamic 
urban studies as well as the effects of Western roots, demonstrated in the previous chapter, on 
these studies. 
While Western roots shaped Islamic urban studies epistemologically, external influences took 
part in formatting the origins of Islamic urban studies in terms of researchers' attitudes. Internal 
influences mean the effects of earlier studies on later ones. For example, when a new paradigm 
is established, this motivates some scholars to circle their thoughts within its orbit, whether 
defending or attacking it, accepting or rejecting it (Kuhn, 1970). Thus, this new paradigm, 
generated within a certain context and subject to external influences, acts as an internal 
influence on the course of later studies. Internal influences conveys the effects of both roots and 
external influences as well as their own effects. In other words, they are related both to the 
authors' level as well as the epistemological level of Islamic urban studies. 
Roots 
T 
Western 
Internal influences 
Urban External influences 
studies 
Uv 
Islamic 
rban 
Studies Orientalism 
(Fig. 4.1): Roots and influences of 
Islamic urban studies 
This chapter first looks closely at some of the external influences that have affected Islamic 
urban studies. To explore the internal influences and the effects of Western roots, it traces the 
main developments in the field of Islamic urban studies; highlighting the main sources, 
influences and arguments of relevant key studies since their beginnings up to the present time. 
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Up to the 1970s, Western Orientalists were mostly the leaders in the field of Islamic urban 
studies. Being Western and coming from a different society from the one they were studying 
(i. e. Muslim cities), Orientalists had certain a priori notions and presumptions about the Muslim 
world, and as individuals, they had their own values developed within their own contexts. These 
notions and values defined their attitudes and influenced their studies of Islamic cities. But, 
what were the most important external influences on Orientalists' studies of Islamic cities? In 
order to address this question, Orientalism as a Western movement is briefly examined. 
4.2.1 Orientalism 
Orientalism as a movement began in 19`h century Europe and covered different disciplines. 
Different debates exist about Orientalism's origins, nature, and its impacts on the Orient. ' As a 
movement, Orientalism acted as an external influence on the course of Islamic urban studies 
(fig. 4.1). This chapter will thus explore the impact of Orientalism on Islamic urban studies in 
terms of its notions and vision of the Orient, its cities and its people. 
Orientalism, as it relates to the Arab region, was an adjunct to Western territorial expansion in 
that region and was funded by the French government (Haneda and Miura, 1994, p. 2-3). It 
began as an introductory process of discovering and understanding the Arab region, a Western 
target of colonization (Al-Musawi, 1993, p. 28-34). In 1904, France organized a mission to 
undertake a general survey of the cities and tribes of Morocco. 2 The result was a concentrated 
multi-disciplinary study which covered the administrative structure and the political, religious 
and economic organizations of a number of cities. This mission was important, as it heralded 
the beginnings of Islamic urban studies. 
Orientalism, generally, started as a politically motivated movement to discover the Orient. Over 
time, other types of Orientalism emerged, according to their aims. In his controversial book, 
"Orientalism", Said distinguished between two types of Orientalism: political and academic, 
and between types of knowledge which each generated: political knowledge and pure 
knowledge, respectively (Sa'id, 1978, p. 2,9-11). 3 Accordingly, two types of Orientalists can be 
classified: first, the political Orientalists. Their studies match directly and consciously the 
The term "Orient" referred to the vast area east of Europe and included not only North Africa, the 
Middle East, and the Levant, but also India and the Far East. But as this chapter is confined to 
examine studies of Islamic cities in the Arab region, i. e. North Africa, the Middle East, and Iraq only, 
the term "Orient" will be used referring to this region specifically. 
Prior to thus survey, Napoleon did a comprehensive survey in his expedition to Egypt (1798). This 
survey was published in Description de 1' Egypte. However, from the French colonization of the 
Maghrib (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria) in the 19" century, exceedingly systematic field surveys 
were carried out, in conjunction with the needs of colonial administration (Hanida & Miura, 1994, 
p. 2). 
Actually, Said, implicitly, relates these two types of Orientalism, as he considers the two types as two 
faces of the same coin. They both, ultimately, lead to the same political Orientalism. Also, he found 
that the two types of knowledge, consciously or unconsciously, served the political aims of 
Orientalism because of the manner in which the produced material and information was used. 
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political plans of Orientalism. They produce political knowledge. Second, the individual 
Orientalists, who are researchers and/or writers dealing with the Orient as an area of their 
interest. They produce pure knowledge. 
Orientalism was based upon certain constructed notions, developed in the West by modernity4, 
and which, over time, became part of an indispensable reality that was rarely questioned. ' 
Among these notions is the Orient/Occident dichotomy (Sa'id, 1978, p. 2); the us/ other 
dichotomy which refers to the European doctrine of " us" as superior to all non-European 
nations and cultures (including Islamic civilizations) which Westerners refer to as "the other"; 
and European political hegemony and presumed superiority of knowledge and power over 
oriental backwardness. Orientalism, therefore, as defined by Said, is "a certain will or intention 
to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly 
different ... world.... 
It is a discourse that is. .. produced and exists 
in an uneven exchange with 
various kinds of power" (Sa'id, 1978, p. 12). Thus, if one accepts Sa'id's argument, the Orient 
was not a free subject of thought. A very large mass of Orientalist literature, some of which was 
about Islamic cities, consciously or unconsciously, was coloured by and circled around such 
preconceptual notions. Of course, the positive aspects of Orientalists studies are numerous. 
However, the focus in this chapter is on their negative impacts on Islamic urban studies. ' 
Orientalism tended to link Arab regions with Islam as a civilization, religion and culture, and 
considered any phenomenon arising in the civilization of a Muslim country as totally 
conditioned by Islam. Thus, Orientalists used the terms "Islamic institutions", "Islamic social 
and economic activities", " Islamic urban space", " Islamic art and architecture", " Islamic 
cities" etc. This approach was criticized and rejected by later scholars of Islamic cities, as 
shown in this chapter. 
In brief, external influences represented by Orientalism (through its preconceptual notions, 
especially the Occident/Orient distinction, and by Orientalists' individual values and notions) 
affected the manner of Orientalists' studies of Islamic cities. These effects were clear 
throughout Orientalists' earlier studies (e. g. Sauvaget, 1934); as the scope of the field of Islamic 
urban studies was relatively limited, undeveloped, and thus internal influences on it were 
minimum. Over time, as the scope of the field broadened, the effect of Orientalism as an 
external influence started to decline; many scholars (e. g. Lapidus, 1967; and Raymond, 1994) 
criticized and attempted to abandon Orientalism's preconceptions and notions. As local scholars 
contributed to the field at later times, and more disciplines participated in it, other sorts of 
Examples of these modem notions are explored in chapter five below. 
5 Although postmodernity (as shown in chapter five) claims to question such notions, certain ideas such 
as the superiority and hegemony of the West over the Orient persist. 
6 Sai'd's study of Orientalism is quite controversial. It created a wide debate about Orientalism, its 
nature, methods, positive and negative impacts, and the like. Although coloured by its presumptions 
and attitudes, Orientalists, in terms of Islamic urban studies, led to advancement of knowledge in this 
field. Most of their suggested studies, although criticized in this chapter, opened new horizons for 
studying the Muslim built environments. 
ISLAMIC URBAN STUDIES 40 
external influence affected Islamic urban studies. For example, local scholars' values and 
notions as indigenous members in the world investigated (the Orient) (e. g. whether such values 
are Western-based or locally-based; what position those scholars hold regarding modernization 
and similar issues), as well as their beliefs as Muslims. 
4.3 INTERNAL INFLUENCES 
To explore internal influences on Islamic urban studies, the main shifts of concern in studies of 
Islamic cities are traced. The focus is on studies by both Orientalists and local scholars of 
Islamic cities in the Middle East, Iraq and North Africa. Particular attention is paid to pioneer 
studies in the field from their beginnings up to the present time, such as Massignon (1920), W. 
Marcais (1928), Sauvaget (1934), G. Marcais (1940,1945), Brunschvig (1947), Grunebaum 
(1955), Cahen (1958), Ashtor (1956), Lapidus (1967), Abu-Lughod (1980,1987) as 
Orientalists, and such as Al-Hathloul (1981), Akbar (1984), and Hakim (1986) as local scholars. 
4.3.1 Islamic urban studies 
The term "Islamic city" dominated Orientalists' work in the field of Islamic urban studies from 
their beginnings. This could be explained as an attempt to understand all cities in the Islamic 
world as a whole in a unified and uniform manner. During the 19" century, as part of the French 
mission, the focus was on certain existing pre-modern Arab cities, such as Algiers, Tunisia and 
Fez, which Orientalists visited in the countries ruled by their governments. At the beginning of 
the 20`h century, French scholars continued to conduct more specialized studies of Islamic cities, 
particularly of those in North Africa. French studies were later extended to cover a few cities in 
Syria, such as Sauvaget's studies of Damascus and Aleppo (1934,1951). Conclusions drawn 
from such particular studies by French and later by other Western scholars were generalized, 
regardless of their time or location, assuming that any phenomena occurring in any Muslim city 
at any time was a characteristic of what Orientalists came to call "the Islamic city". 
Through these studies, Orientalists tried to define the Islamic city according to their discipline. 
Most of these definitions represented the Islamic city as an ahistorical (timeless) entity which is 
static, historically or geographically. Their definitions depended on what these Orientalists saw 
in the pre-modern Islamic cities they visited, and on their own hypothetical, reconstructed 
images of the Muslim city, based on a few descriptions in Muslim manuscripts. Such images 
disregarded cities' evolution. They dealt with Muslim manuscripts' descriptions as though the 
cities were static entities. In that sense Orientalists used modernity's universalism and the 
positivist method of generalization evident in the "Orient/Occident" dichotomy on their 
definitions of the Islamic city. Suprisingly, many later scholars considered these early studies as 
authoritative; they adopted them unquestionally without investigating their validity. 
Islamic urban studies went through different shifts and jumps in their centres of focus and 
approaches. Many recent writers have attempted to trace the different approaches to Islamic 
urban studies. Different classifications were created. Raymond (1994), Haneda and Miura 
(1994) classified these studies according to the geographical areas covered, such as the North 
African school and the Syrian school. Abu-Lughod (1987) described the main works of the 
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Orientalists chronologically, pinpointing the chain of successive authorities ('isnad). While 
those scholars focused only on the studies produced by Orientalists until the 1960s, Akbar made 
his classification by highlighting the main paradigms (centers of focus according to his 
classification) through which Islamic urban studies went, beginning in the twentieth century to 
the present time. He focused both on works by Orientalists and by local scholars (Akbar, 1994). 
Within the context of this study, to explore the effects of the Western roots as well as different 
influences on Islamic urban studies, categorization of the different paradigms of Islamic urban 
studies is based here on the research methodologies adopted by their authors, and on the main 
approaches and themes used. Those categories have been concluded from analysing relevant 
key Islamic urban studies. 
Methodologies denote the manner of study (e. g. descriptive, comparative, etc. ) and its 
epistemological bases ( e. g. positivist, interpretive, etc. ). Themes refer to the main centre of 
focus (e. g. functional or physical themes); however, approaches refer to the vision of the author 
towards the city, for example, whether it is static or dynamic. Logically, some studies of Islamic 
cities are considered authoritative, as they established other conceptions and influenced later 
works in the field of Islamic studies. Such key studies are grouped here under each category. 
The main approaches, methodologies and themes of research in the works of both Orientalists 
and local scholar are illustrated in fig. 4.2. 
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Fig. 4.2: Approaches, methodologies, and themes of Islamic urban studies. 
However, to understand those studies in relation to our current study, the following argument 
induced in this research from analysing those studies is presented first. Islamic urban studies 
presented in this chapter will be investigated in the light of this argument. 
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One of the main arguments this study develops is that the urban built environment in general 
consists of three interrelated levels or structures: first, the " manifested structure" defined as 
the physical status quo. This structure is visible and tangible. For example, the prevalence of 
dead-end streets and courtyard houses in Muslim built environment belongs to this level. 
Second, the intermediate level or the "operative structure", which is invisible yet perceptible. 
It is defined here as the tools that relate the visible effects to its perceptible causes, such as the 
city's institutions (political, administrative, economic, social, etc. ). It is called intermediate, 
since it functions as an intermediate tool between the other two structures. Such causes are not 
static but susceptible to change. Thirdly, the " imperceptible structure", defined as the 
underlying (relatively) static causes that produce the perceptible effects (operative and 
manifested). Such imperceptible causes are either static, as is the case in Islam, or relatively 
dynamic (change very slowly), as is the case in capitalism or socialism (as explained in chapter 
eight). This structure is invisible and latent. It embodies society's values, principles and 
mechanisms (generated by ideologies, or derived from religion as in the case of Islam). 
Therefore, this structure influences the built environment's two other structures. In a city, the 
"manifested structure" is the expression of the "imperceptible structure" implemented through 
the intermediate "operative structure" ; also the "manifested structure" affects the 
"imperceptible structure" through its effect on the "operative structure". It is an iterative, 
integrative process of interrelating the three structures together in any built environment. Cities 
might have similar manifested structures; however, their operative and imperceptible structures, 
in most cases, are different. Thus, to grasp a built environment, its manifested structure has to 
be investigated along with its other two structures. 
I. STATIC APPROACH 
As inferred from investigating the field of Islamic urban studies, this approach to viewing 
Islamic cities seems to have dominated most Islamic urban studies since their beginning. It is 
actually quite difficult to make a clear distinction between this approach and the dynamic 
approach. Some studies might appear to belong to both approaches according to the angle from 
which the study is perceived. According to our research, studies viewing cities as always static, 
i. e. unchangeable entities, whether analysed on the manifested (physical structure) or operative 
levels (such as through cities' institutions) are considered as adopting a static approach. 
Scholars through this ahistorical static (timeless) perspective dealt with the city as an end 
product and neglected the processes which generated it. They focused on outcomes rather than 
processes. Main methodologies and themes adopting this approach were: 
(1) DOCUMENTATIVE STUDIES 
This type of study emerged from Orientalists' fascination with art and architecture during 
their visits to Arab cities in North Africa and Syria. According to Orientalists' tradition, 
these were labeled "Islamic art" and "Islamic architecture". More attention was paid to 
buildings than to urban mechanisms of the city, people and life. In other words, they dealt 
with the city as artefact, focusing only on its manifested structure. 
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Initially, Orientalists, mainly historians and archaeologists, were interested in grand, 
monumental, formal buildings such as mosques, palaces and schools (madrasas) rather 
than in small more informal buildings. ' Sectors of cities containing domestic buildings, 
residential quarters and markets (suqs) were studied only at later times. Maps and detailed 
drawings of real or reconstructed images of urban sectors, streets and buildings were 
produced. One significant study was that of G. Marcais (1926) which, to the present day, is 
considered a reliable guide to most Islamic religious buildings in the Maghreb, Andalus 
and Sicily up to the 10 century. Le Toumeau (1957) did a similar study, exclusive to Fez. 
The pilot of such works in the Middle East was Creswell, noted for his significant 
contribution to the library of Islamic architecture. He produced two comprehensive studies 
of " Muslim" architecture in Iraq, Syria and Egypt, from the Arab conquest to the Mamluk 
dynasty: "Early Muslim architecture" (1932-40) and "The Muslim architecture of Egypt" 
(1952-9). They were richly supplemented with drawings and plans of reconstructed images 
and of existing buildings and cities. This made them useful aids to later studies. 
On the scale of cities as a whole, a few attempts were made to reproduce the urban 
structure of Islamic historic cities, drawing on historical materials and archaeological field 
surveys. The leader of such studies was Le Strange; his key work was "Baghdad during the 
Abbasid Caliphate" (1900). His reconstruction of the round city of Baghdad as it was built 
(145H. /762AD. ) by Al-Mansur was widely used by other scholars in the field. Other 
versions of this reconstructed map were produced later by other scholars, such as Herzfeld 
(1920) and Creswell (1940). 
In general, these documentative studies, either of buildings or cities, from their beginnings 
to present, were mostly descriptive; nevertheless, they were useful as a base for later 
analytical studies. Some scholars, such as Creswell, included in their studies some 
analytical ideas and contributed to the debate about Islamic cities, although insignificantly. 
(2) COMPARATIVE STUDIES 
The influence of some Western urban theories was quite clear in shaping the themes of 
these studies. Apparently, comparative and duality theories (described in the previous 
chapter), more than others, seemed to dominate, affect and colour the studies of Islamic 
cities following this methodology. Both of these theories, in one way or another, were 
embodied in Weber's ideal-type urban theory. 
That is, Weber's theory of the city was quite influential in shaping Islamic urban studies. In 
developing their theories, Orientalists either adopted Weber's ideal-type as it was or they 
developed, following his methodology, their own ideal-type of the Islamic city, limited 
only to Islamic cities. 
This is true also for documenatative studies of Western cities. They were concerned with recording 
and classifying monumental buildings in the investigated cities. 
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This does not mean ignoring the effect of other Western urban theories in shaping some of 
the studies of Islamic cities, but Weber's theory was almost the only one widely adopted 
and used as a complete theory and not as a partial theme forming part of, or used as a tool, 
in Islamic urban studies. 
Several factors favored this wide adoption: first, Weber's theory fits the preconceptions 
and notions of Orientalism about the Occident and the Orient and the significant distinction 
between them. Second, it was the only relevant theory at that time (beginning of 20th 
century) to focus, comprehensively, on cities through history in different areas. Cities were 
treated within Weber's theory as total social systems with many interrelated activities: 
economic, political, religious and legal, and not, as in Simmel and Wirth's studies, 
exclusive to one aspect of the city. Third, it produced an ideal-type of the city, which 
became considered as a defmition of the city. This ideal-type restricted the label of "city" 
to places with certain nominated items and components. Other urban theories used the city 
only as a condition for exploring other social phenomena, and did not consider the city as a 
physical entity or in relation to social processes taking place within it. 
Those who adopted Weber's ideal-type, based on the medieval European city, such as 
Massignon (1920), Ashtor (1956), and Cahen (1958), used it to test the "validity" of 
Islamic cities. They were looking for similarities between Islamic cities and the ideal-type 
city to validate their assumption of the universality of the city as a phenomena, regardless 
of its time or place. They forgot that even Weber himself made a distinction between the 
Northern and Southern medieval European cities when constructing his ideal-type, which 
ultimately he based on Northern European cities of a certain time. In other words, Weber's 
ideal-type stemmed from a specific and unique case of cities, which could not exist 
anywhere else at any other time. Nevertheless, it seems that Weber himself considered the 
city a static phenomena when he used his constructed ideal-type to test other settlements 
and cities elsewhere to determine whether they truly were cities (Weber, 1958). Some 
Orientalists, like W. Marcais (1928), Sauvaget (1934), and Grunebaum (1955), used this 
framework to examine the city in question (to establish whether it was a city or not). 
Others, like E. Wirth (1982), used the same framework to reach a definition of whether or 
not the city is Islamic, i. e. to examine the existence of the Islamic city. Put differently, the 
same concept was used, unknowingly, for two distinct purposes; to examine the 
"citization" (i. e. city-worthiness) of a certain settlement, and to examine the Islamization 
of a certain city (assuming that it is a city). 
As to the dualism theories, different types of dichotomies dominated Orientalists' studies. 
Some were used as the backbone of a study, while others were used just as supporting 
themes. Examples of these dichotomies are: the Orient/the Occident; modern/pre-modern; 
European/Islamic cities; ancient Roman/Islamic cities; the city/the country (rural/urban); 
parasitic/generative cities. 
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These dual, comparative-based theories embodied a certain degree of bias. Springing from 
their preconceptions, Orientalists tended to favour one of the two poles of the dichotomy, 
considering it as the model of comparison, and comparing the other pole with the first by 
enumerating what the other lacked. Sauvaget based his study of Damascus (1934) and later 
of Aleppo (1951) on a contrast between European [antique (Roman) and medieval] cities 
and Islamic cities. To prove the superiority of the former over the latter, he constructed an 
imaginary city ideal-type that does not exist in any single European city at any time. He 
considered ancient Roman cities as one facet of his ideal-type in terms of urban planning, 
and medieval European cities as another facet in terms of administration. Using this ideal- 
type in investigating the Muslim city, Sauvaget stated "The city is no longer considered as 
an entity, as a being in itself, complex and alive... " . 
He concluded that the Muslim city is 
no more than a non-city, and Muslim town planning is not planning at all (quoted in 
Raymond, 1994, p. 7). In his description of a "non-city", he characterized the city by what 
it is not. This approach of Sauvaget, and of some other Orientalists who drew similar 
conclusions supporting the same argument, such as Weulersse (1934) and Grunebaum 
(1955), does not obviously explain the city as much as criticize it. 
Using this methodology, different attempts looked at Islamic cities from different 
viewpoints. These studies can be broadly categorized according to whether they are 
descriptive or analytical, and as a sub-categorization, according to the main themes used in 
investigating Islamic cities. As some overlap existed between these themes, different 
themes were included in one single study. This is seen in the inclusion of one study in 
different categories of theme demonstrated below. 
(2.1) COMPARATIVE DESCRIPTIVE STUDIES 
Two categories of theme can be discerned in Orientalists' writings about Islamic urban 
studies. These are the functional themes and the physical themes. 
(1) Functional themes 
Hellenistic and ancient Roman cities were defined and characterized by their main physical 
elements and political institutions: government, gymnasium, theatre, market, baths, etc. 
(Grunebaum, 1954, p. 75; 1955, p. 141). Orientalists developed this idea into a dichotomy 
between these cities and Islamic cities, both implicitly and explicitly. Some Orientalists 
presumed the universality of the method of defining Greco-Roman cities; thus they 
adopted the method of defining the Roman city through enumerating the most significant 
elements, buildings and institutions, which appear in almost all Roman cities, to define the 
Islamic city. Such a method of definition stems from the observable manifested structure of 
the city. Orientalists defined the Islamic city by looking at the distinctive physical features 
which characterized some Islamic cities which they had studied, assuming that they existed 
in all Islamic cities. W. Marcais (1928), for example, defined the Islamic city by the 
existence of the Friday mosque (jami ), the market (suq) and the public bath (hammam). 
Abu-Lughod described Marcais's approach as an "etched idea" of the Islamic city, since 
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these elements can be found in other religious / cultural contexts and it has no topography 
(Abu-Lughod, 1987, p. 156). Eickelman also criticized this approach, claiming that these 
features are not exclusive to cities only; they exist also in villages in the Muslim world. He 
wrote: "this style of approach does not even define the city adequately in the context of the 
Muslim world" (Eickelman, 1974, p. 276). In this criticism, Eickelman focused on the 
distinction between town and country, an issue that gained wide attention amongst 
Orientalists, as explained below. 
Berque (1958) accepted W. Marcais's definition, yet transformed it into his own words as 
he defined the Islamic city in functional terms as a place for witness and for exchange, a 
somewhat different way of expressing the physical entities of a mosque and a market (Abu- 
Lughod, 1987, p. 159). Similarly, Le Tourneau (1957) found that the main elements of 
Islamic cities are the mosque, the central market and the citadel of the rulers. Proposing 
similar elements, Eickelman (1981) defined the Islamic city by the existence of the qasaba, 
mosque, suq and quarter as distinctive physical landmarks. 
Grunebaum alleged, with no convincing evidence, that as the distinctive elements 
suggested by W. Marcais were mentioned by medieval Muslim geographers, Muslims 
considered them as the main elements in defining their cities. He wrote: "So they 
(Muslims) define the town as a permanent settlement possessing a "cathedral mosque"... 
and a daily market. Besides, the public bath is usually mentioned when essential elements 
of a city are enumerated" (Grunebaum, 1954, p. 75). In his later articles, Grunebaum refers 
to these elements when examining an Islamic city as if their existence was in obedience to 
a rule (Grunebaum, 1955, p. 141,147), forgetting that he himself and other scholars 
constructed such rules, and that they were not invented by Muslims. 
Gardet (1954), influenced by Pirenne (1925) in defining the city in economic terms (see 
p. 30), pinpointed the suq (market) as its distinctive function (Haneda and Miura, 1994, 
p. 41). Wirth (1982) reached the same conclusion, but from a different course of study. 
Reviewing the distinctive physical features of cities in Western Asia and North Africa 
during the Islamic regime, he rejected the usefulness or "reality" of the concept of the 
"Muslim city", for the reason that every characteristic of cities in the Middle East and 
North Africa existed in ancient civilizations. None of those characteristics could be directly 
related to Islam as a religion. He found that only the suq is original, but argued that it is not 
much influenced by Islam. Therefore he suggested "to renounce the term "Islamic city" 
and to prefer the more general "Oriental city"... Islam seems to be more the inhabitant or 
occupant of Middle Eastern urban systems than the architect" (quoted in Raymond, 1994, 
p. 12). Wirth also rejected the designation of "Arab city", since such characteristics can 
also be found in non-Arab cities (Haneda and Miura, 1994, p. 40). In this sense, while 
admitting that there are numerous features in common among cities in North Africa and the 
Middle East, Wirth, implicitly, considered these settlements as cities and he attempted to 
examine the Islamization of these cities and not their "citization". Yet he did not tackle 
those distinctive features of these cities from a dynamic perspective examining the 
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processes of their production. He focused only on the manifested aspects of Islamic cities, 
ignoring the operative and imperceptible factors (e. g. values, norms, property rights) that 
produced them. Following Wirth's method, many cities around the world would thus be 
classified under the same category as cities, without any attached attribute such as Islamic 
or Christian. Most cities share the same main physical features such as the market, 
religious buildings (temples, mosques, churches), streets, and the like. The difference 
between cities does not lie in their manifested structures (physical end-product) but in the 
operative and imperceptible mechanisms embodied in the processes of their production. 
Since W. Marcais's implicit employment of the European/Islamic cities dichotomy in his 
definition of the Islamic city (1928), some Orientalists have used this dichotomy as well as 
the contrast duality (the contrast between town and country, see p. 3 1) in defining the 
Islamic city and distinguishing it from the villages in the Islamic world. They were 
searching for a definition that could be used for testing both the Islamization and citization 
of cities in the Islamic world. 
Basing their definitions on these two dichotomies, some Orientalists, such as Chater, 
tended to underline the main features distinguishing cities from villages. Chater (1978) 
noted that while both cities and villages have congregational mosques and public baths, 
villages contain a type of suq different from that in the city. In this sense, Chater 
considered the congregational mosque as a feature of both city and village (Haneda and 
Miura, 1994, p. 41). A criticism of Chater's argument as exclusive to later Islamic periods 
only is implicit in Johansen's work (1981). In early Islam, as Johansen stated, the presence 
of a Friday mosque presented a clear indicator to differentiate between cities and rural 
villages, since they were constructed exclusively in cities. But at later times, the Friday 
mosque was no longer a characteristic which distinguished between the two. Berque (1958) 
stressed this differentiation between city and rural village by function rather than form, 
such as the three elements of congregational mosque, suq and public bath, as defined by W. 
Marcais. He claimed that in Islamic cities Islamic law functions, while in villages custom 
rather than law prevails (Haneda and Miura, 1994, p. 29). 
In using this contrast theory to explore the functional relationship between the city and the 
countryside, some Orientalists attempted to make a further distinction between the two by 
employing another dualism, the parasitic / generative dichotomy. As Raymond explained 
"It is partly to J. Weulersse ... that we owe the concept of the 
Arab city as a parasitic 
body" (Raymond, 1994, p. 5). To quote Weulersse, who used this concept in his description 
of cities in the Orient: "In the Orient, the city appears as a foreign body "encysted" in the 
country like a creation imposed on the countryside it dominates and exploits. " He added 
that the reasons for this phenomena were that the city is "without human roots in the 
country that supports it and on which it lives ... The city's inhabitants thus [appear] as a 
drifting population ... Their only link with the countryside being the desire to exploit it to 
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the hilt ... 
The economic activities of the cities thus seem essentially parasitic ... 
The city... 
consumes but does not produce. '" Hourani rejected this parasitic/generative dichotomy 
which pictures the village as the productive (generative) and the city as the consumptive 
(parasitic). He stated that the village needed the city as much as the city needed the village. 
Thence, he considered both the city and the village as two mutually dependent components 
of one unit, which he called the "agro-city" (Hourani, 1965, p. 16). 
(2) Physical themes 
Despite W. Marcais's significant influence on later studies, because of his functional 
definition of Islamic cities (1928), studies using physical themes are considered more 
advanced in terms of understanding Islamic cities than those which described and defined 
Islamic cities by function only. 
If one considers the comparative dual approach as a framework under which other sub- 
frameworks emerged, then it is possible to list three sub-frameworks that helped to shape 
some of the physical themes in question. These are: first, European/Islamic dichotomy; 
second, territorial and location theory; and third, physical mosaic theory (territoriality). 
EUROPEAN/ISLAMIC CITIES DICHOTOMY 
Employing this contrastive dualism, some scholars described the Islamic city by specifying 
where and how the Islamic city differed from the European city, which they considered as 
the ideal city type. Fascinated with antique Roman town planning characterized by its 
organized and planned tissue and grand monuments, Sauvaget (1934,1951) tended to 
define the "Muslim" city9 by enumerating all those elements it obviously lacked, that is: 
the regularity and institutions of the antique city and the communes of the medieval town 
(the latter are described in the institutional themes below). Denying the originality of the 
monuments of the Muslim city, he added that those monuments give only a depreciated 
image of those in the antique Roman city: "the souks, the qaisariya, the khan ... are 
but a 
degeneration of avenues with colonnades, of the basilica, of the agora" 1° (Raymond, 1994, 
p. 6). Grunebaum, in the same vein, declared, without any evidence, that " It is certain that 
the qaisariya (covered market) was developed from the Byzantine basilike" (Grunebaum, 
1955, p. 146). As to urban tissue, Sauvaget envisaged Muslim urbanism as subversive of the 
ancient Roman cities that preceded them. In his study of Aleppo (1951), he claimed that the 
Muslim era "is unaccompanied by any positive contribution ... the only thing we can credit 
it with is the dislocation of the urban center, its fragmentation into small, distinct and even 
sometimes anti-nomical cells ... the work of Islam is essentially negative" (cited in 
Raymond, 1994, p. 7). 
8 This quotation has been translated by A. Raymond (1994) from Weulersse, J (1946). Paysans de Syrie 
et du yroche-Orient. Paris. 
9 Sauvaget used the term, the "Muslim" city, and not the "Islamic city". 
10 This quotation has been translated by A. Raymond (1994) from Sauvaget, J (1951). Alen. essai sur le 
developpement d 'une 
. r: rande ville svrienne. Paris. 
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In depicting the Islamic city, Sauvaget, Weuleresse, Creswell and other Orientalists, dealt 
with it as if had a static status. Le Tourneau (1957) wrote: "an aerial photograph of any 
Muslim city makes us think of a maze, or a labyrinth" (bold emphasis added). In this way, 
they characterized the "Muslim" city in physical terms as anarchic, by underlining the 
irregularity of its streets, not perceiving the imperceptible mechanisms which had created 
this irregularity. In other words, the European/Islamic dualism was applied on the 
manifested level of Islamic cities only, and not to the imperceptible level. 
Grunebaum viewed medieval Latin, Greek and Islamic civilizations as basically related 
civilizations. For him, the Greek intellectual heritage was the common element between 
Latin, Byzantine and Islamic civilizations, while some of the differences between the three 
civilizations were to be understood in their differing uses of the classical heritage (Wilson, 
1976, p. 3). Grunebaum in that sense interpreted those cities on their manifested level only, 
assuming that similarities on that level mean similarity between cities. Such a method did 
not consider the underlying mechanisms that are responsible for producing such manifested 
similarities. This approach, however, influenced many other later scholarly expositions 
which constitute an effort to trace the Greek cultural element in classical Islamic 
civilization or the divergences between Byzantine and Islamic civilizations. 
Opposing studies refuted such disparaging comparisons between the Islamic city and the 
city of classical antiquity. Raymond, for example, criticized the ideas of attributing the 
destruction of the antique city's regularity to the development of the Muslim city, and of 
asserting that the Muslim city replaced Greco-Roman order (physically orthogonal) and 
organization with a structure based on no apparent logical principal. He described this 
approach as " fundamentally negative" (Raymond, 1994, p. 6). Cahen (1958) advised the 
avoidance of considering pre-Islamic urban history "through traditional images of an 
impeccable antique city ... The city 
inherited by Islam is no longer an antique city" (quoted 
in Raymond, 1994, p. 11). This theme was convincingly used again by Kennedy as he noted 
that before the appearance of Islam, in urban communities of the fifth and sixth centuries in 
Syria, "there was no classical town plan to affect later growth ... The streets were narrow 
winding paths, there was no agora, no colonnades, no theatre" (Kennedy, 1985, p. 13-14). 
Based on such arguments, Sauvaget's theory (the Muslim city as a depreciated image of the 
antique Greco-Roman city) was challenged and somewhat undermined and refuted. 
TERRITORIAL AND LOCATION THEORY 
Other scholars looked at the Islamic city composed of several functional and territorial 
zones (called "natural areas" by Park of the Chicago School, see p. 28 above). Assuming 
a similarity in all Islamic cities, they concluded that there was a typical pattern of 
functional distribution in Islamic cities. This territorial vision was developed into a model 
of the Islamic city, based on the location of each function (location theory, p. 35 above). 
Early studies, such as W. Marcais's, were concerned with pinpointing the distinctive 
functional features of the Islamic city, yet they included no morphological analysis. As 
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Abu-Lughod stated, "It is George Marcais, however, who gives a morphology to the 
Islamic city" (Abu-Lughod, 1987, p. 156). G. Marcais (1940,1945) described the Islamic 
city in terms of its physical elements and organization. He remarked on the differences 
between residential and non-residential quarters and found that residential quarters were 
often distributed according to ethnicity or specialization. Also, city markets, he suggested, 
were ordered in a certain hierarchy which is not completely accidental. 
G. Marcais (1940), based on his empirical investigations in North Africa, and then 
Grunebaum (1955), as the latter uncritically quoted and paraphrased the former, described 
the order of the functional zones' distribution in Islamic cities. The center was occupied by 
the great mosque and the government office (dar al-'imara)"; from the center towards the 
gates in the city wall, a hierarchy of different types of economic commercial activity (suqs) 
was located: suq of candles and perfumes, bookstores, suq of slippers and leather, suq of 
textiles, the Qaysariyyah (cloth market)'2, suq of hats, etc.; other types of market and fairs 
existed out beyond the gates; and in the open countryside, cemeteries were located. For 
Grunebaum, markets in all Islamic lands exhibited the same general structure. As to the 
city quarters, Grunebaum argued that the unity of the Muslim town was functional and not 
civic. He conceived the residential quarter as a self-sufficient zone "complete with its own 
mosque, bath, and, as a rule, its own market", penetrated by narrow streets with no open 
spaces, and occupied according to the inhabitants' tribe or ethnic origin. Grunebaum, 
confusingly, applied the essential elements of the Islamic city as a whole, adopted from W. 
Marcais (1928), to the scale of the residential quarter. In this description, the residential 
quarters seemed to be separated, with no direct contacts between them. 
These descriptive attempts by G. Marcais and later by Grunebaum were the first steps in 
the construction of a model of the Muslim city based on the relationship between territory 
and functions. This model was adopted by many later scholars, such as Le Tourneau (1949, 
1961) and Coon (1952) in their studies of Fez (fig 4.3). Nevertheless, it should be 
mentioned that this first model included some obvious deficiencies. First, adopting a 
positivist inductive methodology, it was derived from evidence obtained from investigating 
certain cities in North Africa, and then generalized as a model that applies to all Islamic 
cities. Second, greater attention was paid in G. Marcais' study to the physical setting than 
to the social structure of the city, and neither he nor Grunebaum attempted to explore the 
imperceptible structure of this particular physical/functional pattern of Islamic city. 
Instead, they concentrated their attention on describing physical manifestations. 
Other physical models of the Islamic city were constructed. Moneir (Arabic scholar) 
(1971), influenced by the Islamic city model of G. Marcais and Grunebaum, seemed to 
The government office was mentioned only by Grunebaum and not by Marcais. 
'Z Qaisariyyah, according to G. Marcais, is a secure place encircled by walls where foreign merchants, 
mostly Christians, come to display their cloth materials brought from all European countries (Abu- 
Lughod, 1987, p. 157). 
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have derived his model, as al-Sayyad concluded, from medieval Cairo (fig 4.4) (al-Sayyad, 
1991, p.24). Under the same influences, 'Isma'il (1972), incorporating G. Marcais­
Grunebaum model, based his study on the medieval cities of Cairo, Damascus and Aleppo, 
describing land-use patterns and the patterns of later physical growth. He assumed a 
similarity between Arab Islamic cities in their consequential patterns of urban growth. He 
suggested four successive patterns of growth, starting with the early medieval Arab cities 
(the beginning of the l61h c. AD.) and ending with their modern and contemporary period 
(fig. 4.5) ('Isma'il, 1972, p.122). Those two and other similar models can be criticized as 
embodying the same deficiencies of the initial model. 
I. Friday mosque
2. Markets (Suq)
3. Public bath (Hammam)
4. Residential quarters
Fig. (4.3) The stereotypical Muslim city of North Africa, 
based on G. Marcais ( 1945), and Grunebaum 
( 1955), (after al-Sayyad, 1991 ). 
I. Main mosque
2. Royal quarter
3. Markets (rnq) 
4. Main thoroughfare
5. Residential quarter
6. Walls and gates
7. Citadel
Fig. (4.4) A diagrammatic plan of a typical Muslim city, 
according to Moneir ( 1971 ). 
(after al-Sayyad, 1991 ). 
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I. Jami' mosque
2. Specialized markets (suq)
3. Square (Maiydan)
4. Suq of the thoroughfare with khans
at both ends
5. Residential quarters with their own
Mosque, markets, and bath house
6. Hammam
7. Citadel with government complex
8. Walls and gates
9. Cemetery
I 0. Semi-rural districts
Fig. (4.5) A schematic plan of the early medieval Arab city, 
according to 'lsma'il (1972). 
(after al-Sayyad, 1991 ). 
PHYSICAL MOSAIC THEORY (TERRITORIALITY) 
52 
Two consequential or mutual types of the Mosaic theory can be distinguished: the spatial 
mosaic theory and the social mosaic theory. The former is briefly explained here, while the 
latter is explored later in this chapter (section 1.1.b, p.59). 
Some Orientalists, such as Sauvaget, Grunebaum, and Gibb, pictured the Islamic city as a 
collection of segregated aggregates of quarters without an overall integration, or, in 
Sauvaget's words ( 1951), "an inconsistent and inorganic assembly of quarters" ( cited in 
Raymond, 1994, p.7). They described the residential quarters, based on their exegesis of 
social relationships and social institutions, as isolated introverted spatial entities, 
characterized by racial, or tribal, or religious homogeneity, with no social contacts but with 
conflicts between the inhabitants of different quarters. In that sense, Grunebaum reported 
"Not infrequently, the individual quarters are walled13 and their gates locked during the 
night to counteract the insecurity of the town which is, after all, due in large measure to the 
perennial interquarter animosities" (Grunebaum, 1955, p.14 7-8). 14 Thus, as Sauvaget put 
it: "the Muslim city is no longer considered as a single entity, existing in itself, complex 
and alive: now, it is just a gathering of individuals with conflicting interests who, each in 
his own sphere, acts on his own account" (cited in Raymond, 1994, p.7). 
13 In later studies, Akbar showed that this is wrong. Quarters in Muslim cities connect to each other 
through physical elements such as overpasses, doors between houses, and alike (Akbar, 1988, p.164). 
,� While Grunabaum visualized the gates of quarters as defensive, Akbar pictured them as signs of 
territories that demarcate zones of responsibilities and thus, breaking down the task of maintaining the 
city to smaller more responsible groups (Akbar, 1988). 
copyrighted image removed
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When referring such Orientalists' descriptions of the Muslim city to their overall studies, 
one can recognize certain contradictions in their descriptions. On the one hand, adopting 
the consensus theory and reflecting the functional theory of religion (advanced by 
Durkheim, explored in chapter three), Orientalists highlighted Islam as a religion of cities, 
which unites its believers into one society (umma). They also realized the significance of 
the Islamic law in governing the Islamic city (explained below). On the other hand, 
affected by the conflict theory, when describing the Islamic city as a mosaic city, they 
focused only on secular relationships between people and their reflections in the spatial 
distribution of the city, stressing conflicts between people and ignoring what they stated 
elsewhere in their studies about the unifying Islam. Thus, they confused two antagonistic 
positions: consensus and conflict. Moreover, in stressing issues such as social 
stratification based on ethnic or tribal grounds (e. g. Grunebaum, 1955), they ignored the 
fact that inhabitants of different quarters in the Muslim city were mostly Muslims, 
regardless of their ethnic or tribal origins. Thus Islam performed as a unifying element 
between those inhabitants and quarters. Orientalists in this regard saw only the physical 
territorial structure (according to their perception) of the Muslim city, represented mainly 
by its quarters, and marked by their gates. 
Moreover, such a territorial structure was constructed according to Orientalists's 
perception of the Muslim city. For example, gates were interpreted physically as a sign of 
quarters' autonomy and thus isolation. However, as explained later in this study, gates are 
signs of the autonomous status of quarters in terms of control and rights distribution 
(imperceptible structure) and not of isolation (manifested). Thus, Orientalists interpreted 
such territoriality as a sign of mosaic-like physical and social relations, unaware of the 
imperceptible Islamic mechanisms that unite such, manifestly, isolated units. That is, as 
explained in chapter seven below, Islam set several mechanisms that force inhabitants to 
unite in the different quarters and in the city as a whole. For example, it motivates Muslims 
to take care of their neighbors and of each other generally, and established some 
mechanisms to guarantee this, such as the taxation system of zaka, sadaqa, etc. If such 
mechanisms were applied there is no room for social rupture between Muslim inhabitants 
living in different quarters. This does not necessarily mean that there were no disputes and 
conflicts between inhabitants in one quarter and between different quarters, but many 
disputes and conflicts were mostly on individual scale and did not prevent social and 
spatial interactions. 15 This issue is elaborated further under the social mosaic theory 
discussed later (p. 59). 
(2.2) COMPARATIVE ANALYTICAL STUDIES 
Adopting a comparative methodology, some Orientalists employed an analytical approach 
in their investigations of Muslim cities. The main focus of such studies was the internal 
operative system of cities, as explained next. 
`S For spatial interactions, see Akbar, 199%, p. 136-40. 
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(1) The internal system 
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Scholars following the functional and physical themes paid particular attention to the 
morphology of the Islamic cities. They attempted to understand those cities directly 
through what their eyes could see, i. e. through the "manifested structure". Other scholars 
sought to understand Islamic cities, indirectly, through the " operative" or, although rarely, 
the " imperceptible" structure. They focused on the internal systems of those cities, 
emphasizing the importance of their institutions (political, social) and illuminating the 
structure of their Muslim society. As a result, those studies were more analytical and 
provided more understanding of Islamic cities. 
(1.1) Institution-based studies 
As part of understanding the city's "operative structure", special attention was directed 
towards investigating the operation of the city's institutions. Unfortunately, once more, 
using the traditional Orientalist dual-contrastive pattern of Europe versus Islam, 
Orientalists attempted to identify a number of institutions in the Islamic city which were 
equivalent to their counterparts in medieval European cities. Due to their importance in 
medieval European cities, certain types of institution gained more attention than others and 
occupied the centre of different debates in the field of Islamic urban studies. 
Influenced by Weber's ideal-type, in proving or disproving that Muslim cities possessed 
those significant institutions, scholars attempted as an ultimate target to verify the 
citicization of the Muslim city. Such studies tended to focus on a few institutions with no 
reference to the overall framework of the city's operational system. Furthermore, scholars 
attempted to amplify an institution's importance and role in the city's machinery in order 
to make it appear as essential. Those studies ended up being imitative in their comparative 
approach, and partial and exclusive in their course. The following are some of the 
significant institution-based studies that were recurrently quoted by other scholars. 
(a) Political and administrative institutions 
According to Weber, the "decisive" prerequisite of his "ideal-type" city is the partially 
autonomous administration of the city and the existence of an association of urbanites 
which acts as an administrative unit for the city and unites the city into a corporate (i. e. a 
commune or, as used by Weber, Gemeinde). In that respect, Weber was looking to the city, 
in terms of administration, "as a corporate per se". Applying it to Islamic cities, Weber did 
not consider them as cities due, he claimed, to their absence of "urban community" and of 
the concept of "citizenry", for "the idea of an association which could unite the city into a 
corporate was missing" in Islamic cities (Weber, 1958, p. 88). 
Based on Weber's theory, a presumption was formulated that Muslim cities lacked the 
existence of a central authority in their administration. Emanating from such an 
assumption, and employing the Western central/plural duality regarding the system of 
administration, Orientalists referred to the Western operative system of commune-type 
pluralism that prevailed in medieval European cities as an alternative to the central 
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authority, in the administration of Muslim cities. They looked in Muslim cities for a 
commune-like structure that justified their interpretations of the Muslim city. Therefore, a 
debate concerning commune-type autonomous functions emerged in studies of Islamic 
cities. This debate took three forms. First, the studies begun by Massignon (1920,1924) 
focused on guilds (professional corporations) as autonomous communes; second, studies 
which focused on the autonomous informal functional units of Muslim urban society as 
communes, for example those of Cahen (1958-9) and Ashtor (1956,1975); and third, 
studies which totally denied the existence of the concept of autonomous communes in the 
Islamic city, such as the study by Stem (1965). In such studies, Orientalists supposed the 
similarity between European and Muslim cities in their operative system (commune-based 
pluralism), ignoring any differences that might exist between the two types of cities on the 
imperceptible level. The operative and imperceptible structures of Muslim built 
environments differ substantially, as this thesis argues, from any model (central, plural) 
suggested or employed by Orientalists. It is based on the rights system as bestowed by 
shari `a (the Islamic legal system) without a need for a central authority (as explained in 
chapter seven). Such imperceptible differences would most likely produce different 
operative structures. Using the operative tools of the Western system to understand the 
Muslim system is considered here as a deficient method that leads to incompatibility and 
thus fallacious results as shown next. 
FIRST: GUILDS HIGHLIGHTED 
Based on the model of the commune; the self-governing municipality of medieval Europe, 
Massignon (1920,1924) asserted that guilds provided virtually the same functions in the 
Muslim city as the European communes. Based on his own field surveys in some 
Moroccan cities, analyzing the guilds' distribution in those cities, the organization of their 
members, and their internal system, Massignon recognized the autonomous character of 
Islamic urban guilds in the medieval period (9-12th centuries AD. ). Massignon perceived of 
the guilds as constituting the basic structure of the Muslim city. He emphasized the socially 
integrative functions of the guilds from below, and also discussed how they operated 
following, as he claimed, the regulations of the muhtasib (market inspector), the agent of 
the state16 (Haneda and Miura, 1994, p. 20,34). Miura criticized Massignon's work as 
"defective as historical research", because he depended more on field surveys than on 
historical documents (Haneda and Miura, 1994, p. 88). Similarly, Eickelman proclaimed 
that Massignon never produced evidence to support his assertion (Eickelman, 1974, p. 276). 
Nevertheless, many studies, such as those of Lewis (1937), and Gibb and Brown (1950-7), 
emerged which adopted Massignon's theory in investigating guilds in Islamic cities. 
16 Note in the text the claim of Massignon concerning the regulations of the muhtasib as an agent of the 
state. Such a claim will be refuted in chapter seven below when exploring the role of the state and of 
the muhtasib in the Muslim built environment. In short, Massignon looked only at the rulings reached 
by the muhtasib regarding cases in the market, thus considered them as regulations. He did not 
investigate the mechanisms operating in reaching such rulings. The muhtasib's rulings, as described 
in chapter seven, are not regulations but vary according to the case in question. 
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Grunebaum's position regarding the autonomy of Islamic cities sways between focus on 
formal and informal units (i. e. between the first two forms of debate). He (1955) denied 
that the Muslim town had autonomy in the sense of the European commune, saying it 
lacked any specified form of citizenship and municipal organization. However, he 
suggested that this lack of municipal organization in the Muslim town was compensated 
for by the residential quarters with their sheikhs (plural of sheikh, head of the quarter) and 
by guild-like associations with no system of political integration between their people, but 
with ethnic, religious or occupational integration. He agreed with Massignon, stating that 
the heads of quarters and the heads of guild-like associations of trades knitted the social 
organization together as they were intermediate between the townspeople and the state, and 
in that sense they fulfilled an autonomous function. But, at the same time, Grunebaum 
asserted that those city guilds and quarters were under the overlay of the state as, at certain 
times, they were controlled by state-designated officials. Thus, eventually, guilds and 
quarters attained a limited autonomy due to state intervention (Grunebaum, 1955, p. 142, 
149-51). In their studies, Massignon and Grunebaum highlighted the role of the state, as 
perceived in their Western environments, in regulating Muslim cities. Focusing on the 
operative structure of the city without investigating its related imperceptible structure, such 
Orientalists perceived the state in Islam as a regulative device that, through its " designated 
officials" such as the muhtasib, intervenes in the city's residential quarters and trade 
"guilds". This view of the state reflects the concept of the modern state, prevalent in 
Orientalists' own environments (explored in chapter five), based on its acquired power to 
intervene and regulate its people's affairs. Non-consideration of the real imperceptible 
structure that performed as a regulatory device in Muslim built environments led to such 
misinterpretations of Muslim cities. 
SECOND: AUTONOMOUS INFORMAL UNITS 
Cahen and Ashtor adopted the theme of autonomy in their studies of Islamic cities; 
however, relying on their analysis of Islamic historical material, they developed a new 
theory of the autonomous city, asserting that the traditional Muslim city was indeed an 
active municipal entity. They focused on the autonomy of the informal structure of the 
city, mainly on the autonomous role played by gangs in their protection of the quarters and 
the city, and in maintaining their security. 
Ashtor (1956,1958) focused on autonomous movements of gangs in some Syrian cities 
during the 1l'h and 12'x' centuries (AD. ). He highlighted the integration between qadi 
(judge) and muhtasib, as part of the state, and ra'is (chairman) and 'ahdath (juvenile), as 
part of urban residents, in performing an autonomous role in those cities. Ashtor located 
these gang movements in a line of continuity with the Hellenistic-Roman tradition of 
autonomy. In his study (1958-9), affected by the role of guilds in the West, Cahen 
challenged Massignon's theory of guilds, stressing that such professional corporations 
were only instruments of state control. He analyzed Syrian and Iraqi cities in the 10-12'h 
centuries and concluded that urban autonomy was maintained by an organization of the 
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urban outlaws called 'ahdath in Syria and 'ayyarun in Iraq (Haneda and Miura, 1994, p. 35, 
88). This theory was also adopted by Brett in his study of Tripoli in North Africa (1986). 
It seems that Cahen and Ashtor were influenced not only by Weber's theory of communes, 
but also by the Western urban sociological studies of social stratification, particularly of 
the gangs, such as those conducted by the Chicago School. This type of gang study greatly 
affected the studies of social structure (e. g. Lapidus' studies, demonstrated below); 
scholars focused on types of gangs as a significant strata of Muslim urban society. Due to 
the large number of studies focusing on one strata of the populace or one or another type of 
gang, Muslim societies were perceived as over-stratified and fragmented into different 
types of gangs and disputing groups. 
Other studies emerged, taking up squarely this theory of autonomy. In his study of Sale' in 
Morocco, Brown (1976) stressed that the inhabitants of Sale' had a sense of citizenship and 
an autonomous organization. Cigar (1978), in his study of the power structure" of Fez 
between 1660 and 1830, pinpointed the fact that units of the urban populace in Muslim 
cities developed autonomy as political power weakened during that period. Sauvaget, 
however, alleged that the Muslim city was not administered overall, as it lacked communal 
institutions. Reflecting on the mosaic theory of cities, he claimed that residential quarters 
performed the role of self-governing communities; however, they were "mosaic societies", 
without any sense of integration with the city as a whole (Raymond, 1994, p. 7). 
THIRD: COMMUNES DENIED: PLURALISM 
It is apparent that studies of urban political and administrative structure conducted up to 
1950s discussed Islamic cities in terms of their similarities and differences to European 
commune cities. From the 1960s, a growing criticism of the commune model emerged. 
In his paper "The constitution of the Islamic city", Stem (1965) voiced his objection to 
Massignon's guild theory. He denied the existence of guilds in Islamic cities. He 
commented that, despite Massignon's stature as a scholar, his work on urban forms abused 
evidence and constituted no more than a "tissue of fallacies". Stem asserted that it was 
meaningless to make comparisons with the European commune cities, and argued that 
autonomous organizations were extremely immature in Islamic cities. Given the absence of 
corporate municipal institutions in Islamic cities, Stem recommended a positive 
consideration of the elements in those cities: popular disorders, the notables, the quarters, 
and the militias as contributing to the "loose structure" of the Islamic city, rather than 
regarding them merely as the germ of self-government or as an indication of its absence. 
Put differently, Stem claimed that it is not possible to analyze the pluralistic and fluid 
Based on the Western societal model which embodies a power structure (shown in chapters six and 
eight below), Cigar implicitly assumed the existence of such a power structure in Muslim cities as 
well. Cigar's study in that respect embodies a tacit assumption that those societies are similar on their 
imperceptible level. As shown in later chapters of this study, Muslim societies are rights-based 
societies, thus do not have a power structure classifying its members according to power possessed. 
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Islamic city in terms of formal systems and structures such as citizenship and self- 
governing communities. In this sense, he criticized Grunebaum, and Ashtor and Cahen. 
Similarly, Lapidus (1967) asserted that there could not have been any autonomous Islamic 
city centering on gangs as they lacked political ability. Thus, he denied the tenability of 
Muslim city as a model of an autonomous urban commune and, like Stern, turned to study 
the Islamic city through its " informal and unstructured networks", as demonstrated in the 
next section. 
In short, all forms of study explained above are centered on the conception of the Western 
European commune model as a self-governing unit, either positively or negatively. Those 
affirmative studies (the first two forms of debate) looked at either the guilds or the 
residential quarters in Muslim cities as resembling the European commune, thus 
responsible for self-government of the Islamic city. In that regard, these Orientalists added 
a political character to the guilds or to the residential quarts of Muslim cities, which 
actually did not exist. That is, the commune in the medieval European city emerged as 
response to the prevailing political situation. It was a political institution aiming at 
obtaining political power from the state. In other words, the community's demand for 
power led to the mobilization of individuals (explained in chapter eight) into a communal- 
form which, consequently, became interwoven within the political system of Western cities 
(Badie, 1992, p. 207-8). Thus, as a power-based system, communes operated as powerful 
units in the European city. Comparing this with the Muslim city, one can argue that the 
residential quarters in the Muslim city did not have any resemblance to the European 
commune. They, as Badie contends, operated according to different social components 
(Badie, 1992, p. 207). Orientalists could not in their studies penetrate to the imperceptible 
structure of Muslim cities, thus could not sense the reflection of such a structure on the 
operative level. As explained throughout this study, Muslim cities were built around rights- 
based and not power-based mechanisms as Orientalists' studies indicate. 
(b) Social structure 
Different Western sociological themes and theories (mentioned in the previous chapter) 
dominated studies of social aspects of Islamic cities and societies. Among those are urban 
conflict theory; consensus theory; mosaic theory; stratification; and social association. 
Some Orientalists attempted to understand Islamic cities in terms of their social 
institutions, assuming that such institutions were what gave Islamic cities their order, 
identity and distinction. Most of those studies were done by sociologists and 
anthropologists, of which Lapidus was the pioneer. They tended to approach cities as social 
containers, with no recognition of the city as a physical entity (as did the Western 
sociologists Simmel and Wirth). 
Weber, in his theory of the city (1958), denied the status of Islamic cities as cities, due to 
the nature of their human associations (based, as he calims, on kinship and tribal 
associations). Furthermore, he pointed to the segmentation of the Muslim society; he saw 
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its tribes as segregated, with no relationships between them (Weber, 1958). This latter idea 
was an introduction to the concept of the mosaic society, elaborated further by the Chicago 
School (see p. 34 above). Such ideas affected later Orientalists' studies of Muslim cities. 
Reviewing, critically, the traditional Orientalists' comparative approaches in studying 
Islamic cities, Lapidus (1967) had, as he claimed, reformulated the classical problem. 
Rather than concentrating primarily on one feature of town life, the presence or absence of 
formal institutional structures such as communes, Lapidus shifted his focus to the informal 
structures, or as he put it to the "total configuration of relationships by which organized 
urban social life was carried on" (Lapidus, 1967, p. 3). Departing from a pluralist 
perspective, Lapidus introduced his "network" theory, in which emphasis was upon the 
informal associations and networks of Muslim society (informal status stratification) in 
both urban centers and rural villages, as he denied the dichotomy between the urban and 
the rural. He investigated how the administrative machinery of the state worked effectively. 
For Lapidus, it was the interaction of the various sub-communities and of the various elites 
which created the urban community, constituted the government of Muslim cities and 
achieved a" sufficiently good order" (Lapidus, 1973, p. 47). Those sub-communities were 
the military elites, the 'ulama (religious leaders), the local notables and merchants, and 
organizations of urban commoners based in the city's quarters, such as 'ahdath and zu'ar 
(outlaw gangs). Lapidus paid special attention to social solidarity" among various social 
groups, centering on the quarters, and considered their combinations or struggles as ways 
to gain urban power. By developing this perspective, as Turner pointed out, Lapidus 
refashioned the theory of the mosaic society (Turner, 1978, p. 40). 
In his study of Mamluk'9 cities (1967), Lapidus used his idea of "networks" as a tool to 
explain Mamluk power and the nature of urban society. He concluded that Mamluks 
governed by controlling all the vital social threads in their hands. In that sense, Lapidus 
perceived of pluralism in Muslim society as a political tool to gain power; thus to diminish 
this power the central authority, when exists, has to control those plural units. Lapidus in 
this regard, although claiming to abandon the traditional Orientalists' comparative 
methodology, ended up confined within their tradition, despite his few attempts towards 
liberation. Employing the Western pluralist approach, Lapidus perceived of quarters as 
plural units that seek power through their collectivity20; therefore, in this process of 
"lusting for power"", different groups conflict. Lapidus in that sense did not penetrate to 
the imperceptible level of Muslim cities and societies, thus did not discern their regulative 
mechanisms. He supposed the resemblance of such mechanisms to those of Western 
18 This concept of "social solidarity" was used by Durkheim in his studies of social relationships. See 
(p. 25) in the previous chapter. 
19 The Mamluks are an Islamic dynasty that reigned in Egypt and Syria in 648-922 H. / 1250-1517AD. 
20 The concept of " collective power" is explained in chapter eight below. 
21 This term " lust for power" is clarified in chapter six below. 
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society. Pluralism as a political and social concept, used by Lapidus and many other 
Orientalists, does not exist in Muslim cities and societies. Those issues are explained in 
part three of this study. 
Lapidus' work received many criticisms and comments. Eickelman, favoring Weber's 
approach to understanding and identifying cities, criticized Lapidus' work because it did 
not discern a form of association distinct to urban life, as Weber managed to do earlier 
(Eickelman, 1974, p. 277). 22 Miura also described Lapidus' work as one-sided, claiming 
that "Lapidus has not investigated to any great extent either the individual social groupings 
he calls "networks", nor their internal structure and binding ties" (Haneda and Miura, 
1994, p. 340). Nevertheless, Lapidus' theory, whether accepted (Geertz, 1979) or opposed 
(Brown, 1976; Cigar, 1978), was much discussed and indeed adopted by other scholars in 
their studies of Muslim societies. 
Apparently, Lapidus was greatly influenced by several Western sociological theories, 
including Weber's and Parsons's theories of human association. While extending Marx's 
theory of class stratification, he was also influenced by the Weberian categories of power 
and social status and the Marxist conflict theory. Lapidus pictured Muslim society as a 
mosaic society in a constant state of conflict, due to differences in the interests and power 
of different social groups. He highlighted disputes and conflicts between the state and 
people on the one hand, and between different groups of people on the other (Akbar, 1994, 
p. 12). In relation to this research, these conflicts are seen to be given undue importance. 
That is, Lapidus compressed all violent events that occurred over a long period of history 
(1250-1517AD. ) in a one piece of work. This, logically, gave priority to the most influential 
events rather than to other every-day life events which, if taken into consideration, change 
the picture. Moreover, Lapidus was influenced by gang studies conducted by the Chicago 
School and adopted by some Orientalists such as Ashtor and Cahen. 
Sharing common grounds with Weberian typology, Lapidus developed his "networks" 
theory into a methodological model encompassing the total structure of Muslim societies. 
He used this model to examine societal structures in other regions of the Muslim world, 
and to do structural comparisons. In that sense, Lapidus created another ideal-type, 
comparable to that of Weber, however for societal structure rather than for the city. 
Comparing Lapidus and Weber's theories of cities, Eickelman (1974,1981), rejecting 
Weber's ideal-type of the commune city as a framework for cross-cultural comparison 
between Muslim cities and European cities, acknowledged Lapidus' emphasis on the 
informal social groupings in the Muslim city as displaying the most significant patterns of 
constancy and order in Middle Eastern cultures, thus constituting a useful analytical 
concept. However, disagreeing with Lapidus' model for its negligence of the city's 
ZZ Eickleman rejecting W. Marcais's model of Islamic city and Mssignon's thesis of guilds, he 
acknowledged the usefulness of Lapidus' "system of relations" as an analytical concept. However, he 
rejects Lapidus' theory since it compares social structures rather than cities (Eickleman, 1974). 
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physical aspects, arguing that there are continuities between social and spatial order, 
Eickelman employed Weber's concept of social relations within cities. He examined the 
amenability of the residential quarter for uses as a cross-cultural comparable urban feature 
(1974). That is, as Eickelman argues, there are shared cultural perceptions regarding social 
relationships which could be manifested in people's spatial perceptions and use of space, 
particularly residential and domestic space. Clarifying this, based on his research in a small 
Moroccan town, he drew examples from its residential quarters where the quality of life 
was defined by the extension in contiguous physical space of the notion of "closeness" 
(qaraba) (Eickelman, 1981, p. 269-70). 
Affected by the mosaic theory, Gibb and Bowen (1950) and many other Orientalists, such 
as Grunebaum, Sauvaget, Lapidus and Cahnman, asserted, as they claim, this character of 
Muslim society. 23 They perceived this mosaic diversity of Muslim society as a weakness 
and a flaw within the social structure. At the same time, these Orientalists realized that 
Islam, as a system of belief and values shared by Muslim society, holds this mosaic society 
together and maintains its order (Turner, 1978, p. 39-40). Thus, the mosaic theory has 
inherent contradictions, since it describes the Muslim social system as both integrated 
around Islam, and at the same time totally divided in terms of social stratification and 
association (see the physical theme above). This contradiction, as this thesis argues, is due 
to failure of such scholars to understand the imperceptible structure of such societies, 
which makes it look segmented, when it is in fact united. 
(1.2) Religion (Islam) 
In this research, religion (Islam) as an internal system does not mean the religious 
institutions in the city, such as mosques, but means the relevance of Islam to built 
environment production. In this research, Islam, as principles, norms, and a legal system 
(shari `a), is seen as part of the "imperceptible" structure of Islamic cities. 
As this research argues, each system has its distinctive manifested, operative and 
imperceptible structures. To comprehend Islamic cities and their operation, it is essential to 
understand Islam and its internal mechanisms (imperceptible). Neglecting or depreciating 
such an understanding leads to misinterpretation of Islamic cites. As demonstrated, this 
negligence, epistemologically, is reflected negatively in Orientalists' studies. 
In earlier studies of Islamic cities (from the beginning of the 20' century up to the late 
1970s), there was not much concern among scholars (except for Spies and Brunschvig, as 
explained later) about the religious dimension of Islamic cities, either on spatial or social 
levels. Scholars at that time, affected by the modem positivist and interpretive 
methodologies, were inclined towards investigating observable aspects only (the 
23 As explained earlier, those Orientalists argued that Muslim society consisted of many segmentary 
units (e. g. tribes, trade guilds, villages, and communities). Thus, Muslim society did not take the form 
of an integrated social unity but was made of a mosaic of isolated, self-supporting "social groups". 
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manifested and sometimes the operative structures). Orientalists did not deal with Islam as 
part of the imperceptible structure. They tended to link Islam with the city in title only. 
Nevertheless, a few studies, started by W. Marcais (1928) and elaborated by G. Marcais 
(1940,1945) and later by Grunebaum (1955) and Lapidus (1969), hinted, in a formalistic 
way, at the relevance of religion, as a general, abstract concept, to life in Islamic cities. 
In this respect, W. Marcais (1928) affirmed that Islam was essentially an urban religion and 
its growth (as a civilization) occurred necessarily in conjunction with the building of cities. 
He stated that Islam fitted only with urban societies, regulated by Islam as a religion, and 
not with the nomads and the rural population (Haneda and Miura, 1994, p. 33-34). Also, in 
defming the Islamic city, W. Marcais and G. Marcais pointed out that Islam generated, as a 
requirement, the significant features of the city: the Friday mosque for prayer and the 
public bath for ablution. 
Grunebaum (1955) agreed with this argument, as he remarked that Islam favored city 
development, and that the duties of Islam can be fully performed only in a city. He noted 
that Islam is "a religion of townspeople, at least in the sense that it tends to favor the settler 
over the nomads" (Grunebaum, 1955, p. 142). Supporting his argument, he considered that 
the Islamic rule was that the "Friday noon service ... may 
be held only in a fixed settlement 
with a permanent population". He concluded that Islam "exclude[s] the nomad from full 
participation in the ritual of his faith". This seems to be fallacious, overvalued and 
embodies misinterpreted facts. That is, it was only in the early times of Islam that the 
Friday mosques existed exclusively in urban areas in order to unite people together around 
Islam. However, in later times, many Friday mosques were built in urban as well as in rural 
areas (see Johansen's work (1981), p. 47 above). Nevertheless, the absence of 
congregational mosque in the rural and nomadic areas does not mean excluding the 
inhabitants of those areas from the execution of their prayers. Such people have to perform 
their Friday prayers according to their possible means. Islam is a religion for all people, 
urban and non-urban. 
While Gibb (1950-7) and Benet (1963) agreed with W. Marcais, G. Marcais, and 
Grunebaum, Djait challenged them, proclaiming that the city and the nomads had close 
relationships and that it is a mistake to characterize their relationship as antagonistic and 
destructive (Djait, 1986,192-204). 
Other scholars, such as Planhol (1957) and Sauvaget (1934), denied Islam the status of a 
civilization. They viewed it as a destructive religion which caused the loss of preceding 
civilizations (Greco-Roman). Sauvaget, denying any link between Islam and cities, 
described the Muslim town as if it was "the negation of urban order" and wrote that its 
status was subject to no particular provision in Islamic law. He stated that the Muslim era 
" is unaccompanied by any positive contribution ... [thus, ] the work of Islam is essentially 
negative" (cited in Raymond, 1994, p. 7). Sauvaget concluded that Muslim cities were no 
more than non-cities. Cahen (1958) held that there were no differences between cities of 
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the Byzantine period and of the Islamic period before the 11`h century, and that Islam as a 
religion did not exert a great influence on urban life. Therefore, he felt it was not 
appropriate to use the term "Islamic city" (Haneda and Miura, 1994, p. 9). In this sense, 
Cahen anticipated post-1970s arguments put forward by Orientalists such as Wirth and 
others (see p. 46 above). 
In 1981, following a physical comparative methodology, Wirth, superficially, examined in 
a slightly different manner the Islamization of the cities in the Islamic world. He 
proclaimed that as those cities' main physical characteristics existed in other civilizations, 
therefore they were not genuinely Islamic. Eventually, he denied their Islamic attribute. In 
this way, Wirth, in the view of this research, looked only at the manifested structure of 
those cities to examine an issue (their Islamization) that belongs more to the operative and 
imperceptible structures. He could not see the differences between cities of different 
civilizations on their imperceptible structures. 
The above studies demonstrate how Orientalists conceived of Islam as an abstract, general 
idea (religion or civilization) that has certain influences on the built environment. They 
dealt with Islam through the manifested structure and did not view it through its 
imperceptible mechanisms, thus did not consider the role of Islam in shaping Muslim 
cities. However, some Orientalists referred to Islam as a value system, claiming that it is 
Islamic values and norms that are responsible for the production of the Muslim built 
environment in its distinct character. This interpretive perspective is examined next. 
ISLAM AS A VALUE SYSTEM 
Observing the manifested structure of Muslim cities, some Orientalists suggested that those 
manifested forms are physical expressions of the values and norms of Muslim society and 
its inhabitants. For example, gates were seen as installed to reflect the value of security; 
their function was either to protect or to control the neighborhood. Another interpretation 
was that they were installed as a reflection of juridical segregation and values of quarter 
loyalty. Dead-end streets, introverted courtyard-houses, indirect entrances, and non-facing 
opposite house doors were said to reflect the values and norms of visual and physical 
privacy, respect of others and sex segregation; bare external house walls reflected modesty 
values; the "unitary" character of houses reflected egalitarian values within Muslim 
society. The location of incense and perfume shops (`attarin) near the Friday mosque 
reflected the principle of purgation (taharah) (Grunebaum, 1955; G. Marcais, 195724; Abu- 
Lughod, 1980,198725; Raymond, 1994). More specifically, Sauvaget (1934)26 and 
24 Quoted in Raymond (1994). 
ZS Although Janet Abu-Lughod was trying to interpret the Islamic city through certain Islamic 
principles, suggested in her 1980 and 1987 articles (see p. 67), she did not demonstrate how these 
principles could shape the built environment. Thus, ultimately she reversed the argument and 
translated those principles into a form of Islamic values (such as visual and physical privacy, defence 
and security) which were reflected in shaping the urban form of the Islamic city. 
26 Quoted in Raymond (1994). 
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Grunebaum (1955) related changes in the structure of Damascus during the Muslim era 
from those created by the Byzantines (which, according to Sauvaget, preceded it) to 
differences of values between Islamic and Byzantium civilization in Damascus. To quote, 
What had been the haphazard result of the infiltration of Orientals 
[Muslims] into the population of the town [Damascus] became now the 
adequate expression of the mores backed by a definite religious outlook on 
social relations. The ancient political interest in the community, the 
classical ideals of city-oneness and the clarity of the architectural (and 
administrative) design have been replaced by a dominant religious interest, 
by ideals of quarter or group loyalty, by the desire to shield the family 
group from dispersal and contamination 
(Grunebaum, 1955, p. 149) 
In short, according to some Orientalists, the manifested structure of the Muslim city was an 
expressive form of Muslim values and norms. 
Values might be explicit, serving as a directive criteria for judgement, preference, and 
choice, i. e. for actions, or implicit, performing as grounds for decisions in behavior (Sills, 
1968, p. 283). In their interpretations, Orientalists referred only to some explicit values (e. g. 
privacy, sex-segregation, modesty, purgation), neglecting, or unaware of, the implicit 
values. They referred to Islamic values and norms in a general, abstract manner, without 
any detailed investigation of those values. They pointed only to the existence of an Islamic 
value-system that they considered responsible for producing such a built environment. 
However, in her studies of Muslim cities, Janet Abu-Lughod tried to relate certain Islamic 
values to some physical aspects in the Muslim built environment. Nevertheless, her method 
was limited and selective, focusing on a few explicit values, not developing a method of 
generally relating the Islamic value-system to the manifested structure. Therefore, it can be 
said that for many Orientalists, explicit Islamic values were the main interpretative tool 
and determining factor of the manifested structure of Muslim cities. 
If one accepts the argument of these Orientalists, then one wonders how those values were 
translated into a manifested built environment. That is, although those Orientalists focused 
on Islamic values to explain the manifested structures of Muslim cities, they2' did not 
consider the means through which those values were translated into built forms. Thus, a 
clear gap seems to exist between their interpretative tool and the interpreted phenomena. 
In the light of the Orientalists' interpretations, a question arises: are values the pivotal 
determinant of the production of the built environment? and what about those implicit 
values which Orientalists did not consider? It is true that values and norms belong to the 
imperceptible structure, yet they coexist along with other factors within this structure. For 
example, when comparing the built form of a Muslim house in Damascus with a Christian 
house in the Christian quarter of Damascus and with a Muslim house in Malaysia (an 
Islamic country), as all satisfy their inhabitants' values, one can find that although the 
Z' With the exception of Abu-Lughod, as demonstrated later. 
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values of the Muslim and Christian inhabitants in Damascus differ according to their 
different religions, and that although Muslims in Malaysia and Muslims in Damascus, 
relatively speaking, share similar Islamic values, yet a Christian's house in Damascus is far 
more like a Muslim's house in Damascus than it is to a Muslim's house in Malaysia. In 
other words, similar values produced relatively different built forms. Relating this to what 
Al-Hathloul stated, that, because of other factors, implementing one value (privacy in his 
example) in the built environment could be actualized in different physical forms (1996, 
p. 110-113), then one can argue that although values, working on the imperceptible level of 
the city structure, are a significant factor in the production process of the Muslim built 
environment, yet they are not the determinant factor in that process. Values, explicit and 
implicit, constitute only one among several factors that should be taken into account if one 
seeks to understand the built environment. There are certain principles or mechanisms in 
shari 'a that organize these values and their actualization in the built environment. Such 
mechanisms are explored later in the following chapters. 
Moreover, "values" is a modern concept (Hollinger, 1994, p. 59). It did not exist in 
traditional Arabic discourse. It is considered in this research as a contemporary invention 
in, or exotic to, the Arabic discourse. In that respect, Orientalists used a modern concept 
(values) to explain a traditional phenomenon within which such a concept did not exist. 
To recapitulate, studies up to 1960s were confined to the traditional Orientalists' 
"European/Islam" comparative methodology. Influenced by their Western roots, different 
themes and theories were generated by Orientalists in an attempt to examine the concept of " the 
Islamic city" (e. g., W. Marcais, G. Marcais, Sauvaget, Grunebaum, Massignon, Cahen and 
Ashtor). In the 1960s, a voice of criticism and rejection of this traditional methodology began to 
appear. Some of the earlier studies were questioned and refuted (e. g. by Hourani and Stem, 
1965). New attempts tried to abandon this traditional methodology in studying Islamic cities 
and societies (Lapidus was the pioneer). Since the 1970s, particularly in the 1980s, local 
scholars took part in Islamic urban studies. They developed a new epistemological branch 
(paradigm) of Islamic urban studies, adopting a new approach and developing a new perspective 
in the understanding of Islamic cities, as explored next. 
II DYNAMIC APPROACH 
In the last few decades, an epistemological progress has occurred in the realm of urban studies 
generally and in Islamic urban studies specifically. That is, as contemporary planners might 
argue, the static approach did not provide much useful information that might help solve 
contemporary environmental problems. The reason given is that those studies considered cities 
as end products; thus, as our contemporary needs and constraints changed, this static (end 
product) approach is of little value nowadays. Fortunately, a new approach, the " dynamic" 
approach, is emerging. This approach considers cities in general as products of continuous 
processes in which many ever-changing factors (social, economic, political, religious and 
others) interact. It argues that the urban forms that evolve in response to these factors are unique 
to the combination of particular factors at a given time and place. This approach is considered a 
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response to the developments in epistemology. Positivism as the main modern methodology 
restricted studies of the built environment to the observable. It did not qualify, or penetrate to 
what is beyond the surface. However, with the advent of postmodernity, as explained in the next 
chapter, new methods of investigation came forth, liberating such studies from their previous 
restraints, thus allowing them to penetrate to the unobservable. 
In terms of Islamic urban studies, the static approach seemed to have reached its limit; no new 
breakthroughs were occurring. Adopting the dynamic approach, a substantial shift took place in 
viewing and investigating Muslim cities. The dynamic approach is still in its early stages of 
development and more is expected from it. Studies adopting this approach tend to have a less 
stereotyped view of the Islamic city. Most such studies focus on the Islamic legal system 
(shari'a) as the main criterion in their investigations of Islamic cities. 
ISLAMIC LEGAL SYATEM 
Interestingly enough, in epistemological terms, when relinquishing the traditional comparative 
methodology (European/Islamic dualism), a shift occurred in investigating Islamic cities. That 
is, more profound and analytical studies emerged, beginning to understand Islamic cities 
through their imperceptible structure, i. e. such studies tended to understand the perceptible 
(manifested and operative) through the imperceptible. Thus, it can be argued that the 
comparative methodology was repressive and limiting in that it confined the manner and themes 
of those studies adopting it. 
Adopting this dynamic approach, scholars attempted to explore the forces and mechanisms that 
influenced the processes of the production of Islamic cities and societies. The Islamic legal 
system was identified as the factor that might have given Islamic cities and societies their 
particular pattern and character. The studies of Spies (1927) and Brunschvig (1947) are 
considered the first to deal with cities in this way. 28 Although they occurred in a relatively early 
period, these two studies embodied a tacit dynamic approach. 
Spies (1927) investigated the city, exclusively, from the viewpoint of one of the four Islamic 
schools of law (Shaft `i). He focused on the application of Islamic law not only in relation to 
physical environment but also to city life, especially to relations between neighbours (Abu- 
Lughod, 1987, p. 157). Brunschvig (1947), with a broader vision referring to medieval Arabic 
manuscripts, asserted that it was the Islamic law29 (imperceptible) applied by qadis or judges 
(operative) in solving physical urban problems that over time yielded the physical structure and 
urban fabric of Muslim cities (manifested). From this he deduced certain Islamic urban 
principles used by Muslims in forming and transforming the urban fabric, such as: "provisions 
are given only in outline (for example, they recommended damages be avoided but did not 
2S Spies and Brunschvig are, to my knowledge, the only two Orientalists that have tackled the study of 
Muslim cities, focusing on their imperceptible structure. 
Z9 Abu-Lughod, in her article in 1987, mentioned that Brunschvig focused on customary law, and she 
did not mention Islamic law, although she referred to the Islamic schools of law, such as Shafi`i and 
Maliki. In Islam, sometimes, customary law is considered a legal source. 
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clarify the concept of "damages")" (Haneda and Miura, 1994, p. 42,88). Thereby, it can be said 
that Brunschvig managed to reconcile the three levels of structure in Islamic cities. 
In his research, Brunschvig based his analysis exclusively on North African jurists, with Fez 
during the Ottoman period and the French colonial rule as a prime referent for the manifested 
physical structure. Nevertheless, he generalized his conclusions to the " Islamic city". 
Unfortunately, after those two studies, this methodology did not continue among Orientalists. In 
the 1970s, another development in this realm occurred, initiated by Al-Hathloul, whose work 
(1981) might be considered a revival of Brunschvig's work. Advocating the importance of 
conventions in understanding the built environment, his argument in 1981 centred on the 
conventions (a raj) of space usage. Comparing traditional Arab Muslim cities with 
contemporary ones and through studying al-nawazil (legal urban environmental precedents), he 
concluded that the discontinuities in the character of the built environment from the past to the 
present is due to the current focus in contemporary Arab Muslim cities on certain built 
environment regulatory mechanisms, such as building regulations (centred on the manifested 
level), without any consideration of society's values, beliefs and customs. That is, the focus in 
traditional Muslim cities was on the conventions of use which reflect the values and rules of 
conduct of the Muslim society as derived from Shari `a. The traditional built environment in turn 
developed its own distinct physical conventions that satisfy its social conventions of use. In 
other words, the traditional process of producing the built environment embodied a reciprocal 
relationship between form and use without any preconceived final shape or form for the city, 
while the contemporary process implies a deterministic approach to the relationship between 
form and use. By this, Al-Hathloul has indeed managed to reopen an epistemological door that 
was closed for years. His work has been referred to by many later studies. 
In the 1980s, other similar studies emerged, focusing on the influence of Islamic law on the 
Muslim built environment from different angles, three of which are worth mentioning here: 
those of Abu-Lughod (1980,1987); Akbar (1984,1988,1992); and finally Hakim (1986). 
Throughout her studies (1980,1987), the American sociologist Janet Abu-Lughod challenged 
the Orientalists' traditional approaches and methodologies. She was trying to build a model of 
the Islamic city on the assumption that it had been based upon certain Islamic principles. 
Although she considered Islam as one among many interacting forces that shaped, but did not 
determine, the processes whereby Islamic cities were formed and transformed, she did highlight 
the importance of the legal system of Islam, identifying certain " Islamic principles" which, 
when implemented, create distinctively Islamic cities (Abu-Lughod, 1980,1987). 
In her 1980 article, she suggested four basic Islamic principles3° which, as she believed, 
constituted what she referred to as the "deep structure" of the Islamic city. Two of these 
30 These four Islamic principles are: the residential superblock enclosing semi-public space; the nature 
of the circulation system in the city; the relationships between neighbours; and the divisibility of 
property rights. The last two principles are the ones related to the imperceptible structure of Muslim 
cities. 
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principles embodied a static approach as they arose from the manifested structure; thus they 
cannot be considered as Islamic imperceptible principles. The other two principles she 
suggested were imperceptible-related principles; however they are fragments of a general 
framework that was not realized. Her method is thus partial and selective. Developing her 
argument, she identified another three Islamic principles or "elements"3 ' in her 1987 article. 
Those elements, as she claimed, set in motion the processes that give rise to Islamic cities. They 
would lead to certain environmental solutions (spatial and architectural) to embody them. 32 As 
she asserted, those solutions are not in themselves considered Islamic, but Islam was one of 
their origins: "Islamic law was as an adaptive mechanism for helping the society to achieve its 
goals, rather than as a deus ex machina determining them" 33 (Abu-Lughod, 1987, p. 164). Islam, 
as she suggested, is a secondary or contributory factor in shaping cities. It seems that Abu- 
Lughod, influenced by the modem reductionist concept of religion, viewed Islam as a religion 
perceived in abstract terms. Abu Lughod, although adopting a dynamic approach and focusing 
on some Islamic principles, did not explain how those principles operated and were applied in 
Muslim built environments. 
The other study worth mentioning here is that of Hakim (1986). Through an examination of 
some Muslim historical manuscripts (mainly from the Maliki school of law) combined with a 
survey of the Islamic city of Tunis, Hakim (1986) tried to reconstruct the concept of the Islamic 
city. This was done by asserting that urban architecture and composition of Arab-Islamic cities 
are systematic, and result from the implementation of principles and guidelines of Islamic law 
on the "building process". He pointed out that there is a systematized pattern of utilization of 
urban space through the entire Islamic city, based on functional and physical occupation. Hakim 
believed that there is a common physical language and, consequently, a design language in all 
34 Islamic cities, characterized by its distinctive physical components, function and form. He 
31 In her article, Abu-Lughod referred to those Islamic principles as elements or themes or conditions. 
These principles were: the juridical population classes (distinction between Muslims and non- 
Muslims); sex segregation; and the legal system relevant to spatial organization. They differ from the 
first two principles suggested in her 1980 article, while the third Islamic element of the 1987 article 
(the Islamic legal system) might be considered as the broader framework to which the other two 
principles of the 1980 article belong. 
'Z To clarify her theory, linking the city with the three suggested Islamic principles (see previous note), 
she proposed three hypotheses based on the residential neighbourhood, which she considered as a key 
element in the "Arabo-Islamic" city. Neighbourhoods, as she proclaimed, were distributed 
territorially according to juridical classes, spatially organized according to sex segregation, and 
functionally, due to the Islamic legal system as they functioned as a defensible spaces and a subset of 
the state. 
33 For example, as Abu Lughod argues, Islam distinguishes socially between juridical classes and not 
spatially. Spatial distance was not always a mechanism for maintaining social distance. On occasion, 
however, particularly during periods of tension, physical segregation was employed to intensify the 
social boundary markers (Abu-Lughod, 1989, p. 165). 
34 He described these components as they existed in the traditional city of Tunis (which goes back to the 
latter part of the 19th century), mentioning that those components represent the urban elements or 
building types of a mature and relatively large Arabic-Islamic city, or, as he referred to it, the 
"Medina" . 
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argued that those physical components remained relatively unchanged (relatively constant) 
across centuries of use within most of the Islamic world (Hakim, 1986, p. 56-63). Influenced by 
"The pattern language" theory of Alexander, Hakim noted that the interaction between the 
Islamic principles derived from figh (Islamic jurisprudence) and design language (physical 
components and building types) and incorporated in a dynamic building process created a 
certain tradition of design and urban form which could be described as "patterns" (Hakim, 
1986, p. 138). 
In formulating his theory, Hakim was partially influenced by the Orientalists' formalistic static 
approach to Islamic cities. He viewed Islamic cities as having relatively constantly manifested 
physical components35 and relatively settled urban patterns. In this sense, those urban patterns 
are relatively constant or static, and not relatively dynamic, as Hakim claims36 (Hakim, 1986, 
p. 19,102). If one considers Hakim's argument that the city passes through a dynamic building 
process, while at the same time he argues that the Islamic city is basically a set of patterns 
(relatively static) and that all Islamic cities are similar (p. 138-9), there is a contradiction. His 
theory might be applied only at the micro level of the city but not at the macro level. 37 That is, 
logically, a dynamic building process, especially on the macro level, could not lead to static 
patterns of urban forms across the vast Muslim lands and era. Then, the question is: how can 
Hakim interpret the wide diversity of Islamic cities according to his theory? 
The main ambiguity in Hakim's theory might arise from the fact that although he managed to 
liberate himself from the Orientalists' methods of enquiry (comparative) and main themes 
(exclusively functional and physical), unfortunately, he accepted the Western notion of 
" design" without examining its existence in Muslim societies and its applicability to the 
Muslim environment. For instance, influenced by the structuralist methodology in the manner 
employed by Alexander in his studies of the built environment, Hakim used concepts such as 
"design language", "building types", "land-use pattern" etc. (Hamik, 1986, p. 55,63) as 
defined within Western culture, with a quite different environmental evolution from that of the 
Muslim world. He thus used Western environmental tools to explain Islamic cities. It should not 
be understood here that it is unacceptable to adopt any Western theory or method, but those 
theories and methods should be compatible with the three structures of the Muslim society and 
its built environment, otherwise they will lead to contradictions, as this research argues. Yet, 
31 Hakim defined the Islamic city by identifying its urban pre-requisites: Mesjid a! jami (congregation 
mosque); governor or qadi; suq; and sometimes public bath (Hammam) (Hakim, 1986, p. 57, p. 80). 
36 Hakim stated that urban form should be viewed with reference to the scale of the urban environment. 
That is, urban form is relatively dynamic when viewed across a time frame of centuries, and relatively 
static when viewed within a short period (Hakim, 1986, p. 102). But, since the urban form consists of 
certain patterns generated from relatively static physical components which put into effect static 
Islamic principles, logically, the resultant urban patterns are always relatively static. 
31 Hakim differentiated between two levels of the manifested structure of the city: macro and micro. If 
any decision is taken regarding either level, then the former will have very obvious and more impact 
on the city than the latter. To prove his theory of urban patterns, Hakim pointed to some types of 
urban form on the scale of a commercial centre and housing (micro), at certain times, but not on the 
scale of a city (macro). 
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despite these comments, it is undeniable that Hakim's work embodies a significant contribution 
to the study of Islamic cities. 
Among those who accepted the dynamic approach and crystallized it is Akbar (1984)38. His 
work centers on the concept of responsibility in the built environment. Akbar's argument is 
that since the built environment is shaped by individuals holding diverse values and acting 
under several and sometimes unique constraints, then consideration of the mechanisms that 
empower individuals or limit their choices through property and individual rights might explain 
the structure of the built environment. He viewed the built environment as accretions of 
interventions by individuals who held different values. His contribution is in the model through 
which he suggested measuring the responsibility of those people intervening in the built 
environment by observing the physical object's state or condition. He holds the view that there 
is no universal physical pattern or character in Islamic cities. Rather, each town or even each 
site has its appropriate morphology, derived from the interaction between the site's constraints 
(geographical, political, economic, and social) and the mechanisms which stem from property 
and individual rights embodied in the Islamic legal system (Akbar, 1984; 1988). 
Akbar, through his suggested model, linked the three structures of the city. He focused on 
Islamic principles and values, such as rights and obligations and the feeling of responsibility, 
included in the imperceptible structure, reflected through certain operative mechanisms 
(operative structure) such as waqf (endowment), revivification ('ihya'), etc. on the built 
environment (manifested structure). In that respect, Akbar interpreted the quality of the Muslim 
built environment as a tool for decision-making. 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Stemming from their Western roots, most Orientalists' studies were grounded on a Western 
perception of the structures of the built environment. Employing such an exotic perception in 
investigating the Muslim built environment with its unique structures led to misunderstanding 
and misinterpreting those built environments. Furthermore, most Islamic urban studies, despite 
a few attempts to integrate the imperceptible level of Muslim built environments, generally, 
were limited in their analysis, focusing only on the manifested and/or the operative structures. 
They focused on the observable effects without relating those effects to their underlying causes. 
The term "paradigm", used by T. Kuhn (1970), denoting an epistemological shift in enquiry, 
resulting in patterns or modes which are then followed by others, could be adopted here. Using 
this concept, one might argue that studies of Islamic cities have passed through three paradigms. 
The first are those studies restricted by Western perceptions, particularly in its comparative 
methodology, which resulted in depreciating conclusions about Islamic cities. Examples are the 
studies of Marcais, Sauvaget, Grunebaum, Massignon, Cahen and Ashtor. The second paradigm 
was developed in those studies that tried to liberate themselves from Western perceptions of 
3e Akbar's work was originally a doctoral thesis (1984) "Responsibility and the traditional Muslim built 
environment", published in English in 1988, and expanded into an Arabic book in 1992. 
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the environment, yet did not manage to liberate themselves from Western modes of enquiry, 
such as the study by Lapidus, and to lesser extent, the studies of Abu-Lughod, and Hakim. 39 
The third are those that managed to liberate themselves, to some extent, from both Western 
perceptions and modes of enquiry. 4° For example, the studies of Al-Hathloul and Akbar. Most 
studies adopting the first and second paradigms are characterized by perceiving the city as a 
physical manifested entity and/or as an aspatial operative container; while the third paradigm 
went beyond those two concepts. Put differently, the first and second paradigms revolve around 
the manifested and operative structures of the built environment, while the third paradigm 
focuses more on the imperceptible structure. Thus, it is self-evident that the third paradigm is 
the most promising approach for further research. 
The third paradigm is characterized by its ability to have predictive values. For example; what 
are the consequences of the state's intervention in private properties? what are the social 
impacts of demolishing gates of residential quarters? what are the economic implications of a 
government decree changing property laws? Put differently, answers to such questions might 
help future decision-making by predicting future conditions. This is the stand this thesis adopts 
throughout its chapters. 
39 Abu-Lughod and Hamik's studies might be considered as swaying between the second and third 
paradigms. They have characteristics from both. Although they followed a dynamic approach, as they 
could not liberate themselves from the Western modes of enquiry, this study considers them as 
belonging to the second paradigm more than to the third. 
40 The mode of inquiry does not mean here the static or the dynamic approach. Those are general 
frameworks within which investigations, or inquires, took place. Mode of inquiry in this context 
denotes the tools of investigation, whether they are Western or pertain to Islam. For example, adopting 
the dynamic approach, Hakim (local scholar), in his study of Muslim cities, used some Western tools 
of investigation such as the concepts of design, and pattern language. Accordingly, as argued in this 
research, Hakim adopted a Western mode of inquiry. 
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Part 2 
SETTING THE SCENE 
INTRODUCTION 
As argued, contemporary Muslim built environmnts live a state of contradiction 
(crisis), resulting from the coexistence of two ddifferent modes: the acquired and 
the inherited. To understand such a crisis, the two modes of built environmnt 
production have to be grasped comprehensively. That is, understanding the built 
environment whether in its traditional or contemporary processes requires a 
comprehensive, integrated analysis on the three levels of the built environment: the 
THREE manifested, the operative and the imperceptible. Many built environments might be 
STRUCTURES similar in their manifested structures (e. g. pre-Islamic Greek villages share many 
features with Muslim towns), or may utilize similar operative mechanisms in their 
production (e. g. decentralized mechanisms); however, each built environment has 
its own, unique imperceptible structure that, when integrated with the other two 
structures, produces a unique built environment. Therefore, the imperceptible 
structure is considered here as the main determining structure that is responsible, 
through its interaction with the other structures, for the production of the built 
environment in its particular form. The integration of those three structures 
ARGUMENT together leads usually to a stable built environment or, put differently, to a" state 
of equilibrium", i. e. responsive, sustainable, affordable, revolving around 
participation, and the like. This thesis argues that this state of equilibrium is 
reached as a result of the compatibility of the internal performing mechanisms of 
the three structures. Once those internal mechanisms contradict, the three 
structures disintegrate, and a state of destabilization occurs, which is the case in the 
acquired built environments. This argument is what the thesis attempts to explore. 
Traditional Muslim built environments had enjoyed "a state of equilibrium" as a 
result of the compatibility and integration of its three structures. This integration 
and state of equilibrium has dissolved today. Muslim countries today, due to their 
reception of capitalism and its mechanisms, face certain contradictions as a result 
of the systemic contradictions between capitalism and Islam. That is, each system 
(e. g. Islam, capitalism, socialism) has its own internal forces and mechanisms that 
are produced by and perform within it and are reflected in the three structures of its 
built environment. Thus, investigating or producing a particular built environment 
using the tools of another system will, most likely, end in failure and inner 
contradictions. This is clearly evident in contemporary Muslim built environments. 
That is, Muslim countries today are affected by Western methods and mechanisms 
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of producing the built environment which have developed as a result of certain 
Western experiences that are quite different from those of the Muslim world, and 
THE CRISIS loaded with different systemic machinery. Adopting such methods and 
mechanisms has led to another level' of disintegration in contemporary Muslim 
built environments'; a disintegration in the internal mechanisms of its three 
structures where each structure is working separately with no consideration of the 
other. This disintegration has caused destabilization in contemporary Muslim 
built environments, leading to the actual " crisis" in those built environments. 
In that respect, one may argue that the persistence of the crisis that the built 
ARGUMENT environment is witnessing today is partly due to the disintegration either on the 
theoretical or the practical level of understanding previous processes, analyzing 
and advising contemporary processes, or predicting future consequences of the 
production of the built environment. To face such a crisis, both the inherited and 
the acquired built environments should be studied, genealogically, in terms of their 
three interrelated structures. To explore the systemic contradictions between the 
two modes, the focus is on the forces working within their imperceptible structure 
STRUCTURE and mainly the power structure (part three). However, to situate the crisis 
historically, the next chapter (chapter five) investigates the roots of the acquired. 
Islam as a religion has been consistent in its principles since its emergence, thus it 
can be seen as a static religion; therefore, Muslim societies in terms of its 
principles are perceived as relatively static. On the other hand, Western societies 
STATIC move from one paradigm of society-making to another (e. g. from modernity to 
Vs. 
DYNAMIC postmodemity), and thus they are perceived as 
dynamic. The concepts of 
dynamism and staticness are presented here as relative and not absolute concepts. 
Western societies are described as dynamic in relative to Muslim societies. As 
perceptions of Western societies and Muslim societies are quite different, 
everything that pertains to these perceptions in terms of the built environment are 
perceived differently. Therefore, when the " acquired" and the " inherited" coexist 
in contemporary Muslim built environments, each conveying a different 
perception, therefore a different manifestation, tension arises between the two: the 
dynamic vs. the static, i. e. dynamic cultural mode vs. static societal system. This 
issue is explored in the next chapter. 
The first level of disintegration in the Muslim built environment appeared on the theoretical level, as 
shown in part one above, as a misunderstanding in most Orientalists' studies of Muslim built 
environments. 
2 Also a disintegration on the societal level (as shown in the next part) which might be considered as the 
broader framework of which the disintegration of the built environments is a part. 
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Chapter Five 
Roots of the Acquired 
Shilling paradigms 
5 
ROOTS OF THE ACQUIRED 
Shifting paradigms 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As asserted, Muslim countries today live an encounter between two modes: the acquired and the 
inherited. To understand this encounter, the two modes have to be investigated, at their roots. 
The acquired mode has its roots in the Western model of modernity and capitalism, whereas the 
inherited mode has its roots in the Islamic legal system. These roots constitute the milieu for 
each mode, formulating its three structures (manifested, operative, and imperceptible), and thus 
creating their own distinctive models. Stemming from different roots, the two modes differ 
substantially; their encounter in contemporary Muslim built environments has led to a state of 
destabilization, thus to a crisis. To explain this destabilization, the roots of the two modes 
should be grasped, to locate the points of incompatibility between the two modes. This chapter 
is thus concerned with investigating the roots of the acquired mode, with some comparisons 
with the roots of the inherited mode, when necessary. 
The acquired mode began in the Arab Muslim countries with the reception of modernity, and 
shaped by its conditions. However, it is said today that this mode is shifting towards 
postmodernity, or for some (e. g. Giddens) to late modern conditions, which consequently affect 
its structures. So what are the modem and postmodern conditions, and how do they affect the 
acquired mode? Much has been written on this subject. This chapter constitutes a critical review 
of the conditions of modernity and postmodemity from the perspective of this study. 
5.2 SHIFTING PARADIGMS: WESTERN PERIODIZATION 
For Marx, history follows a linear pattern of development. It takes the form of a succession of 
societies from slavery to feudalism to capitalism and ultimately to socialism (Abercrombie et. 
al., 1994, p. 252; Marshall, 1994, p. 310). In the same vein, Toffler (1981) conceives of history 
" as a succession of rolling waves of change". Following the waves of change unleashed by the 
agricultural and industrial revolutions respectively, Toffler argues that a "third wave" is now 
beginning (p. 27-8). Many of those concerned with modem sociological and cultural history see 
societies as moving from an industrial age to a post-industrial age (e. g. D. Bell), or what some 
refer to as an information age or a network society (e. g. Castells). Similarly, some look at this 
change as a transition from a modem to a postmodern era (e. g. Baudrillard, Lyotard, Jencks), 
whereas others (e. g. Jameson, Lash) view it merely as a structural change within the capitalist 
system, from early or market capitalism to industrial or monopoly capitalism to late or 
multinational and consumer capitalism (Mandel, 1975; Jameson, 1991, p. 35), or from Fordism 
to flexible accumulation within the capitalist mode of production (Harvey, 1990). Such are 
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different interpretations of history, however, all convey a sense of periodization' in perceiving 
history, whether it is local or general history. It can be argued here that periodization is a 
Western concept that reflects the dynamism of Western societies. It is a result of the 
chronological development of different transformations and shifts (paradigms)' in the systems 
(or as Marx views it, changes in modes of production, e. g. socialism, capitalism) within which 
societies operate. Thus, a perception developed that Western societies are dynamic; moving 
progressively in a one-way continuum from one paradigm to another. This character of 
dynamism is reflected in many aspects of life in Western societies. Recently, it has been applied 
to internal changes in the one system that is dominant (capitalism), most evidently, in the shift 
from modernity to postmodernity. 
Such concepts stand in contrast to the perception of Muslim societies from which the inherited 
mode emanates. Muslim societies are perceived as static, however, static not in the negative 
sense that implies anti-progress, but static in its roots from which society's development 
springs. That is, Muslim societies at any time are subject to the Islamic law (shari 'a) which is 
static (as will be seen). In this way, the acquired mode, perceived as dynamic3, is discordant 
with the inherited, static mode. 
In comparing Islam with the Western mode, one can argue that in pursuit of fulfilling their aims 
of increased human freedom and happiness, adopted since the Enlightenment, Western 
societies have been uncertain of the means by which to reach their ends. They move from one 
trial (means) or paradigm to another, hoping that the later will operate as a better means to that 
end. Capitalism and socialism constitute systemic paradigms; each has its own ideology of 
achieving the Enlightenment ends. With the demise of socialism, the focus now is on 
capitalism, as the sole existing system, and on the shifts in its internal means (paradigms) to 
reach the pre-set ends. However, starting with modernity within which different diversions 
occurred, and then shifting to postmodernity, the search continues. Those latter means or 
paradigms, once originated and implemented, constitute modes of society-making. Due to 
these "paradigm shifts", most aspects of life (social, cultural, economic, and political) witness 
perpetual changes, some of which are considered as promising or beneficent while others are 
threatening or disastrous. ' 
Periodization signifies dividing the sequence of events of history into periods (Abercrombie, 1994, 
p. 312). 
2 These shifts are referred to here as paradigms, as they involve a reaction against an older model on the 
basis of a new one, i. e. a new paradigm replaces another. 
3 In comparison to the inherited mode. 
4 To name some, material prosperity as manifested in an increase in the standard of living, however, 
this is inequitably distributed; development of an international and global economic system is 
accompanied by a decline of the sovereignty of nation-states and national politics; introduction of 
political democracy, yet, a proliferation of new political movements, and an increase in the sense of 
insecurity, as well as dissolution of the unity of society; technological and industrial advancement, 
yet, an increasing depletion of natural resources, thus accelerating ecological crisis. 
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In short, shifting paradigms, and thus dynamism, have characterized the Western mode 
throughout its development. This chapter is concerned with investigating the impact of such 
characteristics on the built environment and thus on shaping the acquired mode. Therefore, the 
focus is on those paradigms that might be considered the rationale for the present conditions of 
the built environment, i. e. the transition from modernity to postmodernity. s 
Both modernity and postmodernity are invariably defined largely in relation to Europe and the 
USA, and not to the world as a whole. They are Western concepts, whether viewed 
geographically or in terms of the Eurocentric intellectual sources on which they draw and the 
phenomena they purport to explain (King, 1995, p. 110). It follows from here that processes of 
modernization are Western models of development that were/are transmitted to the rest of the 
world, part of which is the Arab Muslim world. Those processes of modernization had a wide 
impact on the built environment in the Arab Muslim world. They introduced to these latter 
environments what is called in this research the "acquired", viz. Western models (modern) of 
built environments, thus, much of Muslim built environments, following those models, are/were 
"modernized", i. e. shifting from their inherited mode to an acquired mode of built 
environment. To scrutinize such impacts, the modern conditions within which the "acquired" 
mode was produced in the West are explored briefly in the next section. 
The significance of this review lies in its broader framework. That is, many contemporary 
scholars argue that the transformation from modernity to postmodernity constitutes the solution 
for the problems in contemporary societies (including the crisis of contemporary built 
environments). Postmodernity is considered as the defender of the marginalized; the rescuer of 
the lost identity of the built environment; the liberating force of modernity's repression. In 
advocating this, scholars (e. g. in planning theories) seemed not to consider the imperceptible 
societal structure of both modernity and postmodernity. Therefore, an in-depth, critical 
investigation of the conditions of modernity and postmodernity and their concomitant 
conceptions and impacts on contemporary societies, and thus on the acquired mode, is required. 
5.3 THE MODERN CONDITIONS 
Modernity as a distinctive era was fully conceptualized in the course of the eighteenth century 
with the advent of what is generally identified as "the Enlightenment" (Smart, 1992, p. 145-6). 
Most of the dogmas and thoughts of the modem age can be perceived as a radical departure 
from premodern dark conditions. Those thoughts were crystallized and brought into practice by 
the French Revolution (1789). It announced its aims as the attainment of freedom and liberation 
Regarding the postmodern paradigm, since this study is related to an issue of a political and cultural 
nature (the built environment), and since the notion of postmodernity is the most comprehensive of 
those theories exploring present conditions, attention here is on postmodernity as a representative 
interpretation of present conditions. Postmodern theory is said to be a theory in which the method of 
analysis stems from and mirrors the reality it analyzes (Kumar, 1995, p. 184). Other theories, such as 
those of the "information society" or "post-Fordism" are confined to certain realms, mainly the 
political economy, whereas postmodernity embraces all forms of change: cultural, social, political, 
and economic. In other words, postmodernity incorporates all those other theories within its scope. 
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of humanity from its chains under the guidance of reason. It had liberty as the centre of its 
project; thus its slogan was "liberty, equality, and fraternity" (Stromberg, 1975, p. 207). 6 
Modernity thus heralded a new beginning, based on a new method of searching out the truth. 
In the Enlightenment era, "the pursuit of happiness" represented the major goal (Stromberg, 
1975, p. 190). The Enlightenment believed in the rational planning of ideal social orders. It 
claimed that only a society that is based on science and universal values is truly free and 
rational; only its inhabitants can be happy. Nothing can picture this dreamy happy modem 
society better than Bentham's Panopticon society. It is an orderly, totally administered 
(Horkheimer and Adorno), reason-led society where all its residents are happy. The project of 
modem politics was thus to define and implement universal goals like freedom, equality, and 
justice, in an attempt to transform the social structure and thus to intervene into the public 
sphere (Best et. al., 1997, p. 272). Happiness in the Western perception is much related to the 
provision of physical well being that could be generated through ordering society. In Islam, 
happiness is a static concept, defined for people by shari'a. Happiness in Islam can be achieved 
through worship and not through physical provision. For example, Islam views the built 
environment as a means for living and not as an end (as the case in the acquired built 
environment), as explained in chapter ten below. Therefore, happiness pertains to individuals; it 
can be achieved through personal efforts without the intervention of any external party (e. g. the 
state). This is a major difference between the Western and Islamic vision of life. 
Such concepts and the aims of the Enlightenment embody an attitude towards the existence of a 
controlling party. That is, achieving such aims and employing such liberating concepts require 
the existence of a particular (maybe central) party that performs rationally to plan for, 
administer, and order society, thus generating happiness. This, in fact, correlates with the rise 
of the modern state responsible for fulfilling such tasks. 
5.3.1 The state in modernity 
Since the eighteenth century, it has become conventional to distinguish between society (or 
"civil society") and the state (Mann, 1993, p. 23; Pierson, 1996, p. 64-7). It is a distinction 
between who rules and who is ruled (citizens). Society cannot exist without the state; the 
modern state guards individuals' interests and freedom (Giddens, 1985, p. 21). The modern state 
is based on the concepts of sovereignty, representation and legitimacy (Badie, 1992, p. 102). 
That is, what is most characteristic of the modern state is legal authority, and the idea that the 
state embodies and expresses (represents) the will of its people (Pierson, 1996, p. 23). 
Dependent upon the implicit consent of its subjects, the state acquires its legitimate authority, 
thus its power. Based on its legitimacy, the state constitutes the supreme power (sovereign); 
subjects are expected to treat its commands as binding obligations (Hindess, 1996, p. 12-3). 
6 The French revolution is considered the first modern revolution because it changed the structure of 
society, rather than simply replacing the existing ruler or even the political regime. Furthermore, it 
created new ideologies to explain its course when nothing suitable could be adopted from the past 
(McLean, 1996). 
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Defining state legitimacy' as the right to exercise its power, the state always tends to reinforce 
its legitimacy by appropriating the legislative process to its side (Badie, 1992, p. 130). Thus, 
enactment of the law is one of the main characteristics of the modern state. Law in its modern 
positivist concept is perceived as a human convention or stipulation enacted by the state as the 
legislative body (Scruton, 1996). The state produces law, and is not restricted by law' (unlike 
the case in the Islamic state which is restrained by the Islamic law of shari'a, as explained in 
chapter eight). Thus, as Black describes it, law is the solemn expression of the will of the 
supreme power of the state (Black, 1991, p. 612). The modem state is the state of citizenship, 
individualism, and the law. Such concepts of sovereignty, representation, and legitimacy 
embodied in the conception of the modern state are Western concepts that do not exist in Islam. 
Therefore, the conception of the modem state embodied in the acquired mode differs 
substantially from the state in Islam embodied in the inherited mode. This constitutes one area 
of incompatibility (or "tension points") between the two modes. 
Different approaches perceive the modern state differently. The Marxists (e. g. Miliband) view 
the state as an instrument of society's ruling class- the capitalists or bourgeoisie. Engles 
declared that the state is a" power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it" (cited in 
Pierson, 1996, p. 75). Thus, for most Marxists, "the state is a concept for the concentrated and 
organized means of legitimate class domination" (Zeitlin, cited in Mann, 1993, p. 45). For 
Weber, the state upholds the claim to the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force in the 
enforcement of its order (cited in Pierson, 1996, p. 55). Weber emphasized state monopoly and 
legitimacy in his definition. The modem state, according to Weber, embodies what he referred 
to as "rational-legal domination" (Mann, 1993, p. 57). He contends that a fundamental activity 
of the modem state is the attempt to legitimate the structure of domination (McLean, 1996, 
p. 474). Neo-Liberals see the modem state as an increasingly domineering and malign influence, 
imposing itself upon society (e. g. Hayek). They argue that the modern state has become too 
large and too powerful (Pierson, 1996, p. 80). Elitists perceive the modem state as an elitist state 
where decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of a minority (e. g. Mosca, Pareto). 
Such views of the state denotes that the state dominates and controls society. Institutional 
statism emphasizes state autonomy (e. g. Nordlinger, Skocpol). Its advocates contend that state 
apparatus may pursue its own interests, sometimes in defiance of interests in the wider society. 
Skocpol declares in that regard that the state is a structure with a logic and interest of its own 
(cited in Mann, 1993, p. 52). Thus, all actors are constrained by existing political institutions. 
Reviewing these diverse approaches to the modern state, it can be noted that they all revolve 
around the concept of power as the main feature of the modern state. Marxists emphasized the 
role of the state as a power holder, exerting domination over its society, while Weber underlined 
the power of the state to enforce its orders. Neo-liberals, elitists, and statists accentuated the 
Weber defined legitimacy as "the prestige of being considered binding" (cited in Pierson, 1996, 
p. 22). 
Sometimes, constitutions limit the state, as in the United States. 
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power of the state over society. Thus, it can be said that the modem state is based on the 
concept of power. Relationships between the ruler and the ruled are power relationships. They 
are hierarchical relationships directed from top (supreme power) to bottom (subjects). 
Accordingly, as explored in chapter six, the modern state differs from the state in Islam. The 
former is a power-based state while the latter is rights-based state, thus the acquired mode 
differs from the inherited mode in that respect. 
Using its legitimate power, the state gives itself the right to be the decision-maker in most 
institutions or to intervene in the decision-making processes of its subjects. A very general 
feature of the state's development in modernity has been its increasing penetration into the 
society on which it presides. The modem state is an active state, increasingly managing, 
shaping, even creating its constituent population (Pierson, 1996, p. 57). Foucoult conceives of 
the modem state (government) as denoting certain rational exercises of power over others 
(subjects). It refers to the conduct of the conduct9, aiming to regulate the actions of individuals 
by working on their conduct, using different rationalities and techniques (Hindess, 1996, p. 97). 
One of those rationalities is the disciplinary method where the government uses discipline as an 
instrument of control. It disciplines (moulds1) the behaviour, personalities and thoughts of its 
subjects (Hindess, 1996). Such use of discipline by the government is predicated on a claim to 
knowledge and the public interest. The state engineers (plans) society, aiming at bringing it to 
an ordered state, according to its standards. Such disciplinary or social engineering projects are 
thus the main block of the modem state. Accordingly, in fulfilling the aims of the 
Enlightenment, the modem state stands as the supreme power that employs rational 
paternalistic methods in ordering society. In short, in the name of rationality and order, the 
modem state controls and dominates the society. It is thus an interventionist state. 
Defining infrastructural power as the institutional capacity of a central state to penetrate its 
territories and logistically implement decisions (Mann, 1993, p. 59), Mann asserts that the 
infrastructural powers of the modem state are increased. " Weber saw this growth of the modem 
state as part of a "rationalization process", sweeping the entire West. This, as Weber contends, 
implies increase in state power over society. However, this increase in infrastructural power is 
accompanied by increased bureaucratization. The modem state is thus a bureaucratized state 
(Mann, 1993, p. 57). 
9 Conduct in the sense used by Foucault denotes leading or controlling a series of actions (Hindess, 
1996, p. 106). 
In the meaning of formulating and reformulating. 
" Five main theories explain the growth of the modern state, thus the size of its infrastructural power: 
first, modernization theory which contends that modern states grew to coordinate greater social 
complexity and differentiation. Second, public goods theory, that considers the state as a provider of 
public goods because they are in no one's private interest to pay for, yet are in the general interest. 
Third, the welfare state theory, which holds that in complex societies the state steps in. Fourth, 
political redistribution theory, where the franchise enables the many to take from the few. Fifth, as 
Higgs contends, the state performs all those roles together and more (Mann, 1993, p. 359). 
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Beginning about 1870, the state expanded in size and scope. It extended material and symbolic 
infrastructures of communication: roads, railways, canals, etc. It also went into direct ownership 
of material infrastructures and productive industries, and it expanded its welfare programs. 
Capitalism required state regulation; even laissez-faire advocates had not doubted the need for 
state regulation. Adam Smith, for example, wanted the state to provide public goods that private 
actors had no personal interest in funding, such as external defence, internal security, national 
education, and a road network. Such a role for the state was not seen as state intervention, but 
as coordination. By the end of the nineteenth century, the infrastructure power of the modern 
state began to grow, though mostly perceived as coordinating rather than intervening in civil 
society. Aiming at more power, the state naturalized social life (Mann, 1993, p. 480) so that 
people become self-subjected to it, accepting such state-determined standards as 
unquestionable. Social questions were seen as legitimate matters for state intervention, thus 
people accepted state regulations and social reform in that context. The state took 
responsibility for education, public health, introduction of material infrastructure, city planning, 
and the like. Gradually the state started to enact regulations and policies for most aspects of life. 
Legislation was mostly directed at social control. Thus, all social issues became politicized. 
The state became the reference for people to define their rights and duties. Consequently, state 
civilian scope and power infrastructure grew (Mann, 1993, p. 481). 
To conclude, the modem state is based on the concept of power. Enhancing its legitimate status 
and acquiring more power, the state acted to increase its power infrastructure, thus its scope and 
size. Ultimately, the modem state intervened, in the name of order and rationality, in most 
aspects of life. This conception of the modem state constitutes the roots of the state in the 
acquired mode. Such conception differs substantially from that of the state in the inherited 
mode, based on the concept of rights in Islam. 
FEATURES OF MODERNITY 
Modernity is characterized by its strong belief in absolute truths, progress through science, and 
in secular reason and rationality (Smart, 1992, p. 149). With this, European thought entered, as 
Marcuse put it, an "era of positivism". Positivism, grounded on instrumental reason (means- 
end rationality), established the authority of observation and experience. Values and value- 
judgements were classed as unscientific. They were not accorded the status of knowledge 
claims (Held, 1980, p. 161-4). Accordingly, modernity's prevailing grand narrative has been that 
of increasing progress towards emancipation or liberation of humans, more freedom, and 
thus happiness. It is a narrative of living in a purely rational world of freedom and equality and 
unlimited progress (Halton, 1995, p. 263). Such has been the "project of modernity" from the 
time of the Enlightenment (Seidman, 1990, p. 219; Smart, 1992, p. 62). 
However, fulfilling this project took a different path. Gradually, value spheres of science and 
scholarship (truth, knowledge), morality (justice), and art (taste) became differentiated, with 
each having its own inner logic (Sarup, 1993, p. 143). Those spheres were institutionalized as 
matters for professionals and experts, where the distance between them and the general public 
is wide (Habermas, 1992, p. 162). That is, aiming at rationalizing society, the state directed (i. e. 
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intervened in) such realms, according to its rational (as alleged) standards. Thus the individual 
lost control over such realms to professionals and state institutions. This in turn marked the rise 
of the extraneous party as an interventionist party. The state and professionals constituted 
this party, as explained in chapters nine and ten. 
Modernity was constituted through its opposition to, or break with, the traditional and the past. 
It has a sense of superiority (Smart, 1992, p. 147). Modernity is committed to the "new", to the 
extent that it can have no respect even for its own past. It is thus characterized as dynamic. It 
meant the dissolution of the norms shared by communities, or imposed absolutely upon them, to 
be replaced on the one hand by individualism, conceived as the ground of knowledge and 
rational truth, and on the other by the state, as the very embodiment of the rational, self- 
knowing will of the nation and people. In this respect, in a society characterized by 
individualism, the state became the representative of the public. It defines their "public 
interest" which it performs to fulfil (as explained in chapter seven). 
Contrary to modernity, resonating its staticness, Muslim society respects tradition and Islamic- 
based norms and values. It is grounded in Islamic tradition. It avoids innovations in matters 
related to Islam. The prophet proclaimed in that respect that "He who innovates something in 
this matter of ours that is not of it will have it rejected". He also counselled: "... Beware of 
newly invented matters, for every invented matter is an innovation and every innovation is a 
going astray and every going astray is in Hell-fire" (an-Nawawi, n. d. /b, p. 40,94,96). 
CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY 
The "project of modernity" has never been without its critics. As a reaction to the poor 
conditions that existed throughout the nineteenth century as a result of capitalism and 
modernity, notions of the Enlightenment (progress and rationality) began to be questioned by 
the end of the nineteenth century. That is, increased instrumental rationalization of society did 
not lead as intended to universal freedom and happiness. On the contrary, due to excessive 
standardization and employment of prestated laws in every aspect of life (by the state), society 
turned out to be, as Horkheimer and Adorno maintain, totally administered. It led as Weber 
argues, "to the creation of an "iron cage" of bureaucratic rationality from which there is no 
escape" (Bernstein, 1985, p. 5, emphasis added). Horkheimer and Adorno in their "Dialectic of 
Enlightenment" declare that the Enlightenment project has turned against itself and transformed 
the quest for human emancipation into a system of universal oppression in the name of human 
liberation. They argued that the logic that hides behind Enlightenment rationality is a logic of 
domination and oppression. That is, the lust to dominate nature entailed the domination of 
human beings (Bernstein, 1985, p. 6). Accordingly, the only way out of this impasse is freedom 
and liberation from the oppressive power of purely instrumental reason (employed by the state) 
over culture and personality. Put differently, in the name of human emancipation, the 
Enlightenment project should be abandoned entirely (Harvey, 1990, p. 13). 
In short, most of those criticisms focused on the failure of modernity as a means to reach the 
pre-stated ends. Eventually, since the 1950s, the very notion of modernity as a means involving 
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a project of human liberation has been thrown into doubt. In that context, Wright Mills suggests 
that as the increasing rationalisation (modernity) of Western society could no longer "be 
assumed to make for increased freedom [its aims]", thus the " modern age" has been succeeded 
by a "post-modem period" (Mills, cited in Smart, 1992, p. 181). 
5.4 POSTMODERNITY 
The postmodern world [is] a world of eternal presentness, without 
origin or destination, past or future; ... a world 
in which all that 
presents itself are the temporary, shifting and local forms of 
knowledge and experience. Here are no deep structures, no secret 
or final causes; all is (or is not) what it appears on the surface. 
(Kumar, 1995, p. 147) 
In the light of such attacks on modernity, postmodernity has emerged as a new means to reach 
the ends. In other words, the solution lies, as thought, in another paradigm shift. 
Since its emergence in the 1960s and throughout its evolution, postmodernity has been going 
through unsettled stages. It has an aim; that is, to fulfil the project which modernity failed to 
accomplish (freedom, justice, happiness), however, it has no fixed method to reach such ends. 
Accordingly, different connotations have been accorded to postmodernity, each reflecting 
different, or sometimes contradicting, positions. Smart explains that postmodernity has been 
invoked to "distinguish an historical period [Toynbee], an aesthetic style [Ghirardo], and a 
change in knowledge [Lyotard]; to conceptualize difference [Jencks, Hassan] -a distinctive form 
beyond the modern- as well as similarity -a variant of the modern [Lyotard], or its limits form 
[Bell]; and to describe affirmative or reactionary [Jameson] and critical or progressive 
discourses and movements [Lyotard, Foster]" (Smart, 1992, p. 164). 12 One should note here all 
those contradicting connotations, as if in postmodernity, as many say, everything goes. 
EVOLUTION OF POSTMODERNITY 
Postmodernity started in the field of culture, mainly in architecture, after which its effects 
spread to other fields such as science, philosophy, and literature. Many ideas of postmodernity 
emerged in the 1960s but did not crystallize till the late 1970s and 1980s. 
In the 1960s, postmodern discourse was premature. It swayed between modernism as the 
previous paradigm and postmodernism as the new promising paradigm. The reference in both 
directions was to modernism, whether affirming or antagonistic to it. Postmodernism at that 
time was quite evident in art and architecture. It was conceptualized as a new fad or style. It 
celebrated the formalistic, stylistic content of anti-modernity without adopting its broader 
ideology. It has no political or social agenda. It is simply one fad among many, or one fad 
superseding another. It emphasizes diversity, displays a penchant for pastiche, and adopts an 
" inclusivist" philosophy of advocating eclectic use of elements from the past in an ironic 
12 The names between straight arches are examples of analysts who view postmodernity in the sense 
aforementioned in the quotation. 
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manner (Ghirardo, 1986; Smart, 1992, p. 168). This facet, with its fragmented pluralism, has 
remained both a fundamental fact and aesthetic of postmodernism ever since. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, postmodernity was widely accepted and practised in the 
cultural fields. That is, postmodernity responded to and fitted with the logic of late capitalism; it 
celebrates mass culture, consumerism and commercialism. It is, as Jameson (1991) perceives it, 
the cultural logic of late capitalism. However, in other fields such as politics, postmodemity was 
less effective, as it contradicts the logic of the state power, as explained below. 
Postmodernity is not totally anti-modem. Aiming at achieving its ends, as evident in the 
writings of many postmodernists13, it builds on the strengths of both modem and postmodern 
theories. It is, as Jencks describes it, a "continuation of modernism and its transcendence" 
(Jencks, 1992a, p. 12). Moreover, postmodernity does not signify an absolute abandonment of 
rationality, but rather a "critical interrogation of reason" (Lyotard, 1988, p. 280). 
Postmodemity's rationality constitutes another form of rationality than that of modernity. It is a 
critical rationality rather than the modem instrumental rationality which is perceived as part of 
the rationalizing system of domination (Best et. al., 1991, p. 282). 
At the centre of postmodemity is its emphasis on pluralism, diversity and difference. 
Postmodernity means the end of a universal worldview and a single explanation. It promotes 
locality, racial and ethnical relativism. It rejects the unifying, totalizing narratives or grand 
narratives in explaining the truth (Best et. al., 1997, p. 10). In that sense, postmodernism stands 
for a political agenda that highlights diverse local struggles, difference, identity politics, the 
"otherness". Instead of grand narratives, postmodernity advocates "little narratives" that 
emphasize relativism; they are forms of "customary" or "local knowledge". They do not 
depend on external, objective validation but are internal to the communities within which they 
occur (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxv). 14 Moreover, postmodernity abandons all deep structures or 
underlying causes; "all is what appears on the surface". It is thus characterized as superficial 
and depthless (Kumar, 1995, p. 148). 
Amidst all those connotations and features of postmodernity, one can argue that postmodemity 
is but a continuation of the spirit of modernity; its manifestation differs from that of modernity 
according to the difference in corresponding conditions within the same system of capitalism. 
Postmodernity is another means to fulfil the same Western project (to reach the Enlightenment 
ends: progress and more freedom, thus human happiness). It is a kind of corrective movement to 
modernity. In its history, this Western project did not follow a linear progressive line, but 
something like a pendular swing from a desire for control over "disorder" to a value placed on 
13 Examples of such writers are Lyotard, David Harvey, Richard Rorty, Richard Bernstein, Homi 
Bhabha, Nancy Fraser, Stueart Hall, Steven Seidman, Charles Jencks, Steven Best, Douglas Kellner, 
and Barry Smart. Those are considered as moderate postmodernists as compared to extreme 
postmodernists. 
14 Harvey and Jameson argue that meta-theory cannot be totally dispensed with; postmodernists simply 
pushed it underground where it still functions as a `now unconscious effectivity' (Harvey, 1990, 
p. 117; Eagleton, 1987). 
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tolerance for diversity, cultural pluralism, and relativism, and then back to a need for some 
imposition of order. Put differently, it sways from order to disorder, from rationality to less 
rationality. The sway from modernity to postmodernity is but one of those sways that this 
project witnessed in its search for the best means. However, as Marxists maintain, unless there 
is a structural change in the political economy, such sways can not be considered as changes 
or improvements (Ellin, 1996, p. 194). As a corrective movement, postmodemity's effects were 
more evident in those areas where modernity went wrong (e. g. culture, literature, philosophy, 
science). In other areas, such as politics and economics, where internal logic stems from that of 
modernity and capitalism, postmodernity had less, if not marginal, effects. 
5.4.1 Postmodernity on politics 
In most areas, information technology has speeded up processes 
begun some time ago; it has aided the implementation of certain 
strategies of management in organizations; it has changed the nature 
of work for many workers; it has accelerated certain trends in leisure 
and consumption. But it has not produced a radical shift in the way 
industrial societies are organized, or in the direction in which they 
have been moving. The imperatives of profit, power and control 
seem as predominant now as they have been in the history of 
capitalist industrialism 
(Kumar, 1995, p. 154; emphasis added) 
Different positions and themes of "postmodern" political discourse15 were developed. Of those 
is the "politics of desire". The overall effect of the politics of desire sustains the autonomy of 
the choosing agents. Postmodernity, as Bauman argues, considers "choice" a central issue in 
determining the individual's freedom (Bauman, 1992, p. 169-170). Opposite to this vision, rather 
than seeing free choice and freedom as beneficial to the individual, Marcuse argues that 
freedom and liberty in contemporary western societies are instruments of social control. 
Individuals are subjected to the creation of false needs which gradually become real needs. 
However, Marcuse contends, what characterizes contemporary industrial societies is that the 
individual himself is integrated into the established society; he reproduces and perpetuates the 
external controls exercised by his society. In this process the "inner" dimension of man, in 
which opposition to the status quo can take root, is whittled down. Thus contemporary man, in 
terms of his thinking, is a "one-dimensional man" (Marcuse, 1991, p. 2-12). 
This postmodern politics of desire is accompanied by uncertainty and suspicion that the 
agencies promoting desire are oblivious or negligent of the damaging effects of their proposals. 
This, which Bauman calls the "politics of fear" strengthens the position of experts as trusted 
authorities. Production and distribution of certainty becomes the defining source of power of the 
experts. This introduces another type of politics: "politics of certainty" which is constructed 
mainly around the production and manipulation of trust (Bauman, 1992, p. 196-200). Such 
15 Most postmodern politics are confined to theory (Best et. al., 1997, p. 271), and if translated into 
practice, they don't introduce radical changes that can lead to systemic transformation. In general, 
postmodernity in politics is oppositional. It aims at changing certain aspects of the status quo, 
however, not radically or systematically. 
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politics are considered here as a continuation of modernity's politics of exercising control over 
agents. It sustains the role of the state and professionals as extraneous parties intervening in 
people's lives, as explained in chapters nine and ten. 
Postmodern discourse establishes what is known today as "identity politics". This may be the 
most dominant form of politics today (Best et. al. 1997, p. 273). In identity politics, individuals 
define themselves primarily as belonging to a given group, marked as "oppressed" (e. g. blacks, 
feminism, environmental movement), however, interests of different groups might conflict. 
These identities revolve around a "subject position", a key identity marker defined by one's 
gender, race, class, and so on and through which, as Foucault argues, the individual is made 
subordinate to the dominant culture. Identity politics often embodies simplistic binary 
oppositions such as Us versus Them, Good vs. Bad (e. g. female against male, black against 
white), thus a deterministic and value-judgmental vision. However, by grouping individuals, 
identity politics ignores that individual identities are also multiple, and that group identities are 
socially constructed according to the structure of domination prevailing in society, thus such 
identities have to be reconstructed in a more emancipatory manner. In short, identity politics 
does not constitute a radical politics; it does not lead to any systemic transformation. It is 
another form of modem politics. 
Identity politics, while breaking from totalizing narratives, tend to be insular and fragmenting, 
focusing on the experiences and political issues of a given group, or even of its subgroups (Best 
et. al., 1997, p. 278). As in modernity, some forms of identity politics are separatist and privilege 
the standpoint and interest of other groups in an exclusivist fashion. Postmodern identity 
politics, in its focus on voicing the silenced, does not consider the power structure within 
society. That is, some people and groups are in a better position to speak than others. Such calls 
for change are vapid when the field of discourse is controlled and monopolized by the dominant 
political power. Thus, the question that is still open, is how is it possible to adjudicate between 
the various claims, and how to reach consensus? Whose responsibility is it? Is it the state's, as a 
representative of the public? If yes, then the state still retains its modem role as a coordinative 
and regulative device, which thus legitimizes its intervention in the public sphere. In that 
respect, one can argue that the modern conditions of power structure and real politics persist. 
To overcome alienation and oppression, postmodern politics involves a radicalization of the 
theme of participatory democracy. That is, postmodern theory involves a shift toward more 
multiperspectival theorizing that respects a variety of sometimes conflicting perspectives, rather 
than, as in modern theory, seeking the one perspective of objective truth or absolute knowledge. 
However, as Habermas argues, conditions of communication and participation can be distorted 
from the start due to the existence of domination, thus not everyone can participate on equal 
terms (see Brand, 1990). Postmodem politics stresses micro-structural diversity, difference, 
plurality, conflict, and respect for the other. However, it is unable to grasp systemic relations 
and casual nexuses, and mystifies various forms of social inequality (Best et. al., 1997, p. 279- 
280). In other words, in its focus on micro-structures, postmodern theory has problems 
theorizing macro-structures and seeing how totalizing tendencies, like capitalism, state 
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apparatus or racial oppression, permeate micro-structures and the plurality and differences that 
the theory celebrates. Most postmodern theory is thus unable to theorize structural causation 
and the relative weight and significance of casual factors like the state or other institutions and 
practices. This sort of pluralism is unable, as Althusser proclaims, to specify key sites of 
domination and oppression (Best et. al. 1997, p. 281). 
In conclusion, postmodernity might fit with the capitalist logic, but it does not fit with the logic 
of the state based on power. That is, as Best and Kellner (1997) argue, postmodern politics 
follow capitalistic and state intervention processes, which tend to politicize every sphere of life. 
Such state intervention processes' imperceptible aim is to increase the state infrastructural 
power. Identity politics if fulfilled on a comprehensive scale reduce state power, which 
contradicts the state's ideal. Therefore, such politics, in the light of the modem state's main 
pillars (power, legitimacy, representation, and sovereignty), are confined to local spheres and 
have only a minor chance to produce radical systemic changes. It can thus be argued that the 
"postmodern" state (if it exists) and politics is but a continuation of modernity. That is, as long 
as the main blocks of the modern state persist, the same politics of modernity persist, even if 
following different strategies. The postmodern state is a power-based regulatory state; it uses its 
power to enact laws and thus to regulate society. It represents its people, defining their public 
interestS (instead of universal interest). It has the right to intervene in people's lives in the name 
of coordination and regulation. This is quite evident in the endurance of urban planning as a 
profession (representing the state) participating majorily in the production of the built 
environment, although with different methodologies, as explained below. And against those 
who argue that the modem state is declining with the dissolution of the nation-state, Pierson 
argues that the nation-state is only one form of the modern state. The contemporary trans- 
national, late capitalism state is another form (Pierson, 1996, p. 193). In that respect, Held 
maintains that despite the many changes that the nation-state is going through, the bottom line is 
that "the modem state is still able in principle to determine the most fundamental aspects of 
people's life chances" (Held, cited in Pierson, 1996, p. 193). In short, as long as state acts out of 
its supreme power, it is the dominant actor in society. 
Most contemporary writings in political thought are quite distanced from postmodern discourse. 
As explained above, state theories in the 1980s and 1990s revolve around the concepts of the 
modern state. They adopt, for example, Marxist (e. g. Poulantzas, Miliband) or Weberian (e. g. 
Rex, Moore, Pahl) totalizing methodologies and narratives, which postmodernity dismisses. 
Moreover, as evidence of the persisting existence of the modem state in this "postmodern age", 
statist theories (e. g. Skocpol, 1992) emerged in the 1980s, focusing on one of the main themes 
of the modem state: state autonomy. In short, much of real politics are distanced from 
postmodern discourse; in real politics, in contrast with political postmodern discourse, the 
conception of the modem state based on power persists, however, using different strategies. In 
other words, postmodemity permeates only to the perceptible levels of the system; it is 
incompetent to permeate into the imperceptible level within which modem mechanisms persist. 
ROOTS OF THE ACQUIRED 87 
Both modernity and postmodernity almost meet in the same systemic imperceptible level 
regarding their goals, systemic mechanisms, state existence, and thus power conception. 
Such is the milieu from which the acquired mode arises; a milieu shaped by dynamic 
mechanisms operating to fulfil a prescribed Western project (Enlightenment project). A milieu 
dominated by the state as the supreme power. But how was this milieu reflected in the built 
environment from which the acquired built environment emanates? 
5.5 PRODUCTION OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT: SHIFTING PARADIGMS 
Aiming at fulfilling the Enlightenment project of achieving a rational well-ordered society, the 
state acted to plan society and its built environment. Planning is thus a state-directed 
mechanism for controlling and guiding society, according to certain standards set by the state, 
as disclosed by the expertise of planners. Representing its people, the state, through its 
legitimate status, set itself to speak in "the public interest". The notion of the "public", 
reflecting the modern universalism, implies an undifferentiated homogenous group, regardless 
of any differences that might exist between its members. As such, planning inevitably demands 
centralization of control and power (Flyvbjerg et. al., 1982, p. 24). Planning, as defined by 
Hajer, is "the activity of the state [of] organising the use of space" (Hajer, 1989, p. 21), or as 
defined by Healey, "an activity of governments, and is structured by the characteristics of 
government activity and its relation to wider societal forces" (Healey et. al., 1982, p. 19). Hence, 
planning perform within the state's general framework; its policies operate in accordance with 
the state's general policies. It is for the liberals16 (e. g. Hayek) a planning of the future of the 
whole society, in which the values of one or a few individuals would decide the direction for all 
the rest of society (Flyvbjerg et. al., 1982, p. 25). In short, planning implies a sense of 
centralization and power exercitation. 
Constituting part of the project of modernity, the idea of modem planning is centrally linked to 
concepts of democracy and progress (Healey, 1996, p. 236). "The aim of modernist planners 
was to act as experts who could utilize the laws of development to provide societal guidance" 
(Beauregard, 1996a, p. 218, emphasis added). Therefore, planners' purposes were to maximize 
welfare and solve problems through the use of analytical tools from the social sciences that 
influence decisions, and through the design of regulations and implementation strategies that 
will produce desired outcomes (Sandercock, 1998a, p. 86). Planning activity is in fact centred on 
the capacity of the planner, working within the state, to control certain aspects of the public's 
lives and built environment. It is, in other words, a legitimate form of state intervention. This 
capacity emanates from the planner's power as an extension of state power. Thus, planning 
activity can be described as an activity of asymmetrical power distribution where the planner 
is a power-holder, and thus has a transformative capacity. Using this power, the planner can 
take decisions that affect the lives of others, such as in allocating resources (life chances 
according to Weber) according to his definition (or more precisely, state's definition) of the 
16 The liberals advocate the laissez-faire conception which starting point is the sovereign individual 
(Flyvbjerg et. al., 1982, p. 25). 
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"public interest". Planning is a redistributive mechanism, in which planners influence the 
distribution of benefits and resources through their decisions (McConnell, 1981, p. 157,162). In 
that sense, planning is a centralized, planned state intervention. For example, to control land 
market so as to be able to control urban development, the state in the post-war period in Britain 
nationalized the right to develop land" (Taylor, 1998, p. 22). This of course implied affecting 
the structure of land and property rights and the interests of land and property owners. 
Planning took an official form as a profession at the beginning of the twentieth century. '8 
However, since the nineteenth century, a project of social reform took place in a form of 
dispersed legislative Acts, and not totalizing schemes as the case in the twentieth century. Such 
process began with legislative reforms so as to legitimize and thus expand the power of the 
state to intervene in private properties (Greed, 1996, p. 82). '9 In that sense, state-planning 
legislation constitutes methods of exerting control over private property and development. 
Reflecting the main tools of the modem state within which it performs, modem planning 
revolved around main concepts of rationality and objectivity. Its knowledge and expertise were 
grounded in positivist science. That is, faith in the possibility of positivist knowledge enabled 
planners to claim their expertise transcended specific interests and gave them the ability to 
determine what was, or was not, in "the public interest". Accordingly, planners claim that they 
act in a value-neutral, objective manner. This conception was attacked by later critiques (mainly 
neo-Marxists and poststructuralists) who claim that planning has never been value-neutral. 
Gans, for example, points out that planners have generally advocated policies that fit the 
predispositions of the upper classes but not those of the rest of the population (cited in Fainstein 
& Fainstein, 1996, p. 267). Marxists attacked planning as serving the interests of capital at the 
expense of the rest of society (Klosterman, 1996, p. 161). Flyvbjerg contends in that respect that 
planners in real times play games of power covered up as technical reasoning, so the politicians 
and the planners can get what they want (Flyvbjerg, 1996, p. 387). For Foucault, planning could 
be associated with the dominating power of systematic reason, pursued through state 
In that sense, the state legislation embodied a contradiction between private ownership rights in land 
and property on the one hand and the regulation of land and property market through state's control 
of development rights on the other hand (Taylor, 1998, p. 22). 
'B In the USA, in 1917 a profession of planning was created (Catanese & Snyder, 1979, p. 22). Zoning 
codes were introduced officially in some American states since 1913. In New York the Zoning 
ordinance was introduced in 1916, and in Berkeley in 1917. In Britain, the Royal Town Planning 
Institute was established in 1913. Housing and Town Planning Act was introduced in 1909, the Town 
and Country Planning Act was first introduced in 1932, modified into the New Town Act in 1946, 
and the Town and Country Planning Act in 1947. The last two acts were consonant with increased 
state intervention at that time. They conferred planners with greater power to control development 
(Taylor, 1998, p. 2 1; Greed, 1996, p. 110). 
19 First forms of state intervention in Britain for example were related to the public health in the houses 
of the working class. Society accepted the state's Acts as regulatory thus needed. However, such early 
Acts paved the way for later, wider controls over all classes of housing and types of land use by 
means of town planning. In Britain in 1875, for example, the state decreed an Act through which the 
power of local authority was increased, granting it the power to control the development in whole 
areas, and giving it compulsory purchase powers (which continued till the present day) (Greed, 1996, 
p. 86). 
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bureaucracies. Thus, planning as a profession can be perceived as a technique for controlling 
others (Sandercock, 1998a, p. 71). In other words, planning is part of the state's power game. 
In the 1930s and 1940s, when state-directed planning activities (state intervention) increased in 
scope, some scholars (liberal economists e. g. Hayek) took a stand in opposition to such 
intervention and thus opposed planning as an activity in the first place. However, in that period, 
affected by Mannheim and Keynes' theories, planning was largely conceived as a need to 
regulate and abolish dysfunctions of capitalism. Its aim was the creation of a good and regulated 
capitalism through scientific insight and social engineering. Society was seen as an object for 
conscious, rational, legitimate manipulation through planning (Flyvbjerg et. al., 1982, p. 25-6). 
In the 1950s, planning was accepted as a regulating activity, however, questions were raised as 
to its techniques (Klosterman, 1996, p. 150). Planning aims at democratizing society and the 
planning process. The goal is a better life, characterized by equality, and good quality built 
environment. However, the question here is who defines the criteria of such good life and built 
environment. It is the state and its planners as power holders. This reflects the paternalistic 
attitude which prevailed in the project of modernity. 
To conclude, planning is an activity of planned state-intervention. It implies power and 
domination exerted by the state on private properties. It thus reflects the power game in state 
and society. 
PLANNING MODELS 
In the modernist model, planning was a project of state-directed futures. It was a technocratic 
type of planning concerned with making public decisions more rational. Reflecting modernity's 
totalizing vision, comprehensive planning was considered as most effective in the modernist 
model of planning to guide state intervention. Its focus was predominantly on advanced 
decision making; on developing blueprints for the future; on an instrumental rationality that 
closely considered and evaluated options and alternatives; and on utilitarianism and efficiency. 
In the modernist model, at least until the late 1960s, planning was held to operate in "the public 
interest". Planners (mostly architect-planners at that time) believed in determinism, i. e. good 
architecture and planning of the built environment will inevitably have its positive effects on 
society, transforming it into good (rational, well-ordered) society. Reflecting modernity's 
differentiation of value-spheres, planning was considered as an apolitical activity where urban 
planners were apoliticized professionals concerned only with planning the built environment 
and thus society (Sandercock, 1998a, p. 204-5). 
Within the modernist paradigm, there has been a succession of competing theories over the past 
fifty years. The Rational Comprehensive model dominated the field for two decades after the 
Second World War. It was accepted that technology and social science could make the world 
work better, and that planning could be an important tool for social progress. Planning in this 
model is confident in its capacity to discern and implement the public interest in specific 
settings (Sandercock, 1998a, p. 88). Planning in this period was majorily physical planning that 
focuses on aesthetic formalism (Taylor, 1998, p. 10-4). Land-use zoning or "master plans" were 
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introduced as regulatory means to bring order to the built environment. They are forms of state 
control over the physical built environment, and thus the property market and society. For 
example, the 1947 planning system of nationalising the right of development in Britain aimed at 
controlling and regulating development in the built environment. It acted as a limitation on 
private property rights. However, according to Hall, this Act had an inegalitarian effect. It 
contributed to land and property price inflation through containment policy (control of urban 
sprawl); thus the planning system exacerbated existing inequalities (Taylor, 1998, p. 100-1). 
Over the past two decades, this model has faced many challenges; nevertheless, it persists 
today. Operating within the same ideology, alternative models of decision-making were 
introduced. Based on rational decision-making, a procedural planning model emerged (e. g. 
Faludi), resting on the assumption that planning action is "acontextual". It does not pertain to 
any particular object or context; it can be applied to any societal context. This model rests upon 
a consensus view of society in which conflicts over values and interests are absent; thus it is 
apolitical (Healey et. al., 1982, p. 8,14; Baum, 1996, p. 367). Lindblom (1965) developed his 
"disjointed incrementalism", focusing on incremental decision making as a replacement of 
comprehensive decision making. Developing from this, Etzioni (1967) proposed his model of 
"mixed scanning" by which the decision-maker quickly scans the field of action, identifies the 
preferred strategy on the basis of incomplete information, then explores that strategy in more 
detail, occasionally returning to the general level to re-establish the overall direction (Faludi, 
1996, p. 69). Stemming from the same base, such alternatives were detached from the political 
nature of planning. They revolve in the technocratic, rational decision-making paradigm which 
persists today (see Breheny & Hooper, 1989; the writings of Faludi, and E. Alexander). 
Starting from the 1960s, affected by the 1960s revolts and the parallel changes in culture 
(postmodernism), the modernist model of planning was greatly attacked. The legitimacy of 
planning was questioned; the grand modem models of planning were no longer accepted; faith 
in technical rationality as the central block of planning was undermined; the fiction of 
determinism has been compromised; and a request for new more democratic methods of 
planning that offer a better quality of life was mounting (Flyvbjerg et. al., 1982, p. 38). Critiques 
attempted to shift focus from quantitative to qualitative planning; from place-oriented planning 
of the rational model, to people-oriented planning, which takes into consideration the people as 
end-users. Moreover, those critiques emphasized the status of planning as a political activity. 
However, Blowers proclaims that such critiques did not conceive of planning in its wider sense, 
that, as Wildavsky contends, "planning assumes power. Planning is politics" (Wildavsky, 1973, 
p. 132). Instead they saw it as an activity operating within a political framework in the sense that 
its decisions has to be approved by the political process. Blowers contends that planning is 
necessarily involved in a social context in which power relationships have to be recognised 
and understood. Power involves conflicting interests, values and outcomes (Blowers, 1982, 
p. 142). Similarly, Alexander acknowledged the difficulty of employing rationality in group 
decisions, due to the conflict of interests among the individuals making up the group. He states 
that in most groups the choice is strongly affected by the relative status or power of participants, 
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and the final issue is often effectively decided by the person with the most clout. Accordingly, 
the political process is not rational (Alexander, 1992, p. 46). Adopting an apolitical stand, classic 
paradigms of planning consider thinking about conflict and power not only unnecessary but also 
imprudent. Power is thought to be the domain of politicians, whereas rationality is the domain 
of planners (Flyvbjerg, 1998b, p. 210). As a reaction, different democratic planning methods 
focusing on heterogeneous interests in society, thus on politics in planning, emerged. 
Despite contemporary attacks on planning activities, there is today, as Klosterman argues, an 
underlying consensus about the need for public sector planning to perform vital social 
functions, such as considering the external effects of individual and group actions; improving 
the information base for public and private decision making, considering the distributional 
effects of public and private action (Klosterman, 1996, p. 162). As such, new attempts were 
made, aiming at a more democratized planning processes. However, such attempts or planning 
models are still centrally directed and organized, and while those models may be new, there is 
nothing new about the power structure. That is, as Flyvbjerg maintains, "we may have done 
away with a pure technical system of planning, but we have not changed the principles of 
control and power. " They still aim at central coordination and planning, however, in a more 
democratic manner. Such attempts, as Flyvbjerg contends, are not "democratic planning" but 
they are "planned democracy" (Flyvbjerg et. al., 1982, p. 32). 
The first serious challenge to the rational comprehensive model was the concept of advocacy 
planning that emerged in the mid- 1960s. Paul Davidoff is considered to be the pioneer of this 
approach. Advocacy planning stresses the role of politics in planning. It questions the existence 
of a single consensual public interest and instead calls for the promotion of the particular 
interests of the disadvantaged. In advocacy planning, the " advocate" planners would work as 
representing the poor in the planning process, without actually giving the poor a voice in that 
process (Sandercock, 1998a, p. 90). It is professionals who set the agenda, conceptualize the 
problem, and define the terms of its solution. In that respect, Goodman (1972) described 
planning professionals as agents of social control, as "soft cops" of the system. Advocacy 
planning, as Sandercock maintains, expanded the role of professionals and left the structure of 
power intact, confident in the workings of plural democracy (Sandercock, 1998b, p. 172). 
Advocacy planning is an affirmative expert-centred model; it affirms the status quo. 
Different directions emerged out of these early critiques of the advocacy experience. Some 
planners focused on the development of public participation mechanisms which would include 
the poor and the unrepresented in the planning process (e. g. Gans). Others tried to perfect the 
advocacy planning approach by turning it into "equity planning" (e. g. Krumholz, Clavel). 
Others reformulated the role of planners in the light of new ideas of transactive planning, 
mutual learning, and social learning (Friedmann, 1973). Other group moved toward an 
empowerment model (Heskin, Leavitt, Friedmann in his later work of 1992). 
Participation aimed at influencing the policy-making/ administrative process and expanding 
the existing concept of democracy, to allow a larger role for the citizen in the decision-making 
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process. Of participation's ingredients are increased democracy, self-fulfilment, and getting 
things done. This third ingredient concerns needs, power and action. Power is, among other 
things, the capacity to get things done. However, as Cox maintains, those with the greatest 
needs generally tend to be the powerless (Cox, 1976, p. 172). Participation revolves around the 
attempt to redraw the rules of the power game to the advantage of those who have hitherto 
been losers. Dahl links this to the first aim of participation, stating that "until and unless we 
reach greater parity in the distribution of political resources, other steps towards 
democratization are like treating tuberculosis with aspirin" (cited in Cox, 1976, p. 173). Scott 
and Rowies (1977) criticized participation in planning as failing to grasp the real nature of 
social and political power in society (cited in Kemp, 1982, p. 60). Participation in such a sense 
involves more consultation with the public rather than the public actively participating in 
decision-making. The authority retains the right to make the final decision. It indicates, as 
Habraken avers, "a change of procedure within an unchanged balance of power" between the 
professional and the user. It does not mean a transfer of any responsibility from the professional 
to the user, but rather the professional domain remains unchanged (Habraken, 1990, p. 71). As 
Arnstein argues, "there is a critical difference between going through the empty ritual of 
participation and having the real power needed to affect the outcome of the process... the 
fundamental point [is] that participation without redistribution of power is an empty and 
frustrating process for the powerless... It maintains the status quo" (Arnstein, 1969, p. 358, 
emphasis added). 2° 
The equity planning model emerged in the 1980s as a democratic socialist-based model 
(Fainstein & Fainstein, 1996, p. 280). Krumholz is considered as its pioneer. Equity planning 
focuses on issues of "who gets what", where the goal is to increase equality by operating from 
within the system. The aim is thus equity and not consultation, as in participation (Fainstein & 
Fainstein, 1996, p. 271). This model retains the belief in the planner's expertise and doesn't say 
much about drawing on local knowledge. Equity planners, as defined by Krumholz, are those 
who consciously seek to redistribute power, resources or participation away from local elites 
and toward the unrepresented (Sandercock, 1998b, p. 173-4). The planner is still the centre of 
the story, the key actor, however, with a much broader role than in the rational comprehensive 
model (Sandercock, 1998a, p. 93). In this model, the planner continues in his role as a state- 
official working within state policies, however, he acts as a mediator to defend the interests of 
20 Arnstein (1969) discerned eight gradations of citizen participation ranging from "manipulation" and 
"therapy" which are literary "non-participation", but a manipulative normalizing process of certain 
ideologies and policies from the side of the higher authorities masked as citizen participation. 
"Informing" as a one-way process, and "consultation" refer to the cases in which the users are 
allowed to hear and to be heard. "Placation" is a higher form of "tokenism". In these last three facets 
professionals retain the power of decision-making and control. However, these three facets of 
participation are the most applied ones. In "partnership" form, citizens become involved in the 
process of production through participating in the negotiations and decision-making process. 
"Delegated power" and "citizen control" are considered the highest forms of citizen participation, 
where users have control over a large portion of decision-making. This latter facet of participation is 
quite theoretical and unappreciable as it contradicts substantially with the notion of professionalism as 
explored in chapter ten below. . 
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the poor and the unrepresented. As such, equity planning is still engaged in, using Wildavsky's 
phrase, "speaking truth to power" (handmaid to power) (Wildavsky, 1992), still engaged in a 
top-down, state-centred planning. However, it is now a consciously politicized practice, where 
its allegiances are consciously directed to those who have been excluded. It is, as Sandercock 
describes it, a "top-down inclusionary politics", in which the poor, the marginalized, are still 
not part of the action, and do not feature as active agents in the narrative of equity planning 
(Sandercock, 1998a, p. 94). 
The communicative planning modelt' marks a significant departure from the rational 
comprehensive model. Extending from action-centred theories (implementation), this planning 
model has moved from the focus on instrumental rationality of the earlier model to 
communicative rationality. It focuses on communication as an interpersonal activity involving 
dialogue, debate and negotiation. Drawing on Habermas' theory of communicative action, 
communicative planners are interested in the problems of action and implementation. They 
maintain that rationality is socially and discursively constructed rather than imposed; they hope 
to improve the quality and openness of the debate (Beauregard, 1996b, p. 108). In this model, 
communication is a precondition of real democracy, and hence of any democratic participation 
in planning (Taylor, 1998, p. 123-4). Forester is considered the leader in this respect with his 
book `Planning in the face of power' (1989). He emphasizes the very political nature of all 
planning activity, in which relations of power are always involved and systemic inequalities 
influence outcomes. Communicative planners focus on what planners actually do, subjecting 
planners' practices to a micro-analysis of interpersonal interactions. They aim at exploring what 
skills planners need to maximize their effectiveness in planning for people. In that respect, in 
his evaluation of planning practice, Forester focuses on listening to storytelling of planning 
practices, because, as he argues, these stories embody and enact the play of power, the selective 
focusing of attention (Forester, 1989). 
In this model, planing is about talk, argument, shaping attention. Its theorists have moved from 
the decision focus of applied rationality, from document- oriented and anticipatory mode of 
planning to a concern with interactive social processes (Sandercock, 1998a, p. 95-97). 
Nevertheless, the primary actor and source of attention is still the formally educated planner 
working primarily through the state. While it is certainly a more inclusive theory of planning 
than its predecessors, it has serious weaknesses. The insistence of communicative action 
theorists on studying practice and practitioners means that their theory will always conform to 
the current practice of planning rather than suggesting alternatives or calling for social 
transformation. Communicative planners do not challenge the existing system with its structure 
of power, but rather they accept it and work within its parameters. They attempt at trying to 
change some of the oppression that might occur in certain cases but do not seek a general or 
21 Healey, in her book (1997), refers to this model as "Collaborative planning", while Forester referred 
to it as "Argumentative planning", however, in his latest work (1999) he refers to it as "Deliberative 
planning". 
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substantial social and systemic transformation. It brackets, although sometimes superficially 
acknowledges, the issue of structural inequalities. Through using universal categories, as 
Sandercock contends, it suppresses the crucial questions of difference and marginality and their 
relationship to justice (Sandercock, 1998b, p. 175). Baum states that although communicative 
planners acknowledge politics in planning, however, they choose apolitical roles. They 
withdraw from acting politically to identifying themselves as neutral technicians; as interpreters 
of texts and stories (Baum, 1996, p. 373-5). Baum and Taylor maintain that communicative 
planning theory is essentially procedural. It can be viewed as a further development of the 
rational process view of planning (Baum, 1996, p. 373-5; Taylor, 1998, p. 153). 
In all those models of planning, the planner is still the driving force, working through the state, 
even if his goal is to achieve some kind of redistribution of resources on behalf of the poor 
(Sandercock, 1998a, p. 100). This "on behalf of " is the problem in planning activities, which 
ultimately gives the planner the authority to act as a decision-maker. 
A growing number of local researchers representing non-governmental organizations (NGO) 
who had their studies and training in the West are now proposing alternative approaches to 
solve planning schemes (mainly housing strategies) in Third World countries. Influenced by the 
work of J. Turner, and through funds from the World Bank, a new wave of proposals of site and 
services with financial low interest loans are experimented. Proposals of empowering the poor 
financially so that they can help themselves are now spreading. Such latter attempts embody 
educating users to be able to survive through the existing capitalist societal structure. However, 
such attempts constitute weak challenges to the existing economic and political structures. Such 
attempts embody a transfer of some sort of power from the professional to the user, i. e. certain 
responsibilities of decision-making which used to be of the professional are now placed on the 
user. However, such attempts have been, in most Arab countries, institutionalized. Many 
conservation and empowerment projects have been carried out in the Muslim world, however 
controlled and directed by state agencies. Examples of such projects are those Aga Khan award 
winners such as Germeen Bank housing program in Bangladesh, East Wahdat upgrading 
program in Jordan, Ismailiyyah development project in Egypt, Khuda-Ki-Basti incremental 
development program in Pakistan, and Kampung Improvement program in Jakarta, Indonesia 
(Davidson, 1998). 22 Such attempts are limited to few sites and not generating a general policy 
that is self-applicable. The role of such state agencies or NGOs as initiator and coordinator of 
such projects reveals the insistence on centralization and external parties' intervention. They 
still perform within the broader systemic mechanisms. 
Attacking those models, radical planning model or empowerment emerged in the 1990s, 
marking a dramatic shift in planning paradigms (e. g. Sandercock, Heskin, Leavitt). Its goal is to 
ZZ Most of those projects are state-controlled projects. The state is the initiator of such projects, however, 
following policies of empowerment. Private agencies were involved in some of those projects in 
planning processes (see S. Serageldin, 1989). In short, such projects retain the role of professionals 
and state control. 
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work for structural transformation of systematic inequalities and, in the process, to empower 
those who have been systematically disempowered (Sandercock, 1998b, p. 176). Thus, radical 
planning is viewed in relation to community organization, urban social mobilization, 
empowerment, rather than to working through the state. Radical planning does not lie on a 
logical continuum with rational planning for societal guidance. It is primarily about community 
participation in projects by the state (Sandercock, 1998a, p. 99). In Heskin's description of 
radical planning, it is the community that initiates, and the planner who enables, assists, but 
never imposes his solutions and only offers advice when asked (Heskin, 1980). Similarly, 
Leavitt emphasizes the role of the planner as working with the community and not for the 
community. In radical planning, the purpose of planning is the empowerment of those who 
have been systematically disempowered by structural inequalities of race, class, and gender, 
where the role of the planner is seen neither as technical expert nor as mediator or negotiator, 
but as an enabler of community self-empowerment (Sandercock, 1998a, p. 65). 
For Heskin and Leavitt, the state is and can only be an adversary. However, for Friedmann, any 
social advances achieved through a radical planning that by-passes the state "will quickly reach 
material limits. To go beyond these limits, appropriate actions by the state are essential" 
(Friedmann, 1987, p. 407). In that sense, Friedmann accepts the state and its hegemonic power 
to approve the actions of the mobilized communities; thus he seeks piecemeal social 
transformations or changes that do not contradict the state in a major way. On the other hand, 
Heskin and Leavitt ignore the existence of the state but do nothing to stand in opposition to its 
major power. Any radical practice ultimately has to be legitimised by the state. "It may well be 
a contradiction in terms to think of the state engaging in radical planning, it is equally 
misleading to think that radical planning can do without the state" (Sandercock, 1998a, p. 101). 
This contradiction is perhaps the reason why radical planning as a paradigm did not receive 
practical acceptance. That is, the internal logic of this model contradicts the logic of planning as 
a state-directed profession (explained in chapter ten), and, in broader terms, with state logic 
based on the concept of power. Planning as a profession is a legitimate form of state 
intervention and exercitation of power and control over private parties. If planning is to be in 
the hands of the community, this means that the state is losing its control over its people and 
their properties, which contradicts its logic. 
In the so-called Third World countries, the situation is even worse. Planning in those countries 
is still centred on the modernist apolitical model of comprehensive planning. It does not 
consider the political and power relations within the processes of the built environment 
production. It is an apoliticized activity that aim at strengthening the status quo and state power 
(e. g. replanning the city of Beirut). Thereby, planning in those countries became, under the 
banner of organization and the public interest, a legitimate tool of manipulation in the hands of 
the state. In Arab Muslim countries, such planning conception (the acquired mode) conflict 
substantially with Islamic principles (the inherited mode), as explained in chapter seven. 
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Although such models establish a development from the rational model, they assume no 
fundamental change in planning practice. Such models develop new methods of the planning 
process; however, the main premises of planning principles persist. They are based on the 
merits of the same concepts: large/small scale; comprehensive/incremental; 
objectivity/advocacy; top-down/bottom-up; place-oriented/people-oriented (Campbell & 
Fainstein, 1996, p. 10). Planning today is a continuation of the modem mode: it is a legitimate 
form of power-based, state-intervention. It does not offer any changes in the existing relations 
of power. At best, as Friedmann argues, contemporary planning models are answers for small 
groups out of step with their society; they are quasi-utopians (Friedmann, 1987, p. 222). All 
those models can be perceived as concerned with societal guidance from above. However, 
planning for societal guidance is very different from planning for structural change and social 
transformation. Friedmann asserts that the crisis in planning is fundamentally a crisis in the idea 
of societal guidance by the state. For Friedamnn, both access to decision-making and the 
capacity to influence decisions should be evenly distributed in the relevant population 
(Friedmann, 1987, p. 311,346). Planning in such models stands as affirmative. That is, as part of 
the state, planning as a profession constitutes part of the existing status quo; it aims at 
preserving this status quo with its structure of power, as explained in chapter ten. 
Throughout those models, planners focused on the operative level of the built environment, 
ignoring its imperceptible level. They did not incorporate issues of power in their theories, the 
issue that, as Friedmann states, created a problem in planning theories. That is, whenever 
planners in Western culture write about power, it has been mostly in the sense of enabling the 
powerless to do things for themselves. " This has led to a great deal of conflict (Friedmann, 
1997, p. 6). With the exception of radical planning24, as Flyvbjerg contends, if there is a thinking 
about conflict and power it is typically of the normative, idealistic kind, which muddles 
"ought" and "is" and wishes power away by different utopian means. Accordingly, Baum 
views such models as deceptions that planning theorists use to comfort themselves and others, 
"as if devotion to [the models] could magically deny everyday reality and substitute something 
reassuring" (Baum, 1996). What is lacking today in planning theory is an understanding of 
relations of power, and, according to Flyvbjerg, an understanding of real politik and 
realrationalitat (Flyvbjerg, 1998b, p. 210). This is what the following chapters are devoted to. 
Comparing Islam to the Western mode, one can argue that paradigm-shifts in Western planning 
are based on a common perception of the built environment as an end in itself. Concerns are 
thus directed to regulate and order the built environment, regardless, sometimes (as the case in 
modem planning), of its end-users. Producing the appropriate quality of the built environment 
using modem concepts raises a question of " how appropriate". However, stemming from the 
Z3 With the exception of Flyvbjerg who has integrated discourse of power with that of planning theory 
(see Flyvbjerg, 1998a). 
24 Or community-based planning, as it is sometimes called. 
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tendency to formally regulate (as in modernity) or from the focus on formal aesthetic issues (as 
in the postmodern architecture), appropriateness of the built environment might be overstated, 
thus the question might incline towards defining the limits of such investment in the built 
environment, i. e. the question changes from "how appropriate" to "how vast" the investment 
should be. On the contrary, in Islam, investment in the built environment is kept to the 
minimum. Islam considers the built environment as a means and not an end in itself. The aim is 
not to reach a well-organized built environment. In other words, the question of "how 
appropriate" is the investment in the built environment should be inclined towards " how little" 
such investment should be. Therefore, architectural styles or planning methods did not receive 
any attention or priority in the production of the inherited built environment. In short, 
production of the inherited built environments followed different mechanisms from those of the 
acquired mode. This simple difference in ideology is considered a major difference between the 
inherited mode and the acquired mode in their respective perceptions of the built environment. 
Examining those paradigm-shifts in modes of existence (from modernity to postmodernity) and 
in models of planning, one can notice that all those paradigms are centred on the acceptance of 
the system of capitalism. Solutions did not aim at systemic changes but corrective changes 
within the same system. Some scholars see in this condition a profound "end of ideology" 
(Bell) or "end of history" (Fukuyama) in the sense that capitalism and Western liberalism have 
triumphed against all other ideologies and systems, especially after the decline of communism 
as an alternative system. But isn't there any foreseeable systemic alternative to capitalism? 
5.6 IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE? 
The "capitalist imperative" has been applied to cultural 
movements as far apart as the Renaissance and Romanticism, 
and to intellectual developments from Hobbes to Hegel to 
Hobhouse. Earlier it was applied to modernism as it now is to 
post-modernism. 
(Kumar, 1995, p. 192) 
To recapitulate, modernity and postmodernity are seen here as but means to the Western 
project, whose goals are pre-stated: progress towards human emancipation, justice, freedom and 
thus happiness. Looking at the deeper logic underlying these paradigm-shifts (in means), it can 
be argued that they are actually experiments in social reconstruction and political reform; a 
progressive process of trial and error. However, both modernity and postmodernity have been 
developed within the context of the capitalist system. Capitalism formulates these means in a 
way that guarantees and sustains itself. Put differently, as Jameson avers, those shifts 
correspond to internal changes in the structure of capitalism as a system. Jameson relates 
modernism to "monopoly" capitalism, while postmodernism is the cultural logic of "late" 
capitalism (Jameson, 1991). For example, capitalism promotes individuality, consumerism, and 
liberal democracy, as they are considered principal features that enhance capitalism's aims of 
capital accumulation and profitability and speed up its turnover. Therefore, those features can 
be found embodied in late-modernity and in postmodernity as a means. To take another 
example, Jameson dwells on "the incapacity of our minds, at least at present, to map the great 
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global multinational and decentered communicational network in which we find ourselves as 
individual subjects". Thereby, postmodernism works as an introductory tool to the new late 
capitalism's constituents. It can thus be argued that capitalism performs as the driving force 
behind those means so as to maintain its perpetuation. 
Capitalism does not stand still; it constantly disturbs settled practices and beliefs. It is a 
dynamic system that produces dynamic, progressive, capitalist societies. The new forms of 
work, the increasing centrality of culture and information, the changing balance between the 
private and public spheres, all are expressions of this dynamism. This dynamism is reflected in 
what we referred to above as "paradigm-shifts". That is, capitalism manipulates those 
paradigms (means) so as to fit with its inner logic, while, simultaneously, directs them to 
achieve their emancipatory goal. In that context, Kumar states (in the epigraph above) that the 
"capitalist imperative" has been applied to cultural movements (Romanticism) and to 
intellectual developments (Hobbes, Hegel) since the Renaissance. It was applied to modernism 
as it is now applied to post-modernism (Kumar, 1995, p. 192). 
The collapse of communism25 meant for some scholars the "end of ideology" (stated earlier by 
Bell), or "the end of history" (Fukuyama). Fukuyama meant by this that, as a result of the 
defeat of Marxism and communism, all ideological conflict in the world has been exhausted. 
There are no more stories of conflict of competing visions of civilization and social order. 
Communism has been defeated by capitalism, or more precisely, by the Western liberal- 
democratic forms of market society (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 18; 1992). Capitalism is the ideology 
that triumphed, with no alternative. 
Similar positions have been adopted since 198926. Bauman states that the "collapse [of 
communism] ushered us into an as-yet-unexplored world: a world without a collective utopia, 
without a conscious alternative to itself' (Bauman, 1992, p. xxv). For him, "the current western 
form of life [capitalist] ... 
has neither effective enemies inside nor barbarians knocking at the 
gates ... It 
has practically (and apparently irrevocably) de-legitimized all alternatives to itself. 
Having done this, it has rendered it uncannily difficult, nay impossible, to conceive of a 
different way of life in a form that would resist assimilation and hamper, rather than boost, the 
logic of its reproduction". Thus, it can be pronounced universal (Bauman, 1992, p. 183). It is, as 
Fukuyama proclaims "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization 
of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 4). 
25 Toffler argues that socialism, based upon a centralized form of planning, cannot cope with what he 
refers to as "the third wave": increasing diversification, an accelerating pace of change, and 
associated shifts towards flexible, customised decisions. It becomes necessary to decentralise 
decision-making. But doing so necessarily risks a transformation of the prevailing system of socialism 
(Toffler, 1981). 
26 1989 witnessed "systemic" revolutions in Eastern Europe against communism, which led to the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. 
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Nevertheless, within capitalism, problems arise and dissatisfaction with present conditions 
mounts. Based on criticism of the present conditions, different utopian theories emerge. 27 That 
is, as the Western system of society-making is perceived as dynamic, theorists are always 
moving in a progressive mode to improve present conditions. Examples of such utopian theories 
are those of Toffler (1981) and Gortz (1982). In this respect, Kumar argues that Utopia per se is 
a Western concept. It arose in the West as a specific and highly original way of dealing with the 
novel problems of modern capitalist Western society. It is a critical rehearsal of the dilemmas of 
capitalist society, and, at the same time, a prescriptive account of the best way of resolving 
them, i. e. a tool of critical analysis and a constructive vision of future possibilities (Kumar, 
1991). Under contemporary capitalism, the search for happiness and contentment through the 
pursuit of material goods seems inherently elusive", therefore, Utopian alternatives attempt to 
suggest other means to reach this contentment. However, all these Utopians operate within the 
present system of capitalism. They are not systemic alternatives but rather partial and 
incremental Utopian proposals concerned with particular, local problems. Current Western 
utopianists' imagination could not go beyond capitalism as a system, especially after the 
demise of its rival, socialism, and the successes that capitalism has achieved during the last two 
centuries. Thus, there exists no conceivable systemic alternative that claims to represent a 
different and "higher" level of social organization. There is only fine-tuning of an already well- 
functioning social machine. In that respect, Marcuse argues that the one-dimensionality in 
thinking that dominates contemporary capitalist Western societies militates against qualitative 
change. Ideas29 that attempt to transcend the established order are either repelled or reduced to 
terms of this order (Marcuse, 1991, p. 12). 
This analysis applies to contemporary built environments. Those built environments are parts of 
and products of the overall system of capitalism; they are subject to the mechanisms of that 
system. They follow a dynamic mode of production; thus, they are always in a process of 
paradigm-shifts in terms of the tools (models) they use in their production processes. Problems 
in contemporary built environments are dealt with partially by using tools produced from within 
the system itself. For example, urban planning models arise as a result of dissatisfaction with 
certain aspects of the previous model. However, those new models directed at solving particular 
problems, employ the same language and merits. For example, incrementalism replaced 
comprehensiveness, politicization replaced apoliticization; people-oriented replaced place- 
27 By demonstrating that industrial capitalism has precipitated increasing levels of inequality and 
exploitation, an accelerating deterioration in the quality of life, and a growing ecological crisis, the 
desirability of an alternative form of life is established, and thus expressed in a form of Utopian 
theories (Smart, 1992, p. 108). The different planning models presented above are examples of such 
utopian solutions in the built environment. 
28 In that respect, Durkheim states that "to pursue a goal which is by definition unattainable is to 
condemn oneself to a state of perpetual unhappiness... The more one has, the more one wants, since 
satisfaction received only stimulate instead of filling needs" (cited in Saunders, 1995, p. 81). 
29 Marcuse describes these ideas as embodying "negative thinking" that "negates" existing forms of 
thought and reality from the perspective of higher possibilities so as to break with the existing world 
of thought and behaviour (Marcuse, 1991, p. xiv). 
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oriented planning. It can be said, thus, that problems, tools, and solutions in those built 
environments are products of capitalism as a system. Examples of such partial solutions are 
regionalism, populism, and postmodernism in architecture, comprehensive planning, advocacy 
planning, social-learning planning, participation, empowerment, and recently communicative 
planning and the New Urbanism. 
Transferring such tools of built environment production, loaded with the mechanisms of 
capitalism, to other societies, such as Arab Muslim societies, implies transmitting those 
mechanisms to those latter societies. To relate this to what have been mentioned earlier (that 
Muslim societies are relatively static societies, whereas Western capitalist societies are 
dynamic), then employing the tools of a dynamic capitalist culture in a static culture (Muslim) 
is likely to end in contradictions and tensions that destabilize this latter culture. This is the case 
in Arab Muslim societies today: an inherited static socio-cultural mode using the tools of an 
acquired dynamic culture to produce its built environment. The result is contradictions, 
disruption between the societal realms, and thus, ultimately a crisis in the built environment. 
Bell, in assessing contemporary societies, states that societies in general consist of three realms: 
techno-economic structure, polity, and socio-culture. The techno-economic is the realm of 
economic life, and polity is the system of societal authority involving the allocation of power in 
hierarchies that can be exercised authoritatively and even arbitrarily (politics). 30 A wider 
definition of the socio-cultural realm, different from that proposed by Bell31, includes culture, 
socialization, religion, values, community, kinship and the like. According to Bell, each of the 
three realms has its own independent logic of development, i. e. axial principle. 32 Each has a 
certain direction and pattern of change. If those axial principles and patterns of change are not 
compatible, contradictions and disjunction arise between the realms. This ultimately leads to 
tension and conflicts in society. 33 Bell refers to these tensions as problems that cannot be 
resolved unless the three realms intermesh (Bell, 1979, p. xxx; Waters, 1996, p. 37,47). 
In traditional Muslim societies, where Islam was the dominant system that operated as a way of 
life in most aspects, those societal realms were integrated and intermeshed; therefore Muslim 
societies were "unified", thus quite stabilized. However, since the introduction of modernity 
'o This definition of the realm of polity is an elaboration of Bell's definition by Waters (1996). 
" Bell confines the realm of culture to artistic expressions and religion. He concentrated only on the 
public realm of social life. On the other hand, adopting a more comprehensive categorization, Parsons 
referred to culture as part of "latent pattern-maintenance" which includes culture, socialization, 
religion, values, community, kinship. Althusser referred to these aspects as "ideology" (Waters, 
1996, p. 46). 
32 In contemporary capitalist societies, Bell argues, the axial principle of the techno-economic realm is 
functional rationality (efficiency), for polity it is equality (stipulation of legitimate power), while for 
culture it is self-realization (Bell, 1979, p. xxx). Waters suggests an alternative to Bell's axial principle 
of polity as monopolization of coercive power, and to that of techno-economic realm as 
commodification (Waters, 1996, p. 47). 
Bell proposes that the disjunction of the realms is the central feature of contemporary capitalist 
society. This is expressed in the ideological terms of alienation, loss of community, depersonalization, 
and the diremption of authority (Bell, 1979, p. xxx; Waters, 1996, p. 37-8). 
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and capitalism into Muslim societies, contradictions have occurred between and within the 
societal realms (using Bell's concept). They become "differentiated, " destabilized societies. 
That is, the realms of techno-economic and polity in the contemporary Arab Muslim world tend 
to adopt a capitalist system, however, some internal tensions exist within those realms as a 
result of the incompatibility between the inherited mode and the more dominant capitalism- 
oriented acquired mode. In the socio-cultural realm, as values, norms, religion, customs, 
community and social bases stem from Islam, capitalism as a system loaded with its values and 
mechanisms could not effectively permeate into this realm. Therefore, the inherited mode 
dominates. It can thus be said the Muslim individual lives in a duality: he belongs to the 
inherited mode socially, whereas politically and economically he belongs to the acquired 
operating mode. Hence, contemporary Muslim built environments that are produced using 
dynamic capitalist tools (e. g. state-intervention, acquired building regulations, planning 
methods, centralised power) contradict with their users' values and socio-cultural base. Such 
environments are the production of " acquired" non-Islamic mechanisms and a container of 
"inherited" Islamic values. Contemporary built environments are used as end-products or as 
containers only, and not as an integral part of the users' lives. " 
This disjunction between the different realms, between the inherited and the acquired modes 
results in the crisis that contemporary Muslim built environments face. Therefore, accepting 
what Bell said that this crisis cannot be resolved unless all realms are intermeshed, solutions 
should be sought accordingly. This chapter has located some of the principal points of tension 
and contradiction. The imperceptible points of incompatibility between the acquired and the 
inherited modes should be pointed out. This can be achieved (as this thesis claims) by 
investigating the concept of power, the main driving force operating in the decision-making 
process in the production of the built environment. 
5.7 CONCLUSIONS 
As inferred from this chapter, the acquired mode is rooted in the Western project and its 
concomitant capitalism and the modern state. Shifting paradigms to accomplish such a project 
does not change the axial principle of this "narrative": fulfilling such a project through the state 
is centred on the concept of power. All Western concepts of society making (modernity, 
postmodemity) are based on the existence of the state as a regulating device. The state is thus 
centralized and interventionist; its logic is based on the concept of power. Thus, any paradigm 
shifts to fulfil the Western project have accepted and have to accept such logic and thus operate 
within its framework. Accordingly, the concept of having a society without a central regulating 
authority is not thought of as an alternative. The next part therefore investigates the concept of 
power as operating on the imperceptible level of both the inherited and the acquired modes, and 
consequently its reflection in their respective built environments. 
See al-Hathloul (1996) for examples of people's defence of their inherited values, presented as 
solutions in their built environments against the employment of the acquired mode in the production 
of the built environment (building regulations) (1996, p. 203-8). 
Part Three 
Part 3 
THE ACQUIRED VS. THE INHERITD 
What is required is a theoretical framework which 
relates the concept of planning to the concept of 
power... Power [should be used] as the central concept 
in the explanation of planning policies and outcomes. 
(Blowers, 1982, p. 140) 
INTRODUCTION 
As this part of study argues, the built environment is an outcome of dynamic 
processes of production in which power through decision-making processes 
operates as the determinant factor. Each societal system has its own system 
ARGUMENT 
of power that operates on the imperceptible level, as an underlying 
mechanism in the production of its built environment. Changing such power 
systems has its impact on the built environment. This is, as this thesis argues, 
the genesis of the crisis of contemporary Muslim built environments. 
Accordingly, power is considered in this research as the main axis of 
investigation in both the acquired and the inherited modes. 
As Friedmann contends, contemporary theorists' ambivalence about power 
issues, in their studies of the built environment, is considered one of the 
CxUsts major outstanding problems in theorizing the built environment (Friedmann, 
IN 1997). That is, affected by modernity's positivism and differentiation of 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
STUDIES value spheres, environmental theorists 
(planners) did not consider the 
underlying processes of city forming, i. e. the imperceptible structure was 
accepted unquestionally; it was perceived as constraint. As demonstrated in 
the previous chapter, although some contemporary attempts acknowledge the 
political role of planning, however, this is in a narrow sense. They perceive of 
planning as operating within the framework of politics, rather than of 
planning as part of the broader political process and power game. They do 
not conceive of planning in its wider sense as Wildavsky describes it: 
PARTIAL "planning assumes power. Planning is politics" (Wildavsky, 1973, p. 132). 
POLITICAL Such planning attempts aim at changing the status quo partially, only as 
CONCERN 
related to their focus: how to ameliorate the conditions of the powerless, and 
not comprehensively bringing about systemic change. They do not look at the 
whole political and power relations operating within the decision-making 
process of producing the built environment. These scholars did not 
incorporate issues of power in their theories. This has led to a great deal of 
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conflict (Friedmann, 1997, p. 6). In other words, such studies did not grasp the 
STRUCTURAL 
imperceptible structure of the societal system and built environment DISJUNCTION 
inclusively, leadimg to disjunction between the three structures of the built 
environment and societal realms, thus to a crisis in conceptualizing the built 
environment. 
This depthless vision and its corresponding structural disjunction is transferred 
DEEPENING today to the Arab Muslim world, leading to deepening of the crisis which 
THE contemporary Muslim built environments witness. It became a crisis of the 
CRISIS 
incompatible coexistence of the inherited and the acquired modes, in addition 
to a crisis in grasping such modes. That is, this imported vision was employed, 
on the one hand, in studying traditional Muslim cities, as shown in part one of 
this study, and, on the other hand, in the conceptualization of the recent 
dichotomy of the `inherited' vs. the `acquired'. Accordingly, most crisis- 
solving attempts perceive this crisis incompletely, only on its perceptible 
(operative and manifested) levels, differentiated from its imperceptible level. 
Broadly speaking, power should become an inevitable question for studies of 
ISSUE 
OF the built environment. In that respect, Friedmann urges urban theorists to build 
POWER relations of power into their conceptual frameworks (Friedmann, 1997). What 
is lacking today in studies of production of the built environment, as Flyvbjerg 
contends, is an understanding of relations of power, and understanding of real 
politik and realrationalitat (Flyvbjerg, 1998b, p. 210; Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 
1998). Accordingly, to grasp the crisis of contemporary Muslim built 
environments, both the acquired and the inherited modes should be studied 
focusing on their imperceptible power mechanisms, responsible for producing 
their respective built environments. This is what this part of the study is 
devoted to. 
Chapter six demonstrates the conceptual differences between the concept of 
STRUCTURE power in the acquired mode and in Islam. It determines that power in Islam is 
centred on the concept of rights, while in the acquired mode it is based on its 
modem conceptualization. Chapter seven is devoted to exploring the inherited 
mode of built environment, as centred on the concept of rights, while chapter 
eight demonstrates some of the dissensions and thus points of incompatibility 
between the acquired and the inherited modes with reference to their concepts 
of power and rights, respectively. 
Chapter Six 
öwer ý ýý rs 
a eo ceptua11iorizou 
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POWER / RIGHTS 
a conceptual horizon 
No practical philosophy can be adequate for our time unless it 
confronts the analysis of power and how it operates in our 
everyday lives 
(Bernstein, cited in Flyvbjerg, 1993, p. 11) 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Modernity, capitalism and, therefore, the modem state, as the main pillars of contemporary 
Western societies, are all conceptions that are centred around the concept of power in their 
mechanisms and operation. On the other hand, traditional Muslim societies, as will be seen, are 
based on the concept of rights. Conception of the state in Islam reflects this concept of rights as 
derived from shari `a. Thus, rights constitute the base for Islamic mechanisms operating in all 
levels in the Muslim society. The coexistence of both systems together in most Arab Muslim 
countries today has led to an acquired/inherited dualism, or to a power/rights dualism, on the 
imperceptible level. This dualism, this study argues, is the main reason for the crisis in which 
contemporary Muslim societies live and is reflected in their built environments. 
To grasp the nature of this crisis, both the inherited and the acquired modes should be 
investigated, genealogically, i. e. at their imperceptible levels. Thus, the modern concept of 
power and that of rights in Islam are investigated in this chapter, generally and as pertaining to 
the production of the acquired and the inherited built environments, respectively, in a 
comparative manner. However, neither of the two concepts should be seen as opposing the 
other, but rather each concept addresses a characteristically different set of concerns. This 
comparison does not aim at degrading or overthrowing either of the two concepts, but at 
exploring them, critically. That is, it is acknowledged that each of the two concepts has its own 
limits. However, as these concepts constitute part of their larger systems, the comparison can be 
perceived as between two systems: the acquired, based on capitalism, and the inherited, based 
on Islam. Moreover, as contemporary Muslim societies adopt the modern concept of power as 
part of the acquired mode, the comparison can be viewed as drawn between two concepts that 
were (are) applied chronologically (past and present) in Muslim societies and states, rather than 
between the Western system (roots of the acquired) and the Islamic one. 
As procedures of the production of contemporary built environments (i. e. planning system) vary 
from one country to another (e. g. between UK. and the US. ), this research focuses on the 
general mechanisms that operate within the acquired system and not on its detailed procedures 
(e. g. planning procedures, regulations). However, the arguments developed throughout this 
study apply to the capitalist-based acquired mode operating in most Arab countries today. 
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For their importance to the concepts of power and rights, certain terms used throughout this 
study have to be defined first. 
"Party" in the context of the built environment is a one party (agent) that exercises its power 
on a site. A party might be an individual, aggregates of individuals (group), collectivity (e. g. 
organization), or a state. A "site" is a locale in the built environment in which power 
exercitation takes place. As this research is primarily concerned with the built environment, 
each party is identified with reference to a certain site or sites in which it has power. In its 
decision-making process, that party is inclined towards or subjected to one of two general 
policies: a centralized or a decentralized policy of decision-making. Centralized decision- 
making means most environmental decisions are made by a central party. With respect to sites, 
it means that the parties in their sites are not in full control; outsiders often intervene in their 
affairs. On the other hand, decentralization means environmental decisions are decentralized 
and thus each party enjoys more control over its site (laissez-faire). Decentralization means, 
generally, more parties are in control of the built environment, whereas centralization leads to a 
decrease in the number of parties controlling the built environment and to increase the number 
of parties in control of a single site (e. g. the state and the owner party, if perceived as two 
separate parties). In a decentralized system, the controlling party has more control over its 
property than in a centralized decision-making process. 
6.3 POWER/ RIGHTS 
The imperatives of profit, power and control seem as 
predominant now as they have been in the history of 
capitalist industrialism 
(Kumar, 1995, p. 154; emphasis added) 
The concept of power has been the centre of many debates among contemporary scholars in 
different fields, especially in social sciences. These debates focus on the modern concept of 
power, derived from observations of and is applicable to modem, mainly Western, capitalist 
societies and states. This modem concept of power has been adopted by the acquired mode. 
Islam as a legal system has its own concept of power which is different from that of the modem 
age. The main relevant aspects of the modem concept of power of the acquired mode and those 
of Islamic rights as pertaining to the inherited mode are briefly discussed in this chapter. 
Power is an "essentially contested concept" (Lukes, 1974, p. 9). Two main perspectives of 
power can be distinguished here: first, power that is concentrated in one side, i. e. one party 
holds power (as in the case of the power of the state in modem times, for example (Wrong, 
1979, p. 11)). In this research, this is called the central power. Second, the diffused power' 
which is diffused throughout a society or organizations (many parties) and not concentrated in 
In the fields of social sciences, these two perspectives of power are referred to in different terms. For 
example, Mann referred to them as "authoritative power" and "diffused power" respectively (Mann, 
1993, p. 6). They were also called "integral power" and "intercursive power" (Wrong, 1979, p. 11; 
Sa'd, 1986, p. 187). 
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the hands of one party such as the central government, for example. ' Diffused power relations 
are characterized by a balance of power and a division of areas of work (scopes)' between 
parties (Wrong, 1979, p. 11; Sa'd, 1986, p. 187). This balance is reached through a set of 
normative laws or regulations (imposed by a central power) within which parties compete with 
one another (Smith, 1991, p. 123). In this perspective, diffused power does not resemble the 
decentralized concept in the sense mentioned earlier. That is, parties have a limited space for 
exercising power, within which they also have to abide by laws and regulations made by a 
higher authority (central). Thus, they work within an overall centralized system. 
Both perspectives, central power and diffused power, regard power when exercised in 
interactions as relational, i. e. comprising relationships between participating parties. Many 
schools of thought can be categorized under these two main perspectives on power. Among 
those arguing for the perspective of the central power are two highly prominent schools: 
Marxist and Weberian schools. On the other hand, Parsonian and pluralism schools advocate the 
other perspective of power: the diffused. ' 
Despite disagreements between analysts from the former group of schools (Marxist and 
Weberian), most of them agree that "power" refers, at a minimum, to the ability of party A to 
make party B do what would not otherwise have done. Put differently, A has power over B if A 
has effects on B's choices and actions and can move them in ways that A intends, despite 
resistance from B5 (McLean, 1996, p. 396), whether A and B are individuals, as Weber sees it, 
or status group(s), according to the elitists, or social classes (bourgeois, proletariat), in 
Marxism. Power, according to this perspective, embodies a conflictual nature (conflict theory) 
as a result of differences of interests (antagonism) between superior and subordinate parties. In 
this perspective, society is seen as made up of various groups engaged in continuous struggle, 
and power is seen as the means by which the dominant group(s) preserves its hegemony, and 
Z If we look at this classification of power perspectives in terms of politics, it can be read as a 
distinction between a centralized state and a decentralized or pluralist one. On the other hand, if this 
classification is viewed from a sociological perspective, it can be read as power serving sectional 
interests, i. e. somebody (elite, e. g. Weber, Mills; social class, e. g. Marx), and power serving 
everybody (e. g. Parsons, Giddens), respectively. 
3 This term "scope" has been introduced by R. Dahl to denote that each party has its own "issue-areas" 
or institutional activities, such as educational, political, urban planning, business, and the like, within 
which its power is accepted. Herbert Simon used a similar term, "zone of acceptance", to denote the 
same meaning (Dahl, 1991, p. 22; Wrong, 1979, p. 15,17). Wrong, elaborating on Dahl's definition, 
conceives of "scopes" as the different areas of choice and activity of the power subject (Wrong, 
1979, p. 15). 
Most of the studies from these schools have dealt with power mainly from a political standpoint. They 
investigated the concept of power in terms of the ruler and the ruled (government (state) and people). 
However, at certain points, they linked the social concept of power with the political one; Foucault 
and Giddens's studies of power might be considered sociologically-based studies. 
5 There is a range of definitions of power, of which Weber's is the most widely employed. The 
Weberian definition used above is the most prominent one. For some Marxists, for example, "power 
is the capacity of one class or section of a class to realize its objective interests at the expenses of the 
contradictory classes or group of classes" (Poulantzas, cited in Castells, 1977, p. 243). 
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exploits those subservient to it .6 Accordingly, power expressed as embodying conflict and 
antagonism contains the concepts of domination' and control which mean repression and 
coercion. Commentators on this type of school attributed it as negative in its perspective 
towards power (Abercrombie, 1994, p. 329). These schools are called " conflict schools". 
Unlike the above, the other group of schools of thought (Parsonian and pluralism) look at power 
as an integral and primary aspect of social life (integration theory). They viewed power as a 
collective social attribute that intervenes in all social actions. Their concept of power is based 
on the notion of consensus, arising from the existence of a value-system shared by any society 
(Parsons) or small collectivity or organization (Arendt; pluralist, e. g. Dahl). Thus, power is a 
facility to achieve social and societal collective goals and desires (Cassell, 1993, p. 214; 
Outhwaite, 1994, p. 504). This type of school is called the " consensus school". This concept of 
power was heavily criticized as abstract, normative, theoretical and unempirical8 (Abercrombie, 
1994, p. 305,444); therefore it (especially that of Parsons) was not commonly adopted by social 
scientists in the debates about power (Lukes, 1974, p. 31; Sager, 1994, p. 61). Thus, the 
discussion in this chapter concentrates less on the consensus schools (diffused power) than on 
the other schools (Marxism and Weberian), yet the theme of diffused power per se is explored. 
Based on the diffused power theme, Giddens looked at power as, potentially, an aspect of all 
relationships; power adheres to social systems, as well as to individuals and groups within them. 
In this respect, Giddens offered a corrective vision to the tendency to concentrate on questions 
of who holds power and who does not (Hindess, 1996, p. 9). In his view, power in its broad 
sense is a "transformative capacity"; it is "the capability to intervene in a given set of events 
so as in some way to alter them" (Giddens, 1985, p. 7). In its narrower sense, power is a 
relational property that is revealed through interactions. It is in this sense, as Cassell stated, 
domination over others (Cassell, 1993, p. 110,227). 9 
6 Marx viewed the modern world as based on a power struggle between those who hold economic 
power (bourgeois) and labour (proletariat) (Abercrombie, 1994, p. 67; Kirby, 1995, p. 118). In the 
same manner, Weber also viewed the world as in continuous power struggle between force from the 
stronger party and resistance from the weaker (Miller, 1991, p. 398). 
Domination refers to those asymmetrical relationships of power in which the subordinated parties 
have little room for manoeuvre because their "margin of liberty is extremely limited" by the effects 
of power (Foucault, cited in Hindess, 1996, p. 102). Later in this chapter, domination is defined as the 
power of one party over another or others. 
According to their perspective, certain pattern of a social system based on normative consensus 
should exist (Giddens, 1984, p. 257), within which their concept of power can operate. This pattern of 
social system does not exist within today's modern capitalist social system. Therefore their 
perspective is considered here as theoretical and unempirical. In his study of power, Lukes dismisses 
this perspective of power as idiosyncratic. He argues that the treatment of power as a function of 
consent is "out of line with the central meanings of `power' as traditionally understood" (1974, p. 31). 
According to Giddens's theory of structuration, each social system exhibits structures of domination 
as a result of its asymmetrical distribution of resources (Giddens, 1995a, p. 50). Within social systems, 
power can be analyzed as relations between actors in which actors draw upon and reproduce those 
structural properties of domination. To quote Giddens, "power is generated in and through the 
reproduction of structures of domination" (Giddens, 1979, p. 92; 1984, p. 258). 
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6.3.1 Rights in Islam (al-Haq) 
Power in Islam is not exclusive to a certain class (such as social classes in Marxism) or to a 
certain type of party (individuals in the Weberian school, or elites in the elitist school), but is 
integrated into all Muslims' relationships, whether between individuals, groups or states. 
However, power in Islam has a different conception from the modem one. The main difference 
between power in Islam and that in the modem concept lies, first, in the sources of power, and 
second, in its nature (static or dynamic). 
Power in Islam is the ability to do or act in a certain manner to achieve certain outcomes within 
the framework of Islamic rights. It is derived from and framed by rights, where rights are set 
and framed by shari `a (the Islamic legal system). To state that one has the power to undertake 
certain action in a certain site means he has the right to perform that action in that particular 
site. However, rights, as al-'Abbadi states, do not mean capacity or power per se, but power is 
the effect of rights (Al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 106). These rights are distributed between different 
parties, whether individuals, groups or the state, according to certain maps established by 
Shari 'a. Hence, the limits of the rights of each party are drawn, and cannot be changed. These 
rights-distribution-maps allocate10 rights to parties in society in relation to the rights of other 
parties. Thus, in Islam, unlike the modem concept, it is rights rather than power that give its 
party the capacity to act in the built environment. 
The other fundamental difference between power and rights lies in the changeability of power 
(i. e. staticness or dynamicity). Rights of parties, bestowed by shari `a, are determined; they are 
well-known to all members of society, they are not covert. The limits of acting parties are clear. 
In short, rights in society are transparent. However, power as employed in the acquired mode 
is changeable (variable). It is not determined. The power of a party might increase according to 
the resources possessed by that party. Power in the acquired mode is non-transparent. 
Rights or "huquq" (sing. Haq) in Islam are divided into two categories: first, the individual's 
rights. These include all the rights that pertain to individuals' interests, where the individual is 
free to use or to drop any of these rights in any specific case. An example of such rights is the 
right of ownership. " Second, rights of God. These denote rights of God such as worship, and 
rights of others (individuals, groups or Muslim society) that pertain to "the common interest" " 
(ad-Duraini, 1984, p. 23), for example, the rights of Muslim passers-by (group) in a through 
10 The word "allocate" is used here (and not for example, "give") to denote that rights are allocated in 
between the rights of other parties, i. e. rights of party A are the space between the rights of other 
parties. This means that rights initially are not absolute but framed by the rights of other parties. (The 
word "give", for example, means that right gives freedom of action embodied in that right, until it 
hits the rights of other parties, i. e. initially rights are not framed). 
" These characteristics of this type of rights (individual rights) are similar in most societies such as the 
case in human rights, however with slight differences. 
'Z "The public interest" as used in the acquired mode has a different conception than that in the 
inherited mode. To differentiate between the two conceptions, the term "the public interest" is used 
here to refer to the acquired mode and "the common interest" to refer to the inherited mode. This 
issue is clarified in the next chapter. 
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street to have control over the street; thus they can object to any action that narrows the street, 
such as building in it. This is the right of the public as one party, and not that of the state. 13 
However, when those rights relate to relations that involve material value (e. g. physical 
properties), then they are considered rights of people. Islam granted a substantial importance to 
the public or the group's interest, and thus associated these rights of people with the name of 
God. (ash-Shatibi, n. d. /1997, v. 3, p. 101-105; ad-Duraini, 1984, p. 70). In that sense, the 
individual is conceived of in Islam as an autonomous social entity and not as part of the group. 
In Islam, in terms of rights, the group is considered as the individual; the state is also considered 
as the individual. Each has its own rights bestowed by God. Individuals are not subjugated to 
the state. The state has no authority to grant rights to the individual or to deprive him/her of 
his/her rights. The state's role in Islam is to maintain the rights of individuals and groups in 
society, within the framework of the common interest which is well defined by shari 'a. This 
enables them to enjoy their rights in a manner that does not cause damage to other individuals, 
groups, or to society at large (ad-Duraini, 1984, p. 73-4). 
As a constituent of shari `a, employing and actualizing rights should accord with shari `a 's 
purposes and spirit. Actions based on rights, aiming at reaching forbidden ends are considered 
abrogative (ash-Shatibi, n. d. /1997, vol. 3, p. 23,120; ad-Duraini, 1984, p. 71-2). 14 Rights are an 
instrument or legitimate capacity bestowed by God to people, whether individuals, groups, or 
state, to achieve certain interests within the framework of shari `a. This legitimate capacity 
cannot be used deceitfully to achieve what is principally forbidden in shari ̀ a. 
Rights in Islam are conceived of in two forms; first, rights in their putative form, derived from 
shari 'a, but not actualized (activated) through interactions. Those putative rights are distributed 
equally among all parties in society. Second, rights in their actualized form, activated through 
interactions. Putative rights do not generate power unless they are transformed, through 
interaction, into actualized rights. In other words, only actualized rights generate power or, 
more precisely, capacity. For example, the right not to be harmed by the actions of others is a 
putative right that all Muslims enjoy; however, this right cannot generate power except when 
actualized in real interactions. 
To give an example, Sahnun (a jurist from the Maliki school's, d. 240H. ) was asked about a case 
of a waterspout owned by party A and pointed towards a neighbour's courtyard. The neighbour 
The public might in some cases be represented by the state, as explained in the next chapter. 
Abuse of rights is called in shari'a: "ta `assuf ". It refers to activities that are originally permissible 
according to shari'a, but cause injury to others and/or to properties (see ad-Duraini, 1988). 
15 Islam has three main sources of legislation: the Qur'an, the tradition of the prophet, and the teachings 
of jurists. The first two sources are always referred to in interpreting the law. This developed several 
schools of law in Islam. The main schools of law (Sunni) that existed in Islam were: the Hanafi school 
after 'Abu Hanifa (d. 150/767), the Maliki school of Imam Malik (d. 179/795), the Shafi'i school of 
Imam Shafi'i (d. 204/820), and the Hanbali school of 'Ahmad 'Ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855). The major 
differences between these schools are methodological, based on the methods of deduction used by 
each school such as qiyas (analogical reasoning), ra 'y (opinion), and 'Uma' (consensus doctorum). 
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B wanted to transform this courtyard into a room in such a way that the waterspout of party A 
would be inside the room. Party A was afraid that the neighbour B might remove his waterspout, 
as it would run inside the room. Sahnun answered that party A cannot prevent the neighbour B 
from building the room; however, this neighbour B had to keep the waterspout of party A 
running inside his room. Party A had to bring some witnesses inside the neighbour B's room to 
affirm the existence of the waterspout in case the neighbour B decided one day in the future to 
remove the water spout (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 38-9). In this case, party A's right to protect 
his owned object (waterspout) is a putative right that was actualized, thus transformed into 
power. The waterspout was to remain. Also party B's putative right to control his properties is a 
putative right that was also actualized, giving its party power to continue in his action (build a 
room). In this case, both rights were actualized thus both parties exercised their power. 16 It can 
be noted here that solutions were reached without intervention from any external party. 
Actualized rights, as framed by shari `a, work as pondering (balancing) mechanisms to weigh 
up and thus balance the powers of parties involved in any interaction. For example, 'Ibn `Abd 
Rabbuh ruled in a case in which a man (party A) transformed his house into a mill, and his 
neighbour (party B) complained about the noise of the mill. Ibn `Abd Rabbuh ruled that 
preventing the man (party A) from utilizing his property for his living" is more harmful than the 
harm of noise caused by the mill (Al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 60). In this example, party A has 
the right to act in his own property's, whereas party B also has the right not to be harmed by the 
new action of party A. Both are actualized rights; however, the damage caused to party B (noise 
of the mill) is less harmful that the damage that might be caused to party A if his mill is to be 
closed. Those rights were weighed against each other according to their consequences (degree 
of damage caused), thus performing as a pondering mechanism to reach a decision. 
As there is no higher regulatory agency in the inherited mode (such as the state in the acquired 
mode), rights in their putative form operate as an organizatory mechanism based on the acting 
party's anticipations, in a certain interaction, of the rights of the involved parties and their 
reactions to its act. Those mechanisms operate in each case according to its specificity. That is, 
rights are well-known to all parties in Muslim society. If party A intends to take an action that 
might affect party B, A will picture the scene of interaction (putative interaction) and the 
actualized rights that might operate within it, after which A will take action accordingly. Such 
mechanisms created rights-ordered relationships that were, consequently, reflected in the built 
environment. This was clearly evident in ordering relationships between vertical neighbours. 
16 This is indeed a unique case. For contemporary professionals, discharging the water of one party's 
house through the room of another party is as unacceptable situation. Mechanisms regulating such 
situations will be explained in the next chapter. 
" Unless there is a direct damage caused to the neighbour's property such as damaging the walls of his 
house. Some jurists (Maliki school), for example, considered the damage caused by the vibration of 
the walls due to the establishment of a new mill, but they did not consider the harm caused by a mill's 
noise ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 212-4). 
According to the Islamic conception of ownership, control over owned property is a primary right. 
Ownership rights, according to Islam, are explained in the next chapter. 
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For example, in one case the rain-water of an upper house (party A) drained through the roof of 
a lower house (party B) into a cistern that belongs to the owner of the lower house (B). The 
owner of the upper house (A) wanted to change the rain-water drainage, however, the owner of 
the lower house (B) objected on the grounds that this water should, by right, drain into his 
cistern. The owner of the upper house claimed that this water is of his right, thus he is free to 
drain it into the direction he chooses ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 424). In this case, both parties were 
aware of their rights, thus acted accordingly. Based on this type of mechanism, most cases in 
the inherited built environment were solved within their sites by the immediate parties involved 
through dialogue, without taking their cases to the judge. This is evident from the limited 
number of cases documented by judges and building experts. '9 
6.3.2 Power sources and power resources 
These two terms, sources and resources, are sometimes used alternatively in the writings of 
Western scholars to refer to the same or different concepts. Sources of power are its bases. If 
we accept the definition of power, in its modern concept, as the capacity to mobilize resources 
to reach outcomes, then sources of power are the machinery which generates that capacity. 
Weber identified power sources as political, economic, and cultural (Wrong, 1979, p. 255), 
however, for Mann, power sources are political, economic, military, and ideological (Mann, 
1986, p. 22-28). 20 On the other hand, resources, in the modern concept of power, are the power 
instruments that a party can bring to a power relationship that enable him (them), when 
employed, to wield power over others, and/or to reach outcomes (Wrong, 1979, p. 124-125). 
Giddens insists that "power itself is not a resource. Resources are media through which power 
is exercised" (Giddens, 1984, p. 16). Power, in other words, is not to be confused with the 
means through which it is exercised in any particular case. If a party has no power in the sense 
of a capacity, it can not employ certain resources. 
Dahl suggested that resources include: wealth; prestige; legitimate authority; skills or 
specialized knowledge; position; and many others (Dahl, 1991, p. 35). For example, decision- 
makers, as part of the higher authorities, are in a powerful position where he/she uses his/her 
legitimate authority and position as power resources to exercise power in the processes of the 
production of the built environment. Using this power, they can impose their own perspectives 
on other parties in society. Power relations, according to Wrong, presuppose that the power 
subjects lack these resources and that the inequality in distribution of and control over 
resources is the basis of the power relation (Wrong, 1979, p. 125). Inequality in distribution of 
knowledge and skills between planners as professional and people gave planners the legitimate 
authority they enjoy. This paternalistic contention is considered as a tool of power exercitation 
over others, i. e. domination (as explained in chapter ten). 
19 Examples of such documentation manuscripts are those of al-Wansharisi, 'Ibn Qudamah, az-Zarkashi, 
'Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Kasani, 'Ibn `Abdin. 
20 According to Marx, while political power is nothing but an instrument of the capitalist (bourgeoisie) 
class, economic power is the ultimate dominant power. That is, political, military and ideological 
struggles are reflections of the economic class struggle (Kirby, 1995, p. 194). 
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Sources create power. Once power is created, according to its modem concept, the party who 
holds that power can mobilize and control resources. It is not necessary to own power 
resources, but to control them. Sources might sometimes be in the form of a resource (e. g. 
wealth), yet if they are the main cause of that power, then they are its source, such as in the case 
of an economic power generated by having wealth. After generating power, sources might turn 
to be resources which work together with other resources in exercising power, and seek more 
power by mobilizing other types of resources. For example, possession of wealth might be a 
source of economic power that provides its holder with the capacity to mobilize resources for 
his own benefit. In this process the main source (wealth) acts also as a resource, for example, in 
using that wealth as a resource to control certain building industries. 
According to the modem concept of power, sources of power are variable. They might be 
political, economic, military, ideological, or cultural. In the same manner, resources do vary 
from one case of power relationship to another. This means that in the modem concept of power 
both sources and resources are variable. 
In Islam, power sources and resources are unitary. There is only one source of power in Islam, 
that is rights. Those rights also act as resources employed in any power relationship. That is, in 
any power relationship in the inherited mode there is no distinction between power sources and 
resources; both are derived from the same source. Rights, as a power source derived from 
shari 'a, in their putative form, are static (non-changing). " Other resources, such as political 
position, wealth, and properties that a party might own and/or control are not considered 
resources that generate power in themselves, but as means to which certain rights are attached. 
Those latter rights are the resources that generate power to its party in certain contexts. For 
example, political position in Islam is not a source of political power (as the case in the modem 
concept of power), but the rights attached to that position are the source or resource that 
generate power in certain contexts. Similarly, ownership of a piece of land is not a resource that 
generate power by itself, yet the rights attached to that land provide its owner, when exercised 
(actualized) in certain interactions, with power. For example, in the acquired mode, in the 
project of re-planning the city of Aalborg, Denmark, the new Chairman of the Chamber of 
Industry and Commerce in the city (part of the committee responsible for the Aalborg project) 
reshaped the Chamber's preferences regarding the "Traffic Plan" according to his personal 
interests. The Chairman owned a large shop adjacent to the existing bus terminal, which was 
doing well because of the dense use of the terminal (Flyvbjerg, 1998a, p. 157). In such a context, 
techne and rationality are subordinated to and used as integral part of politics and power in the 
decision-making process of producing the acquired built environment. If such a situation existed 
in the inherited mode, the Chairman would not be able to direct the traffic plan according to his 
wishes. It is the rights of people that organize the built environment and not the power of 
politicians (powerful) or so. Political position in Islam does not entitle its holder to rights. 
21 This point is elucidated more in the next chapter. 
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Politics is seen to be about might rather than right. 
(Hume, cited in McLean, 1996, p. 396) 
There are no such things as rights in any abstract sense, and that 
questions concerning them are reducible to issues of power, its 
distribution and its justification. Thus rights have no 
independent meaning outside specific socio-political and 
cultural contexts. Thus, property rights could be treated as 
recognized relationships (of power, obligation, influence... ) 
(Harrison, 1987, p. 37, emphasis added) 
As noted, power in Islam is created by rights; however, most modern writings about power do 
not discuss the concept of rights as a central issue. The question which arises here is where do 
rights stand in relation to power, according to modern concepts? Are rights a power source? Is 
power or rights 'responsible for the production of the built environment, whether the acquired 
or the inherited? These questions will be answered next by highlighting the modern concept of 
rights in comparison to that of Islam. 
Rights in its modern concept" comprises a disputable issue. However, most modem schools23 
(positivism24 [Hume, Kelsen, Hart], utilitarianism25 [Bentham, Austin], anti-utilitarianism26 
[Nozick, Dworkin], legal-realism27 [James, Dewey, Holmes, Llewellyn], Marxism2R (Davidson, 
1993, p. 27-38; Curzon, 1995)) share the idea that rights, in its modem perspective, are created 
only by the law issued by the authority, i. e. the state. That is to say, there are no rights outside 
ZZ Rights in its modem concept as described and analyzed in this section is used mainly according to its 
conception and application in the modem capitalist system. 
23 Except for those who argue from the standpoint of the existence of natural rights, such as Locke, 
Rousseau, Kant (Davidson, 1993, p. 27-28). Natural rights theories, after the appearance of positivist 
theories, fell into general disrepute during the 19th century (Davidson, 1993, p. 29). 
Z" Positivism is the approach to the study of law which regards laws as valid only when those laws are 
"posited", i. e. created and put forward by human beings in positions of power in society, who 
provide the sole source of the validity and authority of such laws (Cavendish, 1997, p. 33). 
25 Utilitarianism is a form of positivism. It is epitomized by a famous slogan coined by Bentham, "the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number". Bentham and his followers argued that the respective 
"happinesses" of each individual are additive and that the test of the rightness of individual or social 
action is to maximize the sum of individual utility (Marshall, 1994, p. 549). 
Z6 Anti-utilitarianism counters the utilitarian thrust that individual preferences must always give way to 
those of the majority. Anti-utilitarians argue that in some circumstances the interests of the individual 
must take priority over those of society as a whole. In other words, the individual cannot be sacrificed 
for the benefit of overall social welfare (Davidson, 1993, p. 33). 
27 Legal realism's major concern is with explaining the function of law, i. e. to discover what law does 
rather than what law is. In their investigations, realists followed an empirical approach (Davidson, 
1993, p. 36). 
28 Marxists don't totally accept the notion of rights in their debates. Rights, according to Marx, are 
simply bourgeois concepts and a product of bourgeois-capitalist society, designed to maintain and 
reinforce the pre-eminent position of the ruling class. The concept of rights emerges, as Marx argued, 
only in the transitional stage from the communist state to the communist society, where rights are 
regarded as instruments or tools for this transformation. These rights are not individual rights but 
legal rights which are granted solely by the state (positivistic sense). Once the process of 
transformation is complete, the need for rights disappears (Davidson, 1993, p. 37). 
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the circle of the state (Curzon, 1995, p. 242). 29 As the law is formulated by the authority 
(political power), consequently, rights are generated by power, and not the other way round. 
The idea of rights in the acquired mode is associated with the existence of a claim (e. g. 
Ginsberg, see Curzon, 1995, p. 235; Krieger, 1993, p. 791). That is, rights are, or are embodied 
in, rules and laws formulated as a result of certain claims (if justified and accepted by the 
authority), directed towards fulfilling certain interests for certain individuals or groups of 
people. In that respect, Salmond defines "right" as an interest recognized and protected by law 
(cited in Curzon, 1995, p. 236). Those claims emerge as a result of the experience of certain 
cases of damage or harm occurring in the life of that individual or group (claimant); thus to 
avoid similar damage in the future, claims for rights arise. Accordingly, one can argue that 
rights, in its modem concept, arise through a law enacted after damage has occurred, or could 
occur. A right, which arises from a specific case and is formulated into law, is thus generalized 
and employed in other similar cases. 30 However, it can be contemplated that as rights are laws 
(or are embodied in laws, according to Dworkin) generated by specific circumstances and cases, 
they might be expected to be rigid and inflexible when applied to other cases. This is because 
circumstances are ever-changing; people's habits, preferences and interests are ever-changing; 
claims, accordingly, always change and, thus laws should always move to accommodate such 
changes (Denham, 1994, p. 2). Therefore, law is always subject to changes. However, until this 
change occurs, a law is generally applied. 
To explain this practically in terms of the built environment, power exercitation in any 
environmental interaction between parties in a site results in one of two situations; either, 
environmental solutions that suit all involved parties31, or harm caused to one or more of the 
parties involved or to their properties, i. e. power relationships result either in solutions or harm. 
The latter leads to claims arising to acquire rights to protect parties from such harm and thus 
produce solutions for future similar cases. As those claims for rights (if accepted and rights are 
bestowed to parties) imply a change in law or its implementation, consequently, this ends in 
changing power distribution among parties in future environmental interactions. For example, if 
an unprecedented environmental problem arises, then the party that will solve this problem will 
be entitled to power, through law, to enable it to solve that problem. This might, eventually, 
lead to change in power distribution within society. To conclude, we can say that, in this 
system, the whole process of producing and exercising power is always subject to change, as 
Z' Positivists, as most contemporary writings about rights, detached natural rights from their conception 
of rights, and focused only on the rights created by the law of the state (Davidson, 1993, p. 29). 
30 In the USA there are certain broad rights conferred on citizens by the state which cannot be changed 
by any legislative authority (House of Representative, Senate). Outside the circle of those 
constitutional rights, any new rights enactment operates as discussed above. In UK, there is no written 
constitution as in the USA or Europe, thus the discussion above about rights applies to all cases. 
31 In many cases, solutions cannot accomplish the satisfaction of all parties involved, thus most solutions 
embody compromises. However, as those solutions and compromises are approved and agreed upon 
by the parties involved (no objection), this situation can be differentiated from that where 
unacceptable harm occurs and the damaged party(ies) objects. 
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shown in fig. 6.2. In short, law changes periodically, however, this change in law is not rapid, 
thus, until this change transpires, law is generally applied, i. e. in a one to all pattern. 
This phenomenon of creating law through responding to claims will produce parties who seek 
change in the law to suit their interest. As changing the law is subject to influencing others' 
opinion, the arena is set for competition. People supporting different laws regarding the same 
issue compete in the media to defend their beliefs. Referring to what was explained before 
(power sources and resources), one can conclude that rights are generated by power. Rights are 
in constant change following power holders' visions, influences, desires, etc. The re-planning of 
the city of Aalborg, as analysed by Flyvbjerg (1998a) is a good evidence on this issue. 
On the other hand, in the inherited mode, power in any environmental interaction is generated 
by rights. As rights are set by shari `a, thus, they are fixed; i. e. parties cannot change the law. 
However, this does not mean fixed environmental solutions. The exercitation of rights may 
result in solutions that might embody some harm. If harm occurs then the exercitation of power 
is to be questioned and reviewed with reference to those rights (static, unchangeable) that 
generated it in relation to the rights of the other related parties. Ultimately, solutions are arrived 
at which might develop new environmental conventions that in future similar cases help to 
direct the way of exercising power so as to produce solutions and avoid causing harm. To give 
an example of this process from the inherited built environment, in one case, a man (A) objected 
to his neighbour's action (B) of transforming part of his house into a stable for his small beast. 
The acting party (B) insisted on keeping the stable as his living depended on his beast. The 
judge (according to the building expert's advice) asked the owner of the stable (B) to build a 
wall parallel to the neighbour's party wall, with a foundation of a person's height deep in the 
ground, two hand-spans32 thickness, and half a hand-span far from the neighbour's party wall 
where this cavity should extend five hand-spans below the ground level up to the ceiling, thus 
creating a cavity wall that works as a separating zone between the stable and the neighbour's 
party wall (fig. 6.1) ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 221-2). 
Cavity 
2 hand-span wall 
Party A 
Party B 
Stable 
(fig. 6.1) Person 
I' I ý5 hand-spans 
height J 
This method of "counteracting the damage" by creating a separating zone to absorb the sound 
or vibration caused is a method that has been repeated several times in 'Ibn ar-Rami's 
Hand-span (shibr) is a common traditional method of measurement. Shibr is the distance between the 
top of the Pollex finger to the top of the Pinkie finger of hand ('Ibn Manzur, n. d. ). 
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documented cases (see 'Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 216-224). This means that this solution constituted 
a convention that was adopted in solving similar cases. 33 
In this process (fig. 6.3), in the inherited built environment, the level that is subject to change 
over time (as shown in the fig. 6.3) is related to power exercitation and production of solutions in 
the site and not to rights and power criterion per se. 
Sources and Resources 
1 
Power 
Exercitation 
Level 
of 
change solutions 
Harm 
Rights 
Claims 
Law 
(Fig. 6.2) Process of producing and exercising 
power in the acquired mode 
Rights 
4 
Power 
A) 
Exercitation 
Balancing 
Building f- Solutions Mechanisms 
conventions 
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(Fig. 6.3) Process of producing and exercising 
power (rights) in the inherited mode 
Static 
Level 
of 
change 
It can be said that rights, according to its modem concept, are a temporary manifestation of the 
prevailing values and interests of society at a given time (Miller, 1991, p. 446). They are subject 
to changes of interest, whether from the claimants or from those holding the power of authority 
(accepting or rejecting the rights claims). As a result, because of their inflexibility and yet the 
ubiquitous need for change, rights constitute a burden on authority and on others whose 
decisions they constrain (Miller, 1991, p. 444). Rights set limits to the comprehensiveness and 
the intensity of power (Wrong, 1979, p. 16). 34 That is, due to rights, certain scopes are 
" This was a well-known convention. As a building expert, 'Ibn ar-Rami was asked about the distance 
that should be left between the newly established mill and the adjacent neighbour's walls. 'Ibn ar- 
Rami recommended that the distance left had to be occupied by a building, for example, a room or a 
store or at least a passageways, so that this building works as a separating zone between the mill and 
the walls of the neighbour ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 218). 
"Comprehensiveness" and "intensity" are two attributes distinguished (along with a third one, 
"extensiveness") to describe power relationships quantitatively, i. e. comparing the relative powers of 
parties involved. "Comprehensiveness" of power refers to the number of scopes in which the power 
holder(s) control the activities of the power subject(s). "Intensity" of power relations refers to the 
range of effective options open to the power holder within each and every scope of the power 
subject's conduct over which he wields power, i. e. intensity relates to the limits to the actions which 
the power holder can influence the power subject to perform within certain scopes (Wrong, 1979, 
p. 16-17). Mann defined this attribute in reference to high commitment of power subject(s) (Mann, 
1993, p. 6). For example, decision-makers, although they have power over certain scopes within which 
they can make decisions; have limited space for changing the pre-stated laws that constrain their 
decisions, e. g. the court may possess the power to impose punishments on lawbreakers, but not "cruel 
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specifically excluded from control by power holders, such as freedom of speech, religious 
worship, travel, and so on. Furthermore, rights curtail the range of options available to the 
power holder within those scopes where he does have control. Ultimately, authority has, at least 
at certain times, to ignore those rights and not to guarantee them, as explained next. 
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
Will [the State] allow any rival forms of association to exist in 
society that usurp State power. Clearly, the answer is no... 
Mediating institutions will be sanctioned only if they work to 
reduce the costs of the State by absorbing and privatizing 
functions, and not if they assume for themselves the right of 
decision making and the steering functions of society. 
(Gottdiener, 1987, p. 285, emphasis in original text) 
Are rights defeasible3S? Upon whom lies the obligation to "prove" or "disprove" the existence 
of rights? Can their theoretical existence be proved in practice? 
Assertions that party A has a legal right36 to B are tested by whether the law does in fact 
recognize A's right to B (McLean, 1996, p. 434). We can infer from this that the state (the 
political power that enacted the law and consequently bestowed the rights) is the party that 
grants, proves and disproves the rights. But, if the law (i. e. the state) entitles party A to the right 
of a certain activity or benefit, can we consider A, in practice, as having and enjoying power? 
The answer is likely to be no. That is, according to the modem concept, rights do not 
necessarily have the required enforcement mechanisms to actualize them. 
Rights lack, first, the mechanisms that guarantee their continuation and indefeasibility. Rights 
are bestowed, recognized, and protected by the state; they can be cancelled by legislation 
(Curzon, 1995, p. 242). Accordingly, rights are defeasible. They are subject to be disproved and 
waived at any time by a higher power. This is applicable when a certain right contradicts the 
interests of the power-holders; or, when a private right conflicts with a public interest 
(represented by the state). For example, in many cases in the acquired built environment, the 
state, represented by its planners, despite owners' protest, expropriates private properties 
(eminent domain) for the sake of widening an existing street or establishing a new one (public 
interest as alleged). Thus, the rights of ownership of those private parties were violated and 
defeated for the benefit of the powerful party (the state). In this case the interests of the private 
parties and that of the state are in conflict; the state, as the decision-maker in such cases, 
and unusual punishments", i. e. there are limits within which authority is accepted (Wrong, 1979, 
p. 16-17). "Extensiveness" of a power relation refers to the demographical and geographical spread of 
subjects over whom it is exercised. It means the ability to produce at least minimal compliance over a 
large population and a large territory (Mann, 1993, p. 6). It may be narrow or broad. Wrong, besides 
focusing on the number of subjects, emphasized the importance of the number of power holders 
(Wrong, 1979, p. 15). 
"Defeasible", as used in contemporary writings on rights, denotes the ability to be defeated or 
annulled. 
36 The term "legal right" is used here to distinguish it from what the natural school calls "the natural 
right" that denotes the moral right, which is not the subject of discussion in this study. 
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decides which right is to be upheld and which to be overridden. So it is the rights of individual 
owners in this case which were taken, not just their properties. Most capital cities in the Muslim 
world (in the acquired mode) have gone through re-planning processes in which environmental 
decisions of the state, in the name of the public interest, were imposed on city's people and built 
environments. New streets were created in the traditional fabric, depriving residents in those 
areas of their rights. 
To clarify this issue more, if we consider what is called "human rights", we can find that (1) 
they are connected to the protection of individuals from the exercise of state or governmental 
authority in certain areas of their lives, and (2) also directed towards the creation of societal 
conditions by the state, so that individuals may develop to their fullest potential (Davidson, 
1993, p. 24). This means that human rights are formulated by the state and against the state. 
This sounds illogical. Thus one can infer that those laws, which are rights or embody rights, that 
the state issues against itself, most likely, do not in reality come into effect, or else that they 
might be of marginal effect to its central policies. The state, in cases where rights comprise 
constraints upon it, does not provide the right-holder with the appropriate enforcement 
mechanisms to guarantee his rights, i. e. rights cannot come into effect. Put simply, in practice, 
in most modern-capitalist societies, political power (authority) can overturn rights. In such a 
context, rights in its modern concept can be described as deficient, and unsubstantial, or, as 
"illusions" and "myths", as Tushnet describes it (cited in Ward, 1998, p. 157). 
In clear contrast with the modern state, as rights in the inherited mode are derived from Shari 'a, 
the state in Islam has no role in bestowing, or approving or disapproving the rights of its people. 
In one case, `Umar 'Ibn al-Khattab, the second caliphate (d. 13H/634AD) could not expropriate a 
private house to expand the prophet's mosque in Medina without the approval of its owner (al- 
Wansharisi, n. d., v. 1, p. 244). Each party in the Muslim society, including the state, performs, 
according to rights-distribution-maps, within a limited circle of rights, thus, no one party can 
violate the rights of others (explained in the next chapter). For example, in Islam the right of 
revivification ('ihya' )37 (which ultimately leads to property ownership) is the right to revivify 
an unclaimed land without the approval of the state. In that sense, the state has abated the right 
to intervene in approving or disapproving such rights, thus its authority was limited. In short, 
environmental rights in Islam are static and indefeasible, however, rights in its modem 
concept, as founded on the changing political power, are variable and defeasible. 
Some might argue that during the history of Islamic dynasties, some rulers manipulated rights 
to suit their interests. That might be true in some cases; however, such were illegal acts, 
according to Islam. " Nevertheless, those rulers did not have a free hand to gain power and 
manipulate rights as they wished. They managed to exercise power over very limited scopes 
related to their administration, such as building new military cities (e. g. Samarra'). However, 
" The concept of revivification ('ihya) is explained in the next chapter. 
38 During time, some Muslim rulers did not abide with Islam in their rulings. They tried to violate the 
Islamic law in terms of rights, so as to acquire more rights thus more power. 
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due to the absence of environment-related professionalism (as a form of power acquisition), 
they could not extend their acquisition of power to other environmental matters. They could not 
deprive people of their rights or manipulate property rights, as based on shari 'a. Today, due to 
the rise of professionalism, the case is different, as explained in chapter ten below. 
Second, rights lack the mechanisms that guarantee their actualization and translation into 
reality. There is a distinction between a formal right of party A to action X, and the substantive 
capacity to X For example, A has a legal right to X, in a case where that means "A is not to be 
forbidden to do X', does not guarantee that the action Xis available to A, since its performance 
may require access to resources which A lacks (McLean, 1996, p. 434). For example, consider 
the right of private ownership in a capitalist society. There are no enforcement mechanisms to 
actualize this right. The distribution of wealth does not support it; land is of high value, as it is 
either owned privately or by the state, thus those who do not have the financial resources cannot 
enjoy this right, although formally entitled to it. This in turn leads to a structure where equality 
of rights does not mean equality in actual conditions (McLean, 1996, p. 434). 
As a result, answering the above question, rights are not considered as power, but as temporary 
laws created by power. It follows from this that rights (as embodied in laws) are subject to the 
vertical structure of modern society. They are determined from the top towards the bottom, i. e. 
they are a form of power exercitation. 
To conclude, we can say that, according to its modem concept, power antecedes rights; power 
creates rights; and finally power controls rights. In Islam, power succeeds rights; power is 
generated by rights; and finally power is framed by rights. Therefore, answering the first 
question in this section (Is it power or rights? ), we can say that power rather than rights plays a 
major role in the production process of the acquired built environment, whereas it is rights 
rather than power that play the major role in that process in the inherited built environments. 
6.5 POWER VS. RIGHTS39 
POWER AND HUMAN NATURE 
When everyone is equal there is no politics, for politics 
involves subordinates and superior 
(Gerth and Mills, cited in Wrong, 1979, p. 10) 
History is an ̀ endlessly repeated play of domination' 
(Nietzsche, cited in Hindess, 1996, p. 103) 
Democratic contrivances are quarantine measures against the 
ancient plague, the lust for power: as such, they are very 
necessary and very boring 
(Nietzsche, cited in Flyvbjerg, 1998a, p. 225) 
Power, in its modern concept, is broadly understood as "man's present means to obtain some 
future apparent good" (Hobbes, 1651, cited in Hindess, 1996, p. 14), or the capability to achieve 
desired ends or goals (Weber, cited in Giddens, 1995, p. 49), or the capacity to "produce 
39 Power here refers to the acquired mode, whereas rights refer to the inherited mode. 
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intended effects" (Russell, 1938, cited in Wrong, 1979, p. 219). Given this, obviously, as 
Hobbes and Weber pictured it, all mankind is running after power; they are in a continuous 
struggle for power, they have a restless desire to acquire power after power (Wrong, 1979, 
p. 218), so as to acquire the means and capacities to bring about their own good and satisfy their 
needs and wants. This concept looks at power as a scarce resource, and not just as a facility. 
Therefore it is not difficult to see why conflict is such an important feature of social processes. 
In this scenario, the law of the sovereign or state is to organize these struggles and to keep this 
human desire for power under control (Miller, 1991, p. 398). In that sense, the state becomes a 
necessary device in modem-capitalist societies. 
Control over more and diverse resources denotes more and diverse types of power. That is, 
diverse and more resources, when employed, might increase the means through which more 
parties can be subjected to that power, i. e. increasing its extensiveness, and more scopes are 
open to its holder, i. e. increasing its comprehensiveness and intensity (see p. 116 above). This 
phenomenon might be depicted here as inflation of resources. In this view, power-seeking or a 
"lust for power" is human nature (endowment) (Wrong, 1979, p. 219), although shaped, 
acquired and developed by and through social interactions and institutions within the social 
system in every-day life. 
On the other hand, in Islam, as rights are distributed and framed by shari 'a in a static manner, 
this basic human tendency, the "lust for power", is eliminated (as explained in the next 
chapter). In principle, there is no struggle after power, and no domination of others for the sake 
of acquiring more power. Power is already decided upon and framed by shari `a, the same is true 
for its distribution within any interaction. No party can gain more than the power allocated to it 
(in a form of given rights), i. e. there is no inflation of resources. That is, in Islam rights-derived 
mechanisms operate to limit the growth (inflation) of a party's power if it is detrimental to other 
parties, without suppressing that party. Such mechanisms lead to a more egalitarian40 society. 
For example, revivification ('ihya) is a right that leads to more possession of land with no 
substantial purchase-value, thus wider distribution of resources and no concentration of wealth 
in the hands of the few. This in turn makes land an available resource, thus eliminating what is 
known today as " land speculation" and its associated notion of considering land as a" scarce 
resource". But what about population growth in cities? Land, as contemporary writings reveal, 
must have a purchase value. This contemporary vision is based on the perception of 
centralization. That is, as infrastructure and other public facilities are centrally provided by the 
state, thus the state tends to concentrate population in certain areas and avoid urban sprawl. This 
in turn increases the price of land within urban populated areas. On the contrary, following 
rights-based decentralized mechanisms in the production of the built environment, 
revivification in Islam, as explained in the next chapter, encourages people to spread on earth, 
to utilize available utilizable lands. Thus, due to the wide availability of land, urban lands 
within populated areas has minimal or no purchase value. 
40 Egalitarianism in Islam has a distinct meaning than that of the west. 
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6.5.1 Power to / Power over 
The aim of power relationships is to seek and secure compliance 
power relations involve one actor or group of actors [party] in 
overcoming the resistance of another actor, or group [party], and 
securing compliance thereby 
(Evans et. al., 1992, p. 263,264) 
Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship 
will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance 
(Weber, 1978, p. 53) 
Power is the capacity to produce, or contribute to, outcomes by 
significantly affecting another or others 
(Outhwaite, 1994, p. 504) 
Two main forms of power can be inferred from the above quoted different concepts of power. 
These are: power to and power over. "Power to" is the power conceived as a facility to 
achieve outcomes (the third quotation above), while "power over" is the capability of a certain 
party to achieve its desires and goals, where the means to fulfil this aim include dominating, 
controlling and subordinating other parties, i. e. "power over others" is an instrument for the 
achievement of a wide range of goals (the first two quotations above). In either form, power 
refers to capacities. 
Giddens, in his theory of power, distinguished between two "senses" (forms) of power. In its 
broad sense, power is a transformative capacity, i. e. it takes the form of "power to" mobilize 
resources to achieve outcomes, while in its narrower sense, it is a relational property which 
presents itself as a "power over" (Cassell, 1993, p. 110). 
As the "power to" form of power includes utilization of resources to achieve outcomes, it is 
called in this research utilitative power, while the "power over" form is called subordinative 
power or domination. Consensus schools (e. g. Parsons; Arendt; and the pluralists) argue for 
the utilitative form of power42, whereas conflict schools (e. g. Weber, Marx, and Mills) are 
examples of those whose concepts of power imply the subordinative form (domination). 
While the concept of domination43 (power of party A over party B) seems to dominate modern 
writings on power, with less attention paid to "power to", power in Islam is analogous to the 
°t Compliance behaviour may consist of doing something different or it may consist of continuing with 
a behaviour pattern that an actor really wishes to drop (Evans et. al., 1992, p. 264). 
42 Although his main focus is on the form of "power to", Parsons's definition of power embodies the 
form of "power over". That is, "power to" attain collective goals requires that some men exercise 
"power over"' others in order to maintain organization of the collectivity or of the society (Wrong, 
1979, p. 245). Parsons in this respect " ignores, quite consciously and deliberately, the necessarily 
hierarchical character of power, and the divisions of interests which are frequently consequent upon 
it" (Cassell, 1993, p. 220). The same argument applies to the pluralists' perspective of power. That is, 
inside each organization there is a hierarchical order of power where power is exercised over the 
members of the organization (discussed in chapter eight). 
a' Domination is the ability of party A to make party B, through A's actions, adjust his relevant actions 
accordingly; actions by party B do not necessarily make party A adjust his relevant actions (Habraken, 
1988, p. 17). 
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form of "power to" to fulfil interests, yet it has its own conception. 44 Modern power is seen as 
might rather than as a right, whereas in Islam the focus is on power as a right, i. e. not as might 
over others but power as a legal capacity (power to). Thus, in the acquired mode based on the 
modern concept of power, might is seen as creating right, whereas in the inherited mode based 
on Islam, might is created by rights. 
As it is evident from documented environmental cases in inherited built environments, forcing 
others to adjust their interventions (i. e. power of one party over another) happens only when 
rights are actualized in certain interactions, i. e. after power is generated by actualized rights. 
Moreover, such power or might is conditioned; it can be gained only if proved (through several 
rights-based mechanisms, such as assessment of damage caused to that party, as explained in 
the next chapter). In the acquired mode, on the other hand, higher authorities are in control of 
the environmental production processes. For example, the political power enjoyed by the Mayor 
of Aalborg, as described by Flyvbjerg, gave him the right to continue with the Aalborg plan 
despite public criticism (1998a, p. 96). 45 This power of the Mayor was translated into a right to 
control the built environment. Moreover, the state's power over others can be sensed in the 
state's control over building permissions, connection to electricity and other essential utilities. " 
Power defined as "power over" reflects a social system organized hierarchically. That is, as 
Habermas pictured it, existing (modem) political and social orders (capitalist or socialist) are 
founded on domination (Wrong, 1979, p. 247). In this system, relationships between parties are 
organized vertically; power descends gradually from the higher level party, i. e. dominant party 
or power-holder (starting from the central authority) to the lower level party, i. e. subjected party 
or powerless (such as the masses) (fig. 6.4). Accordingly, any power relationship has always two 
poles: power-holder and powerless. This concept views power as a substance or resource that 
parties (whether states or individuals) can possess. It focuses attention on competition for power 
and domination. On the other hand, the concept of "power to" stresses the potential of 
cooperation, consensus and equality in achieving goals (Johnson, 1995, p. 210-1). In that sense, 
the concept of" power over" is considered negative while that of" power to" is positive. 
Planners, as representatives of the central or local authority, claim that they work as neutral 
agents to fulfil the public interest. They use their legitimate power entitled to them as part of the 
state to take decisions on behalf of the public to achieve outcomes in the public interest. In that 
sense, planners' activities seem to be characterised by the use of "power to" achieve outcomes. 
Planning is a kind of activity that has been described, mainly by neo-Marxists (e. g. Castells, 
Lefebvre, Harvey, Poulantzas), as an instrument of the capitalist state to accomplish the 
Power in Islam is closer to the modern conception of "power to" than to "power over", however not 
the same. 
45 The mayor stated in that respect "No one should interfere" (Flyvbjerg, 1998a, p. 96). 
46 In most Arab countries, the state, through its control over such utilities, guarantees that people abide 
by its environmental laws and regulation. Any violation of such regulations might end in depriving 
the private party from connecting his property to such essential utilities (Akbar, 1992, p. 342). 
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interests of the few; it is, as Lefebvre put it, a tool of social control" (Lefebvre, 1991). Planning 
thus could be seen as an activity of subjection; it subjects the public to its own vision of 
interest, to its policies, regulations and plans. It is a top-down activity. However, this negative 
subjection is masked by a positive perception of the concept of "power to". Thus, "power to", 
as used by planners, with its positive perception, is a tool of manipulation to mask the use of 
"power over" others, i. e. "power to" is a positive mask for the negative face of their actual use 
of power in a subordinative form. Flyvbjerg, in his analysis of the re-planning of the downtown 
of Allborg in Denmark, proclaimed that power in such planning activities defines its own truth 
and works to accomplish it. Planners as power holders define, explicitly or implicitly their 
vision of truth and public interest, rationalize it, and then work to achieve it (Flyvbjerg, 1998a). 
However, this process of subjugation of the public has been transformed into a self-subjugation 
process. That is, planning activity is a reflection of the logic of the modem hierarchical societal 
structure, thus, the public accepts this top-down paternalistic process and legitimizes it as its 
prime movers are professionals with specialized knowledge, thus they know more about the 
public interest than the public themselves (explained in chapter ten). Ultimately, the public 
subjects itself, willingly or unconsciously, to the "power over" of the planners (professionals). 
As rights in Islam are distributed among all parties in society, thus the predominant 
relationships among different parties in society are not vertical. There are no hierarchical levels 
between parties, i. e. in principal, there is no domination of one party over others. In that sense, 
as the term "power" denotes powerful and powerless parties, thus it does not apply to the 
inherited mode where such conceptions do not exist (fig. 6.5). In the inherited built environment, 
the rights of all parties involved in each interaction become actualized. Those actualized rights 
are then weighed up (pondered) against each other with reference to Shari `a to achieve a 
balanced situation on that specific site. Power or actualized rights denote capacity only for 
specific right-based actions occurring in the specific site. Outside that site of interaction this 
power or right expires. In other words, power does not inflate outside its site. Thus, it can be 
said that in the inherited mode, power relationships between parties in any environmental 
interaction are balancious and locational, and not dominative. 
ýý r2 
(Fig. 6.4) Hierarchical relationships between parties 
in the acquired mode. 
(Fig. 6.5) Balanced relationships between 
parties in the inherited mode. 
47 The state for Lefebvre is a hierarchical form possessing the concrete abstraction of power in a 
domination-subordination relationship, which is then utilized by bureaucrats to control society 
(Lefebvre, 1991). 
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As any built environment is part of an overall system, the built environment in its production 
processes reflects the larger societal power relationships. In the acquired mode, as law 
enactment embodies and reflects the hierarchical order of society, thereby this law, as a 
reference in any interaction in the built environment, enhances and maintains domination 
between parties in their environmental power relationships. For example, as a result of zoning 
and land use policies, land tenure in the acquired built environments, and its associated notion 
of land speculation, constitutes a territorial reflection of the societal hierarchical power 
structure. In Amman, Jordan, for example, residential areas are classified into zones A, B, C, and 
D leading to classifying people according to the area of residence. 
Moreover, with reference to the site, law is enacted by a remote party (a higher authority) and is 
generalized and applied to diverse sites in the built environment. In many Arab countries today, 
building regulations for each zone are applied in all cases, such as building heights, percentage 
of built up area, set backs, building materials, etc. (see p. 14). In that sense, parties are subject to 
higher authorities' development control policies, thus subject to higher level power. This can be 
described as a top-down mechanism of organizing the built environment. This implies that 
power of the involved parties does not emanate from the site. Therefore, it can be said that 
power relationships between parties in such acquired built environments are non-locational. 
While power in its modern concept is usually based on the concept of domination, and works 
vertically from top to bottom, it works (in the form of rights) according to the Islamic concept, 
as a pondering mechanism (not vertical and not necessarily horizontal48) between parties of 
Muslim society and state. Pondering mechanisms, in any interaction in the inherited built 
environment, operate to bring the actualized rights of properties and parties at any given 
moment into a balanced state, i. e. an agreed state where all parties involved (immediate parties) 
accord with the solution reached, contentedly and not compulsorily. This balanced state is 
reached in most cases through dialogue between involved parties in a disputed specific case, 
resulting in environmental solutions. If the dispute persists, the judge's ruling (constituting an 
environmental solution) is then binding to all parties. In other words, environmental solutions 
are then dominant over the conflicting parties. In that sense, dominant agreements or rulings 
balance horizontal relationships (or restless horizontal relationships, as Habraken calls them) 
and bring them to a state of stability. Such relationships might then be attributed as vertical; 
however, this verticality is between the involved parties. Both disputing parties jointly 
(neighbours, for example) compose the dominant party. 49 Any intervention in the built 
environment creates a case of interaction, which alters this balanced state. Pondering 
mechanisms then operate to bring the new situation into a new balanced state by weighing the 
48 In most cases, relationships between parties are horizontal. According to Habraken (1998), such 
relationships are restless. However, such relationships are treated (ordered and relaxed) in the 
inherited built environments by certain mechanisms, as explained in the next chapter. 
49 This issue is explained more in the next chapter. 
POWER / RIGHTS 125 
new actualized rights emerging from the intervening actions in that specific context. Such 
relationships in the inherited built environment can thus be attributed as locational. 
As disputes in the inherited built environment are solved following a decentralized, locational 
mechanism of decision-making based on rights network50, thus the parties involved in any 
interaction are of the same level and obviously less in number than in the case of centralized, 
non-locational decision-making process (the acquired). Consequently, balancing such a 
situation, or resolving conflicts through environmental solutions, is much easier and less 
bureaucratic in the inherited mode of production than in the acquired. 
6.6 CONCLUSIONS 
As this chapter demonstrated, there are substantial conceptual differences between the modem 
concept of power adopted by the acquired mode and that of Islamic rights employed in the 
inherited mode of production. Thus, the mechanisms operating in the decision-making 
processes of the production of the acquired and the inherited built environments are inevitably 
different. Some of the differences between the modem (acquired) concept of power and rights 
in Islam (inherited) are summarized in the following table (table 6.1). 
Modem concept of power (the acquired mode) Rights in the inherited mode 
relational relational 
Exclusive to certain parties Not exclusive 
conflictual Balancing (ponderal)/organizatory 
Power sources and resources: 
Two different concepts 
Power sources variable 
Power resources variable 
Unitary (imply the same concept) 
Power sources and resources are static (rights) 
`Lust for power' `Lust for power' is eliminated 
Inflation of resources No inflation of resources 
Power is relatively dynamic Rights per se (putative) is static 
Rights are generated by power 
Power controls rights 
Power is generated by rights 
Power is framed by rights 
`Power over' or domination `Power to' or `utilitative power' 
Power is seen as might rather than right 
Might creates rights 
Power as a right 
Rights create might 
Power relationships are non-locational Power relationships are ponderal and 
locational 
Power works vertically from top to bottom Rights work as a balancing (pondering) 
mechanism 
Rights in Islam are relational. Rights of any party are always perceived in relation to the rights of 
others, thus, constitute a network of rights, as explained in the next chapter. 
Chapter seven 
(lie irtherited 
7 
STRUCTURES OF RIGHTS 
The inherited 
'Ibn Sina' [Avicenna] states that human-derived authority is 
"authority/power" whereas the authority from God is 
"authority/rights" where the first is a necessity-based 
authority while the latter is a legitimate authority. 
(Badie, 1992, p. 100, translated by the candidate) 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
As a rights-based, the inherited mode is quite distinct from the acquired mode characterised as a 
capitalist-, modem-oriented, power-based model. Today, we live the acquired model, witness its 
built environment, and read about its processes. It is a daily observable and lived phenomena 
that has been widely explored and studied. Accordingly, the structure of the acquired built 
environment has become well recognized by us. If there is a lack of knowledge then it is in the 
inherited built environment. This chapter is thus concerned with exploring the inherited built 
environment, its mechanisms, structure, and processes, founded on the concept of rights in 
Islam. In such an investigation, a comparative methodology is adopted, where the inherited 
mode is compared to the acquired. In this context, the acquired built environment, as a living 
structure, will not be scrutinized unless necessary. 
As this research is concerned with the production process of the built environment, it focuses on 
the acting parties responsible of such a process. As this process in the acquired mode is 
controlled and directed by the state, represented by its planners and decision-makers, the focus 
in investigating the acquired mode is on the general mechanisms that operate on that level. 
However, as such process in the inherited built environment is centred around the inhabitants as 
immediate parties in the site without the intervention of external parties, the focus in exploring 
such a process is on the small scale actions (incremental) of the involved parties. 
7.2 RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP 
Ownership is a well-defined right in Islam. It is an appertainance to a thing (object, 'ayn) that 
enables its holder (owner) to use and control this thing exclusively, unless there is any 
preclusive (al-'Abbadi, v. 1, p. 150). Two main principles determine ownership in Islam: need 
and control. Regarding the first principle, al-Qarafi2 (d. 684H. ) relates that the sole 
rationalization for ownership is need (al-hajah) (al-Qarafi, n. d., v. 4, p. 16). Everything that is 
needed and useful for survival is subject to ownership, and conversely, what is not needed or 
'Ibn Sina (d. 428H. ) is an authoritative Muslim scholar. 
2 Al-Qarafi is a jurist from the Maliki School of Islamic law. 
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useful cannot be owned. As to the second principle, as a right, ownership entitles its holder 
power to control the owned thing and its usufruct. Thus, power is an effect of this right. The 
essence or the purpose of ownership is the capacity or the enablement to control, thus what is 
uncontrollable cannot be owned. Control is an imperative to affirm ownership, unless there is an 
impediment3 (al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 142,229). This principle was used implicitly by Muslim 
jurists to determine what may or may not be owned; things that are not controllable may not be 
owned such as the unpossessibles like sunshine, air, or fish in the sea (al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, 
p. 169). Reflecting this principle, Muslim scholars, in their definitions of ownership, emphasized 
the authority of control bestowed to the owner over the owned object or property. 'Ibn 
Taymiyah (From the Hanbali School, d. 728H. / 1328AD) defined ownership as the legitimate 
capacity of controlling the object. Similarily, Al-Karabisi (Hanafi, d. 570H. ) defined it as an 
authorization over all kinds of control over the object; al-Marouthi (Shafi`I, d. 462H. ) defined it 
as an appertainance that entails benefit and control (cited in al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 132). From 
those and other definitions, it can be inferred that Shari `a invests the right to control the owned 
object in the owner and not in any other external party. Thus, the decision-making process in the 
inherited built environment is, in most cases, confined to the circle of immediate owners 
without the intervention of any external party(ies). Granted immense control by shari a, owners 
have a full freedom to act in their properties, provided that they respect the principles of 
shari `a, such as not causing harm to other parties. This is quite evident in the cases documented 
by Muslim scholars in the inherited built environment, such as those of 'Ibn ar-Rami and at- 
Tutayli. For example, there was no limit to building height in the inherited built environment as 
long as neighbours were not damaged. 
Al-Qarafi distinguished between ownership and control, stating that one might be found without 
the other, as in the case of the trustee who controls but does not own, or the madman who owns 
but is not allowed to control (al-Qarafi, n. d., v. 3, p. 208). For example, miri lands' during the 
Ottoman era were controlled and used by the peasants who cultivated, but did not own them, as 
the state owned those lands. ' In that respect, two types of ownership existed in the inherited 
mode. First is "full ownership" (mulk tam) where rights both of control and ownership are 
found united. This form of ownership was the prevailing form in the inherited built 
environment. It confers on its holder rights of use and control over the owned property. 
Regarding full ownership, 'Ibn Hammam (Hanafi, d. 861H. ) stated that the perfection of 
ownership is to have full control (from al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 232). Similarly, 'Ibn `Abdin 
3 Such as in the case of the minor or the madman. 
Miri land is defined as state land that is held by individuals who have the right of usufruct. The user 
controls this land under the state's regulations (Akbar, 1992). 
5 The Ottoman State had its own land law enacted in 1858 and 1869, which did not strictly follow 
shari'a (see Akbar, 1992, p. 113-117). This form of ownership where land is owned by the state does 
not relate to shari `a concept of ownership. 
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(Hanafi, d. 1252H. ) defined full ownership (or "absolute ownership" (mulk mutlaq)6) as 
ownership where the thing is owned substantially (mulk ragabah)' and controlled ('Ibn `Abdin, 
n. d., v. 3, p. 263). Az-Zarkashi (Shafi'I, d. 794H. ) stated in that respect that ownership is of two 
kinds, full and weak or imperfect (tam and da'ij); the full denotes full control, whereas the weak 
does not (from al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 234). Full ownership or the joint of ownership and 
control constitutes the original form of ownership in Islam (al-Bali, 1985, p. 113; al-Khafif, 
1990, p. 84), as reflected in most Muslim jurists' definitions of ownership. They considered 
control and use as rights attached to full ownership. They perceived of control in such cases as 
an effect of ownership'; it is a privilege of or a legitimate capacity yielded by ownership. 
Second is the "imperfect ownership", where the owner has partial or no control over his 
property. It is imperfect as compared to the original form of ownership. ' This ownership form 
was rare in the inherited built environment, and when it existed, in most cases10, it was on 
temporary terms where the property ultimately restores its original state of full ownership, such 
as in the case of leasing. Ownership of a leased property in the inherited built environment 
signifies ownership of its substance without its usufruct; the latter is owned by the tenant. 
In general, control and ownership are both significant rights in the production of the built 
environment. The owner cannot act freely in his property if he does not control it. For example, 
if a property is owned by a party and controlled by another, the controlling party might prohibit 
the owner from conducting changes to the property. The state, for instance, as the ultimate 
controlling party in the acquired mode, prohibits owners, through its planning regulations and 
by-laws, from exceeding certain building heights or built-up area, or from using their properties 
for particular functions. It is thus obvious that decision-making process in the production of the 
built environment in general is shaped by controlling parties more than by owners, if different. " 
6 Some Muslim jurists call the full ownership or mulk tam as absolute ownership (mulk mutlaq) such as 
'Ibn `Abdin (al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 233), however, the common term is the mulk tam, translated in 
this study as full ownership. 
Islam differentiated between the ownership of the thing (substance) and its usufruct. Ownership of the 
thing per se is called mulk raqabah, whereas the ownership of the usufruct is called mulk manfa'ah 
(al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 230-243; Schacht, 1964, p. 134). 
8 Az-Zarkashi avers that control is the product and effect of ownership (al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 143). 
9 Some contemporary scholars defined "full ownership" as the ownership of both the thing and its 
usufruct. Likewise, they related "imperfect ownership" to the case where the thing is owned without 
its usufruct or the usufruct owned without the thing (al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 231; Ibrahim, 1936, 
p. 10-11). However, those types of imperfect ownership constitute only some examples of imperfect 
ownership. Imperfect ownership, as inferred from Muslim jurists' definitions, is a relation between 
ownership and control and not between ownership of the thing and its usufruct. 
1° Some might argue that the wagf (endowment) might be considered as belonging to this form of 
ownership. However, it is a permanent imperfect ownership. In fact, the waqf is a special type of 
ownership. The ownership of the substance is withheld. It becomes, as some argue, the right of God. 
Ownership of the usufruct pertains to the beneficiaries; however, the wagf s caretaker controls such a 
property. See p. 131 below. 
In his study of "change" in the built environment, Habraken focused on control as the determinant of 
change in the built environment. To quote him, "control thus defines the central operational 
relationship between humans and all matter that is the stuff of built environment. As dynamic patterns 
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However, to best benefit from the property and to avoid disputes, ownership and control should 
be united in one party. Islam confered special importance on the right of ownership, thus 
granted owners immense control over their properties. To best effectuate the purpose of the 
right of ownership, shari `a strongly associated ownership and control over properties. It unified 
control in owners. In that respect, Akbar contends that most properties in the inherited built 
environments were in what he termed the "Unified Form of Submission" 'Z, characterized by 
unifying the rights of ownership, control, and use in one party (Akbar, 1988; 1992). 
In that sense, owners in most cases in the inherited built environment were the controllers of 
their properties; thus no external party, such as the higher authorities, has the right to intervene, 
as it has no right of control over private properties. Enjoying such rights, owners in the inherited 
built environment were enabled with such capacities. No one party is subjected to the control of 
another, except in particular cases. 
When ownership is separated from control, a state of dispute between the controlling party and 
the owner is likely to arise. The controlling party tends in such a situation to regulate the actions 
of owners. Such a situation is characterized by subordination to rules on the part of non- 
controlling parties (owners). It is a command-obedience relationship between related parties. 
This is the case in the acquired built environment, where higher authorities are the ultimate 
controlling party in terms of individual properties. Owners are subject to the rules of this party, 
which decides for them for their "public interest", as alleged. Higher authorities (planning 
authorities as part of the state) set rules for land uses, built up area, building heights, building 
material, set backs, and the like. This domination of the higher authorities in the acquired mode 
reduces owners' controlling capacity, bestowed to them as owners. 
To conclude, it can be said that, according to shari 'a, full ownership characterized the inherited 
built environment, whereas imperfect ownership characterized the acquired built environments. 
7.2.1 Access to resources 
Poverty is seen by at least some social scientists,... as 
inequalities in the command of resources, and especially 
those inequalities that derive from the dynamic and 
evolving life-style, rights and opportunities available to 
the average members of society. 
(Rein, cited in Badcock, 1984, p. 30, emphasis added) 
According to Pahl (1975), allocation of resources in the capitalist (acquired) mode is much 
directed by the state, local and central (Saunders, 1993, p. 122-139). Such allocation of urban 
scarce resources resonates and thus sustains the prevailing societal structure. 13 Pahl contends in 
of change echo throughout a built environment, they reveal the structure of control" (Habraken, 1988, 
1998, p. 8). 
'Z Akbar identified five forms of submission according to the distribution of the rights of control, 
ownership, and use of the one object between parties. Any property in the built environment belongs 
to one of those forms (Akbar, 1988; 1992). 
See studies of Rex and Moore (1967) about allocation of housing as a scarce urban resource. 
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that respect that access to scarce urban resources is constrained by the distribution of power 
within society. " In their investigation of unemployment in Atlanta, Bederman and Adam found 
that " structural" effects were very closely associated with tract unemployment rates (Badcock, 
1984, p. 39). Particular classes are denied access to resources. Such state control of access to 
resources and inequalities in their command, as illustrated in the above quotation, would most 
likely result in poverty; the rich gets richer and the poor gets poorer. In that context, many 
scholars believe that urban poverty and disadvantage can be alleviated by improving the 
distribution of resources (e. g. opportunities). However, such suggestion is rooted in the 
capitalist mode. It focuses attention on improvement of resource distribution by a controlling 
party, which is most likely to be the state. Thus it preserves the status quo, with little 
amelioration. Isn't there a radical alternative? What could happen if resources were open to all? 
How can society open the door for all individuals? What kind of societal tools are needed? 
Enablement, in contemporary writings, is considered a necessary condition for society to 
prosper. It is considered as a significant requirement to accomplish social justice. In that 
respect, shari `a has set particular mechanisms in the inherited mode, that promote enablement 
and social justice. For example, Islam has legitimized private ownership. That is, ownership 
constitutes, through the capacities bestowed to its holder, an enabling right socially and 
economically. The purpose of ownership in Islam is not in making wealth per se, but the 
enablement of inhabitants, realised through ownership. Thus, to procure an enabled society, 
Islam does not only avow the right of ownership, but it encourages individuals, through many 
mechanisms, to create ownership, thus increasing the percentage of owners in society. 
To achieve such aims, Islam set other mechanisms of enablement. Examples are social 
solidarity; redistributing existing wealth through, for example, inheritance ('firth), poor-due 
(sadaqah), obligatory giving or tax known as zakah, grants ('ataya); and open access to 
resources. In that sense, enablement keeps the door open for people to work and invest. Shari 'a 
did not consider ownership as exclusive to a particular group or class, but accessible to 
everyone. It granted individuals the freedom of action within the framework of shari'a, with 
little or even no intervention from higher authorities. 
Previous statements may be perceived as conclusions that can only be reached by understanding 
types of properties in the inherited built environment. Five types of land and properties can be 
distinguished according to Shari `a: 
1- Privately owned properties: Those properties are characterized by " full ownership". That 
is, as described above, to best benefit from such properties, shari `a united the rights of 
control and ownership in the hands of the owner (see p. 127 above). Private properties, as 
explained below, constituted the higher ratio among properties in the inherited built 
environment. Thus, most properties in the inherited built environment were controlled by 
14 Advocating this position, Castells perceives of the state as the real manager of everyday life. He 
contends that inequality in terms of income, inherent in capitalism, seems to be expressed in new 
social cleavages related to accessibility and use of certain collective resources (Badcock, 1984, p. 50). 
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their owners without the intervention of any external party. Production of the inherited built 
environment was thus determined by its inhabitants. 
2- Unutilized or left-over properties ('aradi matrukah): Examples of such properties are 
thoroughfares, riverside, seaside, lands around villages and urban areas left for pasture and 
the like, public buildings such as mosques, and any other land from which all individuals 
benefit (al-Muslih, 1988, p. 105; al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 245-257). Those are in public 
ownership, i. e. owned and controlled by all society members collectively. The higher 
authorities have no right of control over them. They are properties to which the benefit of 
all individuals is attached, and cannot be owned privately as this might result in excluding 
other parties from their benefits, thus harming them. Al-Sabki (Shafi`I, d. 756H. )15 gives 
riversides as an example of public ownership, saying that all humans share this kind of 
property which cannot be revivified (utilized and thus owned), sold, or allotted. 
Furthermore, the ruler (representing the state) does not have the right to act upon, 
manipulate, or control over such properties. The ruler and all other users are the same in 
that respect (cited in al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 262-3). This is evident in a case raised to 'Ibn 
Taymiyyah (d. 728H. / 1328AD. ) where a man built a house on a few yards appropriated from 
the side of the street, bought from the vicegerent of beit al-mal (the public treasury). 'Ibn 
Taymiyyah answered that no one has the right to sell any part of Muslims' through streets, 
whether the street is wide or narrow. Beit al-mal (the public treasury) does not have such a 
right unless it is proven that the land is owned by the public treasury, such as, for example, 
if it was owned by a person who transferred its ownership to the treasury. 'Ibn Taymiyyah 
maintained that those who testified that the street belonged to beit al-mal should be subject 
to punishment, and the ruler should not acknowledge the validity of this purchase ('Ibn 
Taymiyyah, n. d. /a, v. 15, p. 313-4). Any Muslim can benefit from those properties in a 
manner that dose not cause harm to others. Ownership of through streets, as an example of 
those properties, is explored later in this chapter. 
3- Waqf properties (endowments): these are originally privately owned properties that their 
owners chose to endow. Benefits of such properties are endowed either for specific 
relatives (known as wagf tharri or ahli) or as a benevolence for the benefit of some or all 
Muslims (known as benevolent endowment or waqf khayri) such as mosques, schools, 
libraries, caravansaries. Such properties are controlled by their caretakers (nazir)'6. In the 
benevolent waqf, endowed properties become public properties which are controlled by all 
Muslims collectively, and the caretaker acts for their common interest (al-'Abbadi, 1977, 
v. 1, p. 253; Khalil, 1993, p. 30-1). In both types of wagf, the substance of the waqf property 
(mulk raqaba) is held; " it cannot be sold, donated, or inherited, however, its usufruct is 
15 From the Shafi'i school. 
16 Nazir al-waqf controls the waqf property within the conditions set by the grantor of the waqf 
(Ibrahim, 1936, p. 335,339). 
For most Muslim jurists, the ownership of the waqf property is held, it is not any more related to the 
grantor (az-Zuhaili, 1987, p. 154-5; Abu Zahra, 1971, p. 99-104). 
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endowed to the beneficiaries of the waqf. In essence, the waqf in its two types constitutes 
a mechanism for enabling Muslim individuals. In case of wagf ahli, it enables relatives; in 
the case of wagf khayri, it enables all Muslims who benefit from it, such as passers-by in 
the case of public water fountains (sabil ma'). Wagf property becomes an available 
resource for its beneficiaries, especially if endowed to all Muslims. 
4- Properties owned by the public treasury (Beit al-mal): those properties are state properties 
which sources are defined according to shari `a. 19 State property is actually public property, 
the ruler being only its caretaker. 20 That is, the state acts in these properties on behalf of its 
people (ummah). It is the duty of the state to disburse it in the interest of the public (Islahi, 
1988, p. 117; al-Kholi, 1978, p. 102-4). 2' This distinction between belt al-mal and state- 
owned properties limits the state's rights to intervene in public properties thus eliminates 
any domination that might be exerted by the state over the inhabitants. Moreover, it 
disciplines and diminishes the human tendency of lusting for power. 
However, in advocating the prevailing position of the acquired mode, that the state is the 
ultimate regulatory device, some contemporary scholars consider all beit al-mal property as 
public property (e. g. al-Kholi). Those scholars contend that public properties are state 
properties, owned and controlled by the state, represented by its ruler. The ruler has control 
over such properties, for example, in selling, or allotting any of them. However, his acts are 
restricted within the framework of the common interest (al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 258-9). 
These writers claim that only a portion of the properties owned by beit al-mal can be 
considered public properties, where the ruler acts as their supervisor. The rest are state 
property in which the state enjoys the right of ownership and thus all subsequent capacities, 
within the framework of shari `a, provided it performs in the common interest. State lands 
that are endowed (wagf) or selected (sawafi)22 for the benefit of all Muslims constitute an 
example of the public properties in belt al-mal (al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 252). Such a 
contemporary position legitimizes and expands state intervention in and thus control over 
public properties. This contradicts substantially the logic of the mechanisms operating in 
the production of the inherited built environment, as explained below. 
'B The beneficiaries in the wagf have the "right to benefit" (haq 'intifa'), i. e. have a permission to 
benefit but do not own the usufruct of the property. This concept is explored later in this chapter. 
19 The main sources of state property are booty and spoils of war, lost property whose owner cannot be 
found, property with no heir, and finally zakat (tax, usually 2.5% of capital). Also trusts, gifts and 
fines may be included as sources of beiz al-mal property (Islahi, 1988, p. 117). For the sources of Beit 
al-mal property, see al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 258-260, or al-Muslih, 1988, p. 114-120. 
20 As the ruler does not own the properties of beit al-ma! but he is only a caretaker, thus many Muslim 
jurists denied him the capacity of endowing such priorities. That is, one of the conditions of 
endowment is that the property endowed should be owned by its grantor (Abu Zahra, 1971, p. 121-2). 
Z' Umar (the second caliph, d. 13H. /634AD. ) states that he is as a caliph only a guardian, a distributor of 
the money in beit al-mal according to its determined channels (cited in al-Kholi, 1978, p. 92). 
22 Sawafi or selected lands are those lands which the ruler selects for beiz al-mal from the booty and 
spoils of war. They become collective public property owned by all Muslims collectively but the ruler 
has control over them. Thus he cannot sell such properties, but can decide how best to benefit from 
them. They are considered as waqf lands for the benefit of all Muslims (al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 252). 
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5- Dead lands (mawat): unclaimed lands or mawat are lands owned by all Muslims 
collectively. Dead lands constitute an available resource to which all individuals have the 
right of access. Any individual can turn dead land into privately owned land through the 
mechanisms of revivification or allotment, as explained next. 
REVIVIFICATION ('IHYA ) 
The Prophet's saying "Whoever revives a dead land, then it is his" 23 sets out the right of all 
individuals to revivify dead lands and thus own them. Mawat or dead lands, as defined by most 
jurists, are unclaimed and unused lands that have no trace of cultivation or building, and are not 
associated with the benefit of the neighboring locality; i. e. as "unutilized lands, matroukah", 
whether adjacent to or far from urban areas. 24 Facilitating the process of revivification, most 
Muslim jurists agree that, as inferred from the Prophet's saying, such a process does not need 
permission from the ruler. 25 Whoever revivifies a dead land becomes its owner. However, to 
regulate this mechanism of enablement and to protect other Muslims' rights, Shari 'a set clear 
conditions for revivification. Before exploring those controlling measures, the mechanism of 
allotment is explained next. 
ALLOTMENT( 'IQTA ) 
'Iqta' literally means the act by the ruler of bestowing or allotting a piece of land to individuals. 
Allotment can be conceived of as another form of revivification of lands; however, it is 
conditioned by the ruler's permission. Allotment is possible from the state lands or from dead 
lands. Revivification and allotment were the two main mechanisms for establishing ownership 
in most cases in urban areas. Such mechanisms lead to the mobilization of resources from an 
unutilized to a utilized state, and thus from collective ownership (owned by all Muslims, or the 
state representing all Muslims) to individual properties (as explained in the next chapter). 
Two types of allotment existed in the inherited built environment: the first is 'iqta' tamilk or 
allotment leading to full ownership. This type implies allotting fiefs to be owned through 
revivification. The allottee ultimately enjoys all subsequent rights, such as control and use of 
the land, as a result of his right of ownership. The second type is that of allotting land with the 
right of utilization but not of ownership. This type is called 'igta' 'istighlal or allotment of 
usufruct. In this type, the user has the right of manipulating the land only; ownership is retained 
by the state, as representing all Muslims. In both types the ruler may give allotments to 
Z3 Cited in al-Mawardi, n. d., p. 252. 
Z" All schools of law except for some jurists from the Hanafi School consider unused lands adjacent to 
urban areas as dead lands, thus available for revivification. Ash-Shafi'i defines dead land as "any land 
which is not cultivated nor constitutes a harim reserve [" unutilized land, matrukah" for the benefit of 
the urban area] of cultivated land- even if it is adjacent to a cultivated land". However, Abu Yusuf 
(d. 182H. /798AD. ), for example, from the Hanafi school, defines mawat as "that land which, when 
someone stands on its point which is nearest to a cultivated land [urban area] and cries out at the top 
of his voice, he cannot be heard by anyone standing at the nearest point in the cultivated land" (al- 
Mawardi, n. d., p. 252). 
ZS Abu Hanifa is the only jurist who conditions revivification to the permission of the ruler (imam) (al- 
Mawardi, n. d. p. 252). 
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individuals from dead lands or from state lands (al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 325-327; Akbar, 1988, 
p. 28). However, 'igta ` 'istighlal was more common in state lands, as most of those lands were 
owned by all Muslims. The ruler has no right to transfer their ownership to the allottee. The 
ruler can allot the usufruct of those lands, provided he acts for the common interest. 26 
Allotting lands was a very well known practice for establishing ownership, mainly in cases of 
new towns. Many cases have been documented in history books, for example, in Futuh al- 
Buldan of al-Baladhuri (d. 279H. ). The Prophet and the caliphs, as 'Abu Ysusf stated, used to 
allot land to those whom they felt would benefit from it positively, and to those whom they 
thought were of benefit to Islam and would fight against the enemy ('Abu Yusuf, n. d., p. 61-2). 
That is, if the individual becomes an owner, he becomes an enabled person and is thus settled, 
so that he concentrates on his other duties towards Islam. 'Abu Yusuf contends that no land 
should be left unutilized; rulers should allot dead lands, as this improves the conditions of towns 
('a'mar lil bilad) and reflects positively on the economic situation, due to the kharaj tax levied. 
To enhance the mechanism of revivification and to protect the rights of revivification of other 
individuals, and to warrant the utilisation of allotted resources, and thus maintain the common 
interest, certain measures were developed. One of those controlling measures is 'ihtijar. The 
revivification process starts with demarcating ('ihtijar) the land chosen for revivification. " 
During this period, the demarcator (muhtajir) works in his land to revivify it. However, if he 
can not revivify it within a certain time limit28 (three years according to most jurists29, or 
decided according to conventions), his right will lapse and, in the case of revivification, any 
other person has the right then to revivify it and thus become its owner; or, in the case of 
allotment, the ruler can get the allotted land back (al-Muthaffar, 1998, p. 287). During 'ihtijar 
Z6 Most Muslim jurists did not differentiate between dead lands and urban lands in considering 
allotment, provided it serves the public interest. The Prophet, although in limited cases, gave 
allotments in urban areas. However, allotment from dead lands was the prevailing type (al-Muthaffar, 
1998, p. 282-3). 
Z' For allotment, demarcation is not a necessary process to affirm the right of appertainance as explained 
below. Allotment in that respect, as an act by the ruler, stands as 'ihtijar in terms of its principles and 
rights bestowed (al-Muthaffar, 1998, p. 286-7). 
ZA The nature of revivification is determined by custom, with regard to the purpose of the revival. For 
example, if someone wishes to revivify a dead land for a residence, then revivification is obtained by 
constructing and roofing a building on it, as this presents the minimum necessary for residence. If 
someone wants to revivify a land for cultivation, then this land has to be marked, and then it should 
be irrigated if dry, or water should be stopped from reaching it if it is marshy. And then preparing the 
land for cultivation or planting. When these steps are fulfilled then the revivification is complete and 
ownership is transferred to the revivifier (al-Mawardi, n. d., p. 252-3). 
Z9 Three years as a time limit has been stated in the Prophet's tradition and also in his successors' 
sayings. It has been reported that the Prophet said: "the common (unowned) land belongs to God and 
his Prophet, then it is yours. He who revived a dead land owns it; and the demarcator has no right 
after three years". It is also reported that `Umar (the second caliph) said that "he who revives a dead 
land owns it, but the demarcator has no right after three years. " 'Abu Yusuf explained that the reason 
of 'Umar's proclamation is that people begun to occupy dead lands without utilizing them ('Abu 
Yusuf, n. d., p. 65). `Umar added, "if he (the demarcator) did not revive the land within three years, he 
is then on an equal footing with everyone else" ('Abu Yusuf, n. d., p. 101-2; see also 'Ibn Qudamah, 
n. d., p. 154). 
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period, a demarcator has the right of appertainance3° ('ikhtisas, taking precedence over others) 
but not ownership of this land (al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 161-2). This right prohibits others from 
revivifying the demarcated land during the limited time of demarcation. That is, demarcating 
land without utilizing and thus revivifying it is considered by shari 'a as a malfunction of 
resources and an impediment to others to invest such resources and to be enabled. 'Ibn 
Qudamah (d. 620H. ) reports in that respect that if the demarcator did not revivify a land within 
the time limit of demarcation then "the Sultan should order him either to revivify or leave [the 
land] so others could do it. Since he is usurping from the people their common right, [the 
allottee] should be treated as if he was standing in [the middle of] a narrow road, ... he is not 
benefiting himself, meanwhile he is not allowing others to benefit" ('Ibn Qudamah, n. d., v. 8, 
p. 153). 3' Only after the land is revivified does its revivifier becomes its owner and enjoys all the 
capacities attached to ownership; i. e. use and control. 'Abu Ya'la (d. 458H. ) reports that " if the 
demarcator wishes to sell the demarcated land prior to revivification, he cannot, as it is 
unlawful" (Al-Farra', n. d., p. 21 1). This controlling measure protects land from attitudes of 
greed and monopoly, and preserves land from turning into a scarce resource, as is the case in the 
acquired mode. Through such controlling measures, Shari 'a protects resources from negligence, 
and thus from wastage. 
Moreover, lands were allotted in accordance with the need and capability of the allottees. If the 
allottee could not revivify the allotted land, it goes back to its previous state before being 
allotted (either a dead land or a state land) (al-Muthaffar, 1998, p. 190,290-2; as-Samih, 1983, 
p. 119,138). That is, shari `a's aim in the mechanisms of allotment and revivification is the 
utilization of resources and thus the public benefit, and not only the ownership bestowed to the 
revivifier per se (al-Kholi, 1978, p. 83). In one case `Umar, when became a caliph, took away 
the unrevivified part of the land that the Prophet allotted to Bilal al-Harith, as the latter could 
not revivify all of it, stating that "you were allotted this land not to demarcate it from people but 
to work", so `Umar took it away and divided it among other Muslims (al-Qurashi, n. d., p. 93; 
Abu `Ubeid, n. d., p. 302). 'Ibn Qudamah stated in that respect that: "The ruler should not allot a 
dead land except what the allottee can revivify, that is, allotting more than this would limit the 
chances for other people in what is a shared right, with no benefit for any of them" ('Ibn 
Qudämah, n. d., v. 8, p. 165). Thus, apart from being a controlling measure of revivification, 
ownership in accordance with revivifier's need can be considered as a one measure of 
maintaining a just distribution of resources among individuals by asserting that resources are 
available to others to invest and utilize. Such mechanisms asserted one of justice's basic 
requirements, that is, everyone should have an equal opportunity to be productive and, thus, to 
31 Appertainance is the right of taking precedence over others ('ikhtisas ). 
" Al-K. sani in Badä'i` äs-Sanä'i` contends that "if the ruler allots a dead land to a person who left it 
without revivifying it, the ruler leaves the allottee up to three years without intervening. However, if 
the three years passed, then the land turns again to be a dead land and the ruler has the right to allot it 
to any other person... That is, holding a land for three years without utilizing it denotes that the 
allottee does not want to utilize it but to allow it to stagnate. Thus his right lapses and the land turns 
back to its original state as a dead land" (al-KäsHni, n. d., v. 8, p. 305). 
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have access to resources, and that no one should be allowed to create a monopoly and so deny 
others the right to produce or invest. This consequently led to a distribution of wealth based on 
efforts exerted in the inherited built environment. 
The question that arises here is: if revivification is possible without the ruler's permission, then 
what is the need for allotment? Allotment was mostly accomplished with state properties to 
which individuals do not have access without the ruler's permission. Allotment as a mechanism 
of establishing ownership was thus not as common as revivification. Therefore, revivification 
without ruler's permission is considered the prime mechanism for mobilizing resources from 
collective unutilized state to utilized, privately owned property. This consequently limits the 
state's possible avenues for dominance over private parties. 
It can be inferred from this demonstration that most properties in the inherited built 
environment are either privately owned, or owned by all Muslims collectively. In that sense, 
Muslims are either owners as individuals thus enabled, or have the opportunity to become 
owners. Most properties in the inherited built environment are controlled by individuals with 
little or no intervention from the higher authorities. The only type of property where the state 
has the right of control is state property. These are actually limited and they are even considered 
by many scholars as public property, of which the state is only a guardian. Through such a 
structure of ownership, shari `a, first, made resources available to all individuals. Second, 
through enacting particular mechanisms, such as revivification and allotment, shari `a gave 
individuals the right of access to those resources for investment, leading in most cases to 
ownership. Shari `a intends by this to increase the opportunity of enabling individuals, thus, 
ultimately, to achieve an enabled society. 32 
It can be seen from this that most lands in the inherited built environment have no purchasing 
value. Land cannot be sold by the state as it does not own it; it is a collective property for all 
Muslims. Land can be taken at no cost by any individual who puts in effort to utilize it. This in 
turn provokes parties' initiatives to act and be productive, to be owners and thus enabled 
individuals in society. Shari'a aims at utilizing resources. It sets many incentives to direct the 
efforts of individuals toward fulfilling this aim. It makes resources available, facilitats their 
utilization by eliminating all impediments, for example, allows action without the permission 
of higher authorities, encourages individuals to work and be productive by promising every 
revivifier rewards from God in return for his revivification, according to the Prophet's tradition: 
32 Shari 'a bestowed the right of access to resources to all individuals in un-owned lands (unutilized 
(matrukah) or dead). Belt al-mal (public treasury) properties also constitute an available resource for 
all Muslims, however, conditioned with the permission of the ruler. For example, the ruler can allot a 
piece of land for any individual to exploit it. Kharaji lands are also owned by befit al-mal but their 
users benefit from them and pay in return a tax allocated on them. Thus, beit al-mal properties are 
also available resources for all individuals, however, with controled accessibility. 
Kharaji lands are basically those lands owned by all Muslims collectively, represented by the state, 
but left in the possession of its owners (originally non-Muslims), provided they pay a tax called 
kharaj to belt al-mal. For more about kharaji lands, see al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 313-8. 
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" He who revives dead land will be rewarded by God. " 33 Moreover, Shari `a protected the rights 
of those who want to work; it protected the right of the demarcator during demarcation period, 
simultaneously, it protected the right of access to resources by others by allowing them to 
revivify a demarcated land if its demarcator fails to. Those mechanisms result in transforming 
members of society into owners, thus into enabled individuals. Therefore society in the 
inherited mode develops into an enabled society, settled, and willing to prosper. 
7.3 MECHANISMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL 
Processes of enablement and production of the built environment are not without some control. 
The legal system has introduced some rights-based mechanisms of environmental or 
development control to regulate such processes. Those mechanisms are self-regulating 
principles derived from rights as bestowed by shari `a. Accordingly, as rights constitute the 
main axis in the production process of the inherited built environment, they are subject to 
certain restrictions in their exercitation. Owners do not enjoy an absolute freedom over their 
properties but restricted freedom that respects the rights of others when these overlap. 
Examples of such restrictive mechanisms are explained next. 
7.3.1 Neither harm nor reciprocal harm 
In principle, rights in Islam are enacted to fulfil shari 'a's purposes of bringing the good and 
avoiding harm (Muwafi, 1997, p. 419). Rights thus are purposeful; they attempt to accomplish 
people's interests. Most Muslim jurists defined people's interest as "the bringing of the good 
and the avoidance of the evil" (Muwafi, 1997, p. 421-2). Shari 'a in that sense accorded harm a 
great importance, thus protecting people's rights. 
"Neither harm nor reciprocal harm" (La darar wa la dirar)34, is a Prophet's saying that 
performs as a mechanism of environmental control in the production of the inherited built 
environment. It is the basic regulating principle in the exercitation of rights bestowed on 
individuals, groups, and the state. It determines that one can act freely as he wishes provided he 
does not cause harm to others. This tradition suggests complete freedom of action, if others are 
not harmed. Parties can act without any permission. This implies that external parties (e. g. 
neighbours or higher authorities) have no right to intervene in the actions of any party within its 
property if not affecting others, such as by knocking or hammering on a neighbour's wall, or 
intruding on a neighbour's privacy by, for example, opening a new window that overlooks the 
neighbour's house. The Islamic concept of harm provides the main regulating mechanism in 
the exercitation of rights in the inherited built environment, affecting its production processes. 
These restrictions are referred to by parties involved in the site and also by judges when 
resolving disputes between parties. 
This tradition is reported by 'Ibn Hanbal and narrated by an-NisA'i. 
This saying (hadith or tradition) is related by 'Ibn MAja, Malik and many others (an-Nawawi, 1977, 
p. 106). It is translated in al-Muwatta of Imam MAlik as "There is no injury nor return of injury" 
(Imam Malik, 1982, p. 346). According to 'Abu DBwud (d. 275H. /887AD. ), this is one of five principal 
traditions on which jurisprudence (fiqh) is based. 
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However, shari'a did not consider all types of harm as harms that should be avoided or lifted. 
Muslim jurists agreed on certain criteria when judging harm to be damaging and thus 
disallowed; however, jurists varied in the degree of applying such criteria. Damage should first 
be unequivocal and not dubious, i. e. it has occurred or will certainly occur as a consequence of 
the action. 35 Second, harm is major and not minor. Most jurists agreed and defined major harm 
as that action which leads to the destruction or weakening of others' property, or totally not- 
benefiting from the property, such as by totally blocking light or air from reaching it. " They 
perceived major harm as that which disaccords with society's habits and conventions. Shafi`i 
and Hanafi jurists applied this definition to harm caused to private properties; " however, for 
public property they considered any harm that curtails the benefit of that property, whether 
partially or totally, as major harm. For example, establishing a mill in a residential 
neighborhood is disallowed because of the harm caused to neighboring properties due to the 
vibration generated. This harm is considered as certain to occur and major, thus disallowed. 
Moreover, building in a through street (public property, owned by all Muslims collectively) is 
considered a major harm if it leads to curtailing the main use of the street, which is to pass 
through it comfortably. If such an action narrows the street uncomfortably for passers-by, then 
this resultant harm is considered as major that should be ended (Muwafi, 1997, p. 721-743). 
Third, harm resulting from non-rightful acts, i. e. acts of infringement, abuse, or neglect. 
"Infringement" or "intrusion" (ta `addi) here means illegitimate or non-rightful acts according 
to shari'a, however "abuse" (ta'asuf) denotes abuse of rights, i. e. acting in a manner that 
contradicts the main purpose of rights: to bring good and avoid harm. Using one's right to bring 
harm to others, whether this harm is intended or not, is considered abuse of rights bestowed on 
the acting party by Shari 'a. For example, building in a through streets (public property) in a 
manner that causes major harm to its users is considered an infringement, as it is not based on 
the rights of the acting party according to shari'a. The acting party in this case acted on others' 
properties. The resultant harm was disallowed. Likewise, transforming one's house (party A) 
into a mill or a public bath is considered, if causing major harm to the neighbor, an abuse of 
party (A)'s rights as party A is, most probably, aware of the harm that is to be caused to the 
neighboring properties due to his action. Such harm is prohibited (Muwafi, 1997, p. 803-7). This 
latter example signifies that if the actions of a party extended beyond its property's boundaries 
to affect others' properties in a major way, it is considered infringement or intrusion on others. " 
35 Jurists from the Maliki and Hanbali schools considered harm that is most probably to occur as a result 
of an action as disallowed harm, provided the other criteria of disallowed harm is met. 
36 In that respect, blocking sun or air from reaching a building partially, by, for example, raising the 
adjacent building, is not considered by most jurists as disallowed harm (Muwafi, 1997, p. 744). 'Ibn ar- 
Rami states that many cases occurred in Tunis where the owner was allowed to raise his building 
although blocking sun and air from reaching the neighbour's property ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 248). 
Ash-Shafi'i applied this definition of major harm to harm caused to the property and not to the owner 
(Muwafi, 1997, p. 758-9). 
3A In addition to these measures of infringement, ash-Shafi'i considers infringement actions as those 
which disaccord with society's habits and conventions (Muwafi, 1997, p. 818-9). 
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Abuse might also include the use of one's rights to damage others deliberately. For example, in 
one case ad-Dahhak bin Khalifa (party A) watered his irrigation ditch from a large source of 
water. He wanted to have it pass through the land of Mohammad bin Maslama (party B); 
however the latter party refused, although this would benefit his land (B's) and would not cause 
him any harm. Party A raised his case to the Caliphate `Umar bin al-Khattab (d. 23H. ) who 
talked with party B, but the latter insisted on his refusal, then `Umar obliged him to allow its 
passage (Imam Malik, 1982, p. 346). Here the intention to cause harm to party A by preventing 
him from his action is clear; party B was not benefiting himself from his refusal, although he 
has the right to refuse, thus such harm was disallowed. 
However, if the action leads to benefiting the acting party and, at the same time, causing harm 
to another party, with no harmful intention, then, the benefit and harm are weighed against each 
other. If the harm is clearly greater than the benefit, then avoiding or lifting the harm is 
prioritized; if the benefit is major in comparison to the resultant harm, then the benefiting action 
continues. If resultant harm and benefit are equal, then the decision is reached according to the 
case in question. 39 In one example, Samra bin Jundub (party A) had a group of palm trees on 
land owned by another party (B). Party A used to walk through the land to get to his trees which 
caused harm to party B, as he and his family lived on that land. Party B asked party A to sell him 
the trees, but party A refused. The owner of the land (party B) raised his case to the Prophet 
Muhammad who then asked party A to sell party B the trees but he refused. Then the Prophet 
asked him to exchange the trees for a piece of land from the owner B but he also refused this. 
Then the Prophet asked party A to grant his trees to the owner and he would get instead several 
rewards from God, but party A insisted on his refusal. Then, and after listing many options to 
solve the case, the Prophet described party A as being "harmful (mudar)", i. e. have the 
intention of harming the other party without benefiting himself from his actions. The Prophet 
ultimately ordered party B to remove the palm trees of party A from his land (cited in ad- 
Duraini, 1988, p. 149; see Muwafi, 1998, p. 843). In this case, the harm caused to party B was 
much greater than the benefit gained by party A from having his palms on party B's land, or put 
differently, the harm caused to party A as a result of removing his palms was less than the harm 
caused to party B as a result of having the palms on his land. Thus, the harm caused to party B 
was ruled to be lifted on the account of a relatively minor benefit to party A. 
Fourth, the harmed interest is originally legitimate and merited for the harmed party, i. e. based 
on its right according to shari 'a (Muwafi, 1997, p. 720). 4° For example, in one case, an owner 
39 Jurists differed in such situations. Ash-Shafi'i and Abu Hanifa prioritized the right of owners to have 
full control over their properties, thus they promote the continuation of the benefiting action, provided 
that resultant harm is not considered as disallowed harm according to the criteria described above. 
Malik and 'Ibn Hanbal tend to restrict such actions where benefit is equal to harm caused, basing their 
opinions on the principle "avoiding harm is prioritized over bringing benefit", or " if two damages are 
concurrent, then the lesser (or less severe) should lapse for the greater" (ad-Duraini, 1988; Muwafi, 
1997). 
40 Most jurists agreed on this criterion, however they differ in deciding whether the interest violated in a 
particular case is deserved to the harmed party or not (Muwafi, 1997, p. 888). 
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(party A) of a yard that was adjacent to a building wanted to build his yard and raise the 
building, thus blocking the sun and air from the neighbor's building (party B). Party B in this 
case could not stop party A from his action on the bases that he is benefiting from the sun and 
air of the yard. That is, party B was benefiting from party A's property. Thus, if this property 
was built and such benefit was blocked, then no destruction would be caused to party B's 
property, nor any benefit. It is like a man benefiting from the shadow of another man's tree. If 
the owner wanted to cut that tree, no one can stop him from acting in his property by claiming 
that he was benefiting from it ('Ibn Hammara (d. 861H. ), cited in Muwafi, 1997, p. 884). In this 
case, the claim of party B was not based on a legitimate right, thus the benefit alleged to be 
damaged is an undeserved benefit for party B. The harm that is, allegedly, caused to party B is 
not considered as disallowed harm. 
It can be inferred from these criteria that two circles are responsible for organizing the 
production of the inherited built environment: first, the control circle, resulting from full 
ownership, i. e. the right of the owner to control his property, i. e. to act within his property; and 
second, the harm circle, derived from the Prophet's tradition "neither harm nor reciprocal 
harm. " This latter circle performs as a restriction on the former one. Thereby, disallowed harm 
criteria balance these two circles. Such a balancing process allows parties to act in their 
properties as they wish, as long as their actions do not infringe on other parties' properties. It 
can be said that such criteria tend to expand the circle of control that owners enjoy over private 
properties, especially if acting parties managed to eliminate the effects of the damaging act by 
counteracting the damage per se and not the action (see p. 115). On the other hand, these criteria 
expand the circle of harm as a regulating mechanism where public properties are considered. 
Jurists vary in applying either of these two opposing circles. Maliki and Hanbali schools 
expanded the circle of harm, whereas Shafi'i and Hanafi schools expanded that of owners' 
control. Nevertheless, identification of these regulating mechanisms was left to the habits and 
conventions prevailing in the local society, and to the opinions of jurists in each region. 
Rights are self-regulating mechanisms in the sense that they are exercised without any 
intervention from external parties or higher authorities, the same applies to the restrictions on 
those rights and thus the freedom bestowed to parties. Rights restrictions are self-defined, 
within the framework of shari `a. That is, principles of restriction in the inherited mode are not 
developed into laws and regulations imposed on the built environment as in the acquired built 
environment. Principles of restrictions in the inherited built environment are self-referential, 
defined by the immediate parties on the site, i. e. harm is recognized by the acting parties 
themselves. Each case in a site is treated differently, according to its specificities. Although 
criteria of disallowed harm are agreed upon, they are quite general to the extent that they do not 
specify disallowed harm in any detail. Islam did not specify types of harm that are disallowed, 
as is the case in the acquired built environment. Jurists for example, differed in their recognition 
of major harm or deserved interest, and thus in their rulings and solutions, if the conflicting 
parties sought external parties' judgement. 
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Harm in the inherited built environment, when it occurs, is interpreted differently by the 
involved parties. The acting party might not acknowledge the damage that is caused to others, 
and a dispute might arise. Dialogue among parties will intensify, and opinions of jurists or 
building experts might be sought. Accordingly, interpretation of harm might differ, according to 
the situation of the case and the parties involved. Solutions in the inherited built environment 
thus differ from one case to another, according to the interpretation of harm (Akbar, 1988, 
p. 94). To give an example, a pre-existing window is not considered as a cause of harm for 
adjacent neighbour, even if causing damage to that neighbour, such as intruding on his privacy. 
The damaged party has to adjust by raising, for example, the parapet of its building. The judge 
'Ibn al-Qasim was asked in that regard about pre-existing doors and windows between two 
dwellings (neighbours), "Does such an opening have to be sealed or relocated? " 'Ibn al-Qasim 
answered, "The owner should not be compelled to seal or relocate them, since he did not cause 
such an opening and it is a pre-existing one. " 'Ibn ar-Rami adds that the custom in Tunis is not 
to seal such openings ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 231-2). For new openings that damage neighbours, 
if the damaged party objects, some jurists advocate sealing those openings, but this decision is 
determined according to the degree of damage caused to the neighbour, which is open to 
interpretation and necessities dialogue among parties involved. 'Ibn al-Qasim was asked about a 
house owner who opened a window or a door in his wall which intruded upon his neighbour's 
privacy and harmed his neighbour. 'Ibn al-Qasim answered, on the authority of Malik, that 
" such a person should be prevented from harming his neighbour, and he should seal such an 
opening, even if it was within his property" (Malik, n. d., v. 4, p. 395). In a similar case, 'Ibn 
Näfi` was asked about a person who opened a high window to let in light in his own wall on the 
neighbour's side. This window could not be reached except by a ladder, but the neighbour 
opposed his action. 'Ibn Näfi` answered that if there was no damage to the neighbour, then the 
action should be approved, as this window will benefit the actor without damaging the 
neighbour. However if it causes damage, then it should be sealed ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 241). In 
the first case (pre-existing opening), the right of the acting party continued while in the cases of 
the new opening, the right of the overlooked (harmed) party was recognized. 
Many cases exemplify the diverse perceptions of damage held by various parties. A needed 
change made by one party may be perceived by another party as a damaging act. These different 
perceptions lead to dialogue between parties involved and eventually to agreements. However, 
if dispute arises and persists, the case may be taken to the judge who makes his ruling according 
to shari `a. Ultimately, in either situation (agreements or rulings), solutions reached will 
dominate both parties. In that sense, the built environment can be seen as an accumulation of 
physical solutions that all parties have to respect. That is, rights in the inherited built 
environment can be perceived as gained through properties. Rights of parties resonate with the 
rights attached to physical configurations (solutions) in specific sites. In that sense, rights 
relationships between parties are translated into relationships between environmental solutions. 
Thus domination between parties is minimized, if not eliminated. In short, the method of 
gaining rights in the built environment does not generate power or domination between parties. 
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It can be inferred from this that in the inherited built environment changes were made with the 
consent of the affected parties and not through the higher authority's pre-stated rules as the case 
in the acquired built environment. This means that any decision affecting the neighbourhood 
was the responsibility of and under the control of the affected neighbours. To conclude, it can 
be argued that the principle of damage in the inherited built environment relates the rights of the 
involved parties to each other and regulates them through their related properties. This in turn 
leads to the elimination of both external domination exerted by external parties, and internal 
domination between parties of different properties. Although solutions reached (through 
agreements or rulings) between conflicting parties bind (dominate) those parties, those solutions 
are the product of parties involved on the site and not of outsiders. " In short, all avenues for the 
creation of power in the hands of the higher authority are closed. 
7.3.2 General principles (al-qawa `id al-kuliyyah) 
A few principles were derived from the Prophet's tradition and from early jurists' opinions and 
rulings (an-Nadwi, 1986). Those principles were adopted as mechanisms of environmental 
control in assessing the damage and consequently reaching rulings or solutions in relevant 
cases. Examples of such principles are "damage should be lifted"; "private damage should be 
borne to avoid a public damage" ; "preventing blight is prioritized over bringing good" ; 
"damage should be prevented as much as possible" ; "necessity warrants the verboten". At first 
glance, one might think that these derived principles would be tools to create power in the hand 
of the higher authority. In fact this is not the case. For example, the derived principle: "If two 
damages are concurrent, then the lesser (or less severe) should lapse for the greater" means, as 
explained by 'Ashhab (d. 150H. ), that "the greater damage means preventing a person from 
doing something that would greatly benefit him in his property, while lesser damage means the 
objection of the neighbour as a result of not-too-severe damage caused by that action" ('Ibn ar- 
Rami, p. 201). In one case, for example, a person (party A) established a flourmill in one room in 
his house; his neighbour (party B) objected because of the noise generated. The ruling based on 
this principle of harm allowed the milling to continue, since the damage of noise was not 
considered severe when compared to the damage that might be caused to party A if prevented 
from having the mill in his house as the mill was his livelihood (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 60). 
Most of those derived principles are not laws. They are also not considered methods of 
jurisprudence for deriving rulings. " However, Muslim jurists were aware of those principles 
91 If no agreement is reached the judge will rule. This ruling although made by an external party, does 
not resemble contemporary regulations. 
42 The institution of Islam is based on two main sources: the Qur'an, the tradition of the Prophet 
(sunnah). However, with the development of the different schools of law, different methodologies 
were adopted for deducing rules from the main sources. The main methodologies followed are: the 
teachings of the jurists; qiyas (analogical reasoning); ra'y (opinion); and ijma ` (consensus of opinion); 
istihsan (juristic preference); masaleh mursaleh (having regard for the public interest), 'urf (custom). 
(see Karnali, 1991). 
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and referred to them in justifying their rulings (al-Burno, 1994, p. 31-2; an-Nadwi, 1986, p. 296- 
9). Over time, and mainly after the fifth century (H. ), those principles became more evident in 
reaching rulings. Many new principles were derived, some basic and some secondary. Many 
books of law documented and classified those principles and their use by jurists (an-Nadwi, 
1986). In short, the general Islamic principles are rights-based mechanisms that perform as 
guidelines for reaching rulings and solutions in the everyday life in the inherited mode. 
7.3.3 Right of precedence (Haq al-'Asbagiyyah) 
Damage in the inherited built environment is of two kinds: new, and old. For new damage, the 
principle of harm performs as a mechanism of environmental control to regulate new harming 
actions; for old damage, rights of precedence perform to regulate such situations. In one case 
from the inherited built environment, a house abutting a dead-end street but without access to it 
had a small, covered, long disused septic tank within the dead-end street (collective property). 
The owner of the septic tank wanted to use it again; however, the owners of the dead-end street 
disallowed this as it was in their territory. The judge ruled that the owners of the dead-end street 
could not prevent the owner of the septic tank from reusing it again as the septic tank was long 
in its position (al-Wanshrisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 32). In this case the septic tank had the right of 
precedence over the dead-end street, even though it might cause damage to the dead-end street, 
and so it had the right to continue. It was said in such cases that the septic tank possessed the 
damage (yahouz ad-darar), i. e. it has the right to damage other properties, within limits (not 
severe), because its existence preceded theirs (Akbar, 1988, p. 101). In another case, 'Ibn al- 
Qasim was asked whether the owner of a house which had an old window or door that was 
harmful to the neighbour could be compelled to close it. 'Ibn al-Qasim ruled that he couldn't be 
compelled, as the window's existence preceded that of the neighbour's house (individual 
property), and it was not a new action. 'Ibn ar-Rami adds that this ruling was applied in all 
similar cases, and no jurist ruled differently; in such cases the neighbour has to adjust his 
building accordingly ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 231-2,243). From such cases it can be inferred that 
right of precedence holds, regardless of whether the property is individually or collectively 
owned (Akbar, 1988b, p. 109). 
As to old harm that severely damages other properties, such as that caused by bad odours 
generated from iron workshops for example, jurists' opinions differed. Jurists varied in stopping 
such damage or not, according to the damage caused, specificities of the case, and to 
conventions of the town. Thus damage was ruled to be lifted in some cases, whereas it 
continued in others. In one case, for example, a jurist was asked about shops for pounding 
kernels in a market, above which some houses existed. The pounding shops had been in the 
market for about ten years. The jurist ruled that since the shops caused damage to the 
inhabitants, they should be removed to a place where they did not harm people. Another jurist 
Some principles if extracted from the Qura'n or the Prophet tradition such as the principle of "neither 
harm nor reciprocal harm" are considered as legitimate sources (explicit text or nass) for reaching 
rulings according to shari'a (see al-Burno, 1994, p. 33-4). 
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added in this case that the duration of the existence of such damage does not give the pounders 
the right to continue. People in the affected houses had to object and lift the damage (al- 
Wansharisi, n. d., v. 8, p. 457). In this case, as damage caused to the inhabitants of nearby houses 
was severe, it was ruled to stop it, although not a new damage. 
The right of precedence or possessing damage is a right that pertains to properties and not to 
parties. If the owner of a property changes, the right continues attached to the property and is 
thus enjoyed by the new owner. Furthermore, as can be inferred from documented cases, the 
right of precedence pertains to the preceding action and not to the preceding property. For 
example, an old window would have the right of precedence and not the house in which it was 
opened. This concept is important in regulating the incremental growth of the inherited built 
environment. In that sense, as Akbar declares, the built environment can be perceived as a 
process of accretion of decisions resulting from considering preceding actions as constraint on 
later actions. Each succeeding party has to deal with all the decisions made by its predecessors, 
and thus adjust its actions accordingly. These constraints are actually created by parties 
themselves and not by an external authority (Akbar, 1988a, p. 80; 1992, p. 174,226). This 
mechanism (right of precedence) performed as a mechanism of environmental control, 
regulating relationships between parties in the inherited built environment through their 
properties, thus ultimately regulating the built environment. Like other mechanisms of 
environmental control, this is a rights-based, self-regulating mechanism that needs no external 
parties (e. g. the state) to implement, except in exceptional cases. This in turn eliminates the 
need for the state as a regulative party as is the case in the acquired mode, and distributes the 
task of controlling development in the built environment between all members in society. 
Jurists differed in their opinions regarding the time needed to gain the right of precedence. 
Some jurists set a certain time limit, such as ten or twenty years, others resolved each case 
independently according to the type of damage, action, and other case specificities. 43 However, 
as 'Ibn `Asim (jurist, d. 208H. ) declared, if a person saw his neighbour initiating an action that 
would damage him or his property and did not protest in time 44, without excuse, then this person 
has no right to object to his neighbour's action, and his reticence is considered in most cases as 
consent, depending on the circumstances of the case (cited in 'Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 321-323). 
Most jurists seem to agree that in some cases, such as latrines or tanneries, where the 
noxiousness of the damage increases over time, there is no right of precedence, regardless of 
time ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 322-3; al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 46-7). In one case, 'Ibn Zarb was 
asked about a person who created a window that overlooked his neighbour, but the neighbour 
41 Malik, for example, resolved each case independently and did not necessarily use ten years as a 
required period. 'Ibn al-Qasim considered nine or eight years as a sufficient period to gain the right of 
precedence ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., , p. 
319). 
44 Al-Wansharisi reported the opinion of many jurists in saying that if a party did not protest against the 
damage caused by other parties for ten years, with no excuses, its right of protestation would lapse, 
and the acting party gain the right of precedence (al-Wansharisi, v. 9, p. 42). See also 'Ibn ar-Rami, 
n. d., p. 318-328. 
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did not protest because, as he claims, he was busy, yet he informed witnesses that he did not 
accept that action. Ten years later he protested. 'Ibn Zarb answered that if it was proven that the 
neighbour did not accept such new damage during this period, then the damage had to be lifted 
(al-Wansharis, n. d., v. 9, p. 56-7) 45 In another case, a person created an opening looking towards 
his sister's house; twenty years later the sister protested, claiming that she tolerated the action 
because of the relationship. Her protest was not accepted on the ground that twenty years is a 
long period and her brother had acquired the right of precedence (al-Wansharisi, v. 9, p. 21-2). 
To eliminate any chance of abusing such a right, certain measures are applied. For example, a 
person reopened an old sealed window that overlooked the roof terrace of some houses on a 
dead-end street. The damaged residents protested. The acting party presented witnesses saying 
that the window was pre-existing, thus he has the right to reopen it. His claim was supported by 
the existence of traces of the frame and the lintel of the pre-existing window. It was thus ruled 
that the window could be reopened ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 251). Traces of old actions such as 
sealed openings might perform as latent rights that give their holder power when activated in 
future interactions. Avoiding such unrightful tactics, jurists emphasized the need to eliminate 
any traces of damaging openings that were ruled to be sealed. The threshold and the frame 
should all be destroyed and all other traces eliminated by filling in the opening and using the 
same building material to hinder future use of these elements as evidence ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., 
p. 250). The same is true for other damages, such as changing the function of a property. For 
example when a person made a stable in a room of his house and the damage of vibration was 
counteracted by building a secondary wall, witnesses were brought in and were informed that 
the stable owner did not have the right to use the house as a stable, so he could not claim the 
right of such a function in the future and could not demolish the secondary wall or transform all 
the house into a stable (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 8). 
Such mechanisms make all property owners aware of their rights, so that if they see a person 
initiating an action that might be harmful to them or to their properties, they react accordingly. 
The possibility of creating a right of precedence performs as an incentive to react quickly for 
parties who believe that their rights have been violated. " In that respect, people themselves 
perform as development controllers in the built environment. They safeguard the built 
environment from actions that are harmful. It is a right-based mechanism that operates from 
within the site without external parties' intervention (e. g. the state). But, above all, awareness 
of parties of their rights eliminates the opportunity for external parties to manipulate local 
people and impose rules. One of the characteristics of the acquired built environment, is the 
45 As reported by al-Wansharisi, the opinion of another jurist regarding this case was that the protesting 
party could have appointed an agent to protest, but he did not, thus the action will continue as it 
gained the right of precedence (al-Wansharis, v. 9, p. 56-7). 
16 For example, in one case, a person wanted to open a new door opposite to his neighbour's door in a 
narrow through street. 'Ibn ar-Rami answered that if the street is narrow then that person has to 
relocate his door so that the damage to the opposite neighbour is stopped. He added that if this door 
continues in its position, then it will possess the damage in the future and no one then can stop that 
damage ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 270). 
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ignorance of the masses of people of their rights, which makes them susceptible to external 
rules. This leads in turn to the development of central power. All principles derived from the 
concept of damage in the inherited built environment are conducted as if they were developed to 
eliminate the creation of external power. 
7.3.4 Conventions as a mechanism of environmental control 
As many documented cases reveal, conventions in the inherited built environment often 
performed as a mechanism of environmental control. They were the reference for many jurists 
and building experts in resolving disputes between parties, therefore, solutions differed from 
one region to another, according to the conventions prevailing in each region. For example, high 
rise buildings are common in San'a, Yemen, whereas they are not in Damascus or al-Madina. 
Overpasses (sabat) are accepted as building conventions in traditional Riyadh, resulting from its 
climatic and cultural needs; thus projecting an overpass is not considered as an unrightful or 
harmful action there. 
Conventions are subject to shari'a and its sphere of rights. They are rights-based mechanisms, 
formulated according to people's needs and solutions. That is, as rights are not organized in a 
form of pre-stated laws and regulations, they are robust mechanisms that tolerate people's needs 
and thus lead to environmental solutions, i. e. people develop their own conventions, within the 
sphere of rights. Emphasizing their significance, some jurists consider conventions as a source 
of legislation in Islam. 47 Moreover, many jurists accepted and adopted the general principle "al- 
'adah muhakkamahi48 (custom is a reference) in their rulings. For example, in resolving 
disputes, jurists referred to conventions in determining the degree of harm, the duration of a 
contract in a leased property if not stated in the contract, in determining what is attached to a 
sold property if not mentioned in the sale deal, the legitimate range of right enjoyment (after 
which it might be considered an abuse of rights). In one case, 'Ibn ar-Rami stated that rulings in 
disputes regarding opening new doors in wide through streets differed between jurists; judges 
ruled according to the local custom ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 267). Certain sentences and words in 
the documentation of the cases, such as, "this was the common practice", "this is prominent, "49 
signify that custom was the reference in many cases, performing as a guiding principle in the 
inherited built environment. 
Conventions develop throughout time; they are dynamic and not static. However, such 
developments emanate from people themselves, with no external pressure. New successful 
solutions invented by some inhabitants, if convincing, replace older ones, thus new conventions 
evolve (Akbar, 1992, p. 372-385). This is the opposite of the case in the acquired built 
environment. As Habraken contends, when custom is challenged, achieving consensus about 
47 Provided not contradicting with the Qura'n and the Prophet's tradition (az-Zarqa, 1968, v. 2, p. 857). 
4B This principle is considered one of the five basic principles in the Islamic jurisprudence (an-Nadwi, 
1994, p. 351). 
49 See for example 'Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 267,283. 
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new solutions may require regulations and bylaws (Habraken, 1998, p. 229). 5° It can thus be said 
that while conventions in the inherited built environment evolve from within, they are, in most 
cases, in the acquired built environment imposed by an external party (the state or 
professionals) through legal obligation. As conventions are the product of the masses of people, 
they reflect their needs and capabilities. "Conventions" are an environmental mechanism that 
eliminates outsiders' intervention and thus the opportunities of generating central power. 
7.4 MAPS OF RIGHTS (RIGHTS STRUCTURES) 
As noted in previous chapters, modern societies are organized according to their power 
structure, which in turn is reflected in their built environments. This power structure in modem 
societies pertains to individuals in society. Such a concept does not exist in Muslim societies; 
but rather one can speak of rights-structures (not one structure as in modern societies) or what 
we will refer to in this study as "maps of rights". To establish this, two statements, based on 
the concept of rights in Islam, have to be asserted first. In the inherited built environments 1) 
each property is unique in its specificities, thus in its rights; 2) each individual is unique in 
terms of his/her rights in the built environment. This is quite different from the acquired built 
environments, based on the modern concept of power. In those latter environments, law as the 
regulatory mechanism tends to standardize sites and thus parties, and classifies them into a few 
categories, in which case, different sites (e. g. in one zone or land use in modern planning) are 
treated similarly, employing general sets of laws. Also different people are viewed as being 
constituted into one standard category, such as when talking about the public interest, or when 
categorizing groups of people into black, white, ethnic minorities, women, and alike. 
In the inherited built environment, several maps of rights can be discerned; some pertain to the 
sites while others to parties. " Obviously, many of those maps may overlap in the built 
environment. Examining those maps of rights clarify to a great extent the mechanisms which 
gave shape to the inherited built environment. Those maps are not geographical maps but are 
structures of rights distribution. To grasp such maps, they are presented in this study in an 
abstract map-like form related to abstract physical settings and territories in the inherited built 
environment. Some of those maps are explored next. 
7.4.1 General rights distribution map 
Rights, as derived from shari'a, are distributed between parties (individuals, groups, or the 
state) according to a certain map. It includes all rights derived from shari 'a, whether pertaining 
to properties or to parties. It is thus a map of static abstract rights of parties and properties. 
so In some cases challenging the custom by introducing new solutions might, over time, be accepted and 
widespread. Thus the "aberration" becomes the norm, superseding the old (Habraken, 1998, p. 229). 
Other maps of rights structure might be discerned in the inherited built environment such as rights of 
rainwater discharge, cleaning streets. Those are environmental issues-oriented structures of rights. 
They are primarily derived from the rights of properties related to the physical settings within which 
they exist, therefore, many of those rights maps do not change by changing the identity of the 
property owner. Those maps vary from one site to another according to the specific rights distribution 
in each site. 
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Examples of such rights are: revivification rights, easement rights, pre-emption rights, rights of 
ownership, height rights, the right not to be harmed by others, and the like. This map, although 
static, is quite comprehensive and broad, so that all other maps of rights (outlined below) 
emanate from it. To explain the distribution of rights within this map, rights of individuals, 
groups and the state, as bestowed by shari 'a, are explored next. 
RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS 
Rights in Islam are distributed between the state, groups and individuals in a manner that 
defines the duties and obligations of those parties while protecting their freedom. There exist in 
the inherited built environment many properties that are owned by particular groups, such as 
dead-end streets, or owned publicly (i. e. owned by all Muslims collectively) such as through 
streets. Islam granted such groups rights and set out the mechanisms which protect those rights. 
Shari `a regards a group as a censor on the actions of individuals, so that its rights are not 
violated. It set out certain methods for groups to guard their rights, depending on the size and 
type of the group. Examples of those methods are explained in discussing maps of situal rights. 
Most societies grant the public interest a distinct importance, to the extent that it leads to the 
generation of central power (higher authorities) representing and protecting such an interest. In 
Islam, public interest is, in principle, prioritized over individual interest. The " public" as a 
party in the inherited built environment is composed of the individuals of the Muslim 
community, i. e. of all Muslims collectively. The public in the inherited mode represents itself 
and is not represented by the state" as is the case in the acquired built environment. In this 
context, one should distinguish between the public interest as defined by the state and the public 
interest as defined by the public itself. As the term "public interest", as used in the acquired 
built environment, denotes control by the central authority in contemporary environments, it is 
used in this study to refer to the acquired built environment, while the term "common interest" 
is used in the inherited built environment. 
Avoiding any possible abuse of such a principle by rulers to gain more rights, thus power over 
the public, shari `a, through maps of rights, regulated the common interest in two ways. First, 
whereas preserving the public interest in the acquired built environment is the responsibility of 
the state, it is in the inherited built environment a duty of individuals as well as of the state. 
Individuals in the inherited built environment, based on their rights, are capable of challenging 
the state if it is superimposing its own definition of the common interest. Shari `a attached 
regard for the common interest as a duty in every individual's rights; thus public rights are self- 
guarded rights among individuals and groups. This in turn limits the state's role to 
participating in protecting the common interest, and not establishing this interest in the first 
place. Second, if the logic in the acquired mode is that the public interest often prevails over 
private interests, leading to the possibility of enacting regulations to protect such interests, this 
consequently empowers the higher authorities, as representatives of the public. 
52 Except in limited cases where the state represents the public, as explained below. 
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In the inherited mode, although the common interest, in principle, prevails over individuals', as 
some documented cases reveal, this is not an absolute principle. Rulings were reached in the 
light of maps of rights in each case independently, according to the specificities of the case in 
question. That is, causing harm to the public is considered severe in comparison to causing it 
the individual. However, if the harm caused to the individual as a result of stopping its action is 
severe and cannot be made up for (1a yanjabir), then the individual's interest is prioritized 
(ash-Shatibi, n. d., v. 3, p. 57-8). Many documented cases showed private (individual in many 
cases) interest prevailing over the common interest. The two contradicting interests in such 
cases are weighed up in terms of their rights against each other, according to the specific 
conditions of the case, and thus a ruling is reached. For example, in one case Sahnun was asked 
about a person who built a mosque resting on its neighbour's wall, where the neighbour's 
privacy could be violated from the roof of the mosque. The neighbour objected. Sahnun ruled 
that the owner of the mosque, who built it, is obliged to block the view from the roof, and 
people are not allowed to pray in the mosque unless the privacy of the neighbour is guaranteed 
('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 262). In another case, 'Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728H. ) was asked about a 
mosque adjacent to a ruined property. Part of its walls had collapsed into the mosque's door and 
yard, and it was feared that the rest of the walls might fall on the praying people. 'Ibn Taymiyya 
answered that if such fears exist, then the part that is most critical, in the sense that if it falls it 
would cause damage to the mosque and its people, should be treated. If there is no way except 
demolition, then this part should be demolished ('Ibn Taymiyyah, n. d. /a, v. 16, p. 143). In these 
cases a private interest was in contradiction with a common interest. In the first case, the private 
interest prevailed, as violating privacy is considered, according to many jurists, as severe 
damage. Salmun in that case prioritized maintaining the neighbour's privacy over the common 
interest of praying in the mosque. In the second example, 'Ibn Taymiyyah was reluctant to rule 
against the individual, unless it was proved that his ruined property is a source of harm to the 
public. He suggested demolishing the harmful part as the last solution. 
It can be inferred from these cases that the common interest in Islam is not an absolute 
dominating interest, performing against private interests; 53 it is restricted by shari `a's 
framework. Private parties' rights cannot be transgressed in the name of the common interest 
(al-Kilani, 1987, p. 57). Decisions related to the common interest in the inherited built 
environment do not pertain to prestated rules and regulations, but are reached according to the 
specificity of each case. This is considered as another rights-based mechanism for eliminating 
the possibility of producing central power, or inflating power in the hands of the state. The best 
example of this issue is the prohibition of property expropriation in the inherited mode (eminent 
domain). This issue is examined below, after explaining the rights of the state according to the 
general rights-distribution map. 
53 Many contemporary scholars, based on the relevant Islamic principle (if two interests contradict, the 
private lapses for the benefit of the public), hold that the public interest is an absolute interest that 
should always prevail over private interests (e. g. ad-Duraini; al-Fayez; al-Kahfif; Khalil). This 
contemporary perception of the concept of the public interest is explained in chapter nine. 
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In the general rights distribution map, the group is considered as the individual; the state is also 
considered as the individual; each has its own rights. As all rights are bestowed by God; the 
state has no authority to grant the individual rights or to deprive him/her of rights. Individuals 
are not subjugated to the state (ad-Duraini, 1984, p. 73-4). The main role of the state in Islam is 
executive and judicial. It has a minor legislative role in matters that are open to jurist' personal 
reasoning ('ijtihad)54; however this is performed within the framework of Shari `a in a way that 
does not contradict with Shari `a's principles (al-Jalili, 1988, p. 553-6). The state has to guard 
and execute Islam, protect and defend the territory of Islam, maintain justice, resolve disputes 
when they arise, and fulfil some other administrative responsibilities (al-Mawardi, n. d., p. 27-9). 
It performs as a supporter in the processes of enabling people to achieve an enabled, settled 
society" (al-Kholi, 1978, p. 68). To actualise such aims, the state has to keep opportunities open 
for people to act, assure access to resources, and maintain the rights of individuals and groups in 
society, within the framework of the common interest. 
As part of its duties, the state is responsible for providing and maintaining public properties. 
Expenditure on such tasks is covered by the public treasury or belt al-mal (al-'Abbadi, 1977, 
v. 1, p. 102; al-Jalili, 1988, p. 462-3)56. However, if the beit al-mal is insolvent, it is the duty of 
the rich to perform such tasks, if they can afford it, without any obligation' In one case, there 
was a main road surrounded by many farms outside the town. When it rains, this road becomes 
quite muddy, so that no one can use it. 'Ibn ar-Rami reported this to the judge, asking him to 
order the people of the town who live close to that street to pave five hand-spans of the road to 
allow people passage in winter. The judge answered that people cannot be compelled. The judge 
then called the owner of the farms surrounding the road, and he preached and encouraged him to 
do the good deed and to repair the road ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 577). Maintaining the public 
properties such as through streets is not an obligatory duty for people in the inherited built 
environment; it is, as 'Ibn ar-Rami states, to be maintained from belt al-mal ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., 
sa 'Ijtihad (personal reasoning) is the effort a jurist makes in order to deduce the law, which is not self- 
evident, from its sources (Kamali, 1991). It is used for establishing solutions for new problems. In 
Islam 'ijtihad has its own methodologies. Opinions reached by 'ijtihad should not contradict with any 
text from Qur'an or the Prophet's tradition. Methods of 'ijtihad vary between schools of law. In 
general, they are qiyas (legal resoning), ijma' (consensus), istihsan (preference), masaleh mursaleh 
(regard for the common interest). 
ss The state in Islam does not act as an enabler because rights are bestowed to it as they are bestowed to 
private parties by God. Thus the state' role is limited to supporting the process of enablement of 
private parties through maintaining their rights. 
sb `Umar (the second caliphate) stated in that respect that " if a sumpter in the Euphrates area falls, then I 
might be responsible for that, as I did not level the road for it" (cited in al-`Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 102). 
s' Such tasks are considered as "fard kifayah" (al-Jalili, 1988, p. 261), (collective duty, the performance 
of which is obligatory for the Muslim community as a whole. However, if a sufficient number fulfil 
the duty, the rest are relieved of it. If the duty is not performed, all the community is liable for 
punishment by God (Akbar, 1988, p. 256)). In most cases, seeking rewards from God, Muslims used 
to endow some of their wealth to the benefit of specific public properties, such as mosques, schools, 
caravans, hospitals, and the like. Thus, those public properties were built and maintained from the 
revenue of their waqfs. 
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p. 577). The ruler cannot force any person from the public to do such a duty. It can be deduced 
that the state's power is limited in its intervention in private parties' rights. Each has its own 
rights, thus the state cannot compel its people to do what is not of their duties, or to deprive 
them of their rights. Simply, it has no right to do so. The boundaries of the rights of people and 
those of the state are defined, so that no one party infringes on other parties' circles of rights. 
This minimizes, if not eliminates, the possibility of creating central power. But how did the 
people manage such a need for public amenities such as paved roads? This is clarified later. 
In the inherited built environment, the state's circle of rights is almost limited to its own 
properties (of the public treasury or beiz al-mal, see p. 132). As those properties are owned by all 
Muslims collectively, the state does not enjoy all rights granted to owners as a result of full 
ownership. The state in that respect acts as a caretaker with limited rights of control. It does not 
have the right to transfer their ownership through selling or allotment, for example. Outside the 
realm of state properties, the state has no right to intervene in people's properties as long as they 
act according to their rights, within the framework of shari'a (al-Jalili, 1988, p. 565). However, 
if private parties violate Islamic law, the state intervenes as a corrector, based on its executive 
authority, to redirect those parties to abide by the law and not to restrict their freedom and rights 
in their properties (al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 2, p. 268; al-Jalili, 1988, p. 366). This intervention is 
accepted in temporary, exceptional cases only and is never considered the norm in the inherited 
built environment. Restricting state intervention to executive matters reduces the circle of state 
rights of intervention in private properties, and grants private parties autonomy over their 
properties. That is, of the state's role is supporting parties' enablement through protecting their 
rights of property ownership and their other consequent rights of control. If the state intervenes 
in private properties, this depreciates from concerned parties' rights and thus contradicts with 
the prestated role of the state as a guardian of shari 'a. State intervention outside its realm 
transforms the nature of its intervention from being a corrective task to a power exercitation 
role not based on rights, which in turn creates a central power against shari'a's objectives. The 
role of the state has to be clearly limited, otherwise, rulers might, under the claim of the public 
interest, lust for more power on the expense of end users. 
Sustaining the performance of the state, Islam introduced several mechanisms that operate 
under the authority of the state, such as those of Hisbah (market inspection) and the judiciary 
system. Those operate to assure positioning parties within their circles of rights and within the 
framework of the Islamic law of Shari `a, thus, ultimately, maintaining a state of freedom (with 
restrictions), enjoyment of ownership rights with no intervention or violation, full control over 
properties, and thus an atmosphere of enablement for individuals in society. 
Yet, in emergency situations, the state might intervene to resolve urgent cases. For example, if a 
city is under threat from the enemy and its walls need to be reconstructed to protect it, and its 
belt al-mal (state treasury) is insolvent and cannot offer any financial support, and there is no 
waqf properties endowed to the benefit of the city walls, then the ruler can compel the rich 
people in the city to reconstruct the city wall (see al-Wansharisi, v. 5, p. 351; ad-Duraini, 1984, 
p. 76; al-Khafif, 1990, p. 106-7). Emergency situations are considered as necessities, according 
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to the principle "necessities warrant the forbidden. "" However, this warrant is temporary and 
limited to a degree that eliminates this situation according to the Islamic principle "necessity is 
judged according to its value. " 59 In other words, state intervention in private properties is not 
the norm in the inherited built environment. 
It can be inferred that the state has limited rights, thus limited power, in the inherited built 
environment. Private parties (individuals and groups) have great autonomy and freedom over 
their properties, restricted only by shari `a framework, and not by any rules or regulations set by 
the state as is the case in the acquired built environment. Thus, rights and not authority's power 
is responsible for the production of the inherited built environment. Put differently, the state in 
Islam is the state of rights and not the state of power as the case in the acquired mode. 
EXPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTIES (EMINENT DOMAIN 
Private parties in the inherited built environment enjoy the right of control over their owned 
properties. Shari 'a limited, if not eliminated, the right of intervention of outsiders, whether 
individuals or the state, into one's property. It regulated actions of parties that interfere in 
others' properties through mechanisms such as that of harm. But what about expropriating 
private properties under the claim of the common interest? Can private ownership rights be 
violated for the common interest? Does the state as a representative of the public, in certain 
cases, have the right to intervene in private properties on behalf of the common interest? 
Shari 'a granted private properties a sanctity that protects properties from being deforced or 
expropriated by other parties. The Prophet states in this regard that "taking the property of a 
Muslim person is not lawful without his conciliative consent (teib nafs)" (ash-Shawkani, n. d., 
v. 3, p. 684; 'Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 185). No one is obliged to sell his property without his consent. 
Two situations can be distinguished in discussing the expropriation of private properties. First, 
expropriation by other private parties, i. e. it is a transaction between private parties. Second, 
expropriation by the state for the common interest, i. e. the eminent domain, thus it is a 
relationship between the state and private parties where the state stands as a representative of 
the common interest. 
In the inherited built environment, rightful actions causing harm to others are stopped, so, 
undoubtedly, non-rightful actions, known as encroachment (ta `addi) or usurpation (ghasb), 
causing harm to others are disallowed and, if happened, abolished. Usurpation in Islam is 
considered an oppressive, unlawful act whose actor is an usurper that should be punished. The 
Prophet stated in that regard that " Whoever usurps the land of somebody unjustly, his neck will 
be encircled with it down the seven earths (on the day of Resurrection)" (al-Bukhari, n. d., v. 3, 
p. 379). 6° Building on others' properties without their consent is considered usurpation upon 
58 Ad-darurat tubeih al-mahthurat. 
59 Ad-darura tuqaddar bi qadariha. 
60 This tradition is narrated by Said bin Zaid. From Al-Bukhari, Hadith no. 632, chapter 14, p. 379, v. 3. 
Also, Abu Salamah narrated that there was a dispute between him and some people (about a piece of 
land). When he told `A'isha (the Prophet's wife) about it, she said "... avoid taking the land unjustly, 
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others' properties. Similarly, constructing on publicly owned " left-over lands, matroukah" (see 
p. 131 above), such as along riversides or in "unutilized lands" around urban or rural areas is 
considered as encroachment upon public properties. If any building is erected on such lands 
then it has to be demolished even if it was a mosque (al-Fayiz, 1997, p. 237). This reflects the 
high status that Islam granted to Muslims' collective rights. This is one of the essential 
differences between the acquired and the inherited built environments. In the acquired mode, 
publicly owned properties are manipulated by rulers or by their representatives under the claim 
of the public interest. In the inherited mode, as rights are prestated, the state is quite restricted. 
For further clarification, let us examine different situations. 
A dramatic case was reported from the inherited built environment demonstrating the degree of 
sanctity that private properties are granted: a person (party A) has built a huge expensive three 
storey building with its external wall inclined towards the property of his neighbour (party B), 
without noticing this inclination. Years later the neighbour B wanted to raise his own building. 
He began, to discover that his neighbour's building inclined towards his property. He asked 
party A to correct his building. Party A replied that it was so difficult to correct the building 
after it is completed. Party B took his case to the judge who ruled that party A should be 
compelled to demolish the encroaching parts. The judge added that whatever encroaches upon 
others' properties should be demolished. 'Ibn ar-Rami states that such cases often happened in 
Tunis ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 463-4). Encroachment upon others' properties is considered in 
Islam as an illegal act even if done undeliberately. This case and the ruling reached shows how 
strict shari `a is in protecting properties regardless of the involved parties' positions. For 
example, the caliph Yazid (d. 64H. ) decided to enlarge the stream that leads to his land through 
peasants' lands, but the peasants did not allow him. An agreement was reached that the caliph 
pays their land tax for three years to come ('Ibn `Asakir, n. d., v. 1, p. 245). In this case, the 
private party (peasants) was faced by the caliph himself, but the caliph as an individual has no 
rights, thus power, more than any other private party. 
Encroachment in the inherited built environment is not exclusive to buildings but to any 
element that encroaches upon the air of others' properties such as the branches of a tree or the 
like. Most jurists61 agree that if the branches of a person's tree (A) encroaches into the air of the 
neighbour's property (B), then this latter party (B) has the right to ask his neighbour (A) to 
remove his tree, if he did not respond, then party B has the right to change the path of those 
branches away from his property. However, if he could not do so, then he has the right to cut 
those branches without any permission of the judge (Bin Fayi', 1995, p. 124-5, see 'Ibn 
Qudamah, n. d., v. 7, p. 18-9, al-Wansharisi, v. 9, p. 23,47-8). Similarly, most jurists agreed that 
no one has the right to extend any element, such as a projecting cantilever (rawshan orjanah), 
into neighbour's air without approval (Bin Fayi', 1995, p. 128). This prohibition of usurpation of 
for the Prophet (peace be upon him) said, " Whoever usurps even one span of the land of somebody, 
his neck will be encircled with it down the seven earths" (al-Bukhari, n. d., Hadith no. 633, p. 379, 
v. 3). 
I' From the four authoritative schools of law (Bin Fayi', 1995, p. 125). 
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other parties' properties protects property rights and defines their boundaries, thus extends the 
circle of autonomy and control of parties over their owned properties. 
Eminent domain or expropriation of private property by the state is a sign of authority's 
dominance over private ownership (Akbar, 1988, p. 105). Expropriation of property is an 
obliged transfer of ownership without the owner's consent. Most Muslim jurists agree that 
properties cannot be expropriated unless causing severe damage to the public, as in the case of a 
weak, collapsible building, for example (al-Hathloul, 1996, p. 116-8). But what about 
expropriating private property for the common interest, such as constructing or extending a 
public building or widening or establishing a new street? 
It is related by many jurists that the Prophet said in this regard that "Taking the property of a 
Muslim person is not lawful without his conciliative consent" (ash-Shawkani, n. d., v. 3, p. 684; 
'Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 185). To clarify the stand of Islam regarding this issue, the following 
instance is given. As the population of al-Medina increased, the mosque of the Prophet became 
too small for the prayers. The caliph `Umar decided to enlarge the mosque (I 7H. /63 8AD. ). He 
bought the surrounding houses except for that of al-'Abbas who refused to sell. `Umar gave al- 
'Abbas three choices: to sell the house at any price he desired, which would be paid out of the 
public treasury; to be given a parcel to build on from the public treasury on any site in Medina; 
or to give the house as a charitable donation. Al-'Abbas refused all choices, thus he and the 
caliph arbitrated under 'Ubay bin Ka`ab. 'Ubay favoured al- 'Abbas's position because he 
invoked the Prophet's story in which God prohibited the Prophet David from usurping another 
person's land to build the house God ordered him to build in Jerusalem. `Umar then told al- 
'Abbas that he would not force him to sell his house. As al-'Abbas heard this, he gave his house 
as a charity to the Muslim community (cited in Akbar, 1992, p. 229). From this case, it can be 
inferred that the caliph `Umar (representing the state) did not have the right, thus the power, of 
eminent domain, even for extending the great mosque of the Prophet. The common interest here 
did not mange to overpower the private interest. 
The state or the ruler in the inherited mode, fundamentally, has no right of eminent domain. 
'Abu Yusuf states in that regard that "the ruler cannot take anything from the hands of others 
without a well known, definite right" ('Abu Yusuf, n. d., p. 65-6, see 'Ibn `Abdin, n. d., v. 6, 
p. 296-8). Similarly, al-Muzni and others asserted that "people have control over their properties 
(money), and no one has the right to take it, or to take part of it, without its owner's consent... " 
(cited in al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 2, p. 279). 
Some later jurists, mainly from the Maliki school, approved, reluctantly, expropriation of 
private properties in limited circumstances, under the condition of desperate public necessity. 
They, however, did not agree upon defining this desperate common interest or necessity. Malik 
and all his followers referred to the above story of caliph 'Umar and al-'Abbas, and prohibited 
property expropriation. However, if an owner refused to sell his property needed for a desperate 
common interest, some Maliki jurists allowed compelling that owner to sell, in limited cases, on 
condition of just compensation. For example, they allowed expropriation of privately owned 
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property for the desperate need62 of expanding Muslims' congregation mosques (and not non- 
congregation ones). Even in such cases, 'Ibn `Abdin (d. 1252H. ) asserted that this is allowed 
only when there is no other mosque in the city, as in the case of the congregation mosque in 
Mecca. Moreover, some jurists limited this to the approval of the judge, even in cases of 
expanding the mosque into wide streets or on the account of a waqf property that is endowed for 
the benefit of the mosque itself ('Ibn `Abdin, n. d., v. 6, p. 576-7; see al-Fayez, 1997, p. 650-2). 
The role of the judge here performs as a guarding mechanism for protecting private properties 
or as a higher authority over that of the state to limit state's right of intervention, and to 
guarantee a just decision regarding expropriation. Also, some jurists allowed expropriating 
houses adjacent to the city wall in cases of emergency security danger, however, with just 
compensation. One jurist stated that farms adjacent to the city wall could be expropriated in 
emergency cases if it was proved that they cause severe damage to the wall, thus he did not 
even allow such expropriation absolutely, but conditioned it to proving that it causes severe 
damage (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 22). Subjecting expropriation of private properties to many 
conditions indicates the reluctance jurists had towards this critical issue. Such conditions 
actually limit the rights of state intervention in, thus power over private properties. 
Other than cases of congregation mosque and emergency exceptions, expropriation of privately 
owned properties is prohibited by most jurists. Even in widening intensively used streets, most 
jurists63 agreed that adjacent owners could not be compelled to sell their properties, even if the 
street was totally destroyed and not passable any more 64 Thus, if it was not allowed to re- 
establish streets that have been totally destroyed on the account of private properties, then, 
inevitably, widening narrow, yet passable, streets or building new streets by expropriating 
privately owned property is disallowed in Islam. Many similar cases are documented in which 
jurists disallowed establishing public benefit properties, such as an ablution place in a mosque, 
by expropriating privately owned properties. bs 
bZ Most jurists assert that Muslims in such cases can build another mosque or in case of congregation 
mosque, they can transfer their mosque to another location. Ahmad bin Hanbal was asked about 
expanding a mosque into the street, he said that prayers would not be allowed in it then (see Akbar, 
1992, p. 230). 
63 Sahnon approved that the ruler can compel the owner to sell his property for establishing a new street 
in case that Muslims' street was totally damaged and unpassable, but he conditioned this to cases 
where there is no other option at all. The majority of jurists (Mutraf, 'Ibn al-Majshun, Asbagh, 'Ibn 
`Abd ar-Rafi') prohibited compelling owners to sell their properties for the sake of establishing new 
street instead of the destroyed one, without the consent of its owner, even if this was the only access 
for people and no other choices were available. They allowed the owner in such cases to stop such an 
action of violating his rights (see 'Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 574-8). 
64 See the cases documented in 'Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 575-7. 
bs 'Ibn Wahab was told of a man who transformed part of his house into a mosque. Could he extend that 
mosque into the public street? The answer was no (at-Tutayli, n. d., p. 261). Most probably in this case 
expanding the mosque was narrowing the street and thus causing damage to the passers by, otherwise, 
according to the rights of through streets (as explained below), it is allowed. Moreover, a jurist was 
asked about compelling a man to sell his property to establish a place for ablution (mayda'a) for a 
mosque. The answer was no, as ablution can be done in houses (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 6, p. 69-70). 
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Many statements can be inferred from cases and opinions of jurists regarding disputes. First, 
they demonstrate that the common interest does not absolutely dominate over private interests, 
and that every case has its own specificities and thus map of rights (explained below). Second, 
they assert the limitation of state power over private properties, even if acting for the common 
interest, i. e. no restrictions or intervention from the state on private properties. As explained in 
the concept of harm in Islam, all privately owned properties are subject to self-regulating 
restrictions derived from the framework of shari 'a only. This ultimately confirms the sacrosanct 
and autonomy privately owned properties receive in the inherited built environment as a 
manifestation of the concept of full ownership in Islam. 
Some contemporary scholars and Muslim jurists (e. g. ad-Duraini, al-Fayez, Khalil, az-Zarqa), 
advocate the principles of al-masaleh mursaleh or the regard for interests and that of 'istihsan 
or preference as methods of legislation. They misinterpret the classical Muslim jurists' opinions 
concerning expropriation of private properties by the state for the public benefit. They argue 
that the state in Islam has the right to intervene in privately owned properties for the public 
interest, i. e. it has the right of eminent domain. This position of contemporary Muslim scholars 
gives modem states in the Muslim world the right to expropriate private properties under the 
claim of the public interest. This position thus resonates with the Western concept of the state, 
which perceives the state as a central authority that guards the public interest, and is responsible 
for regulating and planning the built environment in a manner that matches best with the 
presumed public interest. This stand contradicts the basic principle of ownership in Islam that 
grants owners immense control, within the framework of shari'a, over their properties, with 
limited restrictions by the state in exceptional situations. It tends to transform the status of the 
state from an executive and judicial authority as set by Islam to a legislative authority as in the 
acquired mode, thus transforming its role from being based on rights to being based on the 
power to intervene. This in turn changes the map of rights as bestowed by shari 'a. It expands 
the circle of what those contemporary scholars and jurists refer to as rights of the state, 
justifying those rights as operating for the public interest, and at the same time depreciates 
owners' rights. This issue and its consequences is examined more in the following chapters. 
THE HISBAH SYSTEM 
The hisbah system in Islam is a method in which a post called muhtasib was created by the legal 
system. The duty of the muhtasib or market inspector (as translated by many Orientalists) is 
"commanding what is good when it is being neglected and to forbidding what is bad if it is 
being practised" (al-Mawardi, n. d., p. 337). Thus it is considered as a religion-based mechanism 
rather than a political mechanism; its role is confined to organizational, executive matters and 
does not comprise legislative functions. 
As a state appointed obligation, few questions might be raised here as to the hisbah: does hisbah 
in Islam constitute a legitimate form of state intervention in private properties? Does it have a 
significant role in the production of the built environment? Is it another form of what we refer to 
today as "planning" in the acquired built environment? Was it responsible for shaping the 
inherited built environment in its distinct form, as some Orientalists claimed? 
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As the state and any other party in Islam, hisbah, and thus its muhtasib, has a definite circle of 
rights bestowed by shari `a, within which it performs. Those rights reflect the nature of hisbah 
as a supervising trust on the Islamic law. The muhtasib duty is perceived in Islam as a collective 
duty or "fard kifayah", the performance of which is obligatory for the community. If a 
sufficient number of people fulfil this duty, the rest are relieved of it. Accordingly while the 
state has to fulfil this right officially, every Muslim has the right to be a volunteer muhtasib. In 
that sense, an appointed muhtasib enjoys almost66 similar rights to those of any other person 
from the Muslim community performing such a task. The muhtasib is responsible for enforcing 
the Islamic law, morals and behaviours in the Muslim community such as urging people to pray, 
inspecting markets and industries, stopping people from peering into their neighbors' houses. 
The muhtasib's role in that respect is to make sure that rights are accomplished according to 
shari `a, and to help fulfil them (al-Mawardi, n. d., p. 339). His rights, thus authority, in this 
regard are quite limited, according to the general structure of rights in Islam. 
Hisbah activity may be concerned with matters of individual rights, such as transactions 
between neighbouring properties, as well as with matters of common interest as in market 
places and public streets. Several limitations are placed on the muhtasib in performing his duty. 
First, the muhtasib has to watch for the manifest incidents of evil (such as gambling or littering 
the street), so that he denounces them, and to investigate those acts of good behaviour which 
have been abandoned (such as not praying), so that he may command that they be renewed. The 
muhtasib has no right to detect evil if it is not manifest. This limits the muhtasib's rights of 
intervention to manifest acts only. Second, the muhtasib does not have the right to intervene 
between disputing parties on his own. His intervention applies only if one of the disputing 
parties litigates. Those two postulates accord with the Islamic concept of ownership and its 
ensuing rights. They restrict the muhtasib's circle of rights regarding intervention in privately 
owned properties, while protecting and sustaining private parties' rights of control over their 
owned properties, thus maintaining the autonomous status private parties enjoy over their 
properties. Third, even in those latter cases, the muhtasib is limited to dealing only with rights 
and claims that have been acknowledged. In such cases, the muhtasib should end the 
infringement and may impose a punishment in accordance with circumstances. If, however, 
denials and disputes have arisen between the two parties, he may not investigate such cases. It is 
the responsibility of the judge (al-Mawardi, n. d., 337-340). For example, if the branches of a 
tree intrude on the neighbor's house, the latter should seek the muhtasib's help to remove these 
branches. In this case, distribution of rights is quite well known and clear for both parties, i. e. 
acknowledged with no dispute, thus the muhtasib's role is to help the damaged party to fulfil its 
relevant rights. Fourth, the muhtasib may use his fUthad (personal reasoning) judgement 
Al-Mawardi, in his al-'Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah, listed nine differences between the volunteer muhtasib 
and the official muhtasib. The main differences that concern us in this research are that the official 
muhtasib has to respond to people's complaints while the volunteer does not. The official muhtasib 
may use customary 'ijtihad while the volunteer cannot (al-Mawardi, n. d., p. 337-8). 
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concerning matters regarding customary practice, but not matters of the shari a, 67 such as 
locations of merchants in open markets (maka'id al-'aswaq), and setting up projecting 
cantilevers ('ajnihah) or overarching passages (sabat); thus he affirms or rejects such matters in 
accordance with the results of his customary ijtihad (al-Mawardi, n. d., p. 338). 
As to matters of common interest, the muhtasib supervises individuals' actions in public places 
such as streets and markets, preventing and removing harm caused to the public such as from 
sewage water spilling into the street. His role focuses on individuals' behavior more than on 
intervening in building actions. Performing such tasks, it is up to the muhtasib to make ijtihad 
as to what constitutes harm or not, basing his judgments on customary practice, rather than legal 
precedent (al-Mawardi, n. d., p. 361). Manuals of hisba are full of detailed descriptions of tasks 
such as supervising the cleanness of the public places and prohibiting people from throwing dirt 
into streets or over-wetting them (see 'Ibn Taymiyyah, n. d. /1983; al-Mawardi, n. d.; Ziyadah, 
1962). The muhtasib also has the right, as does any other individual from the Muslim 
community, to prevent people from causing harm to the public, such as adding or changing 
elements in the street, for example, installing a water-spout that would drop water on passers- 
by, thus harming them, or building a bench that would narrow the public street. The muhtasib 
also must oversee the organization in the market, and allow peddlers to enjoy the positions they 
68 claimed in the market, as long as no harm is being done to passers-by. 
Moreover, controlling the quality of building materials and construction techniques is 
considered among the main responsibilities of the muhtasib. It aims at protecting customers 
from deceitful behavior of builders and manufacturers (Ziyadah, 1962, p. 133-5). However, the 
muhtasib has no right to intervene in buildings' designs and organization of spaces in the site 
(i. e. planning the site), as this is purely an individual right. The muhtasib has control over the 
technical quality of the built environment but not over the morphology or on the spatial quality 
of the built environment. In short, the muhtasib's main duty in public places is to protect the 
common interest, however, within the limits of his bounded rights and authorities. 
67 The difference between legal Ytihad and customary Ytihad is that the ruling in the legal ijtihad is 
based on legal principles, whereas Ytihad of customary practice is that which ruling is based on what 
people habitually do in the circumstances (al-Mawardi, n. d., p. 361). 
It was found only in ash-Shizari manuals of hisbah that the mutasib may organize industries in the 
city in a manner such that each industry has its own market or section in the market, separating those 
industries which need heat such as bakers and ironsmiths from perfumes and fabric markets (ash- 
Shizari, n. d., p. 11). As no other manual of hisbah, especially the earlier ones as those of al-Mawardi 
and al-Gazali (both jurists are from ash-Shafi'i school of law as ash-Shirazi), mentioned such an 
organizational task, most probably it was not common among the practices of the muhtasib. 'Ibn 
`Abdun mentioned in his manuals that wood and coal selling should have certain locations, so that 
sellers do not wander in the city, causing damage to passers-by. Customers should go to them. Also 
he mentioned that middens should be located outside the city (Ziyadah, 1962, p. 136). Such matters 
fall into the realm of protecting the public from any harm that might be caused to them as a result of 
such services. However, as might be inferred from 'Ibn `Abdun's writings, it is not part of the duties 
or rights of the muhtasib to specify the locations of such services. They are, most likely, left to service 
providers (immediate parties) themselves to decide. 
STRUCTURES OF RIGHTS 159 
In conclusion, considering the role of the muhtasib in the inherited built environment, one can 
refute the claim of Orientalists and some Muslim scholars (influenced by Western modes of 
thinking) that the distribution of functions in the Muslim city was an effect of its muhtasib's 
role. As shown in chapter four, focusing on the manifested structure of the city, and emanating 
from a Western perception that dictates the need for planning in the built environment, 
Orientalists conceived of the muhtasib, in one of its duties, as resembling the planner in the 
Western environment to a certain extent. They established a hypothetical role for the muhtasib, 
as functional organiser in the city. This hypothesis gradually went unnoticed, to be accepted by 
most scholars. Refuting such a hypothesis, this study argues that the muhtasib's role is basically 
confined to those places where the muhtasib can represent owners. Thus, as the muhtasib is 
considered a member in the Muslim community so his rights include supervising others' actions 
in public places such as through streets. His circle of rights ends where other parties' circle of 
rights begins. The muhtasib's rights do not extend to privately owned places such as dead-end 
streets, unless he is asked to intervene by one of its members. 
Moreover, as a religion-based administrative post, hisbah's duties can only be performed in 
existing cities, helping people to fulfil their rights, and not in establishing (planning in 
contemporary language) new cities. Accordingly, and as hisbah had a very limited role in the 
decision-making process of the built environment, even in existing cities, thus, hisbah cannot be 
considered by any means as a form of state planning agency. As people fundamentally control 
their properties autonomously with no intervention from the state or its agencies, one can argue 
that planning activity in its current meaning in the acquired built environment is not recognized 
in the inherited built environment. 
7.4.2 Situal rights map 
According to the principles set by shari`a in the form of rights regarding ownership and control, 
Muslim cities can be viewed as composed of different physical settings (sites, e. g. streets, waqf 
properties (pl. awgaf), dead-end streets, market places). As part of the general rights map, there 
exists in the inherited built environment `a' map that demonstrates the rights of the different 
categories of sites (physical settings). This map is called in this research as "situal rights 
map" as it pertains to sites in the built environment. The most common physical settings in the 
inherited built environment are: through street (publicly owned), dead-end street (group owned), 
andfina' (individually owned). Rights of these settings are explored below. 
This map might resemble what the acquired built environment has, but, in fact, it is not the 
same. Physical settings in the acquired built environments, based on a centralized process of 
decision-making (central authority), if classified according to their situal rights (in the meaning 
used in this research), have only two categories: private settings controlled by private owners, 
and public settings under the control of the authority (central or local)". Or this might even be 
69 There might also be settings such as housing compounds that are owned and controlled by particular 
companies. Streets inside such compounds are controlled by its owners thus do not fall under either 
categories of private or public. However, even in such settings, the two above mentioned categories 
STRUCTURES OF RIGHTS 160 
reduced to one category, as private properties are also controlled by the higher authorities, so 
there is no fully controlled private property in the sense in which they exist in the inherited built 
environment. All physical settings in the acquired built environment are subject to laws that are 
derived from or work in harmony with the law of the central authority, thus power relationships 
in the acquired built environment reflect the vertical hierarchy of power distribution embodied 
in that latter law (explained in the next chapter). Therefore, whereas rights of each site in the 
inherited built environment are different from each other, even if categorised under the same 
type of setting; in the acquired built environment it is quite the opposite; rights are very similar. 
That is, as properties are controlled and organized by the law which is relatively static (at least 
for a certain period of time) and general (as explained in the following chapter) power 
distribution in those settings is relatively static. 
THROUGH STREETS 
In most current urban studies of the acquired built environment, the term "public street" is 
used. This same term (public) is used by many scholars in describing streets of Muslim cities. 
The term "public" in the acquired mode denotes that government agencies are in control. This 
is not the case in the inherited built environments. Therefore, the term "through street" is used, 
which is a morphological description that is not loaded with any political meaning. The terms 
"common" is used to denote public in the inherited built environment, when necessary. 
Through streets vary in their type according to their size and density of use, thus, the more 
passers-by are the more common the street is, accordingly, main through streets (tariq al- 
`amah), as defined by 'Ibn `Abdin (d. 1252 / 1836), are those streets that their passers-by are 
countless ('Ibn `Abdin, n. d., v. 10, p. 257). Through streets comprise a significant category of 
physical settings in the inherited built environment that has its own distinct rights. Those rights 
vary according to the type of the street (width and density of use). As to the right of ownership, 
through streets, as all other common spaces like yards, are collective properties, owned by all 
passers-by collectively, and not by the state (see lands ownership above, p. 131). Therefore, the 
state has a very limited right to intervene in such spaces, only through the muhtasib, 
safeguarding the common interest, as explained above. As a shared property, no one has the 
right to sell such spaces or part of them, neither the state nor any member of the Muslim 
community. This is evident in 'Ibn Taymiyyah's assertion in one case raised to him that beit al- 
mal (the public treasury) has no right to sell any part of the through street (see the case 
presented above, p. 131). 
Passers-by, as owners of through streets, have the right to use such spaces in a manner that does 
not cause harm to others, such as passing by in the street, sitting in it, displaying their goods 
temporarily. But how can such a large owner-party control its property? The right of control is 
actually regulated by Shari `a in a manner that protects the rights of such streets without any 
bureaucratic or financial burden on society. Every passer-by, as a member of the owning-party, 
can still be applied as: first, those parties which decide for themselves, and second, those parties 
whose decisions are made for them. 
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has the right to perform as a censor on through streets, i. e. has the right of control over such 
spaces. If any individual acts and changes elements in the street, such as building a bench or a 
projected cantilever (rawshan orjanah) or an overpass (sabat), without causing damage to the 
passers-by and no one objects, then his action may continue, without permission from the 
higher authorities. However, if the action causes damage to the passers-by then it is disallowed, 
according to all jurists. As-Sanami (d. 734H. ) states in that sense that every Muslim has the right 
to stop the building action or to demolish it if already built in a public street (cited in Akbar, 
1992, p. 488). Absence of objection implies tacit approval of the new action, however, objection 
of even one individual from the passers-by to any new action in through streets would lead in 
most cases to the prohibition of the action, depending on the damage caused and on the type of 
the street. The objection of any one individual means in that respect the objection of the 
controlling party as a whole (Akbar, 1988, p. 115; 1992, p. 256). 'Ibn `Abdin relates that even a 
dhummi (Christian or Jew) has the right to object to an action made by any individual on a 
through street ('Ibn `Abdin, n. d., v. 10, p. 257-8). According to some jurists70, if the new action 
does not cause harm to others and is directd for the common interest, i. e. embodies benefit and 
no harm, such as digging a well or building a cistern for the public use in a through street, then 
objection of one individual from the passers-by might not be considered ('Ibn Qudamah, n. d., 
v. 7, p. 32). Similarly, 'Ibn Taymiyyah states that enlarging a mosque by taking from the street 
without damaging passers-by is approved even without the authorities' permission ('Ibn 
Taymiyyah, n. d. /a, v. 15, p. 525). 
Objections of passers-by and also judges' rulings regarding actions in through streets varied 
from one case to another according to the intensity of usage of the street and the damage caused. 
An action might be allowed in a narrow, less dense, street, while it might be disallowed in a 
main wide through street, as the potential number of objecting individuals is higher. " 
Documented cases from various Muslim cities such as Cairo, and Tunis reveal that building in 
through streets was a common practice in the inherited built environments (see al-Wansharisi, 
n. d.; 'Ibn ar-Rami, n. d. ). For example, 'Ibn ar-Rami reported that some people transformed 
rooms in their houses which abutted the street into shops. They erected columns on the street 
and roofed the new space. In another case he reported that shopowners tried to build a wall to 
connect the columns and their shops, thus narrowing the street ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 292-3). In 
short, through streets' physical morphology in the inherited built environments is mainly 
determined by the interaction of the rights of parties on both sides of the street as well as of 
passers-by as controllers of such streets, without state intervention. It is thus a rights-based 
process of producing those built environments. 
70 According to jurists from the Hanbali rite such as 'Ibn Qudamah and 'Ibn Taymiyyah, such actions 
are allowed for the common interest and not if fulfilling a private interest. 
71 'Ibn ar-Rami relates that if the street is more than seven cubits, it would be considered wide. Some 
jurists adopted this method, as derived from the Prophet's tradition, and thus did not stop building 
actions in public streets if they met this width and no one objects. 'Ibn ar-Rami adds that roads used 
by cattle should not be less than twenty cubits ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 571-3). 
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Building actions in streets can be classified into two types: first, actions within the street per se 
(batin at-tariq), such as digging a well in one of the street's corners or building a bench, and 
second, actions around the street but affect the street (thahir at-tariq), such as opening a door 
or a window in one of the houses on either side of the street or building an overpass above the 
street (Akbar, 1992, p. 281). As to the first, objection of any individual from the passers-by to a 
building action is accepted, however, for building actions that do not harm the main function of 
the street (passing through), but affect its morphology, the principle of harm according to 
shari `a is the reference. According to shari `a, the air above a property retains the same 
principles applied to the property itself, thus the air of a communal property is communal, the 
air of the waqf is wagf, the air of dead lands is dead, and the air above a private property is 
private (al-Qarafi, n. d., v. 4, p. 40), therefore, the air of the through street is owned by Muslims 
collectively. Most jurists" allow building in the air of the street (such as overpasses) regardless 
of objections raised by others, provided that such actions do not damage passers-by by 
darkening the street for example (see an-Nawawi, n. d. /a, v. 13, p. 77; 'Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 449). 
That is, as any individual has the right to use the street without harming others, thus has the 
right to use its air (see an-Nawawi, n. d. /a, v. 13, p. 77; 'Ibn Qudamah, n. d., v. 7, p. 31). In one 
case, for example, Sahnun was asked about a man who owned two opposite houses on both 
sides of the street and he wanted to build a room (overpass) over the street that connects the two 
houses. Sahnun allowed the action, stating that such actions are allowed, but what is disallowed 
is what causes harm to passers-by or to the street by narrowing it ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 451). He 
added that this is the situation of overpasses, people are used to build it and to shade the streets 
beneath it, thus it should not be stopped if not causing harm to others. This principle was 
applied, according to Malik, to both wide and narrow streets (zuqaq) (at-Tutayli, n. d., p. 148-9). 
However, building in the air of the street gives the owner of the overpass a right of 
appertainance (ikhtisas) only based on his antecedencey in using the space73, and not full- 
ownership, as it is built in a common air, thus, as jurists agree, if someone demolishes his 
overpass then the air goes back to its original state as shared space. If the neighbour built in the 
same space his own overpass then the former owner has no right to object as he lost his right of 
appertainance (ikhtisas) the minute the overpass was demolished (see an-Nawawi, n. d. /a, v. 13). 
The owner of the overpass has to maintain that it does not cause harm to passers-by even in the 
future. For example, if in future times, the clearance of the overpass diminishes as the ground 
level rises, then the owner of the overpass has to lift the damage caused to passers-by, either by 
lifting or demolishing his overpass, or by lowering the road surface ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 450; 
al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 8, p. 431). Such principles gave the acting party more freedom of action on 
the upper level of the street than on the street level. Thus, overpasses were common features in 
'Z As-Shafi'i and Malik and many other jurists allowed this ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 449; 'Ibn Taymiyyah, 
n. d. /a, v. 15, p. 316). 
73 'Ibn ar-Rami states that if the neighbours on both sides of the street disputed, each wants to build an 
overpass above the street, then the space should be divided equally between them. 'Ibn ar-Rami adds 
that the height of such an overpass should be the height of the largest loaded camel with sufficient 
space on top of the rider's head ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 449; see also an-Nawawi, n. d. /a, v. 13, p. 80). 
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the inherited built environment, constituting building conventions that prevailed in many 
Muslim cities, giving them their distinct character. Both passers-by and acting parties were used 
to such practices, therefore, acting parties tend to act in accordance with conventions so as not 
to be objected or their new buildings demolished. 
To conclude, it can be said that such incremental actions from the inhabitants themselves, 
without permission from the higher authorities, were responsible to a certain extent of shaping 
through streets. It is a bottom-up mechanism of producing the built environment, where rights 
perform as the regulating mechanism. Through streets are the product of principles based on 
rights that are predetermined and thus static temporally and geographically. Accordingly, no 
party can create rules so as to possess power. Consequently, avenues for central authority to 
gain power are eliminated in the inherited built environment. This will be more evident when 
explaining the rights of other physical settings in the inherited built environment, next. 
DEAD-END STREETS 
Dead-end streets constitute a common phenomenon in the inherited built environment. It is 
regulated by its situal well-defined rights. A dead-end street, as all jurists agree, is owned by its 
residents collectively as a one party (owners of properties abutting the street and have access to 
it, i. e. properties which have doors opening to the dead-end street). It is a privately owned 
collective property where no external party has the right of intervention, such as the muhtasib. 
Residents of the dead-end street enjoy full ownership of the dead-end street; they share the 
ownership of its substance as well as its usufruct, consequently, they have the right of control 
over their collective property. 
Unlike through streets, no changes are allowed to be made in a dead-end street, such as opening 
a new door or projecting a cantilever or overpass, without the consent of all its party members, 
regardless of the damage that might be caused as a result of that action. 'Abu Yusuf 
(d. 182H. /798AD. ) states that the principle of damage does not apply in dead-end streets but the 
permission of all partners (cited in Akbar, 1992, p. 279). 'Ibn Qudamah relates that building a 
shop or a projected cantilever or an overpass in a dead-end street (darb)74 is disallowed unless 
its people [owners of the dead-end street] permit. That is, as rights of the street pertain to them, 
actions are allowed if they all permit as a one owner-party ('Ibn Qudamah, n. d., v. 7, p. 33). In 
one case a man whose house is at the end of a dead-end street (ra'ighah) extended a wooden 
box (tabut) and a three hand-spans toilet (mirhad) to the street next to his neighbour's house. 
The neighbour objected and raised the case to the judge. The judge ruled that since the principle 
in dead-end streets is that its benefits are shared by all its residents, no one of them has the right 
to appropriate any of its benefits for his own without the consent of all the residents. He added 
that if this is done then it should be eliminated (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 8, p. 499). This principle 
of collective control sustains the right of each of the owner-party members to voice their 
opinions regarding their shared property. Dead-end street in that sense resembles, as 'Ibn 
74 Different names were used to refer to dead-end streets in the inherited built environment such as darb, 
zuqaq, za'ighah, ra'ighah, zanqa, sikkah, or tariq. 
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`Abdin and others pictured it (see 'Ibn `Abdin, n. d., v. 10, p. 259), a shared house where all 
partners have the right to benefit from. However, no one of the partners is able to make changes 
in the house without the approval of all partners, as this partner is acting in a property to which 
rights of other persons (partners) pertain. As collective control is based on agreement between 
the residing parties and never on intervention by an outsider party, thus it is expected to lead to 
intensive dialogue between the members of the controlling party in cases of disputes. This 
principle, in turn, eliminates any domination that might exist between parties in such a shared 
property. In one case a man who owned all but one of the houses on a dead-end street built a 
gate on the mouth of the dead-end street. The owner of the one house objected. The judge ruled 
that the gate should be demolished (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 7; 'Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 307). 
In short, through dead-end streets rights-based mechanisms shari 'a aims to create a shared 
space of needed circulation without the need for any intervention of central authorities. To the 
contrary, the common accepted logic in contemporary urban design (the acquired mode) is that 
spaces of circulation between private properties in any settlement have to be managed by a 
group to which the power of control is conferred. In most cases this group is an outsider 
(municipality, local community, etc. ); a situation which will most likely lead to the rise of 
external power dominating private properties (explained in chapter nine). In the inherited built 
environment, such management is shouldered on the owners of the place themselves, thus 
eliminating the possibility of creating an external dominating power. To clarify this let us 
examine the situal rights of the dead-end street in more detail. 
For actions that abut a dead-end street and affect it (thahir at-tariq), such as opening a new 
door or window to a dead-end street, rulings differed according to the harm caused and 
specificities of the case; they were not all based on the principle of collective control. In some 
cases the principle of damage was applied, and if damage occurred, the voice of the damaged 
party was given more weight in the ruling than that of other parties. But if no damage is caused 
and residents of the dead-end street objected, then their objection might not be considered. For 
example, in one case a man (party A) owned all houses abutting a dead-end street except for a 
yard at the back end of the street (owned by party B). At the threshold of the dead-end street 
there was an old overpass that the owner of the houses (party A) wanted to extend to cover the 
entire dead-end street (fig. 7.1). The judge (al-'Umrani) ruled that this action was permitted if no 
damage is caused to the dead-end street or to the owner of the yard (party B), and in such case 
the neighbour (B) has no right to stop him. However, if any damage is caused (such as the 
overpass has low clearance, or it darkens the way) then, due to the rights of the neighbour if 
objected, the action is prohibited (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 5-6). 75 In this case, the concept of 
damage was applied and not the permission of all residents, as the action in question does not 
hinder the main benefit of the dead-end street and does not cause any damage either to the 
neighbour or to the shared property. 
75 The concept of harm prevailed in the Maliki school in reaching rulings in similar cases. However, 
some jurists from the same school, such as Sahnun and Yusuf bin Yahya disagreed with this principle, 
favouring the principle of collective control (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 5-6; v. 8, p. 42-3). 
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Ovemacs of A Extended ovemacs of A 
(fig. 7.1) (Existing condition of the dead-end street) (The dead-end street after extending the overpass) 
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Most jurists from different schools of law employed the right of istitraq in reaching their rulings 
regarding disputes among owners of the dead-end streets such as repositioning existing door. 
The right of istitraq is the right of each resident in the dead-end street to benefit from a certain 
area in it, defined from the entrance of the dead-end street to his house door, i. e. the area in 
which he walks from the entrance of the dead-end street until he reaches his house door. 
Accordingly, the right of istitraq of the closest house door to the entrance of the dead-end street 
is the least, while the house at the end of the dead-end street enjoys the maximum right of 
istitraq. Thus it shares all the area of the dead-end street with the other houses (Bin `Abd as- 
Salam, n. d., v. 2, p. 118). For example, as demonstrated in fig. 7.2, the right of istitraq of resident 
A is applied to area 1, the right of B is in areas 1 and 2, the right of C is in areas 1,2, and 3, and 
so on, thus resident A shares area 1 with all the other partners in the dead-end street, however, 
resident F has the right of istitraq exclusively in area 6. 
Dead-end street 
A 
C 
E 
(fig. 7.2) Istitraq rights in a dead-end street. 
Repositioning existing doors in dead-end streets (open a new door and sealing the older one) is 
allowed if the door is to be relocated in a position closer to the entrance of the dead-end street. 
In such a case the owner is giving up part of his istitraq right voluntarily, provided that affected 
parties who share the right of istitraq with him agree, regardless of the objection of non-affected 
parties (who don't share the right of istitraq with the acting party, i. e. who live nearer to the 
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entrance of the dead-end street than the acting individual). If the owner is relocating his door 
deeper into the end of the dead-end street, then this allows him to penetrate deeper into the 
dead-end street without a right to do so, as if he is taking from the right of istitraq of the 
adjacent neighbors which is not allowed unless all affected parties agree. 'Ibn Qudamah states 
in that regard that the owner of a house in a dead-end street can only relocate his door closer to 
the entrance of the dead-end street as he has the right of istitraq from his door to the entrance of 
the dead-end street. Thus relocating the door closer to the entrance would reduce his right of 
istitraq. However, whenever he wants to relocate the door to its old position, deeper into the 
dead-end street, then he has the right to, as his right does not lapse ('Ibn Qudamah, v. 7, p. 50). 76 
Materializing the autonomy of dead-end streets, gates were established at their entrances, 
demarcating the boundaries of the area controlled (scope of exercitation, as explained below) by 
the street's owners. Gates of dead-end streets are built and controlled by the owners of dead-end 
street as a one party, i. e. with the consent of all partners. They mark the areas beyond which 
higher authorities (the state), or any other external party, have no right to intervene. Gates were 
so common in the inherited built environment that historians did not document them in detail 
unless they were unusual. Beyond those gates, as privately owned properties, cleaning and 
maintenance of dead-end streets are the responsibility of its residents. The prevalence of dead- 
end streets in the inherited built environments reduced the ratio of public space. Consequently, 
the burden of keeping-up such spaces needed for circulation in the city is much reduced, 
lowering the cost of maintenance on the city at large. 
To conclude, dead-end streets are physical settings with a well-defined structure of rights that 
perform in regulating their production processes in the inherited built environment. The 
incapacity (unrightfulness) of the state to intervene in such widespread private spaces led to the 
restriction of the state's circle of rights territorially in the inherited built environment, and thus 
to the intensification of the role of the individual and private group parties in the production of 
their built environments, based on their rights. This process releases the capacities of private 
parties to act in their built environment without higher restrictions. 
AL-FINA' 
Fina' is defined as the space, mostly on the street", abutting a property, used basically by the 
residents of that abutting property, regardless of the function of that property (Akbar, 1988, 
76 Most jurists from the four schools of law agreed on this opinion, however, few jurists from the Maliki 
school based their rulings on the principle of collective control (see 'Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 279-287). 
For the Shaf`i school see an-Nawawi, v. 13, p. 93; for the Maliki school see al-Wansharisi, v. 9, p. 21 
(the opinion of Asbagh), and 'Ibn ar-Rami, v. 1, p. 280 (the opinion of Bin `Abd al-Bar); for the Hanafi 
school see 'Ibn `Abdin, v. 8, p. 151-2, and ath-Thaqafi, p. 160. 
77 For 'Ibn Manzur's, the fcna' is the space in front of the property's door, or the spaces abutting the 
property from its sides ('Ibn Manzur, n. d., v. 2, p. 1138). Accordingly, fina' space is not necessarily the 
space on the street, however, the most common cases of the fina' were spaces on the street. For 
example, in one case narrated by al-Wansharisi, the fina' of a house was ruled to be in the yard of the 
neighbour's house, i. e. inside the neighbour's property (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 5, p. 183-4). Although 
this was a rare case in the inherited built environment, yet it indicates that the fna', even in such 
circumstances, was a respected physical setting in the built environment that has well-defined situal 
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p. 107; 1992, p. 240). People differed in their treatments of their fina ': some allowed others to 
build on them thus creating an attached tissue, others preferred to protect their fina ' from all 
sides thus resulting in a tissue with free-standing buildings. This was actually decided according 
to the conventions prevailing in each region. Thus, one can observe dense inherited built 
environments with attached properties as in Damascus, Tunis, and Cairo, whereas it is in 
Turkish or Malaysian villages less dense with detached properties. 
As to the rights of the fina', the caliph `Umar ruled that the fina' belongs to the house owner 
which the fina' abuts ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 299). Most jurists7e decided that it is owned by the 
owner of the property abutting it, thus no one can revivify someone else's fina'. However, as 
part of that property's inseparable supplements (marafiq)79, all jurists agreed that the fina' 
cannot be sold separate from its abutting property ('Ibn Taymiyyah, n. d. /a, v. 15, p. 527). 
Consequently, the owner of the fina' has the right of use and control over the fina', thus he can 
use the fina ' as he wishes in activities related to domestic life as well as for communal activities 
such as selling and producing goods, exhibiting goods for sitting in, or storing possessions, 
provided this does not cause harm to passers-by, i. e. restricted by the concept of harm according 
to shari 'a. Malik stated in that respect that " for small fina 'where the least thing posed would 
hinder the circulation in the street, then it is not allowed to benefit from this fina' as such, but 
for those wide fina' that its people can use it in a manner that does not narrow the street for 
Muslims, then this is allowed" ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 305). 
Emanating from his right of control, the owner has the right to lease the fina' provided that the 
new function does not contradict with the rights of the street such as causing harm to the 
passers-by. Part of the owner's rights is to prevent others from misusing his fina' and causing 
him damage. However, as part of the street, he cannot prevent people, who did not ask for his 
permission, from short-term usage of the fina' such as sitting in its shaded area. He has the 
right, however, to forbid passers-by from permanent usage. Moreover, the owner has the right, 
rights. A possible reason for the fina' to be within others' properties is that: party (A) revived a dead 
land and enjoyed his fina' from all sides. Another party (B) revived the area abutting A's property 
while respecting thefina' of party A. Years later, party B tried to deny the right of party A in his fina'. 
The case was disputed. 
'a Most jurists, such as Malik, ash-Shafi`i, and some jurists from the Hanbali school such as 'Ibn 
Qudamah, agreed that the fina' is owned by the owner of the property abutting it. Abu Hanifa and 
some Hanbali jurists consider the fina' as the street, to be owned by all Muslims collectively (ath- 
Thaqafi, n. d., p. 173), however, the owner of the property that abuts it has the right of appertainance of 
the fina' (ikhtisas) (Akbar, 1992, p. 244), i. e. has the right of its usufruct and control over it but not the 
ownership of its substance (raqaba). This ikhtisas right gives priority for its holder to use the property 
exclusively, thus it is in a way ownership of the property without its substance, i. e. the owner enjoys 
most of the rights attached to ownership except the transfer of ownership (see al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, 
p. 160-5). In short, one can state that all jurists agreed at least that the right of usufruct ownership 
(mulk manfa'a) of thefina' belongs to the owner of the abutting property. 
79 Each property has its own zone that is prohibited for others (harim), without which the property 
cannot function, such as its road, pathway, rain water discharge (masil al-ma'). The harim of a 
dwelling is defined as "what is added to the property as its rights and servitudes" such as its fina' (al- 
Hanbali (d. 458H), n. d., p. 212). Those supplements are inseparable rights of the property, thus they are 
transferred with ownership transfer of the property per se (see Akbar, 1988, p. 76). 
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according to most jurists, to build in or to add elements to his fina', without the permission of 
the state, in a way that does not cause harm to the owners of the street (all Muslims) as long as 
no complaints arise. 80 The jurist 'Asbagh (d. 225H. ) said that " [building actions in the fina ' are] 
disallowed unless they did not narrow the road or hinder the circulation of passers-by or 
damaged the Muslims". Thus, if a person builds in hisTina ' and incorporates this building to his 
property, then he is allowed to if thefina' is on a wide street ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 299). 81 
Approving actions in the fina' differed according to jurists opinions about rights of the street, 
for example whether it is a wide or a narrow street, and the specificities of the case raised. For 
example, in some cases, if a building action took place in a fina' without causing harm to 
others, then the action is allowed even if one person from the passers-by objected, as his 
objection is not based on a reasonable cause. 
The concept of the fina' is important in the inherited built environment in providing a clear 
defmition of each party's responsibility for accomplishing the communal tasks in collective 
spaces such as cleaning and maintenance of streets. Each property owner is responsible for 
cleaning his fina'. Furthermore, being a privately owned property (or at least usufruct privately 
owned), authorities have no right of intervention in such private spaces except when the rights 
of the fina' overlap with those of the passers-by in the street. In such an overlap, if disallowed 
actions or harm occurred, the muhtasib might intervene to protect the common interest. This 
territorial division according to ritual rights in the inherited built environment led to minimizing 
the areas where the state has the right of intervention. 
In short, the fina' in the inherited built environment is a rights-based community-managed 
space which formation is left to its people, regulated by its rights, with no intervention from the 
state. It is subject to what can be discerned from the Prophet's tradition concerning advising 
people not to sit in streets, but if they made their sitting places there then the rights of the 
street have to be respected (al-Bukhari, n. d., v. 3, p. 385). That is, as the fina' constitutes part of 
the street physically82, thus it is perceived as a place where its rights and those of the street 
(explained above) overlap, therefore, the rights of both have to be respected. 
so Some jurists (e. g. Mutrif, 'Ashhab, 'Ibn al-Mashjun from the Maliki school) prohibited building in the 
fina' or in Muslims' street, however, as induced from some documented cases, roofing the fina' was a 
common practice in the inherited built environment. For example, 'Ibn ar-Rami reported a case where 
stores had roofed theirfina' by a cantilever and two columns in front of the store ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., 
p. 292). He also reported a case about some stores that have a shaded roofed area in their fina' and 
wanted to extend this area from the street ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 293). Also, the number of questions 
and cases reported reveal that this practice was a sort of convention in Muslim cities (e. g. Tunis from 
where those cases were reported). 
However, Asbagh and Malik disliked building in the fina' in the first place but if the person did such 
an action, then he should not be stopped ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 299). 
82 In some cases, the street might be the fina' itself, as in case of narrow streets to which two opposite 
houses open, thus each house might consider half the width of the street as its fina'. In this case, the 
street is composed of the fna' of the two houses. However, owners of those houses cannot use their 
fina' so that they block or hinder the circulation in the street (see fig. 2 1, al-Hathloul, 1996, p. 96). 
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7.4.3 Scopes of exercitation 
With reference to Dahl's "scopes" of partiesS3, and to Simon's "zones of acceptance" (see 
p. 106 above), "areas of acceptance" in the acquired built environment, as used in this study, 
can be seen as denoting the territorial scopes of parties according to their power. Each territory 
area accepts the decisions taken by its party based on its power. The term "acceptance", as used 
in the acquired mode, implies a dominance relationship between parties. However, in the 
inherited built environment, as rights are distributed by shari `a to all society members, with no 
domination of central power, thus the term "acceptance" does not seem to fit such a context. 
Therefore, the term " scope of exercitation" will be used, defining the areas over which a 
particular party has control. Those maps of scopes of exercitation can be seen as outlining the 
territorial structure of the built environment according to the parties in control of them. Each 
party exercises its rights of control, through its actions, within this area. 
To explain, fig. (7.3) demonstrates an abstract configuration of such a map. The physical layout 
presented here is comprised of three physical settings (Al, A2, A3) and a plaza (P) in between 
them. Each setting of the As is comprised of three physical settings (Bl, B2, B3) and a small yard 
(Y), and each setting of B is comprised of three properties (Cl, C2, C3) opening to a dead-end 
street (R). Party CI controls its property, the same for parties C2 and C3. Party B3, constituted of 
the parties Cl, C2 and C3 collectively, controls the dead-end street (R), whereas party A3 
(constituted of BI, B2, and B3) controls the yard (I). Likewise, the party comprised of Al, A2, 
and A3 controls the plaza (P). In this illustration, the scopes of exercitation of party Cl, for 
example, is its own property exclusively, and, as a member of larger parties, in spaces R and P. 
A3 
B3 
(Fig. 7.3) Hierarchy of scopes of exercitation 
in the inherited built environments. 
To relate this to rights structure, let us consider the case of a dead-end street. In such a case, a 
resident (if having the right of control, e. g. the owner) in a dead-end street controls his property 
which opens to that street. Moreover, he is a member of the owning-party of the dead-end street, 
"Scopes" are defined according to Dahl as the " issue-areas" or institutional activities (educational, 
urban planning, political, and the like) within which a party's power is accepted (Dahl, 1991). 
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constituted by all its residents thus he shares with this party all decisions concerning the process 
of the production of the dead-end street, determining its shape and quality, for example. Outside 
the dead-end street, this resident is a member in the larger party of passers-by in the next 
through street and so on. Each individual in the community has his own scope of exercitation. 
" Scope of exercitation" maps emanate from the conjunction of parties' general rights map and 
the situal rights maps where each site from the latter map is related to its controlling party. To 
draw such a map, the party in control of each area in the built environment has to be identified. 
As the party in control of an area in the built environment change throughout time, therefore 
scope of exercitation maps are always subject to change. For example, if the owner of a 
particular property in a dead-end street changes, then the scope of exercitation of this new 
owner change; his new scope of exercitation would include the new property he owns in the 
dead-end street, plus the dead-end street, as a new member in its owning-party. Accordingly, 
scope of exercitation maps can be attributed as dynamic rights structure maps. 
Boundaries of scopes of exercitation are quite well defined in the inherited built environment, 
thus a party can do whatever he wishes inside his boundaries. However, if his acts trespass to 
other party's scope, then rights perform as regulating mechanisms. For example, each resident 
in a through street is a party controlling its property; he can act as he wishes within his property. 
If this party establishes a ironwork shop in his house where the smoke generated reaches the 
passers-by, then he is touching the scope of exercitation of the passers-by in the street, then they 
are considered as an affected party whose rights, if objected, have to be respected. 
It can be noticed from documented cases that parties in the inherited built environment were 
aware of their scopes of exercitation, thus of their rights. Each party realised its responsibilities 
and the limits of rights of other parties. In one case a man (party A) owned an un-fenced farm in 
which there is a pathway owned by another person (party B) to reach his property at the back of 
the farm. The owner of the farm (A) wanted to fence his farm, thus disallowing party B to use 
his pathway whenever he wishes. Imam Malik ruled that this action is disallowed except with 
the consent of the owner of the pathway ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 598). In this case, the pathway is 
included in party B's scope of exercitation, although exists within party A's territory, thus party 
A cannot intervene in this scope without a permit from its controller. This mechanism 
eliminated the potential domination that might occur from party A over party B due to the 
location of his territory, as explained below. 
Accordingly, no one party can extend its scope of exercitation without a right, i. e. no one can, 
unrightfully, appropriate rights on new territories, otherwise it will be an infringement act which 
is unlawful in Islam. In other words, there is no inflation of scopes in the inherited built 
environment, unrightfully. In that sense, the state cannot intervene in areas which are not within 
its scope such as private parties' scopes of exercitation. That is, if intervening in what is not in 
its scope, then it will be power-based intervention and not rights-based, which is irrelevant in 
the inherited built environment according to shari `a. This in turn eliminates any potential 
domination that might occur between parties in the built environment. 
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As common spaces in the inherited built environment are controlled by passers-by, those spaces 
fall within the boundaries of private parties' scopes of exercitation and not of the state except in 
limited cases. Conversely, representing the public, the state in the acquired built environment 
gives itself the right to control public spaces, thus containing them within its area of acceptance 
(explained in chapter nine). However, as public spaces in the acquired built environments 
constitute a high ratio of spaces compared to private spaces84, the state's scopes of exercitation 
in the acquired mode are quite large in comparison to private parties' areas of acceptance. This 
is the opposite in the inherited built environment where private parties have larger scopes of 
exercitation in terms of the built environment than that of the state, which in turn limits the 
intervention of the state in the built environment in general. It can thus be said that the state in 
the acquired mode plays a major role in the production of the built environment whereas it is the 
private parties that are most significant in the production of the inherited built environments. 
Moreover, as the acquired mode is based on the concept of power, as shown in the previous 
chapters, the state's areas of acceptance are undefined. It can through its power appropriate 
more territories, thus expanding its areas of acceptance, and limiting private parties' scopes. In 
short, whereas boundaries of scopes of exercitation in the inherited built environments are well- 
defined and cannot be changed unless through rightful acts85, it is in the acquired built 
environment blurred boundaries where the powerful (the state) can expand its scope through its 
exercitation of power. Thus, scopes in the acquired built environment are inflationary whereas 
they are predetermined in the inherited built environments (fig. 7.4). 
(Fig. 7.4) 
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Ra Comparing traditional built environments (ad-Dim district in Riyadh) with the contemporary planned 
ones (al-Malaz district in Riyadh) in some areas in Saudi Arabia, al-Hathloul (1996) reached the 
following conclusions: population density has dropped to the fifth in contemporary areas compared to 
traditional areas (60.38p/h in Malaz, 306.25p/h in ad-Dira). The area assigned for public streets has 
increased three times in the contemporary built environment than in the traditional built environment 
(area of public spaces: 45% in Malaz, 18% in ad-Dira). Private areas in traditional built environments 
occupied 77% of the total area, whereas it is 53% in the contemporary built environment (p. 164-6). 
eS Such as through selling and buying properties. 
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7.4.4 Actual power distribution maps 
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Analysing any case from the inherited built environment, one can deduce the power distribution 
structure that occured in that case. For example, al-Wansharisi reports a case in which a man 
(party A) sold part of his house on which roof runs a gully for the other part of the house, and 
this was the only possible access for that gully. Later on, the new owner (party B) stopped the 
flow of water in the gully. The two parties disputed to the judge who ruled that if there is no 
other access for the gully except through the new owner's roof, and if the new owner knew 
about this gully when purchased the house, then he does not have a say about it and thus has to 
allow the water to flow through the gully on his roof. However, if party B did not know about 
such a gully when the house was bought, then he can cancel the sale as this is considered as a 
hidden defect in the house (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 53-4). In this case, party A has the right to 
run his water on the roof of party B as it was there before selling that part of the house. Thus 
party A acquired power generated from this right. Therefore, if party B knew about the existence 
of such a gully, then this power prevails against the right of party B of controlling his property 
and thus stopping the water from flowing on his roof. However, if party B did not know about 
the gully when the house was bought, then the case turns to be between the new owner and the 
old one, then party B can choose either to cancel the deal of purchasing the house, in which case 
the right of party B to buy non-defected house gives him power that enables him to cancel the 
deal, even after he used the house for some time. The other choice for him is to keep the house 
and allow the water to flow on his roof. In this case the new owner (party B) voluntarily waived 
his right of cancelling the deal, and thus he has then to accept the house with the neighbour's 
gully on his roof, in which case the power of party A prevails. 
Power distribution maps are power maps and not rights structures. Those maps refer to specific 
real interactions between immediate parties where relevant rights become actualized, thus 
generating power to its parties. In those maps both parties' rights and situal rights come together 
inseparably. Those maps and the scope of exercitation maps refer to real life, however, the 
former are power distribution maps while the latter is a rights structure map. Moreover, whereas 
scopes of exercitation map as well as situal rights map explore the structure of rights as related 
to a one party or to a one category of sites, power distribution maps focus on relationships 
between immediate parties involved (minimum two) in a site; they are an outline of power 
relationships between parties in real cases. 
As the actualized rights of involved parties in any case are static, thus each actual power map as 
related to a one case (at a specific time and site) is static. Moreover, as each of those maps 
relates to a specific case in the built environment, thus each map is unique, i. e. different than the 
others as sites are different and thus power relationships between parties. As a result, the 
inherited built environment is constituted of a huge number of such maps which emerge daily, 
and which shari `a deals with in a robust manner, applying a proscriptive one-to-one rights- 
derived mechanisms that deal with the specificities of each case without any generalization or 
tendency of applying pre-stated laws, as the case in the acquired built environments. Therefore, 
as can be inferred from documented cases, similar cases in the inherited built environment 
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might have different rulings or solutions, i. e. have different power distribution maps. One can 
say in that respect that solutions in the inherited built environment emanate from the site and its 
parties, thus are responsive to the specificities of each case in question. 
7.5 LEVELS BETWEEN PARTIES/PROPERTIES 
In general, any built environment is a reflection of its societal and systemic structures. Societies 
in the acquired mode are power-based stratified societies, structured hierarchically according to 
the societal distribution of power, thus, the resultant acquired built environment is most likely to 
be a reflection of this systemic structure. It is a vertically structured built environment that is 
characterized by dominance/dependence relationships between physical properties and parties. 
Affirming such a hierarchical character of the built environment, Habraken (1988,1998) states 
that particular "forms of dominance"86 exist between elements in the built environment all 
through their form and territorial relationships. This domination suggests ordering the elements 
of the built environment into levels. Three forms of dominance might exist in the built 
environment, first, dominance due to enclosure relationships. For example, in a network of 
street with houses abutting them, the houses can change without any reorganization of the street 
network. However, the reverse is not the case. Realignment of the street network requires 
serious adjustment in the distribution of houses. " This relationship between the street and the 
buildings is an enclosure relationship where the street encloses the houses, territorially. " In 
such a situation, the enclosed physical elements can change independently within the space 
enclosed, but transformations of the form that encloses will require adjustment of whatever is 
enclosed. This physical relationship, as Habraken claims, is reflected consequently on the 
parties in control of the related elements or territories, translated into relationships of 
dominance/dependence between parties. Thus, physical elements and territories in the built 
environment, operating at different levels, are always ordered vertically as a direct result of 
their physical attributes. Parties in control of buildings are dominated by the parties of the street 
network (1998, p. 32-33), or, put differently, the street network is on a higher level than the 
buildings abutting it. Vertical relations of parties are pre-determined by the orders of their 
physical properties. The party in control of the enclosure predictably dominates whatever lies 
within. 89 Thus, as Habraken declares, there is in the built environment "a hierarchy of powers 
[i. e. parties] connected through relations of form" (Habraken, 1988, p. 23,56, emphasis added). 
86 Or "form imperatives", as Habraken called them in his recent book (1998, p. 98). 
For example, changing the size or level of the roads in particular neighborhood will most likely affect 
the enclosed houses in that neighborhood, by for example, expropriating from its setbacks, or some of 
houses will have to add few steps to reach the new road level, if raised or lowered. 
Similar relationships exist between the furniture and the partition walls in a room. The furniture is 
enclosed by the partition walls, thus the walls are of higher level than the furniture. Thus, parties in 
control of the walls dominate that in control of the furniture. 
89 "Territorial control", as Habraken defines it, is the ability to exclude, to shut the door, selectively 
admitting only who and what we desire (1998, p. 136). 
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Second, dominance due to gravity. For example, the columns and the roof in any building 
operate at two different levels due to the gravity of the building. As the columns carry the roof, 
any adjustment in the position of the columns affects the roof but the reverse in not true. The 
columns are said to be at a higher level than the roof. Consequently, the party controlling the 
lower level is dominant over that controlling the upper level (Habraken, 1998, p. 96-8). 
Third, dominance as a result of supply relationships. For example, the house owner must adjust 
his sewage distribution to the position of the main, but the reverse is not the case. Thus, in this 
case the party in control of the main sewage line is dominant over the party in control of the line 
inside the house due to its position, therefore, the two parties in control of the main line and the 
house operate on two different levels. The party controlling the main line (e. g. the municipality) 
is dominant over that controlling the house. Supply forms often assume the shape of branching 
structures. Water is distributed from one place to many in a tree-like shape. The sewage system 
also collects from a multitude of points to a single main, also in a tree-like shape. The tree- 
shape is a prime example of a dominance hierarchy. In this shape, the party in control of the 
trunk dominates the one in control of the branch (Habraken, 1988, p. 21-2; 1998,114). 
Those forms of dominance, as Habraken avers, drive the built environment into a state of 
stability. Vertical relationships, thus, domination are a necessary condition for equilibrium in 
the site. For example, in the case of two adjacent houses controlled by two different parties, 
sharing a party wall between their properties, the two houses are said to be at the same level, i. e. 
they relate horizontally to each other. This horizontal relationship is a restless one, as Habraken 
describes it (1988, p. 35-6). The two neighbors are connected only through the party wall, thus 
any unilateral actions by one side will most probably lead to a situation of conflict between the 
two parties. To relax this restless horizontal situation and push the site to a state of stability, 
domination is inevitable. The party wall is considered as an element by itself that is controlled 
by a third party consisting of the two neighboring parties as a one party, and thus operates on a 
higher level than the two adjacent properties. In this case, the party wall operates as a mediator 
between the two properties where it is related in a vertical relationship to each of the properties 
whereas the two properties have no relationship with each other. In other instances, the law 
might intervene to regulate such relationships. In this case a third external party (the state) 
exists on a higher level, as a mediator, thus imposing its dominance on both related parties. 
Seeking stability, the site avoids open and direct horizontal relations between physical settings, 
however, where the situation allows for horizontal relationships, forms of dominance occur to 
maintain stability, i. e. domination substitutes horizontal relationships (Habraken, 1988, p. 37, 
67; 1998, p. 34). In short, potential domination that might exist between parties is capitalized in 
the acquired built environment through the prevalence of vertical relations of properties. Thus 
relationships between parties in the acquired built environment are characterized as power 
(dominance/dependence) relationships. 
Describing horizontal relationships as restless is true in the acquired mode where the norm is 
domination and power hierarchy. In such a mode, horizontal relations are abnormal, thus 
avoided. This avoidance of horizontal relations, as Habraken asserts, constitutes the single most 
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important principle in the generation of the built environment, thus, it is hard to find examples 
of horizontal relations (with no dominance) in the acquired built environment. In short, the 
principle of dominance in the acquired built environment is inevitable (Habraken, 1998, p. 34; 
1988, p. 17,22,65). 
This phenomena of dominance orders the elements in the acquired built environment in a 
hierarchical structure where each property and thus party is related to others vertically. Parties 
of street network dominates those of houses, infrastructure institutions dominate house owners, 
parties of road network dominates agencies of the infrastructure, housing compounds agencies 
dominate houses occupiers, and so on. As explained, this phenomenon is a reflection of the 
broader societal and systemic structures that prevail in the acquired mode, however, once the 
built environment is produced and such hierarchical conception is accepted and solidified by its 
inhabitants, such process becomes reciprocal. The hierarchical structure of the built 
environment reinforces and sustains the broader hierarchical societal structure. It is a one whole 
process that is based on the concept of power, whether on its societal level or on its 
environmental level. This subject as related to the acquired built environment is examined more 
in chapter nine. But how does such a structure apply to the inherited built environment? 
IS IT DOMINATION? 
Muslim societies are structured according to the rights bestowed to their individuals, groups and 
state by shari 'a. Those rights are the source of power in Islam, thus no one can acquire more 
power than what his rights generate. Therefore, rights and thus power are predetermined in 
Islam. In that sense, no one party is absolutely more powerful than the other (except in certain 
interactions); no one party is on a higher level than the other. Rights organize relationships 
between parties, thus it is righteous relationships and not power-based. As the physical 
organization of the built environment invites (as Habraken explains) domination between 
parties, this potential domination is maximized in the acquired built environments through a 
centralized mode of providing services (water and sewage for example) and through rules and 
regulations to name a few (will be further explained in chapter nine). However, in the inherited 
mode, the potential dominance is minimized, if not eliminated in some cases, through rights- 
based mechanisms. 
Vertical relationships, as Habraken declares exist between properties operating on different 
levels, each controlled by a different party, thus a relationship of domination exist between 
their parties, however if the two properties (e. g. enclosed and enclosing) are controlled by the 
same party, the potential dominance is eliminated. In the inherited built environment, as noticed 
from maps of rights above, most properties are controlled by the inhabitants themselves. Dead- 
end streets are owned and controlled by its inhabitants; through streets are also controlled by 
inhabitants; infrastructure (sewage canals, rainwater discharge, gullies) is created and controlled 
by its parties (no central authority). Thus, in a house/dead-end street relationship in the inherited 
built environment, the relationship between the parties controlling the house and the dead-end 
street minimizes the potential dominance. That is, as a member in the owning-party of the dead- 
end street, the individual has the right to voice his opinion, objecting to what might damage 
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him. Moreover, each party has its scope of exercitation where no external party can intervene in 
other's scope of exercitation, even the state, without a right to, thus the potential domination is 
much reduced if not eliminated as will be seen. In short, structures of rights (situal rights, 
scopes of exercitation, general rights structure) in the inherited built environment operate as a 
regulative mechanism to minimize, if not eliminate, potential domination between parties. 
Such relationships between parties, although incline to be horizontal90, are based on dialogue 
between immediate parties to reach agreements regarding related properties. Those agreements, 
in fact, dominate the parties who established them. The built environment, in this respect, can 
be perceived as composed of adjacent properties of similar level in which agreements (physical 
solutions) composed by the involved parties dominate those parties. Self-regulating mechanisms 
based on rights structures operate in such situations, without any external parties' intervention 
as the case in the acquired built environment. Therefore, although horizontal relations prevail in 
the inherited built environment, dialogue between parties leads to a state of stability. 
Relationships of enclosure, gravity and supply do exist between properties that are controlled by 
different parties in the inherited built environment. For example, in case of two houses, one 
enclosing the other, the party of the inner house will be, in principle, dominated. Using the tools 
of the acquired built environment, as Orientalists did, one might claim that such properties 
operate on different levels thus their parties have relationships of dominance between them. 
This might be true on the manifested level of the built environment, but once one investigates 
the imperceptible structure of the built environment that is responsible for the production of 
such relationships, then this concept dissolves. Levels between elements in the inherited built 
environment are restricted to the manifested structure and do not penetrate to the imperceptible 
structure to define relationships between parties. Certain imperceptible mechanisms eliminate 
such level differences between related parties (as will be explained). Structures of rights and 
other rights-based mechanisms (e. g. easement rights) set by shari `a reduce potential domination 
that might appear to exist on the manifested level in the inherited built environment. 
7.5.1 Mechanisms of minimizing domination 
EASEMENT RIGHTS (HAQ AL-'IRTIFAQ) 
Due to mechanisms of revivification, a property that is revivified later may block the path of 
other properties with the blocked property owners' consent. Moreover, due to the rights of 
inheritance, properties might be divided in a manner that one share might block the access of 
others. Thus, properties might overlap in the inherited built environment, leading to 
relationships of enclosure, or supply between them. In such situations, the parties of the 
enclosed properties have to pass through the enclosing properties, or a property might have its 
rainwater discharge on the adjacent property's roof or passing through its courtyard. Such 
relationships, manifestly, classify properties or physical elements in the built environment into 
90 We don not actually prefer to use the term "horizontal' in describing relationships between parties in 
the inherited built environment, as this term has been developed to describe restless relationships in 
the acquired mode, however, it is used here just to clarify the concept of dominance. 
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different levels, thus some properties operate on higher levels than others. However, in the 
inherited built environment easement rights operate to regulate such relationships, reducing 
domination between parties and consequently the need for outsiders intervention that might 
create an authoritative power. For example, in one case two brothers subdivided a piece of land 
they inherited from their father in a manner such that one share (A) had access to the main road 
and the other (B) did not, except through the other part (fig. 7.5). Later, the owner of the external 
part (A) denied his brother the right of way through his part. The judge ruled that since the 
external owner (A) did not stipulate the denial of the right of way in the subdivision deal, the 
internal owner (B) has the right of way through his brother's (A) part (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 5, 
p. 143). Thus, the internal property (B) has an easement right (right of way in this case) in the 
external property (A). According to this right the external party cannot deny the internal party 
the access to his property, as it is his right. 
land 
road roäd 
(fig. 7.5) Before subdivision After subdivision 
Easement right, as defined by Muslim jurists, is "a determined benefit for one property 
(immovable) over another owned by a different party, such as water discharge for lands, 
pathways and building rising" (az-Zarqa, 1968, v. 3, p. 34-5). 91 Because the party of the servient 
property might become dominant merely due to its property's territorial position, thus shari 'a 
determined easement right for the interest of the party of the served property. It is, as perceived 
by many jurists, an ownership of benefit, owned by the party of the served property. However, 
as ownership of property changes overtime, shari'a ties rights of servitude to properties, 
therefore, easement right pertains to a shared benefit between the two related properties, 
regardless of their owners. Thus, if either of the two parties changes, easement right continues 
as it is a right for the property and not for the related parties. Az-Zarqa perceives of easement 
right as a deducted benefit from the servient property to the advantage of the served property, 
thus it is a permanent right, unless it was relinquished by its owner legally, such as through 
conventional transaction (az-Zarqa, 1968, v. 3, p. 34-5). 
91 Abu Zahrah defined it as "the right of the defined benefit of one property over the other, regardless of 
the owner". Al-Qarafi defined it as "it is the private right of personal benefit and servitude, and it is 
not a complete manipulation ... such as the passage of a house, the gully of water, and the path of 
road... and he (the user) may not sell this right or give it as a gift to others" (cited in Akbar, 1988, 
p. 208). 
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Easement rights perform as rights-based organizing mechanisms in the inherited built 
environment, where required. For example, al-Wansharisi (d. 914H. ) reports a case in which a 
man sold part of his house on which roof the only access of his water gully runs. The new buyer 
stopped the flow of water in that gully. The jurist ruled that the buyer either had to allow the 
flow of water or cancel the sale if he did not know about the gully when purchasing the house. 
In this case the owner of the gully enjoys easement right as the new buyer's roof was its only 
access, and has been in this position before the sale, thus has also the right of precedence (al- 
Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 53-4). 
In most cases, physical elements subject to easement rights such as pathways or water canals, 
are owned and controlled by the serving party, however, both parties share its benefit. Neither 
of the two parties can make any changes that affect the benefit of such elements without the 
consent of the other. Such elements in that sense constitute a shared property in terms of benefit 
only. In one case, 'Ibn al-Qasim (d. 191 H. ) was asked about two houses, one inside the other, in 
which the internal house residents have the right to pass through the external one to reach the 
street. The owners of the external house decided to relocate the door, and the owners of the 
internal house objected. 'Ibn al-Qasim answered that if the relocation is a simple one and will 
not harm the internal owners, they should not be restrained; but if the relocation is radical such 
as shifting the door to the other side of the house, then that can be prevented if the internal 
owners object. Moreover, the residents of the external house cannot narrow the door of the 
pathway if the internal party objects (Malik, n. d., v. 5, p. 516). 92 In another case, 'Asbagh (d. 
225H. ) was asked about a man (party A) who owned a property inside other people's property 
(party B). The owner of the internal land (A) does not pass from a specific land; he passes from 
different areas depending on the section which has been sowed. The owner of the internal land 
(A) decided to construct a building, however, the owners of the external lands prevented him 
claiming that this would harm their crops and lands. 'Asbagh answered that they cannot stop 
him from building in his land. Moreover, if the owners of the external lands want to wall their 
lands, they have to agree and develop a passageway to be used by the internal owner ('Ibn ar- 
Rami, n. d., p. 594-5). 
Eliminating any domination that might be exerted from the serving party, or from the served 
party as a possessor of this right, Islam has limited the easement rights to the benefit (called 
here the eased or served benefit) in the overlapped part to which easement right pertains (e. g. 
passing-by in a path or discharging rainwater in a water gully). The owner of this overlapped 
part has limited control over that part in terms of its eased benefit only and not absolutely, thus 
only actions that might hinder the eased benefit are disallowed except with the consent of the 
benefited party. Therefore, in the first case above, the external party could not change the 
location of the pathway without the consent of the benefited internal party; however, relocating 
the pathway in a simple manner should not be prevented, as the eased benefit is not affected 
92 See also the cases reported by 'Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 579-580. 
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majorily. 93 This in turn gives the owner of the overlapped part some freedom of action in his 
property that is restricted by maintaining the eased benefit. On the other hand, the served party 
cannot abuse its easement right by, for example, objecting to every action of the serving party. 
Its easement right is framed only by the benefit eased. Accordingly, the served party cannot use 
the overlapped part for other purposes than the agreed upon according to his easement right (al- 
Fayez, 1997, p. 548). For example, a man whose rain water canal passes through his neighbor's 
house wanted to enlarge that canal. The judge ruled that he is not allowed without the consent of 
the neighbor ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 41 1). Moreover, the serving party has no right to intervene in 
the served party's matters that do not relate to the eased benefit. Thus, in the second example 
above, the external party could not stop the internal party from constructing a building, as this 
action is out of the circle of the easement right, the subject of their relationship. In that sense, 
neither the serving party can exercise domination as a result of his property position, nor the 
benefited party can abuse its easement rights bestowed by shari `a. 
Moreover, benefiting from the overlapped element (the subject of easement) is restricted to the 
purpose of the easement right, for example, as a passageway, or as a rainwater-discharge, and 
alike. For example, two houses, one's passageway is through the other. The owners of the 
internal house subdivided their property and wanted to create another door that opens to the 
passageway. The judge ruled that the external party has the right to stop them, however, they 
cannot stop the subdivision ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 554-5). That is, opening new doors to serve 
the new subdivided part that opens onto the passageway means creating new easement rights for 
new parties which is not allowed without the consent of the owner of the passageway. Thus, 
easement rights are confined to their defined purposes and cannot be extended without the 
consent of affected parties. 
Establishing new easement rights require the approval of the owner of the servient property. To 
facilitate the production process of the built environment, physical elements attached to such 
new easement rights, as all jurists agree, can be granted, sold, or leased. The owner of a 
property can sell part of his property to his neighbour to be used as a passage; or a person can 
rent a place from his neighbour through which his water canal runs. An-Nawawi states, for 
example that "no one can run his water duct on his neighbour's house without the latter's 
approval; however, if they agreed to compensate him (the neighbour), then it is allowed, 
provided that the roof on which the duct will run is defined". He added, " if a man agreed with 
another to buy the position of a water canal that passes through the latter's land, then the 
position and dimensions of the water canal should be specified and agreed upon as this is a deal 
for selling part of the land. " The owner also can lease that piece of land, but they have then to 
specify the lease duration (an-Nawawi, n. d. /a, v. 13, p. 84-5). The easement right, thus, is 
primarily an binding agreement between the two related parties, and which operates on a 
higher level than the two related properties (served and servient). 
A few jurists disallowed relocating the pathway even if for a yard, except with the approval of the 
served party (see 'Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 579-584). 
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In short, relationships between properties and parties in the inherited built environment, even if 
horizontal, were stabilised through mechanisms of easement rights. Easement rights possessed 
by one party (the served) balance the hegemony that the other party (the serving) might enjoy 
due to his property's position. Easement rights in that respect drive related parties to dialogue to 
reach agreement regarding their related properties. In conclusion, unlike the case in the acquired 
mode that allow for capitalization of potential domination in the built environment, rights-based 
mechanisms (e. g. easement rights) in the inherited built environment decrease, if not eliminate, 
any potential domination that might exist between parties as a result of their properties 
relationships. In other words, stability in the inherited built environment is sought through 
mechanisms based on rights (of parties and properties) and not on domination and exercitation 
of power between parties of different properties as the case in the acquired built environment. 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
As this chapter ascertained, rights are distributed in the inherited built environment according to 
well defined, determined, structures, whether in terms of physical settings or in terms of parties. 
Such structures of rights perform as the main driving mechanisms in the production of the 
inherited built environment. Each party in the Muslim society acts within its circle of rights 
while respecting other parties' circles of rights. Any infringement on others' circles is 
considered as unlawful, thus controlled by different self-referential, rights-based mechanisms. 
This definition of structures of rights sustains the idea, introduced above, that there is no 
inflation of resources in the inherited mode, thus no lust for power. Power in the inherited 
mode is confined to those determined structures of rights, when actualized, thus there is no 
possibility to gain more power than what shari`a has determined. 
Reflecting such structures of rights, unlike in the acquired mode, the state's role in the inherited 
built environment is confined to its circle of rights, thus, quite limited. It cannot intervene in 
territories or properties that are not included in its scopes of exercitation, thus its role in the 
production process of the inherited built environment is restrained. On the contrary, the state in 
the acquired mode, based on its power, gives itself the right to intervene in most properties in 
the built environment, thus has some degree of control over them (as explained in chapter nine). 
Two dissented conceptions of the state, thus two different effects on the production of their 
respective built environments. This and other related dissensions are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Chapter Eight 
Power vs. Rights 
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POWER VS. RIGHTS 
dissensions 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Different in their bases, several dissensions exist between the acquired and the inherited modes 
and, consequently, their built environments. Those dissensions range from conceptual 
dissensions to practical dissensions in terms of mechanisms of operation. Such dissensions 
denote incompatibility between the two modes. Accordingly, the coexistence between the two 
modes in the contemporary Arab Muslim world, loaded with such substantial systemic 
dissensions, leads (is leading) to internal systemic contradiction that is reflected, in turn, on the 
built environment. This chapter shows some of those dissensions, or points of tension between 
the power-based acquired mode and the rights-based inherited mode. 
8.2 QUANTITATIVITY OF POWER 
Power in its modern concept is quantitative. Three concepts of the quantitativity of power can 
be deduced from modem writings about power: first, power is quantitatively fixed; second, it is 
aggregative and cumulative; and third, power is quantitatively comparable. The first two 
concepts are discussed next while the third is discussed in section (8.2.2). 
First, power is quantitatively fixed. 
Power is "a facility for getting what one group, the holder of power, 
wants by preventing another group from getting what it wants" 
(Parsons rephrasing Mills, cited in Open University, 1975, p. 59) 
Power is often characterized as following what Parsons, in his criticism' of the "traditional" 
visions of power, called a "zero-sum" model. This model (as opposed to a "variable sum" 
model) signifies that when some win others lose (Giddens, 1995b, p. 199). Put differently, 
according to this model, power is something that A has over B, such that if A gains power, B 
correspondingly loses (Marshall, 1994, p. 413). 2 
PA + PB =n (PA, PB: power of A, B respectively) 
(n is a fixed quantity) 
In his criticism of Mills' theory in "The power elite". 
2 Arguing with a "variable-sum" model of power, Parsons does not reject the quantitativity of power. 
In his model, he made an analogy between power and money, that is, as money X+Y might come to 
be more than their pure sum because of interest, so with power. Both models of power (zero-sum and 
variable-sum) are quantitative. The difference is in how to measure power. 
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Parsons, in criticizing the " zero-sum" model, departed from the " variable-sum" or " non- 
constant sum" model which he argued with. This latter model is quantitative; it stands for 
power that has an expandable value which increases and, in certain cases, decreases. ' That is, 
PA +PB#n 
Second, power is aggregative and cumulative. ' 
(n is a fixed quantity) 
" in unity there is strength" 
(An old maxim, cited in Wrong, 1979, p. 243) 
Put symbolically, the power of A and B together is greater than the power of A and/or that of B 
separately: 
P(A+B) > PA or PB (PA, PB: power of A, B respectively) 
or P(A+B) (collectively) > PA+PB (when PA and PB are separate) 
Arguing with this concept of collective power, Hobbes declares that if diverse particular 
powers are combined, they form a power greater than any one of them. For him, the power of 
the sovereign is greater than the power of any single subject or group of subjects, since it 
combines the powers of all of them (Hindess, 1996, p. 14-15). Likewise, the pluralists hold that 
the collective power of organized and solidarys groups controlling the aggregated resources of 
individuals is capable of achieving goals far beyond the capacities of individuals. It is more 
enduring and superior to the power of unorganized aggregates of people as well as to that of 
the most powerful individuals (Wrong, 1979, p. 243). 
8.2.1 Mobilization of power 
Two types of resources can be distinguished in the processes of generating collective power. 
First, human resources, and second, material resources. 
8.2.1.1 MOBILIZATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES (collective power) 
Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group 
and remains in exercise only as long as the group keeps together. 
(Arendt, cited in Wrong, 1979, p. 144) 
In the modem concept of power, collective human resources are seen as more significant than 
individual resources. Wrong described this as "sociological commonplaces" (1979, p. 144). 
Collective power is produced by a process of human mobilization of individuals and their 
3 In his "variable-sum" model, Parsons asserted that collective power (power of society) is, in most 
cases, greater than that of its aggregates (in unity there is strength). Stressing the expandable character 
of power, he marginalized, even in the analogy he drew with money, the situations in which collective 
power is less than that of the individuals who make up the collectivity. 
Aggregative denotes having the tendency to collect aggregates into wholes or particles into masses. 
Cumulative means increasing in quantity and effect by additions. 
s "Solidarity", as Dahl defined it, is "the capacity of a member of one segment of society to evoke 
support from others who identify him as like themselves because of similarities in occupation, social 
standing, religion, ethnic origin, or racial stock" (Dahl, cited in Wrong, 1979, p. 133). 
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resources. The creation and maintenance of collective resources is a central concern of 
sociological and political studies, where the question of "who get mobilized? " is a crucial one. 
In this process, individuals sharing common interests or values are mobilized, and their 
resources, consequently, are aggregated. 6 In this sense, as Wrong proclaims, the size of the 
group in terms of the number of its members might become an important collective resource. 
That is, mobilization of more resources possessed by members of the group means inflation of 
collective resources, thus more collective power. However, mobilization of aggregated 
resources provides the group with no more than a potentiality for having power (Wrong, 1979, 
p. 130-142). Producing and maintaining collective power require pertinacious and redintegrative 
(according to changes in circumstances) mechanisms of organization that operate within the 
process of mobilization. Those mechanisms, directed towards coordinating the activities of the 
group's members and their resources, make possible the mobilization of the aggregated 
resources into collective resources which in turn generate collective power. In other words, the 
old maxim "in unity there is strength" works only in the presence of organizatory mechanisms 
that bring this unity into effect (fig. 8.1). Part of this organization task is to keep the group united 
around particular interests and not facing internal divisions. In that respect, "unity is very, very 
important, collective action is absolutely decisive"' (cited in Flyvbjerg, 1998a, p. 63). 
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(fig. 8.1): Mobilization of resources 
in the acquired mode. 
6 In recent literature, one can distinguish three types of theories of mobilization: first, that of pluralists 
who assume that mobilization is a cost free process. Second, rational choice theory which focuses on 
the barriers to mobilization, and third, the radical literature perspective centred on the less advantaged 
groups or collectivities. As Henig (one of its theorists) argue, the unlikeliness of political success 
forces the marginalized and the powerless people to resign themselves to the status quo rather than to 
mobiliz (Gottdiener, 1987, p. 262-3). 
This is a saying of the Chairman of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce's City Centre Committee 
in the planing project of Aalborg, Denmark (cited in Flyvbjerg, 1998a, p. 63). 
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According to modem concepts of power, this organizatory mechanism does not exist on the 
level of society at large, or on the level of groups and organizations. Each group has to establish 
its own organizatory mechanisms in order to produce power, while between groups, the law, in 
some cases, organizes relationships. For example, if an environmental problem or need occurs, 
such as creating a new street, then an organization' is to be established to construct that street. 
As this case lies within the area of acceptance of the higher authorities (government), thus to 
facilitate the mission of this organization, certain internal rules will be enacted which will in 
turn provide this organization with the needed power to be exercised over (domination) other 
parties. This organization will be, within its scopes, more superior than some other parties. In 
such situations, the process of establishing and maintaining such organizatory mechanisms is 
highly costly for society; it depletes some of the society's resources (time, efforts, financial 
resources, etc. ). It might, as Weber implied, end up in bureaucratic structures that do not 
advance the group's common goals (Weber, 1978). 
Accordingly, in the acquired mode, two kinds of power can be distinguished in terms of the 
scopes of their exercitation: external power and internal power. Organized groups are 
perceived of as exercising power over non-members in a process of exercising power to 
achieve their collective goals. This type of power is called here external power, as it is exercised 
over external (non-member) parties. However, in the process of the internal organization 
(systematization), the group itself develops an internal power structure, directing the activities 
of its own members. Internal organization comprises a presence of leadership, vertical hierarchy 
or power structure, and rules governing interactions between members and between members 
and outsiders (non-members). In other words, power is exercised internally over members of 
group in a form of domination. This type of power is called here internal power. This might be 
seen as leaders of the group exercising their legitimate authority, based on consensus, over 
subordinate members, i. e. consensual form of power (as in the Parsonian school). However, as 
Wrong stated, the notion of "collective goal" need not carry the implication that such a goal is 
necessarily established by consensus among the members of the group organized to achieve it. 
Some groups are held together by fear or material incentives, i. e. by coercive or inducement. 
Consequently, organized groups are themselves arenas in which individuals and subgroups 
engage in conflicts, just as the groups themselves contend for power in the larger society 
(Wrong, 1979, p. 139). Accordingly, we can say that the acquired mode, whether perceived as 
centralized or plural, is based on exercitation of power (internal and external power) that 
embodies the notion of domination. 
Collectivity in the acquired mode, based on the zero-sum model, implies more power than that 
of the aggregates and of some other parties, thus asymmetrical distribution of resources. This 
8 Organization here does not necessarily signify an identified entity in the sense of an institution such as 
municipalities, but it is a group of individuals forming one party that has certain collective goal(s) and 
working to achieve that goal. In the example above, this is a government-based organization which 
might comprise members from different institutions (e. g. it might comprise employees from the 
municipality and others as private contractors). 
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in turn implies domination over other parties; achievements for some parties (the collectivity) 
on the account of others, which might be, in certain cases, destructive to those other parties. In 
that sense, collectivities operate in many cases as pressure groups that tend to affect decision- 
making processes according to their own interests. For example, in planning activities many 
collectivities use their power to affect the decision-making process, however, decision-makers 
cannot respond to all parties' conflicting interests, thus, in most cases, the interests of the more 
powerful groups or the more pressing or effective (e. g. more effective politically, for example in 
the next political elections of city council or so) are respected. Stone has noticed this fact in his 
analysis of an urban renewal project in the city of Atlanta. He found that local government was 
biased against the poor and in favour of organized interests from the business community (cited 
in Gottdiener, 1987, p. 144). 9 The same conclusion was made by Flyvbjerg in his analysis of re- 
planning the city centre of Aalborg1° (Flyvbjerg, 1998a). 
Demonstrating the effect of collectivities as pressure groups in the planning decision making 
process, Flyvbjerg explains that in later stages of the project of Aalborg, when it was decided to 
involve the public in the project, " many collective groups took part in the planning process such 
as Danish Cyclist Federation, Neighbourhood Associations, Aalborg Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce (representing local shops, industrial enterprises, banks, and other businesses). Some 
individual citizens (aggregates, mainly shopkeepers) participated in the project, however, their 
objections and ideas were not considered seriously (Flyvbjerg, 1998a, p. 54-57) as such 
aggregates are of less power compared to other pressure or influential (organized) groups in 
the project. Moreover, in this project, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce representing 
influential parties (politically and economically) had more pressure and power on the decision- 
making process throughout the project than other private collectivities such as Neighbourhood 
Associations whose demands were in most cases ignored (1998a, p. 61). However, this Chamber 
worked for the interest of the business community as a whole, i. e. to a public interest and not to 
its members' specific interest, individually. In other words, within the collectivity, individual 
interests lapse. For example, one shopkeeper objected that executing the Aalborg proposal 
would cause damage to his newly renovated shop because of the vibration of the increased 
number of buses in the city centre. The main issue the Chamber was fighting for was not this 
buss issue but other issues (the lifting of restrictions and the permission of private cars into the 
In that respect, Stone states that this outcome is caused by the operation of city bureaucracy and not as 
a result of some alleged concordance of interests between local officials and business (Gottdiener, 
1987, p. 144). 
10 The Aalborg project is an award-winning project, recommended by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development as a model for international adoption, on how to integrate 
environmental and social concerns into city politics and planning, including how to deal with the car 
in the city. In 1995, triumphing over 300 nominees, this project has been awarded the "European 
Planning Prize" by the European Union in Brussels. It was awarded this prize for developing what the 
jury viewed as an innovative, democratic urban policy and planning with particular emphasis on the 
involvement of citizens and interests groups (Flyvbjerg, 1998a, p. 9, p. 237). 
In the earlier stages of the Aalborg project, public participation was not even thought of. In later 
stages, the public were involved in a very limited informative manner (Flyvbjerg, 1998a, p. 54-7). 
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centre) that, as the Chamber assumed, would benefit the public interest. Put differently, the 
Chamber (as a collectivity) assumed a public interest and performed to fulfil it, regardless of its 
members' interests. " Hence, each collectivity, or power, in the acquired mode has its own 
rationality but in the end the more powerful formulates its rationality as being the truth and 
works to accomplish it. In that sense, planning activities imply domination of some interests 
over others, thus asymmetrical distribution of benefits. 
Acknowledging the human nature of " lusting for power", and as collectivities are more 
powerful than their aggregates, thus this notion of collectivities has become widely advocated 
and employed in capitalist societies leading to pluralist societies. Eventually, this attitude 
transforms society into a segmented mosaic society where individuals find themselves weak if 
not belonging to particular collectivity(ies) that, when necessary, perform as pressure groups. 
Although in the inherited mode, the concept of collective power (" in unity there is strength") to 
achieve outcomes does exist, yet, this notion in Muslim societies is not influential as it is in the 
acquired mode. The reason is that, in principle, the size of the party in the inherited mode, 
whether comprised of an individual or group (institution), does not affect the legitimacy and 
strength of its power (as shown in previous chapters). Rights structures are the determinant of 
power distribution in any interaction, regardless of the size or nature of the parties involved (i. e. 
whether individual or collectivity). That is, as power in Islam is derived from rights, thus as 
long as the actualized rights of a party, in any specific case where it is exercised (actualized), is 
legitimate according to the Islamic legal system (shari'a), then it is indefeasible, even if it is 
opposed by another party (that might be reputed, in modem concepts, as a greater power (e. g. 
state or sovereign)) which controls more effective resources. For example, in one case the caliph 
Yazid (d. 64H/683AD) wanted to widen a stream which reaches his land through peasants' lands 
(known as Yazid river). However, the peasants did not allow him to do so. Caliph Yazid could 
not force his action on them using his position as a resource of power. Power in such cases is 
definite. Agreement was reached as a result of the two parties' dialogue in which the caliph 
pays the peasants' lands tax for a year in return of widening the stream in their lands ('Ibn 
`Asaker, 1979, v. 1, p. 245-6). In this case, the power (according to the acquired mode) of the 
caliph did not give him the legitimacy to complete his action. This power is not based on a 
right, thus it is not a legitimate power according to shari'a. That is, the caliph's action exceeded 
his scope and trespassed into the scope of exercitation of the peasants. 
12 In this case of Aalborg project, the Chamber objected to the municipality planning proposal and 
worked to present a counterplan. The Chamber Committee responsible for this alternative plan set its 
goals according to its assumed business community interests, where these assumed interests were 
opposing the municipality's proposal. In a later stage of their work on the counterplan, the Chamber 
Committee discovered that most of the business community were with the municipality's plan as it 
nourishes the business in the city centre. Thus, in this stage, the Committee discovered that its 
assumed public interest contradicts with the real public interests. This in turn led to internal divisions 
in the Chamber Committee. The Steering Committee as the upper hand in the Committee decided to 
ignore these divisions and majority opinions and interests and to show the outside a united front, thus 
its vision of the project dominated, i. e. tactics were prioritized over consensus. In short, as Flyvbjerg 
put it, the "rationalization" of the powerful dominates (Flyvbjerg, 1998a, p. 61-67). 
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In the inherited mode, legitimate resources that, when employed (exercised), generate power are 
rights. In such cases, legitimate rights are considered the greater power; thus all other powers 
(even that of the state) opposing it are considered, relatively, of less strength. Therefore, 
collectivities in the inherited built environment do not mean more power. Collectivities imply 
larger scope of exercitation for the collectivity, however, such large scope does not necessarily 
denote greater power. As rights distribution in the inherited mode is determined according to 
rights structures, thus if it infringes on other small party's (individual) scope of exercitation, 
then such action has to be stopped. In that sense, collectivities in the inherited mode are treated 
on equal bases according to the structures of rights. In short, in the inherited mode there is no 
superiority for collective power (i. e. party comprised of group, to use the term of the acquired 
mode) over the power of an individual as a party in any interaction, even for the common 
interest (as explained in the previous chapter). The determinant factor in relationships between 
parties in the inherited mode is the rights-based pondering (balancing) mechanisms and not the 
superior power as the case in the acquired mode (fig. 8.2). 
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(fig. 8.2): Mobilization of resources 
As power resources in Islam are rights, thus mobilization in the inherited built environment 
does not mean mobilization of such resources. Each party in Islam has its own distinct rights 
according to structures of rights. Rights of the collectivity are not equal to the sum of the rights 
of its members. The mobilized group becomes a party that has its own rights, distinct from the 
sum of the rights of its members. For example, the dead-end street party is not perceived in the 
inherited built environment as a collective party which rights are derived from the sum of the 
rights of its members but as a party that enjoys the situal rights of its dead-end street. The group 
in the inherited mode is dealt with as a party and not as aggregates of parties, all pooling their 
resources (rights) in the larger group. In short, mobilization processes and collectivities in the 
inherited mode do not follow a quantitative method as the case in the acquired mode. 
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Rights in the inherited built environment operate as self-organizatory mechanisms. Those are 
ubiquitous mechanisms that always exist even in unprecedented situations. They operate in 
mobilizing the aggregated actions of parties into collective coordinated actions. That is, as 
resources denote rights according to Islam, thus mobilization in the inherited mode is for 
actions and not resources. It is a utilization of human resources to achieve outcomes without 
any intermediate (higher) party (e. g. the state), as in the case of fulfilling collective 
environmental tasks (as explained below). The existence and operation of collectivities in Islam 
is framed and directed by shari `a towards beneficial gains without harming others. It is 
mobilization for beneficial purposes and cannot in any case be destructive. Otherwise those 
(supposedly) destructed parties, through their rights, oppose such a collectivity. For example, 
there exist in Muslim societies group parties in the form of collectivities such as parties 
controlling dead-end streets, thus keeping-up those streets, such as cleaning and maintaining 
them, is the responsibility of its controlling party (inhabitants). In that sense, human resources 
were utilized to accomplish the built environment' main tasks. Minimizing burden on society, 
such tasks were distributed between residents in the inherited built environments. In short, 
collectivities in their modem sense are not legally forbidden in the inherited mode (if not 
contradicting shari `a) but are not common as their logic, according to the acquired mode (lust 
for power), does not resonate with the logic of the inherited mode and its built environment. 
Today, Neighbourhood Associations in the acquired mode might seem to resemble these dead- 
end street collectivities. Dead-end street collectivities were the decision-makers in their areas, 
whereas Neighbourhood Associations today are no more than pressure groups that, through 
mobilization into collectivities, obtain more power than if aggregated. Thus they are not the 
decision-makers in their areas. Moreover, such collectivities in the inherited mode are 
legitimate collectivities that have certain rights according to Shari `a, however, collectivities in 
the acquired mode seek legitimation from the higher authorities, which might not even have any 
value at certain times. Moreover, the size of the collective party (or the number of individuals 
composing a party) in the dead-end street (as an example of such collectivities in the inherited 
mode) does not affect the power of such a collectivity. Its rights are determined by shari `a 
according to the rights distribution maps, where enlargement of the collectivity size does not 
lead to inflation of resources, and thus to more power. For example, in one case from the 
inherited built environment, one house owned by a neighbour (A) was abutting a dead end street 
but had no access to it (fig. 8.3). This neighbour (A) had a small, covered, long unused septic 
tank within the dead-end street, and he wanted to use it again. The owners of the dead-end street 
objected. However, they could not prevent him from his action as it was of his rights to use the 
septic tank, as it possessed the right of precedence (al-Wansharisi, v. 9, p. 32). In this case, the 
collective party, as a result of its nature as a collectivity, could not enjoy more power than the 
opposing individual party. In any case, each party, regardless of its size and nature (i. e. 
collectivity or individual party), has its own rights that generate power when actualized, thus, in 
general, collectivities in the inherited mode are considered as a one party regardless of its size. 
In short, unlike its counterpart in the acquired mode, power (actualized rights), according to its 
conception in the inherited mode, is not a quatititative notion. 
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Such collective parties in the inherited mode operate according to their rights. However, outside 
the realm of the collectivity, each member within the collective party, such as the dead-end 
street residents, constitutes a party in itself that has its own rights and thus scope of exercitation. 
However, as documented cases reveal, there are no posited, imposed, hierarchical, 
organizational relationships between inner (aggregated) parties within such collectivities, i. e. no 
internal power but rights-based self-organizatory mechanisms, thus, no domination of one 
individual party over another. 13 For example, in one case a man (party A) owned all the houses 
on a dead-end street except for a one house owned by another person (party B). The owner of 
the houses (A) built a gate on the mouth of the dead-end street. Party B objected. The judge 
ruled that the gate should be demolished (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 7). In this case, the 
collective party controlling the dead-end street consisted of two residents, where party A 
controls more properties than party B. Nevertheless, party A does not have more power than 
party B in that specific case, as the control of the dead-end street is shared by the two parties (A 
and B) as a one collective party (C). Thereby, internal organization of the collective party of the 
dead-end street was based on rights between parties. In that respect, based on the structures of 
rights, domination is absent within collectivities in the inherited built environment. 
Moreover, Islam tends to reduce the environmental tasks that need collective efforts to the 
minimum, fulfilling these tasks through parties contributions and cooperation (not 
agglomeration), employing self-organizing mechanisms derived from rights, without a need to 
establish institutions (e. g. state organizations, municipalities) for such tasks as the case in the 
acquired mode. Certain principles were developed throughout time regarding the shared 
responsibilities towards public objects in the city that are of benefit to the entire community 
" Although the form of 'power-over' is not the general common form of power in Muslim societies, 
nevertheless, it might be found in internal power relationships within groups. For example, it might 
be found in power relationships between employers and their employees, or between a tenant and the 
owner or controller of the property. In that latter case, the tenant is subject to instructions and rules set 
up by the party who controls that tenancy. However, these power-over relationships are not 
unrestricted. They are framed by the general Islamic legal system (shari'a), and directed towards 
achieving certain outcomes. This type of power relationship is often based on consensus (e. g. leasing) 
or material incentives (e. g. job contracts) between parties. 
Dead-end street 
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(Akbar, 1992, p. 402-5; 1988, p. 173-7). In cases of cruciality14 (e. g. external threat on the city 
where its walls are weak), preserving major public elements is the responsibility of all city 
inhabitants. In 792H. /1390AD. the inhabitants of Aleppo reconstructed their city wall (Lapidus, 
1967, p. 64). 15 However, in cases of non-crucial but needed tasks that are of common interest, 
provided they are distributable tasks, such as lighting the city and fire protection, such tasks 
were distributed among concerned parties. In 383H. /993AD., shopkeepers in Cairo were ordered 
to have ready a water bucket as a precaution against fire. Making such tasks obligatory were 
usually part of the muhtasib role (Ziyadah, 1962, p. 135-6). Moreover, as documented cases 
reveal, it was a common practice for shop owners to clean and water the spaces in front of their 
shops (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 6, p. 420). 16 In general, each party in the inherited built 
environment is responsible for its actions' consequences. In one case in Qairawan, Tunisia, 
washing water was discharged from some houses to the street through small holes under the 
doors. When informed about it, the judge of Qairawan announced that whoever did not stop the 
flow of water would be punished ('Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., p. 439). 
Those mechanisms can actually be applied to the acquired built environment today. However 
they need a decentralised mechanisms to sustain them, i. e. without the intervention of the state 
as the provider of most main utilities (e. g. electricity, water). For example, one can think of 
lightning each street by its street residents. Each property owner is responsible of the area 
abutting his property. Thus, this task is distributed on the residents and not outsider controlling 
authority. But what about non-inhabited streets such as external highways, or streets adjacent to 
owned but not utilized lands, and who decides what type of lighting each street should have? 
Those issues will be clarified in chapter nine below. 
Similarly, in the acquired mode, the task of discharging rainwater is the responsibility of certain 
institutions (whether private and/or public) that are entitled some power to fulfil such a task. In 
the inherited mode, such problems are distributed, through self-organizatory mechanisms, 
between parties without the intervention of the higher authority as a mediator in coordinating 
actions of parties. Accordingly, and as most properties in the inherited built environments are 
privately owned, thus most of the environmental tasks are the responsibility of the inhabitants to 
accomplish. In that sense, if we look at the built environment as territorially divided according 
to the rights of each physical territory, i. e. in terms of territorial rights structures (map of rights 
In Islam purposes of actions are divided into three categories, according to the degree of their need: 
crucial, needed and improvement (ash-Shatibi, v. 2, p. 17-23). 
'S Al-'Abdousi was asked about the cost of reconstructing the city wall in Fez, he answered that it 
should take priority over other tasks from the waqfs of the city. Al-Barzali from Tunis (d. 844), ruled 
that, in case there is no wagfs for the city wall, citizens should participate by paying for the renovation 
of the city wall in proportion to their property values (al-Wansharisi, v. 5, p. 351). 
16 Al-Lakhmi (d. 478/1085) was asked about the mud near waste water, he answered that each group of 
people should remove the mud in front of their spaces (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 6, p. 420-1). Note here 
that al-Lakhmi put the responsibility of such a task on parties concerned in the site and not on any 
external parties such as higher authorities as the case in the acquired mode. 
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of every physical setting)", then those territorial rights structures can be translated into a map of 
responsibility distribution in the built environment. As state properties are quite limited in the 
inherited built environment (see p. 132 above), the state in this map has a very limited scope. 
Thereby, the state's role in the production process of the inherited built environment is very 
limited. " In this territorial map, each party is responsible for his property and its fina', however, 
for those areas and tasks that are not included within parties' direct responsibilities, such as 
maintaining the city walls, the residents cooperate to fulfil them. For example, discharging 
rainwater is distributed into smaller manageable problems placed in the hands of residents 
through the right of masil al-ma' or rain-water easement rights. 19 Each property is responsible 
for discharging its rainwater through others' properties through small channels on roof terraces 
of others, depending on its rights acquired by precedent or through agreements reached through 
dialogue between related parties. Some of those channels may join to form larger ones if the 
residents agree. The size of those larger channels does not exceed the limit of the relevant 
parties' manageable capacity. Thus, rainwater is discharged into thousands of gullies and 
waterspouts (rather than into large channels or drains as in the acquired built environments). A 
large environmental problem, which constitutes a burden that requires efforts and capital to 
solve, is prevented in the first place by transforming it into smaller and smaller manageable 
problems. Each resident in a quarter has to respect the easement rights of others. 
Many documented cases have revealed such relationships between adjacent parties founded on 
relationships between properties. In one case, party A has a waterspout that throws its water into 
an adjacent neighbour B's courtyard. The neighbour B wanted to create a tunnel on party A's 
wall so as to reduce the damage caused to his courtyard due to the waterspout. Party A did not 
allow him as this tunnel will cause harm to his walls. Moreover, if party B wants to build in his 
courtyard, causing changes to that waterspout, then party B has to seek permission from the 
owner of the spout. That is, party A has an easement right in his neighbour B's property, thus 
any changes in this waterspout has to be approved by its owner A (al-Tutayli, n. d., p. 153-4; Ibn 
ar-Rami, n. d., p. 417). Such rights created an overlap between properties. Consequently, 
techniques were invented to solve such overlaps. Such kinds of solutions, evolved through trial 
and error over time, have become conventions, forestalling problems and avoiding disputes in 
the first place. Eventually, through easement rights and other similar rights-based mechanisms 
major tasks (e. g. cleaning streets, sewage) are accomplished with minimum burden on society. 
This, ultimately, leads to a built environment with minimized problems. 
To conclude, collective power in the inherited mode is based on cooperation and not 
agglomeration (in its modem sense), thus causes no depletion of society's resources. In 
This map is an elaboration of situal rights map explained in the previous chapter. However, this map 
does not refer to categories of physical settings such as dead-end streets and through streets, but to all 
settings in the built environment as related to their controlling parties. 
18 For example, the muhtasib as an administrative state official, has a limited role in the production of 
the built environment. 
19 Such rights operate as mechanisms that help in reducing problems to the minimum size possible. 
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contrary to the acquired mode, institutions for fulfilling environmental tasks (e. g. water and 
sewage institutions) do not exist in the inherited built environment; it is a self-growing, self- 
maintained built environment. This justifies what Weber stated as to the absence of guilds-like 
associations in Muslim societies and defies and falsifies some Orientalists' claims (e. g. 
Massignon, Grunebaum) about the existence of guilds in those societies. Guilds as collectivities 
embody domination, thus are destructive to some parties, therefore they were absent in Muslim 
societies. Those claims reflect a deficient comprehension of Muslim cities as they were based 
on investigations on the manifested and/or the operative levels only and were not linked to the 
rights structures that belong to the imperceptible level. 
In general, in the acquired mode, collective power directed toward achieving certain goals 
implies that the collectivity controls the collective resources of its aggregates to generate the 
collective power and the individuals cease to control their resources. In contrast, individuals in 
the inherited mode maintain their control over their resources and enjoy the rights attached to 
these resources. In that sense, collectivities in the inherited mode operate to fulfil the interests 
of the group without disrespecting the individual interests of its aggregated parties, thus no 
asymmetrical distribution of costs and benefits as the case in the acquired built environments. 
To summarize, in the inherited mode, as the mechanisms that unite and coordinate the 
aggregated actions into collective ones exist as self-organizatory mechanisms; and as the rights 
of each party are predetermined according to the rights distribution maps, i. e. no lust for power; 
and as decision-making process is in the hands of the immediate parties involved with no 
intervention from external parties, thus there is no need for pressure groups to affect decision- 
making. Therefore, mobilizing human resources does not constitute a crucial issue in the 
inherited mode as it is in the acquired mode. 
8.2.1.2 MOBILIZATION OF MATERIAL RESOURCES 
As to mobilization20 of material resources, pooling material resources constitutes part of the 
mobilization process of human resources into collective power, described above. What concerns 
us in this research is the opposite process: the mobilization of collective resources into 
individual resources. For example, in the inherited mode, dead lands (mawat) are collective 
properties, owned by all Muslims collectively and not by the state (p. 133). Revivification of any 
dead land, leading to its ownership by its revivifier means mobilizing that collective resource 
into an individual one. Unlike the acquired mode where the focus is more on mobilization into 
collective power, this type of mobilization of material resources was important in the inherited 
built environments as it facilitated access to resources to all society members. 
Rights in the inherited built environment are locational, i. e. actualized only if related to sites or 
elements in the built environment; thus mobilizing material resources (assets) implies 
mobilizing the rights attached to those assets. In the previous example, mobilizing a piece of 
dead land from being collectively owned asset into an individual property implies that all rights 
11 Mobilization is used here in the meaning of transference and shift. 
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attached to that land and constitute its inseparable supplements (marafiq)Z', such as its fina ', 
rights of passage, rights of rain-water discharge, rights of servitude and the like, are also 
mobilized (retained by the revivifier). Those mobilized rights act as a resource to the party 
controlling the property to which they are attached. Mobilization of resources does not, as the 
case in acquired mode, imply a potential power; but it increases the party's scope of 
exercitation, i. e. its territorial scope. Mobilized rights, if actualized in any interaction with other 
rights, provide its party with facilitating "power to" achieve outcomes (not "power over"). 
Thus, mobilization of material resources in the inherited built environment increases the 
potentiality of actualizing, thus, utilizing rights attached to these resources. 
In most cases, collective property implies large party (in size) owning or controlling it, thus, in 
principle, responsibility towards this property would most likely be scattered between its 
members. Such parties, therefore, would not advance their goals effectively (Akbar, 1992, 
p. 148). To counteract this problem, in many cases in the acquired mode, large parties delegate 
some of their authorities to smaller sub-parties or even to individuals (as the relationship 
between central and local governments), yet maintain their control over those sub-parties and 
individuals, i. e. not losing power. This creates a vertical hierarchical order among involved 
parties. It is a tree-like order, thus, a sense of domination. In other words, within this process of 
mobilization, collective resources and thus power do not get mobilized into individual 
resources; the large party (central power) dominates. For example, in the Aalborg planning 
project in Denmark (as it is the case in most governmental planning projects), the main 
governmental institutions responsible for the project formed a Committee to be responsible for 
that project which in turn established a working group responsible for the planning process. 22 
However, the higher levels of this hierarchical order, maintaining their control over the project, 
retain the privilege of making or approving the final decisions. In many housing projects 
(compounds), for example, the company owning the project is a large party that delegates some 
of its responsibilities in the project to other sub-parties that work under the control of the 
owning-party (e. g. parties responsible for management, cleaning, maintenance, landscape, etc. ). 
Residents are also subject to this owning-party's power; they do not enjoy full control over their 
properties in the housing project. Moreover, as all unclaimed land in the acquired mode (in the 
Arab countries) is the property of the state (as explained in the next chapter), thus, when 
mobilizing any of those lands into private properties through planning processes, the state 
maintains its power over those lands by retaining its ownership over the public spaces and the 
infrastructure. Thus, the new private owners of those lands are always subject to the power of 
the state as service-provider. This issue is explained more in the next chapter. 
21 See previous chapter, p. 133. 
ZZ In the Aalborg project, four governmental institutions were responsible for the project: the Office of 
the City Engineer, the Planning Office, the Office of the City Architect, and the Aalborg Bus 
Company. Together, they established an Executive Committee to be in charge of the project. 
Subordinate to this Committee, a working team called the Task Force was established to design the 
project (Flyvbjerg, 1998a, p. 10). 
POWER VS. RIGHTS 193 
attached to that land and constitute its inseparable supplements (marafiq)Z', such as its fins ', 
rights of passage, rights of rain-water discharge, rights of servitude and the like, are also 
mobilized (retained by the revivifier). Those mobilized rights act as a resource to the party 
controlling the property to which they are attached. Mobilization of resources does not, as the 
case in acquired mode, imply a potential power; but it increases the party's scope of 
exercitation, i. e. its territorial scope. Mobilized rights, if actualized in any interaction with other 
rights, provide its party with facilitating "power to" achieve outcomes (not "power over"). 
Thus, mobilization of material resources in the inherited built environment increases the 
potentiality of actualizing, thus, utilizing rights attached to these resources. 
In most cases, collective property implies large party (in size) owning or controlling it, thus, in 
principle, responsibility towards this property would most likely be scattered between its 
members. Such parties, therefore, would not advance their goals effectively (Akbar, 1992, 
p. 148). To counteract this problem, in many cases in the acquired mode, large parties delegate 
some of their authorities to smaller sub-parties or even to individuals (as the relationship 
between central and local governments), yet maintain their control over those sub-parties and 
individuals, i. e. not losing power. This creates a vertical hierarchical order among involved 
parties. It is a tree-like order, thus, a sense of domination. In other words, within this process of 
mobilization, collective resources and thus power do not get mobilized into individual 
resources; the large party (central power) dominates. For example, in the Aalborg planning 
project in Denmark (as it is the case in most governmental planning projects), the main 
governmental institutions responsible for the project formed a Committee to be responsible for 
that project which in turn established a working group responsible for the planning process. 22 
However, the higher levels of this hierarchical order, maintaining their control over the project, 
retain the privilege of making or approving the fmal decisions. In many housing projects 
(compounds), for example, the company owning the project is a large party that delegates some 
of its responsibilities in the project to other sub-parties that work under the control of the 
owning-party (e. g. parties responsible for management, cleaning, maintenance, landscape, etc. ). 
Residents are also subject to this owning-party's power; they do not enjoy full control over their 
properties in the housing project. Moreover, as all unclaimed land in the acquired mode (in the 
Arab countries) is the property of the state (as explained in the next chapter), thus, when 
mobilizing any of those lands into private properties through planning processes, the state 
maintains its power over those lands by retaining its ownership over the public spaces and the 
infrastructure. Thus, the new private owners of those lands are always subject to the power of 
the state as service-provider. This issue is explained more in the next chapter. 
21 See previous chapter, p. 133. 
22 In the Aalborg project, four governmental institutions were responsible for the project: the Office of 
the City Engineer, the Planning Office, the Office of the City Architect, and the Aalborg Bus 
Company. Together, they established an Executive Committee to be in charge of the project. 
Subordinate to this Committee, a working team called the Task Force was established to design the 
project (Flyvbjerg, 1998a, p. 10). 
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In conclusion, it can be said that in the acquired mode, the problem of large parties is solved by 
distributing responsibilities among sub-parties under the control of the higher level party, i. e. 
the higher party does not lose power. It is a mechanism of distributing responsibilities and, 
simultaneously, concentrating power in the hands of the powerful (higher level parties). 
Islam, on the other hand, has a totally different conception regarding this dilemma. It tends to 
reduce the size of large parties, thus reformulating the maps of rights. In the inherited mode 
one can speak of reformulating rights maps, and not of redistributing rights. That is, as rights 
are not quantitative, they cannot be divided (redistributed) as the case of power in the acquired 
mode. Mobilizing material resources in the inherited mode does not imply redistributing power 
as the case in the acquired mode, but it denotes redistributing ownership rights. In other words, 
the sum of mobilized rights (attached to mobilized material resources) is not equal, neither 
quantitatively nor qualitatively, to rights of material resources before mobilization. Smaller 
parties to which resources have been mobilized acquire new rights qualitatively, due to their 
ownership over the mobilized resources. For example, a revivifier (party A) of a dead land 
gains, for example, the rights of precedence for his passage way, rain water discharge, openings, 
and the like. Such rights are created as a result of this party's right of ownership on the 
revivified land. Those rights have changed party A's scope of exercitation and the situal rights 
map of that piece of land (from being classified as dead-land, collectively owned, to a private 
property). Thus, the tendency in the inherited mode is to reduce the size of the larger parties23, 
yet, concentrate responsibility through investing rights within parties in the site. 
This process seems to work in a similar manner as that of the acquired mode in the sense that it 
tends to reduce the size of the party, however, unlike the case in the acquired mode, those 
smaller parties acquire rights (power) and control over, thus a sense of responsibility towards, 
their new properties, i. e. power is not retained in the hands of the few (the large party). For 
example, the revivified land (of party A above) becomes an autonomous private property which 
owner (party A) enjoys independence over its property. He is not subject to any external parties. 
Therefore, mobilization of material resources is considered an important process in Muslim 
society as it reformulates right structures for the benefit of the maximum possible number of 
parties in society. This process is thus not a process of delegation of power as in the acquired 
mode, but a process of reshaping rights structures in the built environment and society. In other 
words, it works as a mechanism of enablement24 in the Muslim society. It enables individuals 
to have access to resources. 25 Mechanisms such as revivification ('ihya'), allotment ('igta'), the 
23 In the inherited mode, this tendency of reducing the size of the party does not mean reducing the size 
to the minimum possible, but it reduces the size into the largest possible size with which its party can 
be efficient and responsible towards its property (Akbar, 1992, p. 150; 1988, p. 65). 
24 "Enablement" in the inherited mode is different than that of the acquired mode. Enablement in the 
Western contemporary sense means the enablement or empowerment of the less advantaged parties 
under the control of the higher, powerful party, as explained in chapter five above. 
25 It should not be understood from this that shari `a tends to partition properties or parties. For more 
about this issue, see Akbar, 1988; 1992. 
POWER VS. RIGHTS 195 
inheritance system ('irth) in the inherited mode facilitate this process of mobilizing material 
resources from collective ownership into smaller parties. 
In short, the tendency in the inherited mode is to bestow more rights to parties so as to enable 
them, and simultaneously, concentrate responsibility in parties. In this respect, this 
mobilization does not mean, as common in the modem power concept, that the collective party 
(larger party from which those resources were mobilized) loses power. Rights in Islam do not 
constitute a zero-sum model, as explained above. Moreover, rights attached to those collective 
resources do not generate power unless they are actualized, thus, if putative (as in the case of 
dead lands) there is no power to be lost. If collective resources are not utilized or utilized 
relatively ineffectively, then mobilizing those resources from being collective into individual 
property imply mobilizing the rights attached to them from putative (not actualized) to 
actualized (e. g. through revivification). 
8.2.2 Measurability of power 
Power is simply no more, but the excess of the power of 
one above that of another 
(Hobbes, cited in Hindess, 1996, p. 24) 
The third quantitative attribute of power, according to its modern concept, is that power is 
quantitatively measurable and thus comparable. 
Among others, Hobbes, Marx, Weber, Dahl and Mann argue that whoever has more power is 
dominant, i. e. if the desires of two parties conflict, the desires of those with more power are 
likely to prevail over the desires of those who have less (Hindess, 1996, p. 8,26). Accordingly, 
power can be perceived as measurable and, consequently, comparable. 26 This means that the 
amount2" of power that party A has in a certain context X28 can be measured. Likewise, parties 
can be ranked relatively, according to the relative amount of power they hold in that specific 
context. Finally, it can be said that "A has more power than B in context X" and/or "A has 
more power than everybody else in context X" (McLean, 1996, p. 397; Dahl, 1957, p. 206-209). 
Logically, based on the above, power, in comparable situations, is transitive: 
if PA > PB (PA is the power of party A) 
and PB > PC (PB is the power of party B) 
Comparable situations refer to those situations when, according to Dahl, if PA, PB and PC are "power 
comparable" (Dahl, 1957, p. 208). 
The amount of power, according to Dahl, can be represented by a probability statement, e. g. the 
chances are 9 out of 10 that the power holder will achieve his goals (Dahl, 1957, p. 203). 
Zs Powers can be measured and compared only in a specific context, where (1) the participating parties 
and (2) their means to achieve (3) their goals are known. In such cases, this situation is said to be 
"power comparable" (see Dahl, 1957, p. 205-6). Dahl used this notion of "power comparable 
situations" only in his empirical studies of measuring power that has been exercised in previous 
relationships (see his study in Dahl, 1957). This notion was not taken into consideration in measuring 
(predicting) power in future relationships as empirical power community studies showed. 
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then PA > PC (PC is the power of party C) 
(Dahl, 1957, p. 208) 
Based on this quantitative conception of power, many issues come to the fore, some of which 
are explored in the following sections. 
8.2.2.1 ASPECTS OF POWER 
Departing from Giddens's statement: "Power does not come into being only when being 
`exercised', even if ultimately there is no other criterion whereby one can demonstrate what 
power actors possess" (Giddens, 1993a, p. 118, emphasis added); it is important here to make a 
distinction between different aspects of power: potential power, latent power and episodic 
power. Potential power refers to the possibility of producing power through resources that are 
not presently employed to wield power, but could and might be so employed at some time if 
their possessor chooses to do so. Those resources are not known to anybody except their 
possessor, thus they do not connote a realized power but a potential for power (Wrong, 1979, 
p. 127). For example, the support of a famous politician to a pressure group in any planning 
project, if not known to the opposing parties, is considered as a potential power resource that 
might be employed when necessary as a pressure power to accomplish the groups' interests. 
Latent power denotes the unmanifest actual realized power that is possessed and known to its 
holder and to others, especially its subjects, but its holder chose not to exercise at a certain 
time(s), i. e. having power. For example, government might sometimes take no action against 
parties who violate building regulations, but at any time it can decide to exercise its power over 
them. Episodic power refers to the actual power that is in exercitation (Wrong, 1979, p. 6-8), for 
example, the control of the local state (e. g. City Council, Municipality) over city streets. 
Another distinction is to be made between covert power and overt power. Both are exercised 
powers, but the former is non-observable or not directly observable, i. e. exercised covertly; 
while the latter is directly observable, i. e. exercised overtly (Miller, 1991, p. 398). For instance, 
party A might exercise power covertly by controlling the agenda, thereby limiting discussion 
and decision-making to " safe" issues which would not threaten A's interests. 29 For example, 
citizen participation in many planning projects in the acquired mode is directed according to the 
wishes of the planning authority. In the planning of the Aalborg City, for example, a bus 
terminal was to be constructed, thus, the Bus Company (powerful party backed by the Mayor 
himself) chose Nytorv square as the location of the bus terminal. The project's working team 
accepted and adopted this selection. Evaluation of other alternative locations was carried out 
under pressure from other institutions, however, such evaluation was quite superficial and 
Z' These issues were the centre of wide debates in the field of community power studies. In their 
empirical studies of power, pluralists (pioneered by Dahl) advocated what is called a "decisional" 
approach within which, as Lukes proclaimed, they focused on one face of power: its overt face. On 
the other hand, elitists (e. g. Hunter and Mills) advocated the "reputational" approach, or what 
Bachrach and Baratz called "non-decision-making" approach, for studying power. This reputational 
approach focused on both, the overt and covert faces of power exercitation (Luker, 1974; Bachrach 
and Baratz, 1963). 
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"more ritual than real" (Flyvbjerg, 1998a, p. 15). It was very biased towards the location the 
Bus Company preferred. 3° These evaluations become mere rationalization of a political decision 
made in advance (Flyvbjerg, 1998a, 12-15,19-20). The working team directed the process of 
choosing the location of the bus terminal to serve their interests, regardless of other interests, 
thus keeping the decision "on track". In that sense, they exercised their power covertly in this 
matter. Moreover, the powerful Chamber of Industry and Commerce, using the media, directed 
the debate about the project between the public and the working team according to its own 
interests (Flyvbjerg, 1998a). In that sense, the Chamber exercised its power covertly. On the 
other hand, urban planing activities such as identifying zoning, land uses and, consequently, 
building regulations is considered an overt exercitation of power by authority (or its 
representatives) over parties in society. 
Linking this to the modern concept of power measurability, a question arises: how do we know 
at any one time what power a party has? To compare the power of two parties, power should be 
observed while exercised by those parties overtly. We can say that the episodic overt power is 
the only power that can be measured. Thus, the idea of power as a measurable concept is 
considered here partial and flawed; it cannot be applied to all aspects of power. 
IS POWER A PROPERTY OR A RELATION? 
The above discussion evokes such a question: is power a property or a relation? As power in 
its modem concept can be found in a latent or potential (unactualized) state, thus it can be said 
that power is a possessible property that, using Giddens's words, can be " stored up" for 
future occasions of use (Giddens, 1993, p. 118). In Islam, power is not a property that can be 
possessed, neither its sources. It exists as a relational concept; i. e. manifests in and comprises 
relationships between parties. There is no potential or latent power (not realized, or not 
exercised) as a general concept. Power in Islam is always related to actualized rights that are 
manifest only at a certain time and space through interactions between parties. Those rights 
outside that interaction may not generate power to its holder. 
However, as to rights in the inherited built environment, one can speak of latent property 
rights but not of potential rights. That is, as there is no unexercised power in Islam, and as 
rights (sources and resources of power) are known to all parties (transparent), thus potential 
rights are not recognized in the inherited mode. However, latent rights can be discerned in the 
inherited built environment, but as pertaining to properties rather than to parties. 
Manifest physical solutions, reached through agreements between immediate parties in any 
interaction or through judge's rulings, acquire rights that become attached to the property. Such 
rights are possessed by the physical property but enjoyed by its party only through interactions, 
The criteria set for the selection of the terminal site were designed to point only toward Nytorv. 
Moreover, in the evaluation process, Nytorv option was discussed in terms of the advantages of a bus 
terminal on this site, while for the remaining alternative locations emphasis was placed on their 
disadvantages. This method was also accentuated in the official final report on the bus terminal 
presented to the City Council and to the public (Flyvbjerg, 1998a, p. 22). 
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i. e. they are relational as pertain to parties. Those possessed rights perform as constrains on 
future actions of other parties, i. e. they act as resources (rights) that might generate power to its 
party when actualized in future interactions. For example, existing house doors or openings 
perform as constraints if a person wants, for example, to open a new door in his house opposite 
to the neighbour's existing door. Some of those rights such as rights of precedence (see p. 143 
above) perform as latent rights that can be perceived as ever-actualized rights, however, their 
party might choose not to exercise it at any specific time. For example, in the previously 
mentioned case (fig. 8.3, p. 189)3', the septic tank that existed in a dead-end street possessed the 
right of precedence. Thus, this physical solution (septic tank) has a latent right (of the property) 
that its owner is free to use whenever he wishes. Nevertheless, unlike the case of latent power in 
the acquired mode, latent rights in the inherited built environment generate power to its party 
only in relation to that specific physical element (manifest solution), i. e. it is not a general right, 
but a very limited right. For example, in the case of the septic tank above, the right of precedent 
provides its party with power only in interactions in which the septic tank is a variable. 
Rights-based mechanisms in the inherited built environment perform to eliminate abuse of such 
latent property rights. For example, if a party A opens a door to a dead end street and the judge 
ruled that the door to be closed as a result of other parties' objection, then all the traces of that 
door should be erased completely so that these traces will not posses the right of precedence and 
thus form a latent right that might generate power for party A in the future, for example in 
reopening the door as an old property32 (see al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 14; 'Ibn ar-Rami, n. d., 
p. 250-1). 33 Other examples of such mechanisms are those related to the rights of "possessing 
damage" (hiyazat ad-darar). 34 If a party A saw his neighbour (party B) initiating an action that 
would damage him or his property and did not protest at that time, his reticence is considered 
consent. In other words, party A's right to object does not perform as latent right that can be 
used in future interaction. In a case documented by al-Wansharisi, the owner of one house 
31 In one case, one house owned by a neighbour (A) was abutting a dead end street but had no access to 
it (fig. 8.3). This neighbour (A) had a small, covered, long unused septic tank within the dead-end 
street, and he wanted to use it again. The owners of the street objected. However, they could not 
prevent him from his action as it was of his rights to use the septic tank, as it possessed the right of 
precedence (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 32). 
32 One might argue that such cases demonstrated above exist as well in the acquired mode. For example, 
if a judge ruled that a store for example to be closed, then in this case the reference is the law, and the 
acting party did not base his action on any right, in the first place. However, he does not have to 
eliminate the traces of that store, because even if after a considerable time, he wants to open the store 
again, then those traces will not affect the decision, as the reference is always to the law. It is the law 
that enacts rights and not as the case in the inherited, where rights are generated (actualized) 
according to shari `a in the site itself. 
33 'Ibn Zarb states in this regard that closing the damaging door cannot be only done by removing the 
door and building brick in the opening but by eliminating all its traces, frames and lintel. If traces of 
that door exist, such as the frame or the lintel, then, this will cause future damage to the other party 
(whose objection led to the closing of the door) as these traces will act as a future plea to reopening 
the door (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 56). 
34 Right of precedence, is the right enjoyed by a property to continue the damage caused to other 
properties because its party preceded other parties in action (Akbar, 1988, p. 101-2). 
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(party B) in a dead end street that has fifteen houses opened a door that is not opposite to any 
other doors of the other houses, and no neighbour was absent while opening that door, however, 
after eight years one of the neighbours (party A) objected to this action. The jurist ruled that the 
neighbour's reticence all this time abolish his right to object (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 63). In 
this case, the right of party A to object to party B's action has lapsed, due to the long duration of 
time since the action was completed. In other words, the right of party A did not operate as a 
latent right which its party can use (or abuse to exert power over) at any time he wishes. Such 
mechanisms eliminate potential domination that might occur between parties in such contexts. 
As power in its modem concepts is a property possessed by its holder; it can be argued that it 
pertains to individuals (or groups) as parties. For example, power can be possessed by planners, 
pressure groups, state officials 35 (e. g. the Mayor in the Aalborg project), where those power 
holders can exercise their power in different locations or settings in the built environment. In 
the inherited built environment, however, power pertains to locations or settings within which 
relations or interactions take place. To summarize, while power in its modem concept is mainly 
a possessed property36, it is in Islam relational. Rights in the inherited mode are possessed as 
pertain to properties, however, they are relational as pertain to parties. Moreover, while power 
in its modem concept is partious (attached to parties), it is in the inherited mode locational. 
8.2.2.2 POWER STRUCTURE / POWER DISTRIBUTION 
Within ... societies, there 
is a tendency for their members to 
be organized into a hierarchy differentiated by access to 
scarce and valued resources. 
(Open University, 1975, p. 89) 
In investigating who holds power, two concepts have to be clarified: power structure and power 
distribution. Societies in the acquired mode are stratified societies (e. g. class-based societies)37 
in the sense that they are ranked hierarchically according to certain dimension of inequality (let 
us call it strata)" (Open University, 1975, p. 89). Stratification is a" social process through 
35 This holds true, in the acquired mode, even in the case of political power, as it is more related to 
positions than to individuals, yet, these positions are resources that certain parties attained. One can, 
therefore, talk of the political power possessed by persons A or B. 
36 Some scholars such as Foucault argue that power, in its modern concept, is relational as it is exercised 
in relationship. This is true but these relationships are based on the concept of power as a property 
that can be possessed and stored up for future uses. 
37 Some contemporary scholars argue that the concept of social classes is no longer relevant to an 
understanding of modem societies. The view that class in unimportant is disputed. Studies of social 
mobility have shown low rates of mobility, especially in "relative rates" of mobility, that is the 
relative chances of access to different class destinations for individuals of differing class origins. In 
that sense, as Abercrombie (et. al. ) states, class is still an influential factor in life-chances in industrial 
societies. In Britain, attitude surveys show that people perceive class to be important in terms of social 
differences and social justice (Abercrombie et. al., 1994, p. 63,388). 
38 Weber defined classes according to economic differences based on market capacity that gave rise to 
different "life-chances" (e. g. capital, skill, education). Deferential power was the point of origin for 
Weber's analysis of class. He considered class as only one of three phenomena of the distribution of 
power (inequality) within a community. Those are: class, power or party, and status group or prestige 
(Mann, 1983, p. 47). That is, as status and class represented for Weber the capacity to mobilize and 
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which rewards and resources such as wealth, power, and prestige are distributed systematically 
and unequally within or among societies" (Johnson, 1995, p. 283). Power structure refers to the 
ranking of those stratas according to the power they hold (fig. 8.4) (Johnson, 1995, p. 21 1), while 
power distribution is the measurement of power between parties in society (Dahl, 1975, p. 33). 
Power distribution might be seen as having a role in determining the power structure in the first 
place, and then determined by that power structure. 
Strafas ;""" '`:: _: _..: _ ýý"" society 
Possible societal 
structural form 
(fig. 8.4) 
Power structure Power distribution 
Stratification system might be affected by the distribution of scarce resources and power among 
society. However, once established, it becomes, as most modem writings about power presume, 
an important determinant of the distribution of scarce and valued resources, and consequently of 
the distribution, form and use of power (Open University, 1975, p. 89-90). Stratification is thus, 
first an outcome, and then a determinant. 39 In the acquired mode, according to Pahl (1975), 
scarce resource distribution is controlled by the state (through its bureaucrats, or urban 
managers, e. g. planners), thus life chances of residents are determined by the state (Saunders, 
1993, p. 119). In that respect, Pahl contends that in the urban system, bureaucrats' decisions 
(urban managers) determine degrees of access of different sections of the population to different 
types of crucial urban resources. Accordingly, conflict over resources is inevitable in such 
societies. In other words, the state controls environmental power distribution. It reinforces and 
amplifies the existing status quo of uneven inequalities between people (Gottdiener, 1987, 
p. 60). 
enjoy certain resources such as wealth and honour, these dimensions of stratification had to be 
regarded as simply manifestations of power (Turner, 1988, p. 65). Social status, according to Weber, is 
founded upon relationships of consumption rather than production (Abercrombie et. al., 1994, p. 57-8; 
Giddens et. al., 1982, p. 10). On the other hand, Marx stratified capitalist societies into classes in 
economic terms according to ownership of capital and the means of production: capitalist class and 
proletariat. However, class stratification today is explicitly based on the Weberian approach of life- 
chances. Thus, modern societies today have different stratification models (differences) according to 
the criteria of status stratification, whether it is wealth, income, occupation, power, prestige, 
education, age, ethnicity, or some other characteristic. 
This reciprocal idea can be noted in Johnson's definition of stratification and class. He defined 
stratification as the social process through which rewards and resources are distributed among 
societies (Johnson, 1995, p. 283). On the other hand, he defined social class as a social distinction and 
division resulting from the unequal distribution of rewards and resources (p. 256). From the first 
definition, stratification seems to be a determinant of power distribution within society, however, in 
the latter definition, it is a result of that distribution. 
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Most modem schools of thought (mentioned earlier, except the Giddensian one40), share the idea 
that power has a certain fixed (stable, according to Weber, 1978, p. 933) structure among 
society. They proclaim that power serves the interests of certain parties (individual(s), social 
class, status group) over that of others. For Marx, power is in the hands of the bourgeois. For 
Weber, "classes, status groups and parties are all phenomena of the power distribution in a 
community" (Weber, 1978, p. 927). The elitists see it as in the hands of the elites, however, for 
the pluralists, it is held by organizations. " No form of power structure, Parsons proclaims, 
changes unless a society witnesses a social change as a result of changing its binding values and 
norms (Giddens, 1995, p. 209), i. e. no change is possible in societal power structure unless the 
societal system changes. In the same vein, Marx argues that changes in societal systems 
(replacement of one mode of production by another which is then reflected in changes in 
stratification dimensions), as history proved, requires revolutions (Abercrombie et. al., 1994, 
p. 359). In that sense, societal power structure can be perceived as relatively static. As power in 
the acquired mode, as explained above, varies according to its sources and resources, thus it is 
dynamic. However, as societal power distribution changes quite slowly, thus it is considered as 
relatively variable 42 
In terms of the acquired built environment, power structure is considered relatively constant. It 
is defined in relation to the parties participating in the production of the built environment. 
Those parties are stratified into hierarchical levels according to their power. The central state is 
on a higher level than the local state. Citizens are lower level parties, subjected to the rules and 
regulation of the higher level parties. However, power distribution between parties might vary 
from one interaction to another according to the resources mobilized by parties involved. Such 
changes do not affect, in most cases, the general power structure in the built environment. 
General power distribution is determined by that relatively static power structure. Therefore, in 
most interactions in the acquired built environments, parties involved are ordered hierarchically, 
thus power relationships are, in most cases, established and thus well-known. Thus, as long as 
40 Giddens viewed power distribution as in frequent flux. He stated that "there are normally continually 
shifting balances of resources, altering the overall distribution of power" (cited in Cassell, 1993, 
p. 243). It can be inferred from Giddens's stand that, as power exercitation reproduces the structural 
properties (rules and resources) of the social system, thus always moving it from one structure to 
another; this, consequently, leads to ever-changing power structures within changing societal systems. 
41 For Parsons (Functionalist), social inequality results from the functional differentiation of roles and 
social positions in a complex society (open University, 1975, p. 119). In that sense, functionalists (e. g. 
Davis and Moore) argue that stratification is a functional prerequisite for all societies (Jary & Jary, 
1995, p. 623). 
42 The concept of power distribution per se in the sense defined by Dahl: "the measuring of relative 
amount of power of different actors in a system" (Dahl, 1975, p. 33) embodies a static concept, i. e. 
power value for each party is considered relatively constant in that system; it can be measured and 
ranked generally. This theoretical concept sounds contradictory to the practical aspects of power 
distribution. Members of society tend to mobilize more resources to gain more power or what we 
referred to as "lust for power", thus power distribution is relatively variable in the sense that there 
are continuous changes in the amount and type of power held by parties within a social strata 
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this environmental power structure persists, the mechanisms of the production of the acquired 
built environment persist. 
On the other hand, as Muslim societies are based on definite rights bestowed by shari `a and not 
on the notion of power as in the acquired mode, they are conceived as non-stratified societies. 43 
This can be inferred from the homogeneity of the manifested structure (building sizes, types, 
building material) in traditional Muslim cities. Muslim societies are organized according to 
structures of rights that determine the spheres of rights for each individual in society and for 
each physical setting. Most structures of rights that pertain to parties in the inherited built 
environment such as scopes of exercitation are dynamic, thus there is no absolute rights that 
always generate power to its holder. Rights actualized in each case, most likely, differ from 
those actualized in other cases or in other times. Accordingly, the concept of power structure in 
the sense used by modem schools is not recognized in the inherited mode, as explained next. 
ABSOLUTE POWER OR CONTEXTUAL RIGHTS 
Power, as explained, can only be measured in its episodic overt aspects. However, even within 
certain scopes, observing power in exercitation does not give an accurate idea about the 
"value"' (relative amount) of power held by that party, enabling a generalization regarding that 
party's power value to be made, as Dahl implies. Power within a certain scope changes 
according to the conditions encompassing each case within which it operates. It increases and 
decreases through time and space, according to the power relations' variables. For example, if 
powerful pressure groups were involved in a planning project, this might affect the power 
enjoyed by the planers in the project, i. e. according to the zero-sum model, decreases their 
power in that specific project. This is what happened, for example, in Aalborg project when the 
business community represented by the Chamber of Industry and Commerce took part in the 
project, thus, in a way, directed the project to fulfil their interests (see Flyvbjerg, 1998a). 
Every power relation has its own variables. They might include: the parties participating in the 
power relationship (the actors and the acted upon); scope or areas of acceptance of the parties 
involved; time; space; sources of power (in modem concepts: political, economic, ideological); 
and resources employed (in modem concepts: wealth, military force, occupation, skills, 
prestige, etc. ). Those variables cannot be enumerated generally and applied to all cases of power 
relationship. Each case manifests its own set of variables arranged in a certain manner. 
Thereby, power can be analyzed in relation to what a party does (or is expected to do) in a 
certain context only. It is contextual and cannot, in any case, be considered absolute. Its value 
43 One might argue that during the Islamic era, some sort of classes occurred such as the class of the 
rulers and their men, the class of soldiers, and the public. However, what seems as classes today was 
actually no more than functional roles, where actors of those roles enjoyed definite rights to fulfil 
their roles within the framework of shari'a. Thus, maps of rights derived from shari'a organized all 
relationships among members in society. It is a rights-based society and not a power-based society as 
in the acquired mode today. 
" While knowing that it denotes a quantitative measurable attribute, the term "value" is used here just 
for clarification in refuting the concept of power measurability. 
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cannot be described generally as static (as can be inferred from Dahl's definition of power 
distribution). This might be true in certain environmental cases only when the levels of the 
parties involved are indistinct, such as in some planning projects when different powerful 
parties are involved (with different sources and resources). However, as power structure is 
relatively constant, and thus the general environmental power distribution, thus power 
relationships are, in most cases, delineated. For example, private parties are always subject to 
the state's laws and regulations (as a higher level party). In such relationships, private parties 
are in lower level than the state. 
As each case of interaction in the built environment has its specific circumstances (and, 
theoretically, specific environmental power distribution45), there are an endless number of cases. 
It is impossible to encompass all these cases and deal with each case according to its specificity. 
Therefore, each of the inherited and the acquired modes corresponded to this issue according to 
its perception of power and power distribution. Islam introduced certain rights-derived 
mechanisms that are robust enough to solve this labyrinthic complexity. They are based on a 
proscriptive method with a one-to-one tendency in dealing with cases. The Islamic legal 
system provides rights-derived mechanisms, and not environmental solutions. Such mechanisms 
are "robust" in the sense that they can deal with unprecedented environmental cases. 
Environmental solutions can be found through rights in operation. For example, in cases of 
opening a new shop that is opposite to the neighbour's house door, different rulings were 
reached 47 In some cases the shop was ruled to continue if not causing damage to the neighbour, 
however, in other cases the shop had to be closed, as it causes severe damage. Such cases in the 
inherited built environments act as precedent for future possible similar cases. For example, 
respecting the rights of others, most house doors in the inherited built environments do not meet 
in opposite locations. Thus, over time, such precedent cases formulate environmental 
conventions and not regulations. 
On the other hand, to solve such a complexity in the acquired built environments, a 
prescriptive law with a one-to-all tendency in dealing with different cases was adopted. 
Therefore, to embrace all possible cases, a method of standardizing those cases was adopted 
through which the built environment is regarded as comprised of different physical zones. Each 
zones has its own relatively static power structure that works in the light of the central or local 
law and reflects the general power structure embodied in that law. Accordingly, the vast number 
of cases with different (theoretically) situal power structures in the built environment is reduced 
to the extent that it became controllable by the higher authorities and the law. Neither of those 
"s I say here theoretically, because such vast number of power distributions is eliminated in the acquired 
built environment due to the domination of the state over the built environment. Thus, most 
environmental relationships are defined as relationships between the state (or its representatives) and 
private parties. 
46 Prescriptive law specifies what to do, whereas proscriptive law refers to what not to do. The former is 
more limiting and restricting than the latter. 
See the examples presented in chapter two of this study, p. 16-17. 
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power structures changes unless the rules and regulations applied in its zone change, i. e. 
through the authority. In such an approach of one-to-all tendency and standardization, 
unprecedented cases that the law does not cover might lead to changes in the law or to impose 
some rules on that case which might not be quite appropriate. In such a situation, the law can be 
described as rigid and inflexible in the sense that it does not consider the specific variables of 
each case. It defines power relationships between parties in any environmental interaction. 
Thus, power in the acquired built environment can be described as non-cotextual, i. e. absolute. 
In the inherited mode, although rights, as the source of power, are fixed, yet rights distribution 
within Muslim society is ever changing. That is, putative rights as derived from shari `a are 
static, however, actualized rights as represented in scopes of execration and power distribution 
maps are dynamic 48 For example, 'Ibn Qudamah (d. 620 H. ) states that for a house that its back 
is facing a street, if this street was a through street, then opening a new door to this street is 
allowed, however, if this street was a dead-end street, then creating a new door to be used to 
pass into that dead-end street is not permitted. Here 'Ibn Qudamah distinguished between these 
two cases according to their variables (type of street), thus the acting party in each case enjoys 
different rights, thus different power. In a through street, the acting party has the right, thus the 
power, to open the door, whereas in a dead-end street, it does not have that right ('Ibn 
Qudamah, v. 4, p. 570-1). These two cases are discussed here with the assumption that the other 
variables are the same. However, if other variables take place in determining the ruling, then 
these variables have to be taken in consideration along with the type of the street mentioned 
above. For example, if a house owner opened a door into a through street that caused damage to 
other parties, then this door has to be considered in the light of this damage. Likewise, if the 
owners of a dead-end street approved the act of opening a new door into their street, then the 
acting party can then open the door. 49 
In that sense, power in the inherited built environment, as pertains to parties is dynamic, 
according to its generative dynamic rights, so as its distribution as represented in actual power 
distribution maps. Therefore, unlike the acquired mode, although rights in Islam are known, 
however, power distribution is unknown on the scale of Muslim society at large. Power in 
Islam, as mentioned earlier, is not a possessed property. It can thus be said that the concept of 
power distribution as used in the acquired mode does not exist in the inherited mode. 
It can be noted in most of the documented cases from the inherited built environment (e. g. those 
of 'Ibn ar-Rami, al-Tutayli, and al-Wansharisi) that the variables of the cases (e. g. parties 
involved; nature of intervening action; description of the site of interaction such as width and 
type of street; damage occurred; etc. ) were emphasized as the main determinants for pondering 
the relevant rights (of parties and properties) actualized in each case. For example, al-Kasani 
(Hanafi, d. 587H. ) asserts that building a projected chamber (janah) or a water-spout into a street 
is one of two sorts: if the street is through, then if this action causes any damage to the passers, 
's As explained when investigating rights structures in the previous chapter. 
I See situal rights maps discussed in the previous chapter, p. 159. 
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the action is prohibited, whereas, if this action does not cause any damage to the passers, then 
this action is permitted unless any passer has objected. However, if the street is a dead-end 
street, then it depends if the actor has the right to that action or not; if not, then the matter is left 
to the inhabitants of the dead-end street to decide, as the owning-party of the street (Al-Kasani, 
n. d., v. 8, p. 512-5). Here al-Kasani associated the ruling with the variables of the case: type of 
street, consequence of action, rights on which the action is based, existence of objection or not. 
This method of ruling may suggest a resemblance with regulations in the acquired mode. In fact 
it is not. Rulings are applied on one-to-one bases, thus they are circumstantial and not 
absolute. That is, as noted from the al-Kasani's opinion, the distinction in each case is not 
merely morphological (through or dead-end street) but depends (as shown in the previous 
chapter) on the circumstances of the case such as the degree of damage caused (assessed 
according to the principle of damage), objection of others, rights actualized, and the like, which 
are all interacting variables that ultimately generate diverse rulings and thus physical solutions. 
For example, in al-Medina (in 1268H. /1852AD. ), party A built in a through street in a manner 
that closed this street and transformed it into two separate dead-end streets (fig. 8.5). Some 
people in the city (party B) objected, but party A proved that the street was originally closed in 
the past as was told when he bought his house, thus now he reactualized what was an old right 
for his property (right of precedence). The street was decided to continue closed (al-Hathloul, 
1996, p. 90). In another similar case, 'Ibn Rushd (d. 520H. ) ruled to demolish a building that 
closed a very narrow through street (zanqa) and transformed it into two separate dead-end 
streets. This ruling was taken on the bases that the building is recent action while the street 
before this building was passable although narrow (al-Wansharisi, n. d., v. 9, p. 15-6). 
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Fig. 8.5: Transforming a through street into two dead-end streets. 
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These last two examples represented two similar cases with different rulings according to the 
difference in the variables of each case. Here, regardless of the people's need for a movement, 
the nature of the rights (actualized) on which the action was based performed as the determinant 
factor in the ruling reached. In the first case, the acting party had the right of precedence to that 
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action, whereas in the second case the action was recent, thus not based on a right, as the street 
is a public ownership. It can be noted that changing one variable in the case led to changes in 
the rights actualized, thus in power distribution, and thus in the ruling. In sum, in the inherited 
mode, it is rights that are contextual rather than power. Power in the inherited mode is 
contingent, whereas rights (actualized) are the determinant. 
To conclude, whereas the acquired built environment has a relatively absolute environmental 
power structure in which the state is always the supreme power that exercise its control over its 
people and the built environment; one can talk in the inherited mode about contextual rights in 
which each case demonstrates its specific rights, thus power, distribution. According to such a 
concept, power in the inherited mode is not always attached to certain parties and detached from 
others, i. e. there is no categorization of dominant or subjected party. Everybody has his chance 
to have power in certain contexts. Rights structures are the ultimate determinant of who gets 
power. In other words, the concept of power structure (in its modem sense), with respect to 
parties, does not exist in the inherited built environment. 
However, a question arises here with respect to the notion of quantitativity of power: In both 
concepts of power/rights, in the acquired and the inherited modes, can power/rights make us 
predict outcomes of interactions? 
8.2.2.3 PREDICTABILITY OF POWER RELATIONSHIPS 
To predict a power relation outcome is to asses the powers held by the involved parties, and 
then, by using certain criteria, weighing those powers in relation to each other and to the 
context, and at last predict outcomes. This process requires, necessarily, information about the 
power relation variables. As those variables are dynamic, they have to be known for each 
specific case. If this information is available, predictability could be reached. 
However, if power structure, according to its modem concept, is relatively static, and has (at a 
certain time) a particular power distribution, then power relations outcomes should be 
predictable. This means that, in any future relationship of power, the powerful parties and the 
subjected ones can be specified before the relationship takes place. The same applies for power 
relationship variables, as they might be predictable by analogy with precedent relationships 
(reputation). S° If power relations are predictable, then conflicts between parties should be 
predictable, thus, if possible, avoidable. This is the logic, but according to modern writings of 
power, this is not the case. That is, if parties involved in any interaction are of different levels 
(in the environmental power structure), then power relationship can be defined and its outcomes 
are predictable such as in private parties-state relationships. However, if parties involved belong 
to the same level of power structure, then the relationship outcome depends on the power 
distribution in that specific case. Although many attempts have been made, writers about 
30 As power is a property, holding power in the acquired mode gives a reputation to a party as powerful. 
Some scholars (e. g. Mills and Hunter) used this as a method to study societal power distribution. This 
approach is called "reputational approach" (Sa'd, 1986, p. 201-262; Hindess, 1996, p. 3). 
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modem power did not succeed in measuring power, due to lack of information about power 
relation variables. Accordingly, a paradox can be conjectured: power structure is relatively 
static, yet power is unpredictable. Decision-makers in the acquired built environment depend 
actually on this predictability in their planning schemes, and in their subsequent environmental 
laws and regulations. However, as those laws prove to be inefficient due to deficiency in the 
predictions, re-evaluation of such plans and laws take place. This was the case when the 
Egyptian government after 1952, adopting the acquired mode, performed to control rent rates 
and agricultural land ownership (Akbar, 1988). Laws were enacted which, when put into action, 
proved inefficient according to the deficiency in its premise predictions. 
In the inherited mode, power is non-quantitative, it cannot be measured. It is dynamic, changing 
according to its determinant actualized rights, yet it is predictable. To explain this paradox, it 
has to be related to the main difference between the two concepts of power/rights: power 
sources and power resources, according to the acquired and the inherited modes. 
In the modem concept of power, sources and resources of power are variables', thus unknown 
for a particular interaction, therefore predictability is unachievable. For example, a pressure 
group which was involved in a weak manner in one interaction of a planning project might 
mobile other resources of power in another interaction such as the support of politicians, the 
media, etc. That is, by reducing the variables (by fixing some of them) in any power relation, 
and developing a mechanism for assessing (not measuring) the relative power of parties, 
predictability can be attainable, however, modem power concept lacks those criteria. The 
number of (unknown) variables is quite large especially in terms of resources employed 
(inflation of resources); and there is no mechanism for obtaining information, thus of assessing 
the relative strength (power) of parties involved in any particular context, accordingly, power 
relationships are unpredictable. 
On the other hand, in the inherited mode, sources and resources are the same, they are rights 
which are fixed thus known in any interaction (transparent). There is no inflation of power 
resources in the inherited mode. Those rights work also as the framework or criteria (pondering 
mechanism) by which any case of interaction is assessed and judged. Accordingly, 
predictability in the inherited built environments is, in most cases, attainable, thus many 
disputes are avoidable. Rights in the inherited mode perform as organizatory mechanisms that 
bring order to the built environment, and avoid, as much as possible, disputes between parties. 
As a result, and because of inhabitants' awareness of their rights, the manifested structure of the 
inherited built environment reflected such mechanisms. Through picturing the scene of any 
interaction (i. e. predicting its possible outcome), and thus avoiding conflict with neighbours, 
most house doors were not opposite. Tanneries and iron workshops were located, in most cases, 
outside residential areas, due to their generated bad odour. In other words, such organizatory 
mechanisms ordered the territorial structure of the inherited built environment through ordering 
s' This variability, as mentioned earlier, is mainly due to the variety of sources and resources types and, 
moreover, to the inflation of resources employed. 
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parties and properties' relationships. Such relationship between rights operating on the 
imperceptible structure and the manifested territorial structure of the built environment, and 
resulting in similar, but not typical, Muslim built environments, is what the Orientalists could 
not comprehend. They used the functional distribution of Muslim cities, assumed as constituting 
a prototype, as the main criteria for defining the Muslim city. Some Orientalists referred such 
territorial structure to role of the muhtasib. Accordingly, unaware of the imperceptible structure 
responsible for such functional distribution, Orientalists misinterpreted the inherited built 
environment, as explained in chapter four above. In short, societies in the inherited mode had 
the practical consciousness that is derived from such organizatory mechanism: the know-how 
of reducing the rise of problems and disputes in their built environments to the minimum. 
Moreover, in its modern concepts, power can be generated in many different paths. It can be 
generated by possessing any power source, also it can be generated by mobilizing diverse 
resources, part of which might be sources of power, therefore the path of generating power in 
the acquired mode is variable and, thus, unpredictable (fig. 8.6). In the inherited mode, as rights, 
when actualized, are the only source and resource to generate power, thus this path is clear and 
predictable (fig. 8.7). This justifies the paradox mentioned above about modern concept of 
power: relatively static in it societal structure and structure, yet unpredictable. 
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Fig 8.6: The path of creating power 
in the acquired mode is 
unpredictable. 
0 Sources and resources (rights) 
O Power 
Fig 8.7: The path of creating power 
in the inherited mode is 
predictable. 
As a conclusion, emanating from the investigations demonstrated in this chapter, it is important 
to emphasize here that power in either concepts (acquired and inherited) cannot be measured 
quantitatively. It is not absolutely quantitative. It can be assessed only through power 
relationships and not in general. This means that predictability of power is limited. Power 
cannot be predicted in general, i. e. predicting future events. But, if a power exercitation in a 
certain interaction is about to happen, then it can be assessed, and its outcomes predicted. 
Rights in the inherited mode, as organizatory mechanisms, provide Muslim societies with this 
predictability of their interactions (power relationships) within the every-day life. 
8.3 FREEDOM OF CHOICE (MOVABILITY OF PARTIES 
In the acquired built environment, the law is enacted to perform as a controlling, regulatory 
mechanism aiming at achieving a state of stability and order. Accordingly, justified by order 
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and organization, state control, or state intervention as commonly known, penetrated into most 
aspects of the daily life of the built environment. The law becomes an instrument of such state 
control. It constitutes the reference for parties in their actions. All environmental developments 
are subject to the law, whether privately or publicly owned. Building regulations restrict choices 
of people to what the law inquires: building height, building material, built-up area, plot area, 
set backs, parking areas, etc. The state controls access to scarce resources, property rights, and 
thus people's life chances (as Weber proclaims). Resonating with such a function, the law in the 
acquired mode is prescriptive, dictating what should be done. It restricts people's actions and 
thus freedom to its circle (fig. 8.8). The law, thus, performs as a restrictive regulatory 
mechanism on people's freedom. In that sense, Foucault perceives of the law in the acquired 
mode as a confinement that is a central propellant of the social order. Foucault called such a 
culture as the "culture of confinement" (Wuthnow, et. al., 1984, p. 166). In short, the law (state 
control) plays a major role in the production process of the acquired built environment. It 
dictates that process. 
Although rights in the inherited mode perform as a regulatory mechanism, however, they 
operate as a framing, and not restrictive, mechanism of parties' freedom. That is, Shari `a (the 
Islamic law), as explained in previous chapters, provides the opportunity for all who have 
relevant rights to exercise them. It is a proscriptive law that explains what should not be done. 
It has no boundaries thus it is liberating; it unleashes people's freedom to act (fig. 8.9). Each 
party in the inherited mode has its own scope of exercitation (circle of rights), framed by the 
scopes of other parties, thus, within its scope, each party can act freely as it wishes as long as it 
does not infringe onto the scopes of other parties. In some cases, the party, through dialogue and 
agreement with other parties, can penetrate their scopes thus gaining more freedom. For 
example, a party can reach an agreement with his neighbour to use (through leasing, selling or 
granting) part of his property as a pathway or to run his water gully, i. e. to establish a new 
easement right. In short, as the reference in the acquired mode is always to the law; 
relationships can be characterized as singular (individualistic) between the party and the law, 
however, it is in the inherited mode plural (social), based on interactions between partieS and 
framed by their scopes of rights exercitation. 
As Bauman argues, "choice" in contemporary societies has become a central issue. It is viewed 
as the foremost criterion of good life and personal success, and the essential systemic requisite. 
In that context, human happiness has been redefined to be centred on freedom of choice 
(Bauman, 1992, p. 169,170; Featherstone, 1991, p. 112). 11 Such freedom of the individual is 
measured by the range of realistic choices available to that individual as well as by what can be 
52 That is, as Bauman argues, the focus today in politics is not on the material redistribution of wealth, 
income and other consumable values by society at large, but rather on the agency's freedom of choice 
as the main dimension of social division (Bauman, 1992). 
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chosen and what is chosen. 53 In turn, the degree of freedom becomes the main dimension of 
inequality. In other words, "choice" has become a determinate criterion in achieving the aims 
of freedom and thus happiness. 
However, such aims are insubstantial. As a provider of the main services (streets, 
infrastructure), the state in the acquired mode controls what is available for parties, i. e. it 
controls people's choices. Through the confinement of, and subjection to, the law, and through 
controlling life chances (access to scarce resources such as lands and housing) the state reduces 
choices available to the public, i. e. it confines people' choices to what it provides or allows. For 
example, in terms of infrastructure systems, parties find themselves confined, with no choice 
other than linking their properties to that infrastructure provided, or approved and controlled", 
by the government. Some might argue that through privatization, choices for inhabitants are 
decentralized, thus wider. This might be true, but of course such choices are not as decentralized 
and wide as when decided by the inhabitants themselves in their sites which might be achieved 
if rights structures are applied as the case in the inherited mode (see Akbar, forthcoming). 
Building regulations operate as a means to restrict parties' freedom of choice. Such regulations, 
for example, oblige parties to use certain building materials, to use their properties for pre- 
determined functions, to have certain plot area, and the like (fig. 8.8). In that respect, Marcuse 
argues that the available freedom of choice and liberty in contemporary Western societies 
(acquired) are not beneficial to the individual, but are restrictions of their freedom. They are but 
instruments of social control. It is a manipulated freedom. Accordingly, as Marcuse contends, 
what characterizes those societies is that the individual himself has become integrated into the 
established society; he reproduces and perpetuates such external controls. In this process the 
"inner" dimension of man, in which opposition to the status quo can take root is whittled down. 
Thus contemporary man, in terms of his thinking, is a "one-dimensional man" (Marcuse, 1991, 
p. 2-12). He became self-subjecated to such controlling mechanisms. 
On the other hand, private parties in the inherited built environment have the full freedom (with 
respecting other parties' rights) to determine their choices and alternatives open to them, 
without any intervention from external parties (e. g. higher authorities) (fig. 8.9). They have 
freedom of access to resources; a matter that made built environment-related resources available 
resources and not scarce as the case in the acquired mode. People can choose whatever 
environmental solutions they fmd proper for their properties (e. g. rainwater discharge, 
pathways, streets). Such choices are restricted by particular organizatory rights-mechanisms. 
Moreover, previously manifested physical solutions act as constraints on future choices or 
actions, thus any acting party has to respect the existing built environment as constrains. 
s' For Marcuse, free choice among a variety of choices does not signify freedom if these choices sustain 
social control over life. For example, free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the 
slaves (Marcuse, 1991, p. 7). 
54 If private, as the case in many Western countries. However, privatization is still not widespread in 
most Arab countries, thus inhabitants have no choice other than connecting their houses with what the 
state provides, at the prices it dictates. 
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To sum, the state and the law in the acquired mode act as controlling mechanisms, restricting 
parties' freedom, i. e. decision-making process of the production of the acquired built 
environment is controlled and restricted from above. However, restrictions on parties' action in 
the inherited built environment are self-organizatory based on particular robust rights- 
mechanisms, i. e. the production of the inherited built environment is determined by the 
inhabitants themselves without any intervention from higher authorities. Therefore, parties in 
the inherited built environments have more freedom of action (choice) than in the acquired 
mode. 
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Relating "freedom of choice and action" to internal and external power structures in modern 
concepts of power (explained above, p. 184); freedom of action can be considered as a sign of 
whether a party is acting within an internal system (organization) or an external one. If a party 
is part of an organization, then it is subject to its internal rules and vertical system of 
relationships, while in external relationships, such as in relationships between two parties, a 
party has freedom in determining its actions. In this respect, in the acquired built environments, 
the whole societal system can be perceived as a one internal system (organization), where its 
rules are applied to all its members. Relating this to the concept of mobilization of resources 
discussed earlier, there is a tendency in the acquired mode to produce collective resources and 
thus collective power (organizations and institutions), i. e. increase the number of internal 
systems, thus decreasing choices or freedom of end-parties. This implies that the acquired built 
environment in modem societies is commanded thus constrained. It is dominated by 
professionals-based institutions, such as those of electricity, water, telecommunications, etc, 
that have to abide with the government's permissions and regulations which the government 
claims that they are directed at protecting the rights of the end-party (consumer). This hierarchy 
ends up in bureaucratized processes that restrict freedom and creativity and confine the 
potentialities of smaller (individual) parties. 
In the inherited mode, the tendency is towards increasing the number of parties in control of 
their properties; to enable people and society at large. This tendency leads to a reduction in 
internal power relationships to the minimum (minimum domination between parties) and an 
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increase in the external ones with respect to the built environment at large, i. e. relationships are 
between immediate parties with no external interventions. " This leads to an increase in the 
number of autonomous parties controlling their properties, thus autonomous sites. Thereby, in 
the inherited mode, internal organizations are minimal, thus movability of parties (freedom of 
action) is maximum, and freedom of action and choice for parties is quite extended. Such a 
situation (wide options of choice open to autonomous parties and their sites) creates minimum 
points of contacts and overlaps between parties and sites; ultimately, minimizes disputes and 
conflicts (fig. 8.10). However, sites in the acquired built environments have a vertical tree-like 
dominative pattern of relationships which implies a lack of autonomy, dependence on higher 
level parties or authorities, a determined path of power hierarchy, more points of contact with 
other (higher) parties, and thus more spots of potential conflictual interfaces (fig. 8.11). In 
conclusion, the acquired built environment is viewed as a one large system within which 
movability of parties is limited, whereas the inherited built environment is an endless system 
with limitless movability of parties. 
External power 
relationships -" 
Internal power 
relationships '`' '" 
External powert 0 
Lines of relationships 
Minimum sitesQ 
overlap 
Fig. 8.10: Sites in the inherited built 
environment relate to each 
other with minimum 
overlap. 
Fig. 8.11: Relationships between sites in the 
acquired built environment reflect 
relationships between parties in the 
societal system. They relate to each 
other with more points of overlap. 
8.4 POWER/RIGHTS AND STATE OF STABILITY 
Political stability has.. . been associated with the idea of ingrained respect for the authority of the law itself. 
(Denham, 1994, p. 9, emphasis added) 
In the short run the law can be a stabilizing and unifying 
influence in a temporarily divided society. 
(Atiyah, 1995, p. 217, emphasis added) 
Human nature motivates people to take certain decisions and actions. People tend to possess and 
control things; they seek to improve their environments; and more often than not desire to 
ss "External power relationships" is used here in the meaning of the acquired mode. It means power 
relationships between non-members organisations. "External party" as used previously in the 
inherited mode in this thesis means not immediate party in terms of the site, e. g. remote party such as 
the higher authorities. 
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expand their properties or territories if they have the chance. They also try to avoid and even 
may hinder the interventions of outsiders (Habraken, 1988). Those attitudes are considered as 
basic human tendencies that are of significance in producing the built environment. They are 
thought to be basic for all human beings and societies, despite of their intra-cultural 
differences" and subjective and personal differences. 
In the acquired mode (modern societies), law constitutes the means for the orderly settlement of 
disputes (Denham, 1994, p. 2). Rules, regulations and laws are all concepts to reduce and 
eliminate conflicts between acting parties. 57 They are developed to control those basic human 
tendencies, and ultimately aiming at organising the society, including its built environment. In 
that respect, as Pound contends, law in the acquired mode performs as a" social engineering" 
instrument (Harris, 1997, p. 253), or as Foucault put it, to conduct the conduct. However, in the 
inherited mode, abstractly, rights are the substitute for regulations and pre-stated rules in 
modern societies in the sense that they function as societal regulatory mechanisms. 
Generally speaking, societal systems (e. g. Islam, capitalism, socialism) reach their states of 
stability through interactions between their regulations and laws on one hand, and the basic 
human tendencies of their societies and individuals, on the other hand (figs. 8.12). Each societal 
system has its own state of stability as a result of these interacting forces. In capitalist societies, 
due to their liberal-democratic attitudes; forces of human tendencies are greater than in socialist 
societies where the collective interests of society at large take precedence over the interests of 
its individuals. However, both systems reach their states of stability through the employment of 
laws and regulations. The true aim of law is thus, as Jhering asserts, "the realisation of an 
equilibrium of individual and social principles and purposes" (Jhering, cited in Curzon, 1995, 
p. 151). 
Rules and regulations 
(Rights in the inherited mode) 
Equilibrium 
line 
Basic human 
tendencies 
(societal system) 
fig. 8. l2: Societal state of stability 
The Law is by no means a static, rigid structure. 58 As laws and regulations are generally a 
codification of values held in society, thus, from time to time the law must embrace freshly 
defined values, attitudes, and codes of behaviour resulting from changes in the societal system 
16 Intra-cultural differences result from societies' ideologies, value-system, education, discipline, etc. 
s' This view characterised the thinking of almost all sociological jurisprudence scholars, such as Jhering, 
Weber, Durkheim, Pound. This view of "the law as a form of social control" is also considered as a 
basic assumption in socio-legal studies (Cavendish, 1997, p. 125,130). 
Se Bentham (Utilitarian and positivist) asserted that laws were human creations made by humans, for 
humans, thus can be made and unmade at man's mere pleasure (Atiyah, 1995, p. 150). 
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(Denham, 1994, p. 2). Atiyah stated in that respect that "change in society's value system ... 
is 
and has been for centuries a cause of legal change which is both widespread and deep" (Atiyah, 
1995, p. 173). Also, the law, at any given moment, can be used in an instrumental way, i. e. it is 
possible to change and adapt the law in order to attain a given objective. 59 The law is an 
immensely complex social machine. It is continually in need of patching, repairing, and from 
time to time overhauling in this or that area (Atiyah, 1995,122,177). On the other hand, 
changes in the laws and regulations affect the societal system as well, including the values and 
norms (human tendencies) held by its people (Atiyah, 1995, p. 88-9). 60 Thus, societal systems 
are not steady in their general shape, accordingly, their ideal state of stability is unknown and 
unpredictable", and subject to "periodical shifting" according to changes in the law. The same 
can be said as to laws and regulations; they are not static, but subject to "periodical shifting" 
reflecting shifting in the societal system (fig. 8.13). It is a reciprocal process, where changes in 
either force affect the other and thus the resulting state of stability. In conclusion, state of 
stability in the acquired mode is dynamic. It is subject to continuous changes in both of its 
forces: the law and in the societal system. Each historical period establishes its own state of 
stability; i. e. there is no absolute ideal state of stability. 
In the acquired built environment, regulations and laws are generally superimposed on the built 
environment throughout the processes of their production. Those laws and regulations, at a one 
state of stability, usually deal with diverse resources and situations of different cases in the built 
environment in a static manner (one-to all), thus producing a steady built environment. 
Nevertheless, "periodical shifting" in laws and regulations, and/or in societal system, leads to 
drastic changes expressed as continuous leaps or "paradigmatic shifts" in terms of the built 
environment's end-products and/or processes of production. The built environment, 
accordingly, shifts from subjection to one set of regulations to another. Paradigm shifts in laws 
and societal systems are congruous, i. e. mutual; respond to each other's changes, as the one 
produces the other. Such changes need some time to be reflected on the built environment. 
Accordingly, paradigm shifts in the built environment are always behind those in law and 
societal system. They cannot cope with the pace of changes in societal system. This is because 
59 This means in political areas that whenever there is a change of goals among those in charge of the 
country (a new government with new goals or different ideologies, for example), a change of laws is 
likely to be inevitable (Atiyah, 1995, p. 172). 
60 An example of the effects of the law on social conditions is drawn by comparing the modern English 
and French farming conditions: English farms tend to be larger than those in France, where land 
ownership is much more fragmented. The reasons for this lie largely in the result of several centuries 
of different inheritance laws. In England, primogeniture and freedom of testation tended to preserve 
landed estates; in France, the rights of succession of children to a share of the parental lands tended to 
break up landed estates. So present-day economic and social conditions in these respects are the 
consequences of differing laws (Atiyah, 1995, p. 122). 
61 According to historicists, there are fixed laws of historical developments, deduced from history, 
which can be used to predict the future. They argue that society will necessarily change but along a 
predetermined path that cannot change. Thus, those laws determine the society's movements. On the 
other hand, Popper argues, against historicists, that social phenomena are ever-changing, thus, social 
laws are changing accordingly, and they are unpredictable (Popper, 1957, p. 51). 
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the built environment is produced by external parties other than the end-user himself (explained 
in chapters nine an ten), thus decision-makers need some time to grasp societal or law changes 
and then to reflect them on their decisions. In other words, there is always a gap between 
societal system and the existing paradigm of built environment (fig. 8.13). 
An example of such "paradigmatic shifts" in the built environment is the zoning model in 
planning and its concomitant zoning law (in New York in 1916), which consequently led to 
changes in the regulations and in the societal system regarding the production of the built 
environment (see Warner, 1972; Berry, 1973). It led, for example, to spatial segregation that 
reflects societal stratification; uneven distribution of scarce resources (e. g. services); and thus 
unequal distribution of life chances. In that respect, Lefebvre proclaims that capitalism with the 
support of the state (including its planners) through its laws and regulations (e. g. of planning), 
aiming at maintaining capitalism, produces "abstract spaces" (in contrast to "social spaces" 
which prevailed in traditional built environments) loaded with capitalist values, thus directing 
the society to maintain capitalism and to accomplish its interests (Lefebvre, 1984). In that sense, 
planning activities perform as a state instrument of social and systemic control. In short, society 
changes through changes in the law. 
In Saudi Arabia in the 1950s and 1960s, the application of roads and buildings statute, 
introduced in 1941, with its emphasis on minimum plot area, set backs, grid pattern of streets, 
led to changes in societal values and norms. The villa type became dominant; apartment 
buildings became common. As al-Hathloul noted, these building changes, following the new 
regulations, led to societal changes. Today, unlike in the inherited mode, the acting party, for 
example, acts in his property regardless of his neighbour's rights, even if he causes damage to 
his neighbour (e. g. invading his privacy). Moreover, whereas in the inherited built environment, 
the acting party, if causing damage to other parties, is responsible to lift the damage, in the 
acquired mode the damaged party who has to act so as to protect himself or damaged property. 
For example, if party (A)'s privacy was invaded by a new window opened by the neighbour (B), 
then the damaged party (A) has to find a solution to cover his window from the sight of the 
damaging party (B) such as fixing wooden screens on his boundary wall. Such a solution is now 
very common in Saudi Arabia as such practices became current. Moreover, unlike the inherited 
mode where territories used to accommodate people regardless of their economic situation, 
territories or land zoning in the acquired mode in Saudi Arabia (as in all the Arab countries), 
following the minimum plot area regulation, led to a sense of spatial segregation 
(discrimination) based on people's income. Zones with higher plot areas have a higher value, 
thus affordable by the higher income class. This in turn led to stratifying land zones and thus 
society on economic terms (al-Hathloul, 1996, p. 197-218). 
In the inherited mode, the scene is different. The interaction between rights and basic human 
tendencies have come into a state of stability. That is, first, rights as derived from shari a are 
static. Second, the mechanisms that perform to regulate and discipline human basic tendencies 
in the inherited mode are rights-based mechanisms, i. e. they are static mechanisms. 
Accordingly, there is a perpetual state of stability between rights and basic human tendencies. 
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Thereby, and as rights are robust in the sense that they are able to absorb unprecedented cases 
without changing the rights per se; the state of stability in the ideal Islamic society is supposed 
to be steady. Each site has its state of stability. " In that sense, one might argue that in the 
inherited mode, static rights-derived-mechanisms deal with the changing resources and other 
variables in a dynamic manner according to the specificity of each case. The ultimate outcome 
(the built environment) is therefore a dynamic one (fig. 8.14). Nevertheless, due to rights 
robustness, inherited built environments are characterized by similarities and not conformity. 
This is because decisions of shaping built environments are not dictated by external parties 
(higher authorities), but evolve from within the site with reference to conventions shared by 
those residing the site. This can be depicted as "diversity within unity" : the diversity of the 
inherited built environment within the unity of its rights. As the inherited built environment is 
produced by its people; such environments are always in pace with changes in the societal 
system and any newly emerging needs or technical solutions. In other words, unlike the 
acquired built environments, there is no gap between changes in societal system and the 
inherited built environment. They are all the production of the same parties (fig. 8.14). 
--ý ')- 
Time 
Societal changes 
Law changes 
The built 
environment changes 
(fig. 8.13): `Periodical shifting' in capitalist societal 
systems, thus `periodical shifting' in 
laws and regulations. This leads to 
continuous leaps in the production of 
the acquired built environments, 
however with time gap. 
8.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Societal changes 
Rights 
(static) 
The built 
environment 
Time changes 
(fig. 8.14): In the inherited mode, static, robust rights 
and societal system are reflected on the 
built environments, with no time gap. 
There are thus no jumps in the changes of 
the inherited built environment. 
As this chapter demonstrated, substantial dissensions exist between the modem concept of 
power adopted in the acquired mode and that of rights employed in the inherited mode. 
Accordingly, the mechanisms operating in the decision-making processes of the production of 
62 Some Muslim rulers intervened in the production of the traditional built environment, such as in 
shaping the main through streets of capital cities such as Cairo, or in creating new capital cities such 
as Baghdad and Samarra (see al-Lahham, 1994). Such actions were actually limited to certain sites 
and not extending to all built environment. Thus, the condition of stability (state of stability) of such 
sites (subject to state-intervention) does not follow the ideal condition of stability as determined by 
structures of rights set by shari'a. That is, such actions of the ruler exceed the state's scope of 
exercitation, as explained in the previous chapter. 
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the acquired and the inherited built environments are inevitably different. Thereby, the 
coexistence of these two modes loaded with such substantial dissensions in a one system 
(contemporary Muslim world) will inevitably lead to internal contradictions in the system, thus 
a crisis. The genesis of such coexistence is explored in the following chapters. 
Some of the differences between the modem concept of power (acquired) and rights in the 
inherited mode can be summarized in the following table (table 8.1). 
Modern concept of power (the acquired Rights in the inherited mode 
mode) 
Law is prescriptive Rights are proscriptive 
One-to-all attitude One-to-one attitude 
Power is quantitative and measurable Rights are not quantitative, thus non- 
measurable 
Collective power Cooperation not agglomeration 
Latent power, potential power Neither latent power nor potential power are 
recognized. Latent rights exist 
Episodic power Episodic power: putative or actualized rights 
Power is partious Rights are locational 
Power structure is static and absolute No power structure but rights structures 
(maps of rights) 
Power is dynamic No absolute power distribution 
Power structure is absolute Rights distribution (actualized) in society is 
dynamic 
Power (actualized rights) distribution is 
static 
Power is a property that can be possessed, Power is not a property but relational 
stored for future occasions of use 
Environmental Power distribution is non- Rights are contextual 
contextual 
Power relationship is unpredictable Power is predictable in interactions 
Power distribution in physical settings Rights distribution in physical settings is 
(standardized) is relatively static dynamic (ever changing) 
Increases internal power Decreases internal power 
Movability of parties is limited Movability of parties is maximum 
Part Four 
Part 4 
FROM THE INHERITED TO THE ACQUIRED 
The deviation 
INTRODUCTION 
The means adopted to apply the project of modernity (with its notions of 
rationality, supremacy of science, efficiency, progress, and more freedom) to 
the Arab Muslim world were inevitably accompanied by a shift in the systemic 
power structure. That is, modernization as a societal reformative project 
necessitates some sort of regulative (subordinative) power in the hands of a 
THE central party. Thus, there emerged what might be called in this study the 
EXTRANEOUS extraneous party(ies) that performs in a paternalistic, centralized manner, PARTY 
controlling and directing other parties, so as to accomplish modernity's goals. 
This centralization of power was accomplished by a shift of power from people 
(the public) to the hands of this new party. The emergence of this modern 
extraneous party with its concomitant shift of power, this thesis argues, is 
considered the genesis of the acquired mode and its built environment. 
This was effectuated through, first, the rise of the modem state with its notion 
of centralization, and, second, the rise of professionalism. The state as a 
THE 
centralized, supreme power was the ultimate decision-maker that penetrated, by MODERN 
STATE means of its laws, into most aspects of its people's lives (chapter nine). That is, 
the state, through its people's consent, acquired the power that gave it the 
right to intervene in, and engineer people's lives so as to accomplish an 
ordered, regulated society and built environment. It controlled and directed, 
through its bureaucrats (e. g. planners), the processes of the production of the 
built environment. The modem state, thus, constitutes an extraneous party 
controlling people's lives. On the other hand, based on their knowledge and 
PROFESSIONAL 
expertise, and backed by state support, professionals acquired power that 
-ism 
entitled them the right to take decisions for others. Gradually, they became an 
indispensable part in modem societies, performing as extraneous parties in 
people's lives (chapter ten). In short, it is the rights of power and not the 
power of rights that gave those extraneouses their legitimate status. 
Modernization process of the Arab Muslim World was necessarily predicated 
MOnEw41znT- 
on a superimposition of the modem concept of power. This, gradually, led to a ION 
deviation from the inherited concept of power based on rights as derived from 
shari ̀ a. Modernization, thus, meant a shift in the societal mode from a rights- 
based to a power-based mode. It is a shift from the inherited to the acquired 
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mode. The emergence of the extraneous party (the state, professionals) led 
CHANGING 
accordingly to changing the mechanisms of the built environment production. 
MECHANISMS This shift, as this thesis argues, is the main element responsible for the crisis of 
contemporary Muslim built environments. That is, the shift from the inherited 
mode to the acquired mode was not comprehensive at all societal levels 
(polity, economic, socio-cultural, see p. 100 above), but rather prevailed in 
those levels into which the extraneous party had managed to penetrate (mainly 
techno-economic and polity). Accordingly, the coexistence of both 
COEXISTENCE 
substantially dissensious modes (acquired and inherited) in contemporary Arab 
Muslim societies, each performing on a particular societal level (or in certain 
aspects of that level), will inevitably lead to internal systemic contradictions 
and structural disjunction. Such disjunction is reflected, consequently, on the 
process of the production of contemporary Muslim built environments. For 
example, many inherited Muslim values persist today, thus using acquired 
power-based mechanisms loaded with acquired values in the production of the 
built environment will lead to incompatibility in such environments. They are a 
production of "acquired" alien mechanisms and a container of "inherited" 
local values. 
Part four of this study is devoted to explore the genesis of the shift from the 
inherited to the acquired built environments. It attempts to investigate the 
impact of the emergence of the extraneous party on the decision-making 
process of the production of contemporary Muslim built environments. 
S'rRUCruRE Chapter nine is concerned with scrutinizing the role of the modem state, using 
its power as an extraneous party, in the production of the built environment. It 
focuses on the shift of mechanisms of such production processes from rights- 
based to power-based mechanisms. Chapter ten investigates the rise of the built 
environment-related professionalism and its impact on changing the 
conception of the production of the built environment from inhabitants-centred 
in the inherited mode to professionals-centred in the acquired mode. 
Chapter Nine 
Changing Mechanisms 
9 
CHANGING MECHANIMS 
from rights-based to power-based 
The growth of the state in the Western world is 
accomplished by the state's appropriation of the legislative 
process. It is a monopolization of that process. 
(Badie, 1992, p. 130, translated by the candidate) 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Concomitant with the process of modernization in the Arab Muslim world, the modem state 
emerged as an extraneous party with legitimate power to control and engineer the society and its 
built environment in the names of order, progress, and freedom. In its Western concept, the 
power of the modem state emanates from its legitimate status as a representative of its people. ' 
As such, the status and role of the modem state dissent substantially from that of the state in 
Islam. It is a power-based state, where power is defined according to its modern concept, and 
not rights-based as the case of the state in the inherited mode. Accordingly, new exotic notions 
were superimposed on the Muslim society such as representation, legitimacy, supreme power, 
and sovereignty. The state thus became the main axis in the operation of the underlying system, 
representing its people, and controlling its legislative process. 
The emergence of the modem state in Muslim societies induced a substantial shift in the 
conception of the system of society-making. This led to changing the mechanisms of society 
maintenance and of the production of the built environment. It is a shift from rights-based 
mechanisms to power-based mechanisms. This chapter attempts to scrutinize the 
transformation in societal modes, as related to the production of the built environment. It 
investigates the mechanisms through which the modern state acquired the power that bestowed 
it rights to intervene in its people' built environments. 
9.2 THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN STATE 
TOWARDS CENTRALIZATION 
As noted from previous chapters, decentralized decision-making process prevailed in the 
inherited built environments. Shari 'a (the Islamic law) was set in a form of proscriptive 
principles that are applied to cases in a one-to-one manner, i. e. it did not set general laws that 
can be applied to all cases, regardless of their specificity. However, affected by the Western 
Explained in chapter five above. 
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modem system and its civic laws and aiming at modernising the Islamic empire2 (Badie, 1992, 
p. 74-5), the late Ottoman State3 codified the opinions and rulings of the Hanafi school in a law- 
like form 4 In 1869(AD. ), the first written authorised Islamic law was published in al-Majalla. 5 
Accordingly, al-Majalla became the formal state law, to which all people were subject. 
Although the state in this stage was still performing according to its role in Islam in the sense 
that it was not legislative, this step towards codification of shari 'a is considered the first step 
towards centralization in decision-making process. The ruler in this matter gave himself the 
right to impose al-Majalla on his people. In other words, the rights of the ruler in this regard 
extended his scope of rights exercitation, as determined by shari 'a, to infringe into other 
parties' scopes, i. e. to intervene in other parties' circles. 
Moreover, aiming at regulating land properties and ameliorating the built environment, the 
Ottoman State in 1858 enacted a land lawb, based on shari'a. According to this law, dead lands, 
unutilized lands (matrukah), and those owned by the public treasury (beit al-ma! ), which are 
collective properties according to Islam (see chapter seven, p. 131-133), became state properties 
(mini lands) on which the ruler had full control over, provided he performed in the common 
interest (az-Zarqa, 1968, v. 3, p. 152). Increasing the state's properties denotes a remarkable 
expansion in the state's scope of rights exercitation, accomplished through a decrease in private 
(individual or collective) parties' scopes. This is a sign of a new attitude towards state 
centralization and intervention. Revivification of dead lands became a state-controlled 
mechanism, conditioned by the ruler's permission, with a particular tax levied on land in 
return. ' To regulate the relationship between state properties and other parties, a series of laws 
were promulgated, following the European model (Ziadeh, 1979, p. 8). The state, as the owner 
of those lands, subjected private parties to its laws. In this respect, a deviation in the conception 
of property ownership from that prevailing in the inherited built environment began to emerge. 
Shari'a, through its concept of property ownership, opened access to resources and thus 
2 Attempts of modernization at that time did not aim at replacing the Islamic culture but only to 
modernise it, at least in technical and political terms, i. e. the model of the modem state was not 
thought of yet (Badie, 1992, p. 76). 
3 The Ottoman administration system affected most Middle Eastern countries, as those countries, 
excluding Egypt, were under the rule of the Ottoman Empire until the First World War. 
° The Hanafi school is one of the four main schools of the Islamic law. The Hanafi school was the 
official school followed by the Ottoman state. 
s In this Ottoman period, 'ijtihad was assigned to the ruler, thus he started to work according to al- 
Masaleh al-Mursaleh or regard for the common interest (as explained below, p. 225). In this period 
the codification of the Islamic jurisprudence started (az-Zarga, 1968, v. 1, p. 194). 
6 In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman State enacted a series of land laws aiming at regulating the 
relationship between the state, owning most lands, and the workers on those lands (az-Zarqa, 1968, 
v. 3, p. 157). 
According to the Ottoman land law, the taxation system on land operates according to Islam, 
however, with some manipulation. For example, tax on min lands is a kharaji tax which is much 
higher than the 'ushri tax levied on privately owned lands. Accordingly, all revivified dead lands 
(became miri lands according to this law) are subject to kharaji tax and not to 'ushri tax (Akbar, 
1992, p. 117). 
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increased opportunities for ownership and thus enablement of individuals and society. 
Transforming collective properties into state properties denotes imposing certain constraints 
(e. g. ruler's permission) on and limiting the chances of utilizing and owning' available 
resources and accordingly enabling the society. 
Municipalities were established in the Ottoman Empire. They were first responsible for the 
public areas such as market affairs and street lighting, i. e. performing the role of the muhtasib. 
However, later on, municipalities' responsibilities were expanded, accorded more rights to 
intervene in private parties' domains. In 1879 a decree gave the municipality the right to 
confiscate private properties (Akbar, 1989, p. 6). Thus, municipalities acted as extraneous 
parties intervening in the production of the built environment in the name of organisation. In 
that sense, a hierarchical structure of higher authorities started to emerge. New rules 
agglomerated, increasing state intervention in the built environment (Ziadeh, 1979; Akbar, 
1992, p. 340-1). Such rules were based on extended rights acquired by the ruler to fulfil 
administrative tasks. That is, in this stage of the late Ottoman Empire, a disharmony existed 
between the tendency of rulers, affected by modernity, to lust for more power on the one hand, 
and the pre-determined role of the state and the ruler as set by shari `a, on the other hand. Thus, 
the political (administrative) sphere, over which the ruler has full control, was distinguished 
from the sphere of the Islamic law. This political sphere was justified as pertaining to 
administrative necessities (daroura), operating to fulfil the common interest. The two spheres 
were compatible, i. e. the political sphere was conditioned by the Islamic legal sphere; it 
operated in accordance with its principles. Hence, the ruler acquired new rights (power) to enact 
laws and regulations that pertain to this new political sphere, but in a manner that does not 
contradict with shari'a so as to gain legitimacy (Badie, 1992, p. 104-5). In the inherited built 
environments, the ruler has the right to intervene under the name of administration only in 
emergency cases and in a temporarily manner. Thus, rules enacted in such situations were by no 
means permanent. However, in the Ottoman Empire, such exceptional rights of intervention 
were expanded to take a permanent, official shape. Intervention became legitimate, according to 
the state's political sphere. The law, enacted by the ruler, was thus an expression of the power 
of the ruler, and an instrument to perpetuate this power. This marked the beginning of the 
emergence of a power-based state, yet still in a blurred shape. It is the beginning of the 
monopolization of the legislative process by the state, however in this stage such 
monopolization was masked by shari`a so as to obtain legitimacy. 
CENTRALIZATION 
Until the First World War, most Middle East countries followed the Ottoman system of 
administration (e. g. land codes and Majalla). Later, as a result of colonialism and modernization 
movements and under the name of reform, scopes of political sphere widened on the account of 
8 Revivification of dead lands does not, according to the 1858 land law, lead to full ownership as was 
the case in the inherited built environments, but rather to imperfect ownership where the revivifier 
owns the usufruct of the land and the state owns its substance. 
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the Islamic legal sphere. Accordingly, power spheres expanded over rights spheres. This led 
gradually, in most Arab Muslim countries, to relinquishing shari `a principles in most aspects of 
life, replaced by the model of the modern state and Western civil laws9 (based mainly on the 
French law1), i. e. posited laws replaced shari `a law. In other words, an acquired power-based 
mode replaced the inherited rights-based mode of society-making and built environment. 
9.3 LUSTING FOR POWER 
The state intervenes more when it acquires strong 
power resources. 
(Badie, 1992, p. 139, translated by the candidate) 
According to its modem model, the state constitutes the supreme power, which power is 
acquired through its legitimate status. Defining state legitimacy as the right of the state to 
exercise its power (see p. 77-8 above), the state always tends to reinforce its legitimacy, thus 
lusting for more power. Accordingly, different strategies were followed by the state to acquire 
more resources so as to acquire more power. Some of those strategies are explained below. 
9.3.1 Appropriation of the legislative process 
Lusting for power, the most significant strategy adopted by the state to maintain its status and to 
perpetuate its legitimacy is its appropriation and monopolization of the legislative process 
(Badie, 1992, p. 130). That is, perceiving of the law as a state instrument, monopolization of the 
legislative process means the ability of the state to achieve its interests and to exert domination 
over, and thus subjection of, the public. In that respect, in contrast to the inherited mode where 
the state acts as an executive device framed by and subjected to the Islamic law, the state in the 
acquired mode performs as the legislative authority to which people are subject; it is the 
producer of the law. In that sense, the law in the acquired mode is, as Black describes it, the 
solemn expression of the will of the supreme power of the state (Black, 1991, p. 612). Thus, 
instead of being controlled by the law (in the inherited mode), the state in the acquired mode 
controls the law. It emanates in its performance from its power base that determines its rights. 
In brief, the state in the acquired mode performs out of its rights of power instead of its power 
of rights as was the case in the inherited mode. 
As some Arab countries' property laws (e. g. Jordan) are based on the Ottoman Majallah, which 
is basically an Islamic-based law, one might argue that such laws might be perceived as a 
continuation of the Islamic law. This is not true. Such continuation might be true on the 
manifested level only, however, on the imperceptible level, the two types of law (acquired and 
inherited) are quite different according to the difference in mechanisms of producing and 
operating the law and consequently the built environment. The law in the acquired mode, in the 
9 In 1930, the French commissioner in Syria and Lebanon established the Property Law, abolishing all 
Ottoman land codes (az-Zarqa, 1968, v. 3., p. 157). 
10 The Egyptian civil code was drafted along the lines of the French civil code by Dr. as-Sanhuri, 
assisted by the French jurist E. Lambert. The Egyptian civil code became the model on which as- 
Sanhuri depended in preparing the Syrian, Iraqi, and Libyan civil codes, and on which the Jordanian 
authorities depended in formulating their civil code (Ziadeh, 1979, p. 14). 
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name of order and regulation, constitutes an instrument of social control, of legitimising state- 
intervention in private parties' properties, and thus of legitimising centralization in decision- 
making process of the production of the built environment. Thus, through the law, the state 
increased its power infrastructure, penetrating into most aspects of life, legitimately. 
9.3.2 Conceptual changes 
As part of the state apparatus of maintaining its status and lusting for power, perceptions of 
some significant notions had to be changed, such as conceptions of property ownership, the 
public interest, and the rights of the group inherent in private ownership. Gradually, through 
power-based processes of "normalisation" ", to use Foucault's expression, those new acquired 
conceptions became accepted notions in society, thus employed unquestionally. 
9.3.2.1 PROPERTY OWNERSHIP 
Most civil codes in the Middle East do not define private property ownership but rather codify 
its limitations and the rights it entails (al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 152). An owner can act as he 
wishes as long as his actions are within the framework of the law. 'Z In that sense, in contrast 
to the inherited built environment where an owner party acts according to its rights, regulated 
by structures of rights according to shari'a, and thus by dialogue between immediate parties 
without any intervention from external parties, the owner in the acquired mode is subject to the 
higher authority and its laws. The state in the acquired mode gave itself the right to intervene in 
its people' private properties. The law became the reference in any environmental interaction. 
Accordingly, hierarchical relationships between related parties and the state replaced property 
relationships between immediate parties in the inherited mode. 
Accordingly, rights of control and use bestowed to the owner as a result of his right of 
ownership are decreased in the acquired mode. The owner does not have full control over his 
properties but subject to the higher authorities' control (e. g. building regulations). Therefore, 
ownership in the acquired mode is characterized as imperfect ownership in contrast to full 
ownership enjoyed by the owner in the inherited mode (see p. 127-8). Such a change had its 
impact on social relationships in the Muslim society, as will be explained below. 
SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNERSHIP 
Islam, as explained in chapter seven, granted the rights of the group a substantial importance. It 
associated such rights with every private property ownership through structures of rights. Thus, 
property ownership in the inherited built environment is composed of two components, the 
primary private ownership right and the group right. The former gives the owning party 
freedom of action restrained by the circle of the latter component. That is, exercitation of rights 
of private ownership is restrained by the Islamic concept of harm (as a regulatory mechanism). 
"Normalization", according to Foucault, means inculcation of certain truths or ideologies into the 
subjected people. 
12 To protect the subjection of people to its laws, most clauses of the law include the phrase "within the 
limits of the law". People are always subject to the law in their actions in the built environment. 
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In that sense, the circle of ownership rights is much wider than that of other parties' (group) 
rights performing as constrains (see p. 140). 
Today, in the acquired built environment, such a conception (rights of the group inherent in 
private properties) is changing. Aiming at expanding the circle of the public interest represented 
by the state, property ownership is conceived in the acquired mode as a private right with a 
social function, thus enjoying such a right should be consonant with the public interest. For 
example, clause no. 32 in the Egyptian constitution of 1971 states that "the law organizes the 
operation of the social function of private ownership, into the benefit of the national economy, 
and within the framework of the development national plan, ... and such 
function should not 
contradict in its performance with the public interest" (cited in al-'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 424, 
translated by the candidate). Hence, the state as a representative of the public is responsible for 
directing private property ownership rights in a manner that accords with the public interest (al- 
'Abbadi, 1977, v. 1, p. 420-). The state's rules and regulations in that respect act as constraints, 
conducting private parties' actions to comply with the public interest. Such a change in the 
conception of private property from a private right, self-regulated by structures of rights in the 
inherited mode, into a private right with social function directed by the higher authorities had its 
consequences on power relationships in the built environment. It gave the state a free hand in 
constraining private parties' actions under the banner of the public interest. This accordingly led 
to legitimising state intervention as an extraneous party in the production of the built 
environment, thus increasing its areas of acceptance in the built environment. This shift sustains 
the change in ownership conception from a full ownership in the inherited mode into an 
imperfect ownership in the acquired mode subjected to state power. Such a conceptual shift was 
concomitant to a shift in the conception of the public interest per se, as explained next. 
9.3.2.2 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
As explained in chapter seven (p. 148), the common interest in the inherited built environment is 
not an absolute dominating interest that is absolutely prioritized over the individual's interest, if 
in conflict. Most schools of law (Maliki, Hanafi ", Hanbali) considered the regard for the 
common interest, or al-masaleh al-mursaleh, as a method for reaching rulings. Avoiding 
abusing this method by rulers to gain more rights thus power over the public, the concept of the 
common interest, as defined by Muslim jurists, was confined to matters related to shari 'a's 
main purposes, with consideration to the ranking of the necessity of such matters (necessities, 
needs, or improvements) (az-Zarqa, 1988, p. 41). Jurists employed this method in reaching 
rulings in a very cautious manner. What those jurists feared happened in the acquired mode. 
The method of "regard for the common interest" or "al-masaleh al-mursalah" has been 
expanded in the acquired built environment. Some contemporary Muslim scholars (e. g. ad- 
Duraini, az-Zarqa, al-Fayez) consider the public interest as an absolute priority over 
The Hanaf school considers preference (istihsan) as a source for reaching rulings. However, 
according to az-Zarqa, preference is one form of "al-masaleh al-mursaleh" or regard for the common 
interest (az-Zarqa, 1988, p. 64). 
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individuals' interests. This stand turned the public interest into a state power resource. The 
public interest is used in the acquired mode as an instrument for legitimizing state actions. 
In contrast to the inherited built environment where the common interest is defined and fulfilled 
by the inhabitants themselves, the public interest in the acquired built environment is defined 
and fulfilled by the state. It is a centralized process. For example, state interventions such as in 
planning certain districts, creating new streets, limiting building height, and enacting zoning 
regulations, are all justified as performing in the public interest, as defined by the state. As a 
result of such an extension in the concept of the public interest, the state gained more rights, 
enabling it to penetrate into most areas in the built environment. In other words, the scopes of 
state power increased to include many areas which it could not include in the inherited built 
environment due to its limited rights predetermined by shari `a. One of the most significant 
rights that the modem state acquired through its recourse to the expanded notion of the public 
interest is the right of expropriation of private properties, or eminent domain. 
EXPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTIES (EMINENT DOMAIN) 
Unlike the situation in the inherited built environment, where private properties were granted a 
high degree of sanctity against infringement or expropriation from other private parties or 
higher authorities, properties in the acquired mode lost such sanctity. The state, using its power 
resources, gave itself the right to expropriate private properties'" in the name of the public 
interest, conditioned by just compensation. 15 Expropriation of private properties was accepted, 
with reluctance, in very limited cases (desperate necessities, see p. 154) by some jurists in the 
inherited built environment; many contemporary scholars used such an acceptance as 
justification and thus allowed expropriation of private properties for the public interest (defined 
by the state). " The Egyptian law of 1990 identified the public interest for which expropriation 
of private properties is allowed as creating or widening streets, planning new neighbourhoods, 
creating bridges or tunnels, urban planning projects and amelioration of public facilities, and 
any other works that are considered for the public interest. Moreover, this list could be extended 
through government decisions (Khalil, 1993, p. 38-9). Thus, the state has the right to determine 
the public interest according to its own perspective. This in turn opened more avenues for the 
state to acquire power over private properties, expanding the state's legitimacy as an 
extraneous party in its intervention in the production of the built environment. For example, in 
The modern state's role as a representative of the public interest applies to the communist system. 
That is, communism is another form of modernity. It has a different ideology. It is a totally 
centralized system. However, as our study is about the capitalist-based acquired system, thus such 
notions as expropriation are explained as related to the capitalist system and not to communism. 
's The Egyptian Law no. 10, enacted in 1990 regarding the expropriation of private properties for the 
public benefit, did not insist on compensating the owner before taking his land for the public benefit 
(Khalil, 1993, p. 8). Many contemporary scholars objected to such an act. However, their objection 
focused on the necessity of compensation and not on the concept of expropriation per se. They 
advocate expropriating private properties for the public benefit, conditioned with just compensation. 
16 The right of eminent domain was used to its extremes in some Arab countries (e. g. Egypt) in the 
processes of nationalisation of private properties (Ia'mim). 
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the process of superimposing zoning regulations in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the municipalities 
were granted the authority to use eminent domain in non-conforming cases, i. e. not matching 
with the zoning regulation whether in terms of plot sizes or land-use (al-Hathloul, 1996, p. 227- 
8). " Eminent domain became a tool of power in the hands of the state to achieve its interests, 
masked by the public interest. 
9.3.3 Controlling the built environment 
In the inherited built environment, the state's scope of rights exercitation is small, confined to 
its properties (of the public treasury or beit al-mal) which were quite limited. Thus, the state had 
very limited rights to intervene in the production process of the inherited built environment. 
State property in the inherited mode was conceived as a public property that is owned by all 
Muslim collectively and controlled by the state as a caretaker, thus the owner-party has the 
right to object to the state's actions if not performed in the common interest (see p. 132). 
In contrast, the state in the acquired mode, as the supreme regulatory device, had to acquire 
power to control and thus direct (intervene in) the production of the built environment through 
expanding the state's areas of acceptance. This in turn means increasing state properties, and 
changing the conception of state ownership from that prevailing in the inherited mode. This 
consequently leads to changing the territorial structure of the built environment. 
POWER AS A "ZERO-SUM" MODEL 
Power in the acquired mode, follows a zero-sum model in the sense that to gain more power, 
some has to lose. This concept is quite evident in the state's attitude to increase its power in the 
built environment. That is, to increase state power through expanding its areas of acceptance, 
the areas of acceptance of private parties had to decrease correspondingly. Put differently, to 
attain more control over the built environment, private domain has to be reduced. Hence, the 
state, through its laws, appropriated public properties that used to be owned in the inherited 
built environment by all Muslims collectively, such as roads, dead-end streets, yards, and dead 
lands, and transformed them into state properties, owned and controlled by the state and used by 
the public. Such processes, as Habraken states, flattened the territorial structure of the built 
" The public interest became a powerful tool for justifying the state's action. For example, the case of 
Berman vs. Parker (1954), decided by the US. Supreme Court, involved a property in the District of 
Columbia that was taken by the Congress through eminent domain for the purpose of slum clearance 
and then given to a private firm for development. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the 
District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 as it applied to the taking of his property. The 
owner argued that giving the property to a private firm amounted to taking it from one businessman to 
give it to another. The court when reviewing the case stated that, "Once the object is within the 
authority of the Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For 
the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end (that is, making the Nation's capital 
beautiful as well as sanitary)... the means by which it (the object) will be attained is also for the 
Congress to determine.., once the public purpose has been established. Once the question of the public 
purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project rests in the 
discretion of the legislative branch". Ultimately, the court decided that the expropriation is 
constitutional, and thus the owner's interest was violated for what was decided as the public interest 
by the District of Columbia (Haar, 1976, p. 636-639). 
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environment, i. e. decreased its territorial depth's (Habraken, 1998, p. 220-1). That is, due to the 
existence of several territories controlled by different private parties such as dead-end streets 
and through streets, the territorial depth in the inherited built environments is quite high. By 
transforming those different territories which party A, for example, has to pass to reach his 
house from being private territories controlled by different parties into a one territory owned 
and controlled by the state, the territorial depth of the built environment is reduced (fig. 9.1). 
This increased the central control of the state over the built environment. That is, the shallower 
the territorial structure is, the more the top-down domination. 
3 
Fig. 9.1 High territorial depth in the Shallow territorial depth in the 
inherited built environments acquired built environments 
Moreover, to sustain its power over such properties, the state considered its ownership over its 
properties as full ownership, characterized by full control over the owned property. 
Accordingly, what used to be self-controlled inherited built environment turned in the acquired 
mode to be extraneously-controlled built environment. Private parties' rights of control over 
through streets are diminished. The concept of the fina' was abolished. Dead-end streets that 
were privately-owned property became a public property owned by the state in which every 
person has the right to use (pass-by). 19 Gates on the mouths of dead-end streets that used to 
signify the autonomous status of dead-end streets were demolished. As a result, the percentage 
of controlling parties in the acquired built environment, as Akbar proclaims, became far less 
than in the inherited ones (Akbar, 1988, p. 59). 
Such processes led to the deterioration of the territorial structure of the inherited built 
environment, enfeebling the social relationships in the acquired mode. That is, the territorial 
structure in the inherited built environment affected, and was affected by, the social structure 
(Akbar, 1992, p. 386-8). The neighbourhood centred on the dead-end street disappeared in the 
Territorial depth is measured by the number of boundary crossings needed to move from the outer 
space to the innermost territory (Habraken, 1998, p. 137). 
According to the Ottoman codes of al-Majalla, the dead-end street was recognised as a private 
property that belongs to its residents collectively. However, through state codes, the owner-party's 
rights over its collective property were reduced. Al-Majallah gave the passers-by in main roads the 
right to enter private streets in cases of crowding. The owners of the dead-end street did not have the 
right to sell it, even if they agree to do so among themselves, nor could they divide it. Moreover, the 
owners could not block its mouth by, for example, building a gate (articles 906 & 1223) (Akbar, 
1988, p. 51). 
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acquired built environment. In that respect, some contemporary planning themes, such as the 
"New Urbanism" 20, attempt to revive the spirit of the community through reviving the 
neighbourhood. As such attempts operate within capitalist power-based imperceptible 
mechanisms, thus such solutions are confined to the manifested level and cannot accordingly 
revive the spirit of the community as existed in the inherited built environment. 
Accordingly, situal rights maps as existed in the inherited built environments changed. That is, 
instead of having several categories of physical settings in the inherited built environment, 
according to their rights (e. g. through streets, fina', dead-end streets, private properties), 
categories of physical settings in the acquired built environment are reduced to only two: state 
properties that are owned and controlled by the state, and private properties that are owned and 
controlled by private parties but the state has the right of control over them. Thus, in contrast to 
the situal map in the inherited mode where private properties were characterized by full 
ownership and state properties by imperfect ownership, state properties in the acquired built 
environment enjoys full ownership whereas private properties enjoy imperfect ownership. This, 
is in fact a reflection of the societal power structure and the mechanisms (power-based or rights- 
based) operating in each mode. Thus, the territorial structure of the built environment in the 
acquired mode became the reversal of that of the inherited mode. Areas of acceptance of the 
state expanded, while those of private parties contracted. 
CONTROL OF ACCESS TO RESOURCES 
Part of the state apparatus to acquire control over the built environment is to control private 
parties' access to resources. In that respect, revivification was abolished21 as a mechanism of 
mobilizing resources and initiating ownership. All dead lands and left-over lands (matrukah) 
became state properties that cannot be utilized without the state's permission. In that sense, land 
as an available resource in the inherited mode became a scarce resource which access is 
controlled by the higher authorities. Hence, lands of no purchase value in the inherited mode 
became a valuable resource, a matter that led, consequently, to the emergence of the phenomena 
of land speculation in the acquired built environment. In other words, land has been transformed 
from an available resource of decent life in the inherited mode into a capitalist resource of 
investment in the acquired mode. This in turn restricted the chances of the individual, and thus 
the Muslim society, to be enabled and self-dependent. Lands are available, but unpossessible 
(whether unaffordable, or unreachable (if state owned)). Consequently, the cost of development 
20 The new Urbanism is a movement that addresses many of the ills of our current sprawl development 
pattern. It contends that the costs of urban sprawl are visible in the creeping deterioration of the once 
proud neighbourhoods, the increasing alienation of large segments of society, a constantly rising 
crime rate and widespread environmental degradation (Katz, 1994, p. ix-x). The New Urbanism 
believes in producing the built environment by extraneous parties, a modem-capitalist method, and 
not by the inhabitants themselves. Thus, New Urbanism is but another model revolving in the orbit of 
the modern-capitalist paradigm. 
21 With respect to revivification, the Syrian civil code considered dead land a state domain. The same 
process took place in Iraq in 1938. In Egypt, nullification of revivification was gradual, however 
ended up in 1964 in considering all dead lands as the state's exclusive property and thus revivification 
was abolished altogether (Akbar, 1988, p. 53). 
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is far too high for most inhabitants. Problems of housing shortages are thus mounting in most 
Arab countries. Almost seventy percent of the housing demand is for the poor (Hasan, 1995, 
p. 25). House-building loan programs for low-income groups emerged. However, the problem in 
most cases is in the acquisition of land, and not in building houses. People, if obtaining a land, 
can incrementally build their own shelter, to minimum quality standards. However, with state- 
control over access to resources (lands) such a process has become a dream for many 
inhabitants. This situation led consequently to the emergence of informal squatter settlements 
with unacceptable living conditions, which are again fought by the state and professionals. 
TERRITORIAL DOMINANCE 
Dominant top-down control inevitably implies increased 
proportion of public space. 
(Habraken, 1998, p. 2I2) 
In an attempt to regulate the relationships between private parties, and to sustain its control over 
the built environment, the state in the acquired mode tends to avoid any direct (or horizontal) 
relationships between parties (such as those prevailing in the inherited built environment), and 
thus any potential domination or conflict. To achieve this, two mechanisms were adopted. First, 
through laws and regulations. The law in the acquired mode acted as a mediator between 
parties and their properties. It performed as a regulatory mechanism to which parties refer. 
Any dispute between neighbours, for example, is resolved by reference to the state's law. 
Replacing direct relationships between neighbours with state-private parties relationships 
through the law led to the elimination of dialogue between neighbours. This had its impact in 
weakening the social bonds in the built environment. Moreover, building conventions in the 
inherited built environment are developed by inhabitants themselves and transmitted among 
society by means of dialogue (explained in the next chapter). Elimination of dialogue between 
parties means the stagnation of the conventional building knowledge. This, consequently, leads 
to the decline of self-created, responsive, creative solutions in the built environment. The law 
(the state) in the acquired mode determines such solutions and thus replaces other methods of 
knowledge transmission. In short, dialogue is replaced by imperatives. 
Second, to minimize such relationships between private properties, the state increased what can 
be called "safe areas" as areas that separate private properties. These are public areas, such as 
streets and plazas, owned and controlled by the state, and which perform as higher level areas 
through which any potential friction, due to horizontal property relationships, between any two 
adjacent properties dissolves. Private houses, for example, open into public streets directly. No 
direct relationships between private houses through for example easement rights. Creation of 
new easement rights by the inhabitants is nullified (Akbar, 1992, p. 337). In that sense, areas of 
contact or friction between neighbours are reduced, if not eliminated, and, as Habraken states, 
higher level areas function to organize lower level ones. They are what lower level forms have 
in common (Habraken, 1998, p. 84). Each property has a direct relationship with the state, 
through the safe areas (state properties), and indirect relationship with other properties through 
the law. This avoidance of horizontal relationships between properties, Habraken contends, 
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constitutes the single most important principle in the generation of the acquired built 
environment (Habraken, 1998, p. 34). 
Where rights-based mechanisms in the inherited built environment connected properties and 
thus parties together, power-based mechanisms (the law) in the acquired built environment 
separated such properties and thus parties, leading to eliminating any overlap that might occur 
between properties. The state (the law) performs as an intermediate extraneous party, 
controlling private properties. In that sense, state domination replaced horizontal (restless, 
according to Habraken) relationships between parties. 
Accordingly, the ratio of public spaces to private properties increased dramatically in the 
acquired built environment compared to the inherited built environments. For example, 
according to al-Hathloul's study of change in ad-Dira district in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the area 
of streets had increased from 18% in the inherited built environment to 45% in the acquired 
built environment (three times), whereas the area of private properties had decreased from 77% 
in the inherited mode to 53% in the acquired mode (al-Hathloul, 1996, p. 166). As state 
properties, the organization and maintenance of such large areas of public spaces became the 
responsibility of the state instead of the responsibility of all inhabitants, as was the case in the 
inherited mode, i. e. transformed from being de-centrally fulfilled to centrally fulfilled. This 
consequently had led to the depletion of society's resources in ordering and maintaining those 
spaces. The poor financial situations of states in most Arab countries has led to deterioration of 
quality in such spaces. For example, unserviced areas are increasing in Cairo at twice the rate of 
urban growth. Existing infrastructure is operating at levels two to four times above their 
designed capacities. Facing such problems, ten billion U. S. $ are needed to bring Cairo's 
services up to an acceptable standards (Serageldin, 1989, p. 264). The problem does not lie in 
the lack of state development programs, but in their inefficiency. Such programs cannot solve 
those urban problems unless the roots of the problem are challenged; that is the domination of 
the extraneous party in the production process of the built environment. 
This process of eliminating potential domination between related parties through creating safe 
areas led in turn to the creation of another sort of hierarchical relationships between properties, 
but with the state as a one component in such relationships. Private properties in the acquired 
built environment relate territorially to higher level public spaces (whether, as called in 
contemporary terms, public, semi-public, or semi-private spaces), which are state-owned and 
controlled. Such relationships are produced and organized through power-based mechanisms 
which are directed by the state, as the supreme regulatory device, and its laws. The state, thus, 
exercised its power over the built environment: it appropriated public spaces; owned them; 
imposed its control over them; intervened in the production of the built environment; changed 
the territorial structure; subjected private parties to its laws and regulations; and thus gained 
territorial dominance in the built environment. In other words, the societal hierarchical power 
structure in the acquired mode capitalized potential dominance/dependence property and thus 
parties' relationships in the built environment. 
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As noted, the physical organization of the built environment invites territorial domination 
between parties (as Habraken asserts, 1998). This potential domination is maximised in the 
acquired built environment through a centralized mode of providing services (e. g. water piping, 
sewage, electricity). That is, as part of the welfare state, provision of the essential infrastructure 
(e. g. road networks, sewage, water, electricity, communication system) became its 
responsibility. Thus, instead of being privately owned properties in the inherited built 
environment, produced through parties' incremental decisions, and distributed and regulated by 
means of rights-based mechanisms, such infrastructure in the acquired built environment is 
owned or controlled" by the state. To maintain its control over such services, their distribution 
followed the territorial structure of state properties. Water and sewage lines, for example, were 
placed along public streets to reach private properties 23 They do not penetrate, in most cases, 
into non-state-owned properties. This in turn enhanced state's territorial dominance in the 
acquired built environment. That is, the state (as the dominant party) in such a structure has the 
power of the territorial imperatives of enclosure and supply (see p. 173-4 above). The state in 
many Arab countries uses such services as a tool of power to oblige private parties to abide by 
its building rules and regulations. If such rules are violated, the resident will be debarred from 
connecting his property with those state-owned essential services. In short, the state, through its 
territorial position which it created, dominates private parties. 
In the inherited built environment, territorial structure is regulated (and partially determined) by 
structures of rights. A private property could extend onto a through street (in its fina ), however, 
respecting the situal rights of the street (i. e. if not causing harm to passers-by and no one 
objects). Thus, private territories' changes (lower level properties) in the inherited built 
environment affect higher level properties (public streets). Expropriation of private properties 
for the benefit of widening a street (higher level property), for example, is prohibited. 
Accordingly, lower level properties in the inherited built environment could change on the 
account of higher level properties, but not the opposite. In contrast, regulated by power-based 
mechanisms, higher level properties in the acquired built environment, such as public streets, 
might extend over lower level ones (e. g. widening a public street), and not the other way round. 
Changes of lower level properties (private residences, for example) are constrained within their 
boundaries. This reflects the imperceptible power structure in the acquired mode. The state (the 
owner of public spaces) is more powerful than private properties, thus, through its acquired 
rights of eminent domain, imposes its control over private properties. In short, whereas rights 
structures shaped the territorial structure in the inherited built environment, it is power 
relationships that shape the territorial structure in the acquired built environment. 
22 In case of privatization, the state retains its control over the privatized infrastructure. 
23 However, with the privatization movement, the same territorial structure was followed for such 
infrastructure; although privately owned. 
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9.4 CONCLUSION 
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The emergence of the modem state as extraneous party acquiring power to intervene in the 
production process of the built environment is considered as a one determinant in the shift from 
the inherited to the acquired mode. This shift is accompanied by changing mechanisms of the 
production of the built environment from rights-based, self-directed (by the inhabitants 
themselves) mechanisms in the inherited mode to power-based, extraneously-controlled 
mechanisms in the acquired mode. Accordingly, the conception of the production of the built 
environment and other related conceptions changed. 
Emanating from the modem concept of power with its notions of lusting for power and inflation 
of resources, the state in the acquired mode abandoned its inherited status as a party with 
limited rights (scope of exercitation) in the production of the built environment, determined 
according to structures of rights set by shari `a. Fulfilling its apparatus of lusting for power, 
the state acquired territorial dominance in the built environment, thus subjecting other parties 
and properties to its control. State power in the production of the built environment increased 
while private parties' power (rights) decreased. Such changes led consequently to changes in the 
territorial structure of the built environment and thus in the social structure of the acquired 
mode. State areas of acceptance increased, while those of private parties decreased. Conceptions 
of state and private property ownership changed. The percentage of controlling parties 
decreased than the case in the inherited built environment. Access to resources is controlled. 
Chances of enabling the individual and society are abated. In short, due to the emergence of the 
modem state as an extraneous party in the acquired mode, acquired power structure replaced 
the inherited rights structures of parties and properties in the built environment. 
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SHIFTING POWER 
from the intraneous to the extraneous 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
Professionals and the modem state constitute the two extraneous parties that are considered, as 
this thesis argues, the genesis of the acquired mode. They perform in a mutual manner where 
the role of each sustains the other. The two parties together, the state through its supreme 
power, and professionals through their power of knowledge and expertise, led the shift in 
contemporary Arab Muslim societies from the inherited to the acquired mode. They controlled 
and directed decision-making processes of societal engineering and the production of 
contemporary Muslim built environments. They changed the conception of the production of 
the built environment from that of the inherited (based on intraneous parties) to that of the 
acquired (based on extraneous parties). The previous chapter explored the impact of the modem 
state on changing mechanisms of the production of the built environment. This chapter is 
devoted to examining the rise of professionalism and its impact on the built environment. 
Professionalism occurred in most areas of life; it penetrated into all societal levels. However, 
what concerns us in this study is the built environment-related professionalism (e. g. planning, 
architecture). Accordingly, the focus in this chapter is on the shift in the conception of 
production of the built environment, concomitant to the reception of the acquired mode and its 
notion of professionalism. Although professionalism arose in the West (as explained), it is 
considered a universal phenomenon. Thus, the discussion in this chapter, although based on 
writings of Western scholars, applies to the Arab Muslim world as much as to other cultures. 
10.2 CONVENTIONAL/ INVENTIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
Two types of knowledge can be distinguished here: conventional and inventional knowledge. 
"Conventional/ experiential knowledge" is the type of knowledge that dominated in the past 
until the rise of modernity, when it was replaced by "inventional/ processed knowledge". In 
terms of the built environment, "conventional knowledge", or what Habraken (1997) refers to 
as "thematic knowledge", is predicated upon a "knowledge-base" shared by its community 
and established by accumulation of experiences in shaping the built environment. A shared 
vocabulary is a sign of the existence of this knowledge-base. ' Thus, conventional knowledge is 
characterised by its knowledge-base and shared vocabulary, performing as a unifying 
Knowledge-base as used above is a broadened definition of Habraken's. Habraken defines 
"knowledge-base" with reference to profession as "the domain of expertise claimed by a profession" 
(Habraken, 1997, p. 267). 
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knowledge in society (Habraken, 1997, p. 267-9). This is, as Schönt defines it, a knowledge-by- 
doing (experiential) developed out of everyday experiences; out of trial and error methods in the 
production of the built environment. Those experiences and methods are manifested as new 
solutions in the built environment, where society evaluates and judges such manifestations. 
Starting as inventions, accepted manifestations perceived as successful are widely shared and 
employed, thus become conventions that are inheritable from one generation to another. In that 
manner, through inventions turning to conventions, knowledge evolves and redintegrates 
according to the emerging conditions. Produced and adopted by the people sharing it, 
conventional knowledge incarnates a sense of integration of the three structures of the built 
environment (the manifested, the operative, and the imperceptible). In traditional built 
environments, those three structures were unconsciously intermeshed and taken for granted in 
people's daily experiences, thus, end forms produced by this knowledge represent the 
integration of those structures together. Conventional knowledge, thus, is experiential, 
contextual, and intuitive. It is, as Habraken defines it, "the knowledge of the built form ... [that] 
reflects the agreements, tacit or otherwise, honoured by those who act on it. " It is "the 
knowledge of what is not to be different" (Habraken, 1997, p. 284). 3 
This type of knowledge resembles the knowledge employed in the production of the inherited 
built environment. Inhabitants of Muslim cities shared a conventional built-environment 
knowledge that embodied covert societal agreements. Such knowledge is reflected in many 
manifestations in the built environment such as rainwater discharge methods where water 
spouts run over properties' roofs, solutions of counteracting the damage, and the like. However, 
the most evident example of such knowledge is the existence of a common typology of form 
and a common pattern of the built environment fabric in general. That is, although 
decentralization prevailed as a mechanism of decision-making in the inherited built 
environment where each party makes its own decisions, however, similar typologies and 
patterns were produced such as similar house plans and facade treatments, similar dead-end 
street layouts, and similar territorial structure. Habraken refers to these shared typologies and 
patterns of form produced as a result of such a conventional knowledge as " forms of 
understanding" (Habraken, 1997, p. 285; 1998, p. 230). These typologies and patterns, produced 
by people's shared knowledge, reflect the integration of the three structures of the built 
environment: the manifested in the sense that it respected the common conventional types, the 
operative in the sense that it was based on dialogue and agreements between people through 
their shared knowledge, and the imperceptible in the sense that it is stemmed from the everyday 
life of its people, applying their rights derived from shad a. 
In the inherited built environments, social bonds and relationships between people are 
manifested in relationships between their properties, regulated by the structures of rights. The 
2 "Knowledge-by-doing" or "knowing-in-action" is a concept used by D. Schön in his reflective 
practitioner theory (1991). 
3 This definition refers to what Habraken calls "thematic knowledge". Conventional knowledge, as 
used in this study, denotes thematic knowledge. 
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inherited built environment can thus be perceived as composed of a network of property 
relationships where each property has a relationship with adjacent ones, according to rights 
maps. In that scene, knowledge is transmitted within Muslim society through such a network of 
properties, through dialogue and experience. Properties of one block relate to each other 
through certain elements (previously reached agreements or solutions) or rights such as 
waterspouts, party walls, passage ways, and easement rights. Similarly, blocks relate to others 
through doors or overpasses with the right of precedence. Interfaces between these properties 
are points of conflict where solutions, through dialogue and agreement between related parties, 
are invented. For example, a party wall between two neighbours' properties is an element 
controlled and used by the two neighbours jointly (as a one party). Party walls, generally, force 
the adjoining neighbours to communicate (Akbar, 1988, p. 148-150). For example, if the co- 
owner of a party wall wants to build an overpass in his property where the load of one side of 
this overpass rests on the party wall, he has to seek the approval of his neighbour as a partner in 
that wall. This makes the two neighbours communicate to reach an agreement on this matter 
where a particular solution is agreed upon. This solution, if successful (i. e. accepted by society), 
is then transmitted through properties network from one neighbour to another until it is 
transmitted to the whole society. Such method of knowledge transmission sustains and 
contributes to the unifying knowledge-base of society. 
This unifying conventional knowledge and its method of transmission were swept away by the 
effects of modem rationality and its resultant professionalism. 
MODERNITY AND INVENTIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
Aristotle distinguished between three types of reason or knowledge: episteme (theoretical 
knowledge), techne (technical applications of theory) and phronesis (practical wisdom). ' 
Phronesis is a type of prudence that allows a significant role for intuition, imagination, and 
emotion (Hollinger, 1994, p. 58). Whereas episteme and techne relate to scientific and 
instrumental rationality, phronesis relates to value rationality and praxis (Flyvbjerg, 1993, 
p. 13). For Aristotle, these types of reason and knowledge are all practices that are not reducible 
to one another. Plato, on the other hand, rejected the elements of phronesis knowledge as 
irrational, and stressed only those of episteme and techne. With the rationalist turn of 
modernity, and its differentiation between facts and values, episteme, techne and instrumental 
rationality have been emphasised, however, phronesis and value rationality have become 
marginalized. Subject to the domination of the scientific movement and the industrial 
revolution, and proceeding with the Platonic philosophy of knowledge, modernity conceived of 
science as the highest form of knowledge where other types of knowledge are dispensable or 
replaced by science. Positivism had become the dominant philosophy of knowledge 
(Sandercock, 1998a, p. 59). 
As Flyvbjerg pointed, the terms episteme and techne are still found in current language, for instance 
in the words epistemology and epistemic, technology and technical, whereas phronesis has no direct 
modern counterpart (Flyvbjerg, 1993, p. 12). 
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Removed from everyday life and its daily experiences and focusing on a singular (rational) way 
of knowing, this conception of scientific knowledge can be described as a static conception that 
does not include thinking in terms of "knowing", which is the process of becoming, but as a 
thing already "precipitated" (Sayer, 1984, p. 16). It is a knowledge that is produced 
intentionally in laboratories and research centres, away from people's intuition and daily lives, 
thus conceived of as a product or a thing that exists outside lay people. It is an 
institutionalised knowledge, established and transmitted through institutions (universities), 
thus, it can be called as a processed knowledge. This is the knowledge of professionalism. 
On another level, modernity as an "antitraditional tradition"s was a rebellion against 
normative standards, and a constitution of the "new" (Smart, 1992, p. 148). In the name of 
progress, modernity was committed to the "new", and obsessed with novelty and creativity 
(Berman, 1983), thus replacing convention with inventions. It is the tradition of the new and the 
different, thus, the knowledge it advocates is the knowledge of invention and creativity. 
Modernity and its inventional knowledge situated the world in a maelstrom of change in which 
the experiences of today might contradict the experiences of yesterday. In that sense, in terms of 
the built environment, previously honoured concepts such as "accumulation of experiences" 
and "knowledge-base" became nonsensical. Predicated on modem notions of heroism and 
individualism, inventive knowledge invalidates the unifying knowledge-base that used to exist 
within the community of a particular activity or even within society at large. These modernist 
avant-gadrist attitudes of heroism do not allow for the cultivation of a body of knowledge. That 
is, as Habraken states, "to the avant-garde ideology the common ground [knowledge] is an 
obstacle to success" (Habraken, 1997, p. 272). These attitudes explain the great variety and 
continuous shifts of styles in contemporary architecture, each expressing the creative artistic 
talent of its architect to produce a different piece of art. Modern built environments (the 
acquired) lack the sense of typology and patterns, " forms of understanding", that used to unify 
traditional built environments (the inherited). It is a built environment that accentuates 
difference and not similarities. In that sense, in the acquired mode, the process of the production 
of the built environment ceased to be an integrative process which incorporates its three levels 
together (manifested, operative, and imperceptible). In the inherited built environments, 
architecture used to be a process of producing spaces and buildings to accommodate, thus it was 
a daily experience that adds to the knowledge-base of its community. Differentiating its three 
structures, modem architecture conceived of itself as an aesthetic exercise on the manifested 
level only, where the good architect is a good artist who produces original, unprecedented work. 
This constitutes one component in the changing process of the conception of the built 
environment production in Muslim societies (from the inherited to the acquired). 
To explore the process of the production and transmission of this type of knowledge it is 
necessary to explain the context of its emergence and domain: professionalism. 
5A term used by de Onis, cited in Smart, 1992, p. 51. See chapter five above. 
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[A new class would try to create] "the reign of scientific 
intelligence, the most aristocratic, despotic, arrogant and elitist 
of all regimes. There will be a new class, a new hierarchy of 
real and counterfeit scientists and scholars, and the world will 
be divided into a minority ruling in the name of knowledge, and 
an immense ignorant majority" 
(M. Bakunin, cited in Derber et. al. 1990, p. 5) 
control over knowledge serves to establish structures of 
hierarchy and domination that are quite inconsistent with 
democratic ideals. 
(Chomsky, back cover comment on: Derber et. al., 1990) 
Professionalization is a form of a "lust for power" which maintains and is maintained by 
capitalism. After the rise of the free market and industrial capitalism (beginning of the 19`h c. ), 
the process of professionalization began in the Western world. Certain groups of people 
(producers of special services), lusting for power, sought to make use of those opportunities 
open in the emerging conditions. Aiming at controlling the market of their expertise, they 
started organizing themselves by negotiating the boundaries of their areas in the social division 
of labour. In that sense, professionalization movements are a kind of counteract movements 
directed against the market, and attempting to subtract certain areas of social life from the naked 
operations of market forces (Larson, 1977, p. xii). They are thus understood, as Larson 
proclaims, as: first, defining and controlling a protected market for professional services, which 
must be distinguished form competing services; and second, attaching social status and concrete 
economic and social privileges to the fact of membership in the corporate professional category 
(Larson, 1977, p. xii). Thus, from the side of professionals, professionalism today might be seen 
as a "power struggle" on a societal level. It is an ideological battle for recognition where 
professionals are striving for privileged social status. Based on this, "professionalizationism" 
can be perceived as aiming at a power gain through mobilization and possession of power 
resources: controlled market, economic privileges, and social status. 
Professionalization appropriates knowledge from society to professionals, thus transforming 
knowledge from being available and open to everybody to being exclusive to somebody. In that 
sense, professionalization can be perceived as an attempt to pre-empt, possess, monopolize, 
and control knowledge and skills (mobilization of resources) so as to become a scarce 
resource exclusive to certain group of people, and then to translate this scarce resource into an 
order of economic and social rewards (market control and social mobility). ' It is a process of 
6 The idea of knowledge monopolization is not new to the Western culture. In the nineteenth century, 
craft knowledge monopolization has been exercised. That is, as the power and privilege of craft 
workers depended on the preservation of unskilled class, thus socializing craft knowledge would have 
meant allowing everyone the opportunity to become artisan, which craftsmen assiduously sought to 
prevent. Thus, through guilds and other fraternal organizations (established as early as the eleventh 
century), craftsmen had control over their knowledge and created a monopoly that denied this craft 
knowledge to outsiders. In this way, craft knowledge was, for centuries, kept "all in the family". 
Guilds, as exclusive clubs, were the true owners of craft knowledge, thus, abiding rules of 
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privatizing knowledge and transforming it into a property. As ordinary knowledge is 
considered as a threat to the professionals' monopolization of truth, thus, professionalization 
had to go parallel with a process of discrediting, disqualifying and limiting the conventional 
(ordinary) knowledge and regulating its boundaries. In that sense, Illich denounces the 
professional discrediting of ordinary knowledge as the great cultural revolution of modem times 
(cited in Derber, 1990, p. 62). This process led consequently to the concentration of power in the 
hands of professionals. That is, monopolization and control of knowledge as a power resource 
led consequently to what we called earlier as " inflation of resources", i. e. more resources are 
mobilized to this group as a result, such as economic privileges and elevated social status. 
Professionalizationism in that sense redistributed resources in an unequal manner, creating 
power relationships between two groups: professionals as knowledge-based service providers, 
and lay people as recipients of these services. One can say thus that " monopolized knowledge 
is power". As an ideological struggle for power and recognition, professionalism divides 
society into two parties, professionals and non-professionals, or what is called in this study, 
extraneous parties (professionals) and intraneous parties (the general public). In that sense, 
professionalism asserts the notions of class divisions and social status and thus societal power 
structure in capitalist societies. In brief, the concept of professionalism is centred on the modem 
concept of power. It is a form of " power to" achieve outcomes. It is a power game. 
In the acquired built environment, this apparatus of knowledge monopolization 
(professionalization) embodied an implicit contingent process of relatively "ignorancing" 
society by disqualifying thus "passivizing" their knowledge-base. What started as a result of 
modernity and its Enlightenment goals ended up contradicting such goals. Instead of 
enlightening society, professionalization produced unenlightened, dispossessed, dependent 
majority, compared to the society in the inherited mode. That is, power relationships necessitate 
inequality in resource distribution, thus, society's inherited conventional knowledge-base had to 
be disqualified and "passivated", and then discarded and replaced by the professions' 
knowledge-base (acquired) where each profession's knowledge-base (if exists at all) is defined 
and modified from within the circle of its profession. This new knowledge-base of professionals 
became the "active" knowledge-base in comparison to the inherited "passive" knowledge-base 
of the people, however, confined to its professionals. 
Building on their faith in rationality, professionals eschewed nonrational ways of knowing such 
as intuition or faith (religion), thus dismissing much of conventional knowledge as irrational. 
Accordingly, professionals in contemporary Muslim built environments dismissed the inherited 
mechanisms of the built environment production, based on the concept of rights as derived from 
shari `a, as irrational and replaced them with more rational (according to their acquired 
standards) methods (imported). Stemming from this base, and understanding that they cannot 
totally discredit and diminish the inherited ordinary knowledge, professionals sought to limit 
membership kept knowledge within the club (Derber et. al., 1990, p. 80). Craft guilds were devices for 
establishing social credit. 
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lay people's confidence in ordinary knowledge and in their ability to act in their own best 
interest. Acceptance of this ideology created a demand for professional knowledge and 
expertise, thus acceptance of professional hegemony. This gave professionals an 
authoritarian, elitist position over non-professional people. ' Moreover, in the inherited built 
environment, building knowledge was transmitted through conventions, i. e. it reached 
everybody. However, in the acquired mode, due to professionalism and its knowledge 
monopolization, knowledge became a scarce resource that is not available for everybody. The 
method of transmitting knowledge in the acquired built environment does not guarantee its 
reception by everybody, but rather it sustains the exclusion of knowledge to a certain group 
(professionals). In other words, professionalism dissolved the knowledge-base of society. 
Whoever needs knowledge has to search for it. Such a method, hinders the development and 
redintegration of ordinary knowledge, a matter that contributes to the process of " ignorancing" 
non-professional people. 
Through passivizing people's knowledge, professionalism transformed members of society 
from being active, acquainted to dependent, unacquainted people, labelled as 
"' uncredentialed"g in comparison to the credentialed professional "knower". This created a 
gap between the elite professional and lay people, characterised mainly by the loss of a common 
language between the two groups, i. e. by the loss of a knowledge-base shared by society 
members. In that sense, professionalization, appropriating power from the hands of people, 
led to the elevation of the few and the subjugation of the many (Derber, et. al., 1990, p. 110). It is 
a "power to" form of power that aims at achieving outcomes, however, this might not be 
possible except through exercising power over others, i. e. domination. 
Professionalism advanced the emergence of the extraneous parties (professionals) for the 
previously independent intraneous people's party. That is, as explained in chapter seven, the 
production process of the inherited built environments is based on intraneous parties 
(inhabitants) as decision-makers, each performing in its site, according to structures of rights. ' 
One might argue that this is not always true in Western societies as, for example, any person can build 
his own house by himself. That might be true in limited cases. Procedures for obtaining permission 
from higher authorities for any building action is quite sophisticated and thus require an expert to 
fulfil its requirements. For example, in most Arab countries, development projects have to be 
presented to the higher authorities through a licensed office, in professional-form drawings. Thus, 
such a requirement sustains the role of professionals in the production of the built environment. 
Moreover, self-built houses might be suitable to small scale projects such as residential houses, but 
not to a larger scale projects, such as in the re-planning of cities or certain neighbourhoods. In such 
latter cases, the expertise and knowledge of professionals is necessarily needed. 
8 "Credential society" is how Randall Collins refers to modern society, based on the power of 
knowledge. In such a society, professionals are credentialed;, the general public are uncredentialed 
(Derber, et. al., 1990, p. 3-4). 
To compare this with traditional Western societies, in the eighteenth century-America, producers and 
consumers were virtually identical. Practically all the family's needs were supplied by its members. 
Nineteenth century industrialists and retailers sought to break family and neighbourly self-reliance in 
the service of profit. By World War I, American capitalism had largely undermined the family as a 
producer (Derber et. al., 1990, p. 141). 
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However, in the acquired mode today, with their knowledge appropriated and monopolized, 
thus transformed into ignorants, intraneous parties have to refer to extraneous parties to solve 
their problems. This new order subordinates the intraneous majority to those powerful 
extraneous minorities. This can be depicted as a legitimized process of intervention in 
previously intraneous parties' affairs. Such a change in the conception of the production of 
Muslim built environments constitutes a determining component in the shift from the inherited 
to the acquired built environment. But what gives such a process and a party its legitimacy? 
MODERNITY, RATIONALlY, AND PROFESSIONALISM 
Most studies, as Larson states, implicitly or explicitly present professionalization as an instance 
of the process of "modernization". Professionalization pertains to the general dimensions of 
"modernization": the advance of science and cognitive rationality and the progressive 
differentiation and rationalization of the division of labour in industrial societies (Larson, 1977, 
p. xvi). Thus, professions are typical products of the modem-capitalist society. 
Enlightenment philosophers were hoping that art and science would promote not only the 
control of the forces of nature but also the understanding of self and world (truth), moral 
progress, justice in social institutions, and also human happiness (Habermas, 1992, p. 162). 
What happened was in marked contrast to these hopes. Gradually each domain of what Weber 
calls value spheres has been institutionalized; science, morality and art have become 
autonomous domains separated from the life-world (Sarup, 1993, p. 143), and their knowledge- 
base removed from life experiences. That is, as Weber proclaims10, such differentiation of the 
value spheres of science and scholarship (truth, knowledge), morality (justice), and art 
(aesthetics and taste), each has its inner logic, is what characterises the rationalization of 
cultural modernity. Those spheres were institutionalised as matters for professionals and 
experts, their knowledge was processed inside those institutions, thus the distance between 
them and the general public had increased. Such institutionalisation contributed to the unequal 
distribution of competence and rewards, thus, unequal distribution of power. Differentiation, 
institutionalisation and thus professionalization of value spheres led to the differentiation and 
thus fragmentation of the previously unifying knowledge into several spheres. Thus, instead of 
performing as a unifying base, knowledge, through professionalism, contributed to the 
differentiation and disintegration of the various realms of modern-capitalist societies, each has 
its internal principles: techno-economic, polity, and socio-cultural (see p. 100 above). 
The "community of profession" was both an agent and a product of rationalization (Larson, 
1977, p. 56). The most general and abstract dimension modem professionalism incorporated is 
its appeal to science, or, broadly speaking, to rational and systematized knowledge. Affected 
by market forces, it also incorporated the notion of rational efficiency. This led to the 
transformation of professionalism into a sort for organization of producing services. Subject to 
capitalism and its market forces, professional work has been transformed into a commodity in 
1° This value-spheres distinction was made by Kant and reiterated by Weber (Cooke, 1990, p. 337). 
SHIFTING POWER 242 
the market, where the professional is a knowledge-based service provider. Attempts to measure 
and increase efficiency in the production of services have led to the emergence of professional 
occupations such as managers and bureaucrats. Those attempts embodied an extension of the 
role of the "expert". They led to more differentiation in disciplines and more specialization, or 
to be more precise, professions were more narrowed down and more over-specialized. One 
previous type of work has produced several types of profession. This gave rise to new 
professionalizing occupations. It was also reflected in the division of the built environment into 
separate disciplines (architecture, urban design, planning, landscape, behavioural studies, etc. ), 
each concerned with particular aspects, and thus with a particular structure, or part of a 
structure, of the built environment. The architecture profession, for example, seemed to become 
merely design-oriented, where structural engineering, surveying, and urban planning were 
developed into separate professions (Crinson & Lubbock, 1994, p. 43; Larson, 1977, p. 143). As 
a result, the previously unified and unifying built environment knowledge became fragmented 
between those various professions. This consequently led to further the disjunction of the three 
structures of the built environment, and even to the segmentation of each of those structures. As 
a result studies of the built environment became specialized, thus partial. 
However, the question now is: how did such professions acquire legitimation? In the process 
of professionalization, the concept of social closure was employed as a central block to protect 
professionalism. That is, as Weber argues, status groups or classes in society attempt always to 
maintain their social privileges by a mechanism of "social closure" to protect and expand 
existing monopolies of privilege against outsiders, thus restricting these resources to their 
members and closing access to outsiders (Turner, 1988, p. 8; Jary & Jary, 1995, p. 81). Processes 
of social closure work through a dual mechanism of inclusion and exclusion; they involve 
marginalization (exclusion) and incorporation (inclusion). They are based on the power of one 
group to deny access to reward, or positive life-chances, to another group (Marshall, 1994, 
p. 60). " This process eventually leads to maintaining the power structure within society. 
Accordingly, in the professionalization process, to establish and protect the market for 
professions and to maintain privatization of knowledge, i. e. to maintain social closure, legal 
locks of inclusion and exclusion had to be introduced (e. g. licensing, patent and copyrights, 
credentials systems). Licensing is a means to back up the professional's knowledge claims with 
the force of the state by legally restricting who can practice (Derber et. al., 1990, p. 110). 
Professional entrepreneurs, thus, solicit state protection and state-enforced penalties to 
implement exclusion methods against unlicensed competitors. For example, in the field of built 
environment-making, the titles of " architect", " engineer", " surveyor", " builder", and the like, 
were not protected and often used synonymously. To protect these titles there was a need for 
Later exponents of this view saw closure as the basic of all inequality, be it that of material rewards, 
status honour, etc. (Marshall, 1994, p. 60). Parkin considered this concept of "social closure" as an 
aspect of the distribution of power within classes (Abercrombie, 1994, p. 383). Pierre Bourdieu (1984) 
has developed his idea of status distinction through cultural exclusiveness in the field of cultural 
sociology. 
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state support. That is, due to the nature of the products and the state of their markets, it was only 
the state, as the supreme legitimizing and enforcing institution, that could sanction the modern 
profession's monopolistic claims of superiority for their "commodities" (Larson, 1977, p. 14- 
15). The state, using its power, entitled professionals to power that gave them the right to 
intervene, legitimately, as extraneous parties in people's lives, i. e. power creates rights. In that 
sense, legitimate intervention in the production process of the built environment was extended. 
It is the right of power of both the state and the professionals as extraneous parties. 
Using the mechanisms of social closure, to control professionalism, professionals sought to 
protect their professional status and boundary by excluding those without the relevant 
credentials from their circle. In such a process, modem rationality was incorporated. That is, to 
identify the "commodities" professionals produce, these have to be standardized. For this, a 
cognitive bases was crucial: what kind of knowledge each profession could claim as 
distinctively its own. This led, under the effect of rationalization, to the standardization and 
unification of professional knowledge. Formal education and credentialism are the means to 
accomplish this task. As a result, formal institutions of training as centres for the production of 
knowledge were established. In other words, the role of the modem university was to produce 
professional producers and the production of professionally relevant knowledge (Larson, 1977, 
p. 50). Professionals used schools to promote and protect knowledge monopolies. In that sense, 
professionals have helped turn schooling, officially a means of diffusing knowledge, into a tool 
of confining it as well (Derber et. al., 1990, p. 82). It became a tool of knowledge 
monopolisation. Thereby, educational institutions performed a significant role in changing the 
conception of the production of Muslim built environments from that which prevailed in the 
inherited mode to that of the acquired. They contributed to the shift of power in the production 
of the built environment, from the hands of people to the hands of professionals. Knowledge 
was processed in these institutions away from daily experiences; it can be said that the 
rationalization of professionalism had the effect that the "theoretical/processed" (acquired) 
and the "experiential' (inherited) knowledge became distinct. 
To take Britain as an example for the rise of architectural professionalism, the RIBA was 
founded in 1834 to become the focus to define the practice of architects as distinct from other 
workers in the building industry. However, to perform its role properly, the RIBA had to have 
some control and influence on architectural training (Crinson & Lubbock, 1994, p. 41). That is, 
a system of registration was introduced by RIBA to control the profession. " This began as 
voluntary system in 1863 and then turned to be a compulsory system of registration in 1905. 
This led to Registration Acts (1931,1938) enacted by the government to support the control of 
the market and the profession. It can be said that registration was the culmination of the process 
of professionalization in architecture inaugurated by the formation of the RIBA in 1834. 
Registration meant that "only those who had qualified as architects through professional 
12 In 1897 in the USA, the state of Illinois introduced the first registration law for the practice of 
architecture in the United States (Larson, 1983, p. 50). 
SHIFTING POWER 244 
examinations should have the right to use the title `architect' in their professional practice" 
(Crinson & Lubbock, 1994, p. 61). In other words, registration performs as a social closure 
mechanism of inclusion/exclusion. It is an instrument of exercising "power over" others; of 
control and domination. Examinations were set by the RIBA, modelled partially after those of 
the Ecole des Beaux-Arts. Thus, subjected to RIBA's domination, architectural schools in 
universities had to modify their educational approaches and curriculum, so as to enable their 
students to pass those examinations and become credentialed. In other words, the RIBA had 
standardized the architectural educational approach in schools of architecture in Britain, 
especially after its introduction of the system of "recognition" to inspect and evaluate the 
standard of schools of architecture, so the students of those schools which fulfil certain 
conditions could gain exemption from one or more of the RIBA examinations. In this way the 
RIBA gained significant power over (control) architectural education, arguing that to gain entry 
into its ranks it had to oversee the form and standards of training (Crinson & Lubbock, 1994, 
p. 60,80). The RIBA in that sense enhances the institutionalization and thus processing of 
knowledge. It sustains the process of professionlization and, thus, authenticates the role of the 
professional as an extraneous party in the production of the built environment. 13 
In that respect, RIBA is only one example, it resembles most engineering associations or 
architectural associations in Arab countries. For example, the Architectural Department in the 
Association of Jordanian Engineers has its own system of registration, through which architects 
can get their license to practice architecture in Jordan. Such a procedure acts as a mechanism of 
exclusion to confine the circle of the architectural profession to those who have licence. 
This goal of the professional project of regulating and controlling access to the professional 
market on the supply side can be seen, according to Larson, as contradicting the 
democratization potential inherent in the idea behind the capitalist competitive market (Larson, 
1977, p. 5 1). However, from a different angle, it can be perceived as reflecting and maintaining 
the hierarchical power structure built into the modem-capitalist system as an ideology of 
" control for order". The RIBA, as claimed, uses its power gained through its legitimate status 
to control and thus organize the profession. The RIBA thus constitutes a superior extraneous 
party for architecture professionals, whereas the latter constitute a superior extraneous party for 
the public. It is a hierarchy of extraneous parties that reflects and sustains the hierarchical nature 
of modem-capitalist societies (the acquired), within which the professional performs, accepting 
the hierarchies above him, and exerting his control over those beneath him. 
PROFESSIONALIZING THE BUILT ENVIRONEMNT 
In the field of architecture, until the 1870s, there was little that could distinguish the architect's 
designs from those of builders. In the past, whether in the Islamic or Western world, the vast 
majority of buildings were erected by builders with no pretensions to being designers. 
13 Even some schools outside UK were seeking the RIBA recognition as a prestigious status for decision- 
makers. For example, King Faisal University in Saudi Arabia sought such recognition. Such attempts 
did not continue. 
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Architects, so-called (e. g. Mimar Sinan in the Ottoman period, Michelangelo), were only 
responsible for designing major monuments such as palaces, mosques, churches, and since there 
were no professions as such, they were trained in many different fields. 
Due to the strong competition in the market between different specialists, the architect, 
protecting his social status, had to concentrate on architectural functionalism (design) and on 
the aesthetic control of the market, as the aesthetic dimension of buildings was not claimed by 
other expert rivals (Larson, 1983, p. 70-2). 14 Thereby, the architect's role was more or less 
defined as formalistic, focusing on the manifested aspects of the built environment, leaving the 
other related issues to other professions such as the newly emerged profession of urban 
planning. 
As a result of rationality and market forces, each profession claimed autonomy in its field, 
discourse, and role in the production of the built environment. Moreover, instead of mutually 
beneficial relationship, specialized fields, in most cases, regard one another with contempt, 
animosity, and resentment (Larson, 1993, p. 8). '5 Architects and planners, for example, rather 
than grew in productive collaborations, assumed a dismissive or even antagonistic relationship 
with little interaction between them (Ellin, 1996, p. 224). 16 Thus, instead of having one party 
(intraneous) controlling its properties as in the inherited built environment, many extraneous 
parties were involved in the production of the acquired built environment (architects, planners), 
each performing according to its standards and values. This accordingly increased the number 
of extraneous parties intervening, thus controlling the production of the built environment, and 
thus limiting the rights of intraneous parties over their properties. 
This process of the differentiation of the built-environment-related disciplines led to the 
differentiation and even segmentation of the structures of the built environment thus to 
disjunction between the structures of the built environment, and even, sometimes, to 
inconsistency in the one structure. Architecture, in limiting its focus to design and aesthetic 
issues, became specialized in the manifested structure only. Urban planning concentrates on the 
operative structure through issues such as development control, resources distribution, and the 
like. The imperceptible structure is the speciality of other extraneous (for the professions) 
parties: the higher authorities and lawmakers (the state), thus, this structure is imposed on 
14 By the nineteenth century, many specialists such as builders, surveyors, and engineers were 
competing in the market of the building industry. In this competition, the architect, disdaining his/her 
rivals' designs and middle-class taste and protecting his social status, had to stick to the traditional 
role of the architect (as artist), defined by the Ecole des Beaux-Arts as artist. As the nineteenth 
century advanced, the market expanded into new areas of life. New building typologies emerged, 
such as railway stations and factories. No single role could possibly contain all these challenges. The 
profession of architecture could not claim possession of technical competence, thus concentrated on 
the aesthetic and functional aspects of the built environment. 
This resentment might also extend inside the one specialized field. In architecture, this can be 
perceived between the different architectural schools as a result of their different orientations and 
conceptions of what makes good architecture. 
16 Each of the two professions developed its own organizations, journals, and schools, so as to protect 
their respective intellectual and professional turfs from incursion by the other. 
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architecture profession as unquestionable constraint. This fragmentation of, and in many cases 
contradictions between, the structures/disciplines of the built environment leads to 
incompatibility in the process of the production of the built environment. 
10.4 PROFESSIONALISM AS AN IDEOLOGY 
Nowadays, the persistence of professionalism as a category of social practice suggests that the 
model of professionalism constituted by modernity has become an "ideology". This ideology 
began to dominate by the beginning of the twentieth century (Larson, 1977, p. xviii). 
Professionalism started as a project of power gain on the part of professionals. Over time, it 
became a mechanism of state control as well. In other words, professionalism started as a form 
of "power to", and then expanded to be a form of "power over" others, as well. 
Professionalism is part of what Althusser calls Ideological State Apparatuses (Althusser, 1970). 
It is a part and a product of the modem-capitalist system in that it sustains, applies, and works 
within its mechanisms, i. e. it is a product of capitalism and a tool of its reproduction. 
For professionals, professionalism is a resource of power that maintains social and economic 
privileges for them. Professionals seek to perpetuate professionalism by turning it into an 
ideology. Therefore, although faced by many crises in confidence, they always strive to 
legitimize their positions by recourse to their claims of superior knowledge and, above all, 
through state support. 
Professionalism is an ideological state apparatus" that maintains state control by reproducing a 
submission to the ruling ideology. Schools and universities in this respect, as Althusser 
proclaimed, perform as institutions for the reproduction of submission to the established order 
(Althusser, 1970, p. 104), whereas professionals perform as agents of this apparatus. Althusser 
states that " it is by an apprenticeship in a variety of know-how wrapped up in the massive 
inculcation of the ideology of the ruling class that the relations of production in a capitalist 
social formation are largely reproduced" (Althusser, 1970, p. 119). Thus, backed by state 
support, professionalism gradually became an undeniable ideology in people's lives. 
Professions have become essential to the very functioning of society in the acquired mode. We 
look to professionals for the definition and solution of our problems, and it is through them that 
we strive for social progress. In all these functions we honour the profession's claim to 
extraordinary knowledge in matters of great social importance, and in return we grant 
professionals extraordinary rights and privileges. Today, for example, one cannot imagine the 
process of city production without urban planners and urban managers, one cannot imagine the 
environment without architects who, as inculcated in people, know better how to produce good 
For Althusser, the ideological state apparatus, installed in the dominant position in mature capitalist 
social formations is the educational ideological apparatus. The mechanisms which produce vital 
results for the capitalist regime are naturally covered up and concealed by a universally reigning 
ideology of the school. In schools, the educational state apparatus is inculcated into students, where 
the teachings of the know-how are wrapped in the ruling ideology (Althusser, 1970, p. 118-9). 
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built environments. In short, professionalism in the acquired mode became an indispensable 
part of people's lives and of their culture, it became an ideology. 
As a state apparatus, professions (including urban planning and architecture) represent different 
forms and techniques for controlling others (e. g. "extraneous" parties control "intraneous" 
parties). Professionalism for Foucault is a disciplinary and oppressive apparatus that created the 
possibility of new forms of domination. In that respect, Foucault proclaims that modern 
societies control and discipline their populations by sanctioning the knowledge claims and 
practices of sciences. Foucault's analysis of such a project takes us behind the facade of 
neutrality and objectivity to reveal the operation of modem techniques of domination. In this 
context, Foucault draws attention to the connection between power and knowledge, where 
power exercised in modernity, argues Foucault, is wrapped in the mantle of scientific 
knowledge. Power for Foucault is disciplinary, where discourse18/knowledge is the vehicle for 
its establishment and maintenance'9 (Surber, 1998, p. 214). Its goal is " normalization" 20 and 
"subjectification" in order to reproduce docile and useful bodies. 
Professions create their own definitions of truth (professions' knowledge). Specialists always 
work together to establish their field and its dominant ideas, thus their knowledge (Fillingham, 
1993, p. 6). Professions using their authorities, through institutions of knowledge (e. g. schools, 
universities, hospitals), operate to "normalize" their truths/knowledge by inculcating such 
knowledge to their clients (e. g. students, patients), discipline them, thus transforming their 
truths to "normal", accepted ideologies to which clients become self-subjugated. Professionals 
are agents of this distinctively modem form of normalizing/disciplinary power (Sandercock, 
1998a, p. 71). Professionalism as an ideology was, thus, inculcated to the public through this 
process of "normalization". It was infused into society that people, based on their ordinary 
knowledge, may not be able to understand their own best interest and that professionals, based 
on their expertise and knowledge, work for "the public interest". Through their self-defined 
knowledge, professionals identified themselves as "knower" in comparison to lay people whom 
they attribute as "less-knower" or "laymen" (ignorant). Normalization of these identities and 
their acceptance by lay-people led to a process of " self-subjection" where people, in tying 
themselves to their imposed identities, became participants in their own subjectification 
(Simons, 1995, p. 2). Such a process, Foucault contends, produces a "subject" who is both 
1e Discourse is central in Foucault's studies. Discourse for him means writings in an area of technical 
knowledge; that is, areas in which there are specialists, specialized or technical knowledge, and 
specialized or technical vocabulary. Each era will define its own discourses, and these definitions may 
vary radically over time (Fillingham, 1993, p. 101). 
19 For Foucault, scientific knowledge functions as a major social power. Through the state, the family, 
the hospital, and therapeutic institutions, the scientific disciplines shape our dominant cultural ideas 
about who we are, what is permissible and unacceptable, what can be said, by whom, when, and in 
what form. It is this power/knowledge configuration that is the critical object of genealogy (Seidman, 
1994, p. 216). 
20 "Normalization" denotes inculcation of certain truths or ideologies (such as professionalism) into the 
subjected people. 
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" subject to someone else by control and dependence [to professionals], and tied to his own 
identity [as ignorant] by a conscience or self-knowing" (Foucault, 1983, p. 212). 2I 
Emphasizing the importance of knowledge in shaping society, Francis Bacon, and later Foucault 
state that "knowledge is power". This statement might be best rephrased as "monopolized 
knowledge is power". This power gave professionals an authoritarian position to control 
others, thus legitimates their domination, i. e. such power creates the right to dominate. 
10.5 CONSEQUENCES OF BUILT ENVIRONMENT PROFESSIONALISM 
Most significantly, professionalism had changed the conception of the production of the built 
environment. It enunciated the shift of power from diffusion between people in traditional 
environments to concentration in the hands of extraneous parties. For Muslim built 
environments, the emergence of professionalism, based in its imperceptible facet on modem 
conceptions of power, marks the shift in mechanisms of producing the built environment from 
those based on rights as derived from shari `a to those based on modem concepts of power; from 
those centred on intraneous parties to those centred on extraneous parties. It marked the shift 
from the inherited to the acquired mode. 
The following sections explore some of the consequences of the contemporary prevalence of 
professionalism in the production of the built environment. Chapter five explored the impact of 
the profession of planning (as a process) and its shifting paradigms on the built environment. 
The following sections focus more on the profession of architecture (as an end product). 
10.5.1 Profession's discourse: imprisonment 
We do not wish to be concerned with planning social systems 
because that is a political problem to be solved by politicians. 
What we ask for is a framework, defined by politics, within 
which we can work. 
(Huet (activist), cited in Braid, 1995, p. 275, emphasis added)22 
The position that only formal elements matter in architecture 
bespeaks a monumental refusal to confront serious problems; 
it avoids a critique of the existing power structure, of the 
ways power is used, and of the identity of those whose 
interests power serves. 
(Ghirardo, 1996, p. 390, emphasis added) 
What started as an avant-garde political project of social engineering fulfilled through designing 
the built environment (determinism23), ended up as a de-politicized project. That is, in the 
1930s, the project of modernity in architecture gave up its social and political agenda. 
21 Foucault refers to the examination of this process as "genealogy". 
22 Extracted from a conversation with Martin Pawely and Bernard Tschumi in 1971. 
23 Environmental determinism refers to the idea that social change can be achieved through the 
replanning of the built environment. This embodies the notion of social engineering by means of 
environmental determinism, that is seeking to control people's behaviour through the nature of the 
layout (the built environment) (Greed, 1993, p. 214). 
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Architecture was narrowed down to merely functional, stylistic and aesthetic exercise. 24 This 
intensified the fragmentation of the built environment between different professions, each 
imprisoned within its boundaries. 
Architectural discourse is laid down from within the profession and is based on a simple 
exclusionary principle that excludes lay people from participating in its production; it is remote 
from people's daily lives and experiences. This discourse constitutes the ideological syllogism 
of architecture: "Only architects produce architecture. Architecture is an art. Architects are 
necessary to produce art" (Larson, 1993, p. 5). Architecture, thus, became differentiated and 
autonomous from the other value-spheres, from other professions, and from daily life. This 
method is in marked contrast to that of producing and transferring knowledge in the inherited 
built environment. That is, whereas knowledge in the inherited built environment is unified in 
the intraneous party (the producer of the built environment), it is in the acquired mode 
dispersed among several extraneous parties. Thus, instead of being part of society's 
experiences and a reflection of its values and needs in which all structures of built environment 
are integrated (as in the inherited mode), architecture today (in the acquired mode) has become 
an individual exercise (of the architect and not of society), based on the professional's 
knowledge, and confined to the manifested structure of the built environment. 
However, after about thirty years of the apolitical interlude of modernity (since the 1930s) a 
second phase of apparent politicization began in the 1960s, coming to its own crisis in 1968 
(Braid, 1995, p. 241-2). Different from modem attitudes, some architects and planners attempted 
to broaden the scope of their professional discourse and connect their discipline to social and 
economic questions. For example, some attempts emerged to broaden the social role of 
architecture and planning professions and to include the previously excluded groups, thus to 
politicize the professional and change his role. Translating these ideas into practice ran into 
trouble. Such attempts contradicted with the logic of the power game prevailing in modem- 
capitalist societies (of the state). " As a result, shifting paradigms arose in planning profession, 
hoping to reach the incompatible goal: more equality in resource distribution, i. e. bestowing 
power to the powerless, under the umbrella of the existing modem power game (in which the 
state constitutes the supreme power) part of which is professionalism. Such radical attempts in 
architecture (postmodernism) ultimately turned again to its autonomous, depoliticized sphere, 
focusing on mere opposition to the dominant aesthetic of modernism (Crawford, 1991, p. 39). In 
that respect, Wojciech Lesnikowski contends, "Instead of speaking of an ideology or group 
approaches, architects started discussing their works in terms of their own attitudes and 
indulged in extreme individualism" (cited in Ellin, 1996, p. 154). 
It seems that both modernity and postmodernity in architecture started as radical corrective 
movements with broad aims that include social, economic, and political issues. Faced by 
24 In the 1930s, as the Depression deepened, architects' hopes of social reconstruction was weakened, 
then architects once again subconsciously focused on architectural aesthetics (Larson, 1993, p. 34). 
25 For more clarification of this point, see chapter five above (p. 89-95). 
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stronger systemic forces, they ended by relinquishing these aims. 26 Nevertheless, the shifts in 
architectural discourse from modernity to postmodernity and its concomitant stylistic changes 
can be perceived as symptoms of changes in architects' conceptions of their professional role. 
However, both movements seem to have incorporated the logic of modern-capitalism, and thus 
of professionalism. They produced elitist discourse and elite designers. Therefore, architecture 
remains depoliticized, and autonomous from the range of ideological, political, social, and 
economic roles that it was designed to fulfil (Crawford, 1991, p. 39). 
CHANGING THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONAL 
Architecture today is in a time of crisis; while public debate 
rages over architectural styles, architects themselves are 
uncertain of their status in society, their role within the building 
industry, and their professional goals. 
(Cover comment, in Saint, 1983) 
Postmodernism offered no new pedagogy or new system of 
architectural training. Postmodernism did not seek to change 
the relation between the architect to the rest of the building 
team, nor to change the way architecture is produced, and 
certainly not to change the relationships between the architect 
and the society at large. Postmodern plurality allowed 
everything except a deep institutional critique. 
(Crinson & Lubbock, 1994, p. 172) 
Professionalism in general, and the built environment professions in particular, witnesses today 
what many writers call a" crisis of confidence". A crisis that is generated from within the 
professions through the professionals themselves and from without through their clients. This 
crisis seems to be rooted in a growing scepticism about professional effectiveness in the larger 
sense, a sceptical reassessment of the professions' actual contribution to society's well-being 
through the delivery of competent services based on special knowledge (Schön, 1991, p. 13). 
In the light of these crises, and as a counter movement to that of modernism, different attempts 
have emerged since the 1960s holding different positions. Some of those attempts were directed 
at reviewing the system of educating the architect and the other related professions (urban 
planning), while other attempts aimed at a reconsideration of the role of architects and planners 
as professionals, and their image. 
Today, for many scholars, attention is driven towards a different kind of training for architects. " 
Some attempts suggest, inspired by the model of the builder in the past, that a 
26 In that respect, many postmodernists (e. g. Venturi) see urban and architectural space as something 
independent and autonomous, to be shaped according to aesthetic aims and principles which have 
nothing to do with any overarching social objective. 
27 The Prince of Wales is one of the non-professionals who advocate such a position. He stated in that 
respect that "the tendency for architectural education [is becoming] ever more narrowly specialized 
and remote from the concerns of the public at large, from the other building disciplines and from the 
process of making buildings, as architecture became a profession in its own right. Excessive 
specialization is not unique to this field. But this is no justification for doing nothing to rectify the 
situation" (Prince Charles, cited in Crinson & Lubbock, 1994, the Forward). 
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multidisciplinary, "holistic" approach is the appropriate method for architectural education, so 
as to enrich and broaden the architect's vision. " However, such aims cannot be fulfilled 
provided they are operating within the existing systemic power structure. That is, to revive the 
traditional conception of the built environment production means to abolish the role of the 
architect as extraneous party per se. Thus, such attempts are superficial, aiming at a manifested 
holistic role of the architect in the sense that the architect would have a holistic knowledge of 
building (e. g. crafts, construction, and technical skills). These attempts seek to improve the 
education of the professional but without questioning the notion of professionalism per se. This 
same process of searching for identity, or of being dissatisfied by the professionals' production 
is currently a subject of continuous debate in the Arab Muslim world (see Ozkan, 1995). 29 
Attempts aiming at changing the role of the professional in architecture and planning took two 
forms: either to design for people or to design with people30. The first reaction led to the 
emergence of new approaches of design such as regionalism (Frampton, and Shu'ibi in Saudi 
Arabia), contextualism (Venturi, Rowe, and A. Ibrahim in Egypt), historical eclecticism (Krier, 
Badran in Jordan, and al-Wakil in Saudi Arabia). This led to no changes in the elitist, 
authoritarian role of the architect. The architect as a designer was the ultimate arbiter in his 
designs for people. Thus, the role of the architect persists. The second reaction (discussed in 
chapter five), although insisting on the architect or the planner as the final arbiter, it led to some 
changes in the role the architect and the planner perform. However, both reactions insist on the 
concept of design in the built environment. That is, designing the built environment constitutes 
the basic service produced by those professions. It is the essence of the built environment 
professions as formulated by modernity. For those professionals (architects, planners), 
relinquishing " design" means abolishing their professions. 3' 
Such attempts actually questioned the role of the professional, however, in an apolitical manner. 
They did not challenge the systemic power relations, but modified the role of the professional 
in a manner that fits within that systemic status quo. That is, what matters in changing the 
professional's role is the balance of responsibilities between the professional and the recipient 
Such attempts appeared at the beginning of the century, especially under the strong effect of the Arts 
and Crafts movements. Gropius, for example, incorporated such an approach in the education method 
in the early years of the Bauhaus. However, such early attempts were squeezed out afterwards by the 
drive for uniformity. Today, such a model is applied in Prince of Wales Institute of Architecture. 
Aiming at a holistic perspective of built environment production, education in this institute focuses on 
arts and crafts in the education of the architect. (See the issues of the last decade of Journal of 
architectural education). 
Z9 For such debates, see the publications of the Aga Khan, for example. 
30 Such attempts ranges from citizen participation to professional participation (Habraken, 1990), from 
advocacy planning (Davidoff) to transactive planning (Friedmann), from equity planning (Krumholz) 
to the lately communicative or collaborative planning (Forester, Healey). See planning models 
discussed above (p. 89-95). 
" Within these reactions, several studies were directed at re-evaluating the scope of architecture, aiming 
at broadening its tight boundaries. Different new areas and concerns have emerged since the 1960s, 
such as the environmental and behavioural studies, community architecture, psychological studies, 
and alike. Of the main pioneers in that sense are Alexander, Rapoport, and Lynch. 
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of his services; i. e. the power structure within which this role is practised. If no changes occur 
in such a structure, then the same role persists. However, challenging the systemic status quo 
means challenging the conditions and components of professionalism per se, a matter that 
professionals aim to perpetuate. Accordingly, professionalism has a little margin for 
modification, within which the role of the professional can change. 
Efforts of the 1920s and the 1960s to politicize the architectural discourse and to restructure the 
professional role have failed to achieve their purposes. They have been defeated by the power 
game. Constrained by the imperceptible systemic power structure of their societies and by its 
law, architects have no great control over the built environment. "Architecture", as Gutman 
stated, "cannot directly produce changes in [the] underlying conditions" (Gutman, 1990). 
Architects, working within the framework of the political and economic spheres, are involved 
only in the design level of some social problems in the built environment. The other levels of 
those problems are seen to be the province of the economist, politician, the corporate capitalist 
structure, but not of the architect. In other words, they are left to the power holders (decision- 
makers) who shape the imperceptible thus participate in shaping the power game in society. In 
that respect, it can be said that, as long as architecture as a profession is subjectively 
imprisoned within its boundaries, designs of the built environment cannot have great impact in 
solving such problems as homelessness. Professionals (architects and planners) cannot have a 
role in changing society or solve societal problems unless they understand and get involved in 
the imperceptible driving forces behind these problems, i. e. in the larger systemic power game, 
so as to alter it. In that sense, Jameson believes that architecture today cannot be political 
without "total revolutionary and systematic transformation" of the political economy (Jameson, 
1985, p. 68). However, as professionalism is a part and parcel; a product and a tool, of the larger 
system of modem capitalism and its power game, thus changing the latter will inevitably affect 
professionalism's status quo, if not enfeebling its bases. Therefore, protecting their privileging 
status and the existing status quo, professionals seek to maintain and perpetuate the existing 
power structure (imperceptible structure) and its overall systemic impelling force of capitalism. 
"BUILDING" AND "ARCHITECTURE" 
Reflecting its autonomy, architecture discourse distinguishes between what is architecture and 
what is not (building). Non-architects designed buildings, or what Habraken (1997) refers to as 
"ordinary architecture", are excluded from the definition of architecture. In that sense, 
architecture excludes more than it includes. This canon of defining what is architecture is 
established from within the profession. In dismissing the non-architect architecture, architects 
are enhancing and preserving their professional and cultural status, their self-identity, and their 
role by claiming that their work is of higher worth because of its artistic qualities thus 
protecting the profession from other competing non-credentialed skills. It is a mechanism of 
social closure. That is, exclusive control of professional territory depends on the monopoly of 
its service provision. For Ghirardo, this type of architectural criticism is actually not engaged in 
the act of criticism, but rather acting to preserve a particular status quo (Ghirardo, 1991, p. 10). 
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This distinction between "architecture" and "building" led to discontinuity between the two. 
Although postmodernity, allegedly, calls for diminishing the boundaries between elite and pop 
architecture as apparent in Venturi's writings in "Learning from Las Vegas", however, 
selecting particular elements from the pop culture and pasting it on the facades of the designed 
"architecture" does not make the latter a pop architecture or eliminate its title as "elitist", 
therefore, does not re-establish the continuity between architecture and non architects- 
architecture. In postmodernity, pop culture or "ordinary architecture" constitutes no more than 
a new source of inspiration for a new style of "architecture". The Arab World is witnessing 
today a stylistic revival of Islamic architecture. However, such a revival is exclusive to the 
manifested structure. Architects recourse to Islamic architecture to copy physical forms and 
patterns, without understanding the imperceptible mechanisms responsible for producing such 
forms, i. e. they refer to the end product and not the process. They are thus freezing and 
reducing the Islamic architecture into static solutions. The works of Badran (international 
architect, Jordan) and al-Wakil (Saudi Arabia) are a prime example. 
In contrast, production of the inherited built environment was centred upon intraneous parties, 
thus, using the contemporary terminology, the end product is attributed as "building" (ordinary 
architecture) rather than "architecture". However, continuity existed between the 
(extraordinary) "architecture" and the "ordinary architecture" (building). The extra-ordinary 
used to grow out of the ordinary, out of the everyday life. This relationship had ceased to exist 
in the acquired built environments. Departing from the conception of professionalism and its 
domain monopolization, what extraneous parties produce (professionals) is inevitably 
architecture rather than building. Accordingly, "architecture" in the acquired mode is thus 
separated from "the ordinary", whether in modernity or postmodernity. That is, in modernity, 
as architecture is authoritarian and elitist, "the ordinary" is excluded from any consideration, 
however, in postmodernity "the ordinary" is considered merely as a source of inspiration. 32 The 
ordinary in the acquired mode is a reduction of the extra-ordinary. In that sense, as Habraken 
states, the ordinary had been abased and rendered as powerless (Habraken, 1997, p. 278), thus 
excluded from architecture's boundaries. 
10.5.2 The built environment: end or means? 
[T]he important thing about housing is not what it is, but 
what it does in people's lives, in other words, that dweller 
satisfaction is not necessarily related to the imposition of 
standards. 
(Colin Ward, in the preface to Turner, 1976, p. 5-6) 
Is the built environment per se an end in itself or a means to a satisfactory life"? Two 
conceptions can be distinguished in this regard. 
32 The work of A. Ibrahim is a good example of such an attitude. 
33 Demands of satisfactory life vary from a household to another according to various factors. They 
might be very basic demands as Turner (in his "Housing by people") showed in what he called the 
"supportive shack", or they might be of higher standards. 
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First, the built environment as a means. In such a conception, the built environment is perceived 
as a context that accommodates its inhabitants lives; as a container of life, thus it should 
correlate to and support its inhabitants' conditions and expectations. J. F. Turner's position can 
be classified as belonging to this category. He states that "the physical quality of the shelter is 
secondary and almost anything will do", whereas the important thing is the fulfilment of the 
inhabitants' life demands such as a healthy and secure environment (Turner, 1976, p. 56). This 
approach, nowadays, applies more to what we referred to earlier as "building" or "ordinary 
architecture" than to " architecture". That is, " architecture" is a profession-based designed 
environment which capitalism constitutes its main driving mechanism. However, such a 
contemporary position is still ineffective. Solutions still revolve within the circle of capitalism. 
That is, instead of transforming the process of the built environment production into a self- 
managed process through opening resources to inhabitants themselves so that they can decide 
for themselves, the process is still revolving around state fund and support (e. g. empowerment 
attempts in Third World countries). In short, the conception of the built environment as a 
means, as will be shown shortly, contradicts with the forces of capitalism and its market, 
therefore, such a conception receives very little advocation and application in contemporary 
times in comparison to the other conception which views the built environment as an end. 
This perception (the built environment as a means) applies to the inherited the built 
environment. Shari 'a is concerned with developing the Muslim society more than the built 
environment. Its environmental principles are mainly directed at enabling individuals in 
society, aiming at, to name some, improving their productivity, eliminating oppression, 
expelling inequality in access to resources. Shari 'a regards society as a priority over the built 
environment, thus, it invests in the built environment in a manner that facilitates its main target. 
In that regard, ownership conception in shari'a aims at enabling individuals and thus 
society. lhya' (revivification), for example, as a mechanism to initiate ownership, is a 
mechanism of enablement as well. It considers land as an available resource, open to everyone, 
with no exchange value (see chapter eight). This is the exact opposite of the situation in the 
acquired mode which considers land as a scarce resource with exchange value, thus enhance its 
speculation. However, one might say that such principles as 'ihya', most likely, produces 
irregular, disorganized built environments with tortuous streets and overlapping properties. That 
might be true if departing from the contemporary perception of organized built environments. 
That is, organization of the built environment today means straight streets and regular layouts so 
as to respond to the existence of vehicles, however, in the inherited built environments, with the 
absence of modem vehicles, the conception of organization was quite different. It revolved 
around the concept of settled environments where inhabitants in their sites control their 
properties, according to the structures of rights. Accordingly, shari 'a aims at " settled" 
environments, or what Akbar refers to as "ordered environments", more than at organized 
environments in the contemporary sense (Akbar, 1992, p. 349-366). 
As the built environment is not the main issue of concern in the inherited mode, its organization 
and maintenance were left to intraneous parties to deal with according to their capabilities and 
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needs, with reference to Shari `a, and not to any extraneous authoritarian organisations. This 
mechanism avoided the emergence of that bureaucratic class (e. g. professionals) which 
characterises the acquired mode, and is responsible of organising the built environment and 
defining and maintaining its quality. Thus, the inherited mode produced a built environment 
with no depletion of society's resources, and with minimum cost as compared to the acquired 
mode. The wealth of society is kept to its members. This should not mean that the inherited 
built environment was disorganised. All environmental problems and needs at all levels, from 
street layouts to cooling the house were solved by reference to conventions (Akbar, 1992, 
p. 367). 
Many of the radical attempts of the 1960s that aimed at changing the role of the built- 
environment professional did not stress this conception which elevates building over 
architecture. Its advocates insisted on the authoritarian (although to lesser extent than in the 
modem project) role of the professional to bring order and develop the built environment. This 
tendency reflects a well rooted, power-seeking-based, modern ideology of environmental 
determinism which aims at developing the society through developing the built environment. 
Arguing against this, Schumacher (economist), in his book "Small is beautiful", points out that 
development does not start with material factors such as natural resources, capital, or 
infrastructure, but it starts with people and their education, organisation and discipline. '' 
Improving people will improve the built environment. Without these, all resources remain 
latent, untapped, potential (Schumacher, 1973, p. 168). Thus Schumacher, relinquishing the 
modern tradition of environmental determinism, asserts that raising the quality of the built 
environment by investing in its structure, such as building highways and efficient infrastructure, 
will not develop the society or lessen its poverty. The built environment in that sense is seen as 
a means and not as an end. 
In the Muslim world, concomitant to the shift from the inherited to the acquired mode was the 
shift in the conception of the built environment from being a means to being an end in its own 
right. Affected by what many calls "late capitalism" or "post-industrialism" or 
"postmodemism", built environment production has been widely seen as part of these prevalent 
forces. Architecture's autonomy and depoliticization, as explained above, were results of these 
forces. Such effects and forces, however, led to another shift in architecture; that is to its 
commodification and commercialization. These latter shifts stem from the modem conception 
of the built environment as an end in itself. 
COMMODIFICATION OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT 
Professionalism emerged as a result of the forces of the capitalist market, thus to perpetuate its 
status this market has to be maintained. Therefore, professionalism turned to be the server of 
and served by that market. For architects, as professionals, to compete in the market and to 
gain a privileged status, architecture had to be part of this market. Advocating consumption, 
34 Schumacher's study focused on the Third World, however, his theory is applicable to all countries. 
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architecture became, especially in its postmodern era with its focus on aesthetics, a project to 
promote and draw attention to the market's goods. On another level, architecture per se became 
a commodity to be consumed. As a result, it can be said that architecture became a profit 
making profession. Architecture, thus, entered a new stage of representation: architecture as a 
commercialized commodity. Images have themselves become commodities. Such an attitude 
depletes society's resources. For example, as part of the building regulations in Amman is the 
use of stone masonry in building facades. The cost of constructing one square meter of stone 
facade is quite high if compared to the individual's average monthly income in Jordan. The 
insistence of professionals and the higher authorities on such an aesthetic matter (image) is 
taxing the society and depleting its resources that can be better utilized in health or education 
(according to Schumacher, 1973). 
In this context, the differentiation between "architecture" and "building" becomes quite 
important. "Architecture" is a commodified, commercialized product, produced by profit 
seeking professionals who view architecture as an end in its own right, however, "building" is 
a product that is produced by its people (owners and/or users), who view their building as a 
means, or context for living. Today, the former conception represents the acquired mode of 
production of the built environment whereas the latter resonates with the inherited mode. 
ORDER, CONTROL, AND CENTRALIZATION 
A visitor to any traditional quarter in Damascus or Cairo, for example, will inevitably realize 
the difference in organization and quality between such inherited built environments and those 
produced according to the acquired mode. Quality (as perceived in the acquired mode) of such 
physical built environments is low as compared to the acquired ones: its streets are narrow and 
tortuous; its buildings are attached with no setbacks and a high density. Today, these characters 
are assessed by the observer with reference to acquired criteria of evaluating the quality of the 
built environment, based on totally different grounds than those which were involved in the 
production of such inherited qualities. They are based on the conception that the quality of the 
built environment is determined by extraneous parties and not produced from within its sites 
and by its intraneous people. This latter conception acknowledges the centralization of the state 
in providing order and control over the built environment; it is a conception that accepts the 
subjection to the power of the higher authorities in the name of order and organization, or on a 
broader level, in the name of welfare. Such conceptions are mainly a result of an ideological 
belief that views the built environment as an end. These ideologies and conceptions have today, 
in the acquired mode, become normalized thus, absolutely, accepted. 
Stemming from such conceptions, and based on its systemic power structure, the acquired built 
environment received a great attention in terms of its production. Organizing the built 
environment and raising its quality became a target, and the state, as the supreme authority, is 
the agent of shaping and fulfilling this target. However, order, organization and quality are 
concepts that imply centralization: what standards of quality, who determines its criteria, how to 
organize, who implements, who decides, all these are related questions that embody a sense of 
centralization, thus of control. In that sense, people turned from being controllers of their built 
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environments (in the inherited mode) to being controlled by extraneous parties (in the acquired 
mode). In such processes, central authorities claimed to be working for the public interest. 
Whole districts were demolished, properties were expropriated to build a new street in the area; 
all this was in the name of the public interest. Concepts such as beautification of the built 
environment, urban renewal, conservation emerged accordingly, all view the built environment 
as an end that is prioritized over its people's health or education. The reconstruction of central 
Beirut in Lebanon is a prime example. After the civil war, the new government expropriated 
properties of most owners in central Beirut and transformed a fabric composed of hundreds of 
small property owners into a single property owned by a supreme owner (the state). A massive 
urban design scheme that commodified the site to attract capital is in progress. 
This expansion of the role of the state in the built environment led some professions, such as 
planning, to perform as "public service" professions linked to state policies and programmes. 
Planning as a profession was thus, as described by many writers (e. g. Castells), directed to serve 
the higher authorities. It is a capitalist tool that serves the dominant systemic power. 35 
In short, what differentiates the concepts of " architecture/planning" and "building" in terms of 
the production of the built environment is their producers: extraneous or intraneous parties, 
which is in turn associated with the conceptions of the built environment as an end or as a 
means respectively. When decisions-making process of the production of the built environment 
is controlled by its immediate intraneous parties, each performing in his own interest, the 
resultant built environment will respond to those parties' needs and values. Such a built 
environment is conceived as a means. Even if certain individuals act as if their built 
environment is an end and paid much attention to its formal aspects, however, the sum of the 
produced built environments are still looked at as a means. This represents the process of 
"building" prevailed in the inherited built environments. On the contrary, profession-based 
designed, centrally and extraneously controlled, built environments imply the conception of the 
built environment as an end in its own right. In such a process, professionals (e. g. planners) 
perform, as claimed, in the public interest, assuming the public, or a faction of the public, as a 
one group, thus ignoring the diverse needs and interests of the members of such a group. ", 
However, those planners and central authorities are remote extraneous parties that might have 
no direct intimate relationship with the built environment they control, thus they lack the motive 
to consider the built environment as a means that supports their lives. It can thus be argued that 
their designs and plans, although sometimes claimed otherwise (as in radical planning), 
3S See chapter five above. 
36 As explained in chapter five above, the concept of the public interest has been recently challenged 
and attacked. Many scholars are calling today to the consideration of the diverse interests of the 
previously marginalized groups such as ethnic minorities, feminists, and alike. However, such calls 
changed the idea of the "public interest" into "the group interest" where the public as a one group 
has been partitioned into several groups each has its own interests. In that sense, the exact needs of the 
members of such groups are still marginalized. 
SHIFTING POWER 258 
conceive of the built environment as an end. 37 In such a process, extraneously designed built 
environment is an end for the higher authorities, for their professionals, and an imposed end for 
its direct users to whom it is a deficient environment that does not satisfy their exact needs and 
support their lives. It is a meretricious environment that claims to serve the public, but in fact it 
is the server of the systemic established order. 
10.5.3 Design as a capitalist tool 
Spatial design is a political instrument of social control 
which the state uses to further its own administrative 
interests... Spatial organization, therefore, represents the 
hierarchy of power. 
(Lefebvre, in Gottdiener, 1994, p. 126, emphasis added) 
Based on the above, in the acquired built environments, this deficiency in fulfilling inhabitants' 
needs in their extraneously designed built environments is seen by many as a problem that can 
be solved by placing the social needs on the agenda of design process. Themes as designing for 
people38 and designing by people were adopted accordingly. However, all those themes departed 
from the concept of " design" as the main tool of built environment production. 
Concomitant to professionalism of the built environment was the introduction of the concept of 
" design' as an extraneously performed decision-making process. This led to the dominance of 
the concept "architecture/planning" instead of that of "building" which dominated in the 
inherited built environment. "Design" became the central activity of built environment 
professionals. It is an activity of producing spaces to others, thus, of taking decisions for others. 
In other words, it is an activity of exercising power (backed by the state) over others. 
Design is the activity of materializing the capitalist relations in space. It infuses the logic of 
capitalism in space (e. g. individualism, commercialization, capital accumulation, profit seeking, 
hedonism, etc. ). Thus, the primary modem function of design is conceived as a mechanism in 
the material world of capital production and accumulation. This tendency can be described as a 
capitalist hegemony over people first and over space, second. Professionals are subjected to 
capitalism's systemic power, and they in turn participate in subjecting the public to those 
powers. Also, as Lefebvre argues, space has been captured by capital and subordinated to its 
logic. In that sense, space has become instrumental: it is a product of capitalism and a tool of its 
consolidation (Saunders, 1993, p. 157-161). 
" Some might argue that this is not true in the case of the empowerment model of planning. Actually, 
what empowerment advocates aim at is to organise the built environments of certain poor groups. 
They aim, for example, at providing housing to such people. However, this attitude is still centred on 
the concept of prioritising the built environment over other people's needs. It embodies a 
deterministic attitude that good environment produces good society. Such attempts are still controlled 
by planners and other agencies, and are not transformed into self-managed processes. They did not 
provide access to resources; they did not diminish poverty. All what those attempts did is that they 
provided a fraction of the society with good (according to professionals) environments to live in. 
" Example of designing for people is the work of Oscar Newman in "Defensible space" (1973). 
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Based on this, the function of maintaining such a reproduction of capitalism through space, 
argues Lefebvre, invokes the need for interventionist state in capitalist societies. Intervening in 
the production and organization of the built environment, the state has used space as a political 
instrument that serves its interests and ensures its control of places (Gottdiener, 1994, p. 125, 
145). Planning as a state-based profession is a form of state intervention directed at fulfilling its 
interests. Spatial organization, thus, represents the systemic hierarchy of power. 
Relating this to what we described earlier as internal contradiction in capitalist societies39 (see 
p. 100 above), it can be argued that professionalism, thus design (production of space) and space 
per se intensify such disjunction and contradictions. Design as a capitalist instrument produces 
what Lefebvre refers to as "abstract space" that enhances the capitalist relations and 
consolidates its logic. In modern societies, according to Lefebvre, "abstract space" has come to 
dominate "social space", or the integrated space of social communion, and the very productive 
potential the latter has itself been attenuated (Gottdiener, 1994, p. 127). Abstract space is loaded 
with capitalist relations and abstract from any traditional social relations, values, daily life 
experiences, interests and needs. It is abstract but from the capitalist logic. Its design is based on 
capitalist concepts such as functionalism and efficiency (Akbar, 1995, p. 17-8). The state, 
masked by the ideology of planning, is considered the agent of producing such abstract spaces. 
As a tool of capitalism and the state, abstract spaces witness contradictions between capital 
logic and social needs; between profit for capitalists and professionals and needs of users and 
the public; between exchange value and use value. This in turn intensifies the contradictions 
between societal realms; it deepens the disjunction between the economic and polity realms and 
the socio-culture realm. As space is the milieu that merges these three contradictory realms 
together, thus, capitalist space today witness a crisis due to such contradictions. 
This crisis is evident in the acquired built environment. As the acquired process of space 
production does not in most cases consider inherited mechanisms and values, thus the resultant 
professionally-produced spaces contradict with users' (Muslims) needs. Such spaces reflect 
professionals' logic and not those of the users. Many attempts, such as citizen participation and 
even " communicative planning", have tried to solve such a contradiction by involving the user 
in the process of space production, however, as such efforts are based on professionals as the 
centre of the process and on " design" as the main mechanism of producing space; it cannot 
escape the circle of professionalism and thus the logic of capitalism. Such attempts, 
unquestionally, accept capitalism as a system and work in its service. Captured by its logic, it 
became almost impossible to think of any other logic of space that challenges the dominant 
capitalist one. In that sense, these attempts are considered merely as " patching solutions" of 
the same dominant system. 
This space crisis is a manifestation of the contradiction between the acquired mode adopted by 
professionals in the built environment and the persisting inherited mode of reproducing the 
39 Contemporary capitalist societies, as Bell argues, witness disjunction and contradiction between their 
different societal realms (techno-economic, polity, socio-culture, see p. 100). 
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socio-cultural realm. That is, as Lefebvre argues, every society produces its own space. New 
social relations call for a new space. However, any "social existence" failing to produce its own 
space would be a strange entity, thereby loosing its identity (Lefebvre, 1984,1991). In the past, 
Muslims society, performing according to the inherited mode, had its own space. As inherited 
social relations persist in contemporary Muslim societies, thus, according to Lefebvre' 
argument, Muslim society today should have its distinct space (not Western, not imitation of the 
past) that is responsive to its contemporary needs, however, produced by its societal relations 
regulated through structures of rights. That is, past solutions do not fit the newly emerged needs 
and technologies such as the use of vehicles, and new building techniques. Therefore, if rights 
structures, set by shari `a (explained in chapter seven), are employed today, they will produce 
new solutions that fit with the contemporary era. However, subjected to the capitalist systemic 
power, contemporary Muslim society is conquered by a new acquired space loaded with new 
extraneous (capitalist) social relations. Such space is in conflict with the inherited mechanisms 
and social relations. This in turn causes an antagonistic relationship between the acquired built 
environment and the inherited social relations, which consequently perplexed the process of 
space production, and led to the loss of its social and spatial identity. 
10.5.4 Professionals and the public 
Part cause and part result of the crisis in the architectural profession, as Huxtable contends, is 
the gap between architects and non-architects with regard to the production of the built 
environment. Different aspects of this gap can be discerned from what has been explored in this 
chapter, however, all these aspects are due to the notion of professionalism. For example, the 
gap in knowledge-base between professionals and lay-people; the gap due to an absence of a 
common language, of shared experiences and knowledge; the gap in logic between the needs of 
professional identity and users' needs; the gap due to social distance; the gap due to the 
distinction between "architecture" and "building"; the gap due to the centralization of the 
process of built environment production; and so on. 
Now there is a tendency among professionals to celebrate and preserve this gap despite the 
dangers it poses. This desire can be attributed to the profession's instinct for self-preservation 
through distinction, so preserving its legitimacy (Huxtable, 1992, p. 29). Like any other 
profession, architectural profession cultivates its distinctiveness in order to preserve its 
legitimacy. Design schools have contributed to preserving rather than bridging this gap (Ellin, 
1996, p. 219). According to Alexander and Chermayeff, these schools "try to perpetuate the 
traditional image of professional integrity and unique skills personified by the `architect' 
guiding the `cultured' and unique `client' [and to] transform average students into universal 
men of the highest order" (Chermayeff & Alexander, 1963, p. 106). In education and practice, 
total design was conceived as a device of control as much as of service, thus, in this process, 
neither the user nor the passer-by has a place, except by accident. The wider community thus 
loses its involvement with the process of building (Saint, 1983, p. 160). Such designs are, in 
most cases, utopian solutions, that are individualistic in the sense that they are different from 
one designer to another. They have no systematic ground, thus are in a constant change. This in 
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turn widens the gap between professionals and lay people as the latter cannot comprehend such 
utopian solutions, first, and cannot cope with the speed of their change, second. 
Those were the consequences of professionalism in the built environment; together they 
complete the picture of changing the conception of the production of Muslim built 
environments from that prevailed in the inherited mode based on intraneous parties to that of the 
acquired mode based on professionals as extraneous parties. 
10.6 SHOULD THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSIONALISM BE ALTERED? 
This research is not against specialized knowledge, or expertise in special areas; these in the end 
lead to the development and progress of society. One can never deny the contribution of 
environmental knowledge. It is against professionalism in its modern form as an exclusive 
dominant service provider. It is against its autonomy and authoritarianism. It is in disagreement 
with the role professionals of the built environment are performing in the acquired mode (as 
extraneous party). That is, professionalism in the manner practiced in the acquired built 
environment, as this chapter argued, constitutes, along with the modem state, the genesis of the 
crisis those environments witness today. The problem thus lies in the modern formulation of 
professionalism; in the logic within which professionalism is practiced, and not in the concept 
of professionalism per se as a source of expert knowledge. Thus, is there an alternative that 
performs the role of professionalism, however, escapes its logic? The answer might reside in the 
inherited mechanisms of built environment production. 
Professionalism in its current conception led to the creation and/or intensification of the points 
of tension between the acquired and the inherited modes in contemporary Muslim built 
environments. It changed the conception of the production of the built environment. 
Professionalism is predicated on a different imperceptible structure (power-based) than that of 
the production process of the inherited built environment (rights-based). This in turn constitutes 
one of the main points of tension between the two modes: the acquired and the inherited. Many 
contemporary attempts, as explained above, aimed at changing the role of the professional so as 
to solve the crisis contemporary Muslim built environments live, however, such attempts were 
not successful. They did not grasp the roots of the crisis. Operating within the present systemic 
conditions, adjustment of professionalism has marginal chances, i. e. changing professionalism 
requires changing the underlying systemic structure, or more precisely, the imperceptible 
systemic power structure. 
The main logic of professionalism that contradicts with the inherited built environment is the 
acquired legitimate power of professionals an extraneous party intervening in the production of 
the built environment. Legitimacy and imperative status quo of professionals are actually 
acquired through state support. They are considered the main elements within professionalism 
that are responsible for contemporary Muslim built environment crisis. To solve this crisis a 
systemic structural change is required. However, to isolate the problem of professionalism, 
theoretically, from the other components of such a crisis, an alternative might be suggested. 
Acknowledging the importance and the need to specialized knowledge and expertise in this 
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increasingly complex age, this study argues that this state of imperativeness of professionals as 
extraneous party should be eliminated. Scarcity and monopolization of knowledge should be 
eradicated, and knowledge should become again an available resource, reachable to everybody. 
To accomplish this, the ties between professionalism and the state should be abolished, i. e. the 
state support of professionalism should be lifted. In that sense, professionalism converts into 
66 experientialism". 
In experientialism, the production of the built environment is conceived, as Habraken depicted 
it, as a shared live process (1990, p. 74). It is an every-day experience in which many actors 
participate, each according to his position, thus to his rights, in the built environment (e. g. user, 
owner, expert service provider, etc. ). It is a "building" process and not an 
"architecture/planning" process. In this perception the imperativeness of the extraneous party 
as the ultimate arbiter in the production of the built environment is dismissed; professionals 
perform as expert actors whose services are sought volitionary and not obligatory. In that sense, 
intraneous parties exercise effective roles and enjoy more freedom in the production of their 
built environments. They are the final arbiters in decision-making each in his built environment. 
This, ultimately, looked at from a narrow angle, resonates with the inherited mode of the built 
environment production. However, for a comprehensive solution of the contemporary crisis of 
Muslim built environment, a systemic structural change is required. The three societal levels 
and the three environmental structures have to intermesh, otherwise the contradiction, and thus 
the crisis persists with dire consequences 
10.7 CONCLUSIONS 
The emergence of the extraneous party, represented by the modem state and professionalism, is 
perceived in this study as responsible for the actualization of the shift in contemporary Muslim 
societies from the inherited to the acquired mode. Professionalism constitutes a power game 
within the broader modem-capitalist system. It operates within its logic. Professionalism 
accordingly, contributed largely to changing the conception of the production of the built 
environment. It led the shift from the conception prevailed in the inherited built environment 
based on intraneous parties as decision-makers, each in its site, to that of the acquired mode 
based on the extraneous party as the ultimate arbiter and decision-maker in such a process. It 
shifted power from the intraneous to the extraneous. This acquired conception became, as a 
result of professionalism, an ideology to which people are self-subjected. Accordingly, this shift 
and ideology, contradicting with other inherited societal realms, contributed to the crisis 
contemporary Muslim built environments witness. 
In conclusion, power, legitimizing professionalism and state centralization (intervention), and 
bestowing them the right to control and intervene in people's built environments as extraneous 
parties, is considered, as this thesis demonstrated, the main determinant of such a crisis. In 
short, it is the rights of power replacing the power of rights that is the main imperceptible 
factor responsible for the crisis of contemporary Muslim built environments. 
Finally 
11 
CONCLUSIONS 
CRISIS 
OF 
COEXISTENCE 
DISSENSIOUS 
MODES 
The Arab Muslim world lives today what this thesis described as a crisis of the 
coexistence of two dissensious modes: the inherited mode rooted in Islam and 
the acquired mode rooted in modern-capitalism. Each of those two modes has 
its distinct roots, characteristics, principles, and mechanisms, which, as this 
study demonstrated, contradict with each other. The main dissension between 
the two modes lies in the imperceptible level. It is a dissension in the 
conception of power of each mode. The acquired mode is power-based, where 
power refers to its modem concept, whereas the inherited mode is a rights- 
based mode, where rights are defined according to shari `a. Thus, the 
coexistence of these two dissensious modes, each operating in a particular 
societal realm, created a crisis of internal systemic disjunction. Societal realms 
in the acquired mode are no longer intermeshed as they were in the inherited 
mode. They embody different dissensious conceptions and ideologies. Thus, as 
long as this systemic disjunction exists, the crisis persists. 
Reflected on the built environment, this coexistence led consequently to a 
MUSLIM 
BUILT crisis 
in contemporary built environments; a crisis of disintegration and 
ENVIRONMENTS incompatibility in the structures of the built environment. Thus, to understand 
this crisis in terms of the built environment, this thesis studied it 
genealogically, relating it to the wider systemic crisis. 
Moreover, as contemporary built environments in general witness today what 
ON some refer to as a crisis, this study also attempted to bring the attention of the A WIDER 
SCOPE environmental community (architects, planners and, urban designers) to the 
intellectual rupture that their professions are living. On the theoretical level, 
built environment professionals are moving from one paradigm to another (e. g. 
planning model: comprehensive, participation, equity, communicative) 
searching for the best model for producing the built environment through 
which their utopias can be accomplished, their social status preserved, and the 
interests of the masses of people can be served. However, as this study 
demonstrated, such moves are constantly challenged by contemporary modern- 
CRISIS IN capitalist societies' inner logic. The aims are contradicted with the actual 
CAPITALIST 
means. Dreams dissolve in front of reality. This is the crisis of contemporary ENVIRONMENTS 
built environments. It is the crisis of thinking from within the lived system (i. e. 
capitalism). It is the crisis of the perception that capitalism is the only 
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perceivable mode. It is thus the crisis of living without any conceivable 
alternative. Thus, this study shed light on a possible systemic alternative, at 
least in terms of the production of the built environment. 
The debate over this crisis of contemporary Muslim built environments is 
IMPASSE intensifying, however, revolving in an impasse. Two main interrelated factors, 
as tackled in this study, are responsible for the current situation in debates. 
First, the epistemology of reading and theorizing the built environment. 
Second, the ignorance of questions of power (i. e. power game and the societal 
power structure). This led to misunderstanding the crisis of contemporary built 
environments and thus to failure in attempts of solving it, thus to the 
persistence of the dualism of environmental ideology. 
As argued in this study, the built environment is composed of three 
THREE complementary structures or levels: the manifested, the operative and the 
STRUCTURES imperceptible. Each system or mode of society-making (e. g. Islam, 
OF THE 
BUILT capitalism, socialism) produces its distinct built environment according to the 
ENVIRONMENT integration of its three structures. Different built environments might share 
some characteristics on the manifested or the operative level, however, in most 
cases, each built environment has its distinct imperceptible level. Thus, to 
comprehend the production process of the built environment, it should be 
studied comprehensively, on its three structures. 
Most Islamic urban studies investigated Muslim built environments partially, 
focusing on the manifested and/or operative levels only, dismissing the 
imperceptible structure as universal (chapters 3,4). That is, unaware of the 
peculiarity of the imperceptible structure of Muslim built environments, and 
influenced by Western concepts of society making, Orientalists as well as 
some Muslim scholars accepted the Western modes of environmental 
EPISTEMOLOGY 
production as the only conceivable possible mode. They employed Western OF READING 
THE BUILT professional and epistemological concepts in studying Muslim built 
ENVIRONMENT environments. Employing such exotic perceptions in investigating the Muslim 
built environment with its unique imperceptible structure led to disintegration 
and incompatibility, on the theoretical level, between the three structures of the 
Muslim built environment, a matter that led to misinterpreting those built 
environments. Unfortunately, those studies became authoritative in the field of 
Islamic urban studies, thus widely adopted and accepted. This led 
consequently to deepening the misunderstanding of Muslim built 
environments and their production. 
Few of those scholars have gone beyond the operative level to focus on the 
imperceptible level, however, very few have paid attention to questions of 
power in the production of the built environment. Who controls what element 
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on which space? What are the legitimate sources of such control? Who decides 
IGNORANC 
OF POWERE the 
limits of ones' power? How power relates to rights? All are questions that 
are fundamental in the production process of the built environment and can 
never be understood without a comprehensive understanding of principles 
related to power. Accordingly, this thesis considered power as the main 
determinant in the decision-making process of the production of the built 
POWERAS environment. Power thus constituted the main axis of investigation in this 
THE TOOL OF thesis. It is used as the tool of investigating both the acquired and the inherited 
INVESTIGATION 
modes and their coexistence. Accordingly, this thesis located some of the 
points of tension between the two modes, which consequently led to 
destabilizing the contemporary system through the shift from the inherited to 
the acquired mode. 
Production of the inherited built environment is centered on the concept of 
THE rights as bestowed by shari `a. Rights generate power when activated in actual INHERITED 
BUILT interactions. Rights are the only source and resource of power in the inherited 
ENVIRONMENT mode. Rights create power. Power thus cannot be stored up; it is not 
possessable. Rights in the inherited mode are determined by shari `a according 
to structures of rights (rights distribution maps), accordingly, power is 
determined. One cannot acquire more power than what his rights generate i. e. DETERMINED , 
RIGHTS there is no lust for more power in the inherited mode. Structures of rights 
define rights of each party and property in the inherited built environment. 
Each party whether the individual, group or the state has determined rights, 
thus determined scope of exercitation (changeable) within which it performs. 
The state is a party like all other parties. The state in the inherited mode has a 
limited scope of exercitation thus limited role in the production of the built 
environment. The inherited built environment is the product of the 
accumulations of private parties' actions based on their power of rights, 
regulated by certain rights-based mechanisms, without the intervention of 
external parties. Therefore, parties had freedom of action, however restricted 
by certain rights-based mechanisms such as the concept of harm. They are not 
subject in their action to the higher authorities. Accordingly, rights-based 
mechanism regulate relationships between parties and properties in the 
inherited built environment in a manner that minimizes, if not eliminates, 
potential domination. 
THE 
On the other hand, the acquired mode is centered in its operation and 
ACQUIRED maintenance on the modem concept of power. Thus its mechanisms of 
BUILT producing the built environment reflect such an attitude. They are power-based ENVIRONMENT 
mechanisms. Reflecting such a centrality of power, human life in the acquired 
mode can be perceived as in a continuous lust for power. That is, power 
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sources and resources in its modem concept are variable, thus power is 
dynamic. It can be acquired and possessed. Mobilization of human and material 
POWER resources leads to inflation of resources and thus to more power. In such a 
is 
context property ownership became a resource of power. Accordingly, to DYNAMIC 
maintain its status, the state uses its power to acquire more power so as to 
enhance its legitimacy and control over its subjects and their built 
environments. It is lusting for power. Following a zero-sum model, if some 
gain power, others lose. Thus, the state as the supreme power wins power 
whereas the people lose. This expanded the state's area of acceptance, and 
reduced private parties' areas of acceptance. Thereby, the built environment is 
seen as an arena for competition among parties to acquire more power. 
Exercitation of power and lusting for more power embodies, in most cases in 
the acquired mode, domination over others. Power exercitation is characterized 
by dominance/subjection relationships. It is an exercitation of power over 
others. Such relationships are mostly evident in state-private parties' 
relationships. Employing its acquired power, the modem state gave itself the 
right (power creates rights) to intervene in the production of the built 
environment, under the names of order and organization, and the public 
interest. Acting out of its rights of power, the state designated itself as a 
rightful extraneous party responsible for directing and controlling the 
production of the built environment. It used laws and regulations as a tool of 
control. It is a legitimatized method of state intervention. Thus, the built 
environment became directed and produced according to the societal power 
game. Such power-based mechanisms, in contrast to the inherited mode, 
capitalize potential domination between properties and parties in the acquired 
built environment. 
Societal hierarchical power structure is reflected in the production process of 
the acquired built environment. Diversities among parties are mounting. The 
powerless, with no access to resources is left without shelter. Land values are 
signs of spatial segregation. Scarcity of resources, evident in land speculation, 
is an effect of state control of what used to be available resources. Power is 
shifted from the hands of people (as in the inherited mode) to the hands of the 
state. Locational rights-based relationships between private parties are replaced 
by relationships between parties and the state. Dialogue between parties, thus, 
declined to be replaced by dominance/dependence relationships, regulated by 
state's prescriptive laws and regulations. Built environment conventions 
diminished. Inhabitants' self-inventive environmental solutions are replaced by 
top-down imposed solutions. In that sense, the modem state that calls for 
democracy in theory has created, through its intervention, an environmental 
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milieu of subjection and domination. Contemporary scholars are looking into 
the past, nostalgically, longing for reviving the special qualities which they 
admire in such inherited built environment and are lost in contemporary 
environments. Local architects (e. g. Badran, al-Wakil) refer nostalgically to 
physical past forms; planners (e. g. New Urbanism) refer to the spirit of the 
community and the physical characters of the neighborhood; sociologist long 
for the social relations of the Gemeinschaft community in comparison to the 
Gesellschaft (see p. 25). They are longing for the "quality without a name" that 
characterized the inherited built environment such as its sustainability, 
responsiveness, affordability, harmony with its inhabitants' values, coherency, 
and the like. Such qualities are in fact the manifestation of rights-based 
imperceptible mechanisms, thus to revive such qualities, those mechanisms 
have to be revived. 
Concomitant to the power-based logic of the acquired mode, professionalism in 
PROFESSIONA- the built environment arose. Professionals became state-backed extraneous 
LSIM parties, intervening legitimately in the production of the built environment, a 
matter that contributed to the shift of power in the production of the built 
environment from the hands of immediate parties to the hands of professionals. 
Accordingly, the emergence of the modern state and professionals together, as 
extraneous parties, changed the conception of built environment production. 
Created by extraneous parties, acquired built environments do not necessarily 
respond to the needs of its end-users. Aiming at ameliorating such built 
environment, professionals (e. g. planners) are in continuous search for better 
models of built environment production. They are shifting paradigms, searching 
for better alternatives. Each built environment is a production of its system's 
distribution of rights. Thus, what those professionals are actually seeking in 
their shifting paradigms is to reach the distribution of rights that can best 
generate the required utopian built environment (according to their standards). 
However, as such rights-distribution maps are produced under the umbrella of 
PERSISTENT the capitalist system (through professionalism, which is a production of 
CAPITALIST 
modem-capitalism), thus they are indulged in its logic centered on the concept LOGIC 
of power. Thus, such maps will be ultimately no more than another formula of 
capitalist power-distribution maps. Thus, such models or solutions are partial, 
challenging the manifested status quo, but not the imperceptible level. 
Accordingly, the existence of the extraneous party as a manifestation of the 
inner logic of the acquired mode sustains the persistence of such a mode, and 
thus its conception of built environment production. Unless such solutions 
liberate themselves from the systemic logic of modem-capitalism, they remain 
as Utopias. 
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Apparently, each of the two modes produces its environmental ideology. 
CANTHE 
But can the two ideologies meet? Unfortunately, this question was not 
TWO MODES raised and 
dealt with properly by scholars and professionals. The 
COEXIST? coexistence of such substantially dissensious ideologies has reached an 
impasse. The Islamic mode is active in certain societal realms whereas 
the acquired mode is employed in other realms. Islamic teachings and law 
are continuously shaping every day life. Islam, operating on the 
imperceptible level, produces individuals' Islamic customs and values. In 
the inherited mode, such values were integrated in the manifested 
physical built environment through rights-based mechanisms 
(imperceptible), thus producing a compatible built environment which 
three structures are intermeshed. It is a built environment with a "quality 
without a name", as Alexander describes it. ' However, replacing such 
mechanisms by power-centered ones, the resultant built environment 
contradicts with its inhabitants' inherited values and customs. It is thus a 
contradictory built environment. Thus, to solve such a crisis and to 
INTER- 
MESHING intermesh the structures of the 
built environment together, either 
THE REALMS Muslims have to change their ideology or modify the acquired modern- 
capitalist mode of built environment production, otherwise the crisis 
persists. 
What the Arab Muslim world needs is a serious attempt to understand the 
impact of power on built environments. Its contemporary needs are 
different than those of the Western world; thus does it have to adjust the 
inherited rights structures? If so how? What are the possible cultural 
changes if the power-based acquired mode is adopted? Does it have to be 
adjusted rather than accepted as it is? 
To conclude, staticness of rights vs. the dynamism of power is the main 
STATICNESS dissension between the inherited and the acquired modes, respectively. If 
OF RIGHTS 
vs. rights are distributed in any society in a static, determined manner so that 
DYNAMISM the rights of each party are episodic and well known to others, i. e. rights 
OF POWER 
structures are transparent, then avenues of rights manipulation and thus 
domination is eliminated. However, if rights/power is dynamic, 
undetermined, possessible and can be found in latent as well as episodic 
forms, then it allows for manipulation of power, lust for power and thus 
According to Alexander, the system is characterized by quality without a name when it is a true 
system that is true to its "inner nature". It is characterized by its oneness. It is free of inner 
contradictions (Alexander, 1979, p. 28). 
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capitalizes potential domination over others. This latter position allows for 
inequality, injustice, confinement, and repression. 
However, one might argue that such a structure of rights cannot be applied in 
contemporary built environments due to the complexity of contemporary needs 
such as infrastructure, road networks, health and education services. Such needs 
require centralization and expert knowledge to be accomplished, thus, they are 
revolving around the concept of power. In other words, centrality of power in 
its acquired mode is inevitable to accomplish contemporary needs. One might 
STRUCTURES 
argue that this is in fact not always true. Structures of rights as existed in the OF RIGHTS 
IS THE inherited mode can be employed for contemporary needs. However, such 
SOLUTION structures did not have the chance yet to prove its suitability to contemporary 
times. If such rights structures are accepted and applied in providing the 
infrastructure, for example, then residents (private parties) will own and control 
such infrastructure. Conventions will be developed for providing and keeping- 
up of the sewerage. Properties might have, for example, their independent 
systems for processing sewage in site. ' New types of industries and 
technologies will emerge to fit with such a synthesis. Industries respond to 
people's needs and not the other way round. Private parties might dig wells in 
their properties to get water. Innovative solutions will occur, conventions will 
develop, and industries will advance accordingly. People will coordinate to 
provide their infrastructure. Accordingly, if such a structure of rights is applied, 
the phenomena of infrastructured unutilized lands, of land speculation, of 
squatter settlements, of homelessness, and of scarcity of resources will dissolve. 
However, if the above argument is not convincing, then this study might be 
considered as an attempt to bring the attention of the academic and professional 
community to the impact of the issues of power structure on the production of 
the built environment. Built environment production using modem concepts 
could indeed advance if extraneous parties expose themselves to criticism from 
CAPITALISM other cultures. Solutions for contemporary problems might lie in the 
IS NOT THE 
environmental wisdom of other cultures. Capitalism is not the end of history. END OF 
HISTORY There is much room for ideological criticism and improvement that could be 
best seen from other cultures. This is the nature of human development. In this 
regard, the hope is that this study achieved its objectives. 
Z There is today a machine called "digester" that can process sewage at homes. Such a machine can be 
used in the inherited-like built environments. 
j 
ý .. 
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Glossary of Arabic Terms 
bei al-mal : lit. the house of wealth. Public treasury. 
bid`a : innovation. 
darar : what an individual benefits from at the expense of damaging others. 
dhummi :a non Muslim living under Muslims rule (Christians and Jews). 
dirar : actions which damage others without benefiting the acting party. 
faqih (pl. fugaha' ): jurist 
fard kifayah : collective duty, the performance of which is obligatory for the community as a 
whole; if a sufficient number fulfil the duty, the rest are relieved of it; if the duty is not 
performed all the community is liable for punishment. 
fatwa : legal opinion. 
fina' : the space abutting a property and used by the residents of that property. 
figh : Islamic jurisprudence. 
ghasb : usurpation. 
hadith : tradition or reported speech of the Prophet. 
hammam : public bath. 
hag al-'asbagiyyah : right of precedence. 
haq al-'irtifaq : right of servitude. 
hiyazat ad-darar : lit. possessing damage, the right enjoyed by a property to damage other's 
property; right of precedence. 
harim : the protected area which may not be revived by others. it is what the revived land 
cannot function with out as its road and pathway. 
hisbah : commonly used in reference to what is known as "promotion of the good and 
prevention of the evil". 
'ihtijar : demarcating a piece of land with stones or the like to revive it with out necessarily 
having the ruler's permission. 
'ihya' : lit. life-giving, utilization of dead-land by building or planting it (revivification) and 
not necessarily through the rulers permission. 
'ijtihad : lit. to struggle, to exercise personal reasoning. 
'ikhtisas : right of appertainance. The right of an individual to benefit from the property 
without leasing it such as sitting in a mosque and it is not compensatable or salable. 
'imam : leader of a school of law; prayer leader; caliph. 
'igta` : the act of the ruler bestowing or allotting a piece of land to individuals to be utilized. 
'igta ` 'istighlal : concession of right to exploit a property. 
'igta` tamlik : concession of full ownership. 
GLOSSARY 
'firth : inheritance. 
'isnad : the chain of successive authority. 
'istihasn : juristic preference. 
'istitraq : right of passage. 
jami `: Friday mosque. 
janah (pl. 'ajnihah) : cantilevers. 
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kharaj, kharaji (adj): tax levied on land owned by the state but left in the possession of 
individuals. (tribute imposed upon the land whose inhabitants have been left free to 
exercise their own religions). 
madrasah : school. 
marafq al-'aswaq : the ample servitutive spaces in the market in which the preceding person 
has the right to benefit from the place. 
masil al-ma': rainwater discharge. 
maslahah (pl. masalah): interest. 
masaleh mursaleh : regard for the common interest. 
matrukah : lit. left over, unutilized land reserved for public use. 
mawat : lit. dead, unowned and unutilized land. 
miri : state land that is held by individuals who have the right of usufruct. 
muhtajir : demarcator. 
muhtasib : market inspector. 
mulk 'intifa `: the ownership of benefiting; the permission to a person to benefit by himself 
only from the property, such as residing in schools and rabats in which the benefiting 
person is not allowed to compensate or sell the place to others. 
mulk manfa`ah : the ownership of usufruct like the peasants who own the right to use the land. 
mulk naqis : imperfect ownership 
mulk raqabah : the ownership of the substance of the property. 
mulk tamm : full ownership. 
nawazil (sing. nazilah): legal urban environmental precedents. 
nazir : guardian of wagi 
gadi : judge. 
giyas : legal reasoning by analogy. 
qaysariyyah : covered market. 
ra'y : opinion. 
rawshan (pl. rawashin): projecting cantilevers often having openings with wooden screens. 
sabat : overpass. 
sadaqah :a charity that is owned by the donee. 
GLOSSARY 296 
shari'a : the societal modality of Muslims based on the Qur'an and the tradition of the Prophet 
(hadith); or the Islamic legal system. 
shufa : pre-emption. 
suq : market. 
t`addi : infringement or encroachment. 
t`assuf : abuse of rights exercitation. 
`urf (pl. 'a ̀ ra, f j: conventions. 
`ushr : tenth, tax levied on lands held in absolute ownership. 
waaJ' (pl. 'awqaj): a pious foundation in which the property held in perpetuity with the income 
devoted for charitable purposes. 
zakah : annual obligatory Islamic legal alms. 
